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Abstract: Alternating Ditransitives in English 
 
This thesis is a large scale investigation of ditransitive constructions and their alternants 
in  English.  Typically  both  constructions  involve  three  participants:  participant  A 
transfers an element B to participant C. A speaker can linguistically encode this type of 
situation  in  one  of  two  ways:  by  using  either  a  double  object  construction  or  a 
prepositional  paraphrase.  This  study  examines  this  syntactic  choice  in  the  British 
component of the International Corpus of English (ICE GB), a fully tagged and parsed 
corpus incorporating both spoken and written English.  
After  a  general  introduction,  chapter  2  reviews  the  different  grammatical 
treatments of the constructions. Chapter 3 discusses whether indirect objects have to be 
considered necessary complements or optional adjuncts of the verb. I then examine the 
tension between rigid classification and authentic (corpus) data in order to demonstrate 
that  the  distinction  between  complements  and  adjuncts  evidences  gradient 
categorisation effects.  
This study has both a linguistic and a methodological angle. The overall design 
and  methodology  employed  in  this  study  are  discussed  in  chapter  4.  The  thesis 
considers a number of variables that help predict the occurrence of each pattern. The 
evaluation of the variables, the determination of their significance, and the measurement 
of  their  contribution  to  the  model  involve  reliance  on  statistical  methods  (but  not 
statistical software packages).  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 review pragmatic factors claimed to influence a speaker’s 
choice of construction, among them the information status and the syntactic ‘heaviness’ 
of the constituents involved. The explanatory power and coverage of these factors are 
experimentally  tested  independently  against  the  corpus  data,  in  order  to  highlight 
several features which only emerge after examining authentic sources.  
Chapter 8 posits a novel method of bringing these factors together; the resulting 
model  predicts  the  dative  alternation  with  almost  80%  accuracy  in  ICE GB. 
Conclusions are offered in chapter 9. 4 
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  1  Introduction 
Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears 
Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (Act III, scene II)] 
 
Are sentences like Eve gave Adam an apple and Eve gave an apple to Adam (or indeed 
lend me your ears and lend your ears to me) truly different? An answer to that question 
will  have  to  differentiate  between  syntactic  and  semantic  criteria.  Assuming  the 
sentences  are  different,  when  did  they  start  to  be  different?  And  why  do  an 
overwhelming majority of speakers find them almost interchangeable? Here again, the 
answer is far from clear. Finally, why is it that the more closely one looks into linguistic 
categories, the more elusively data behave? This thesis is an attempt at finding answers 
to  the  above  questions  in  the  field  of  syntax,  more  specifically  in  the  area  of 
(ditransitive) verbal complementation.  
A speaker referring to a situation involving three participants, whereby participant 
A transfers (literally or metaphorically) an element B to participant C, can linguistically 
code  it  in  one  of  two  ways,  by  using  either  a  double  object  construction  or  a 
prepositional paraphrase: this has been called the ‘dative alternation.’ The main aim of 
the present study is to examine speakers’ syntactic choices in a corpus including both 
written and spoken language. The research questions I propose to address lie in the 
interface between syntax (form) and pragmatics (function). Description normally works 
as a prelude for theory, so explanations will have to be found for empirical data. Can 
corpus evidence be relevant to the study of the syntax of a construction? I am of the 
opinion that corpus data are invaluable for correcting or refining linguistic descriptions, 
which would in turn mean better, more accurate grammar/s.  
Corpus linguistics is a relatively recent development within linguistics, giving the 
researcher the possibility of going beyond their own linguistic intuitions, and testing 
hypotheses and theories against actual data. Linguistic insights are thus freed from the 
linguist’s  armchair,  and  need  no  longer  be  based  solely  on  an  individual  linguist’s 
intuition:  they  can  be  evaluated  against  a  systematic  collection  of  utterances 
representative of language as used by their speakers. Whether corpus linguistics is to be 
considered a linguistic discipline in itself or a methodological approach is still matter 
for debate. Many authors believe (Aarts 2000, McEnery and Wilson 2001) that corpus 
linguistics is only a methodology, in that (a) corpus linguistics (as opposed to other 
established branches of linguistics such as syntax, semantics, sociolinguistics, etc.) does 
not require either explanation or description; and (b) corpus linguistic methods can be   11
employed in the analysis of many different aspects of linguistic enquiry. Still, other 
authors (Sinclair 1991, Mukherjee 2004, Togninin Bonelli 2001, inter alia) believe that 
corpus linguistics has developed from being merely a means to being an end, the subject 
of rather than the method for study.
1 Corpus linguistics then can be viewed both as a 
method and as a discipline. Personally, I side with those who consider corpus linguistics 
as simply a methodology. 
But what is a corpus? McEnery and Wilson (2001:75) define it as a maximally 
representative  finite  sample,  a  very  successful  synthesis  which  requires  some 
explanation.  A  corpus  is,  first  and  foremost,  a  sample  of  a  larger  population.  This 
sample is not random, but has been assembled in such a way as to ensure as far as 
possible that it is representative of a language, genre, text type, etc. Representativeness 
–in Biber’ opinion (1993:243)— refers “to the extent to which a sample includes the 
full  range  of  variability  in  a  population”,  i.e.  a  sample  is  representative  if  results 
obtained from the sample can validly be extrapolated to the general population. This 
makes  samples  no  more  (and  no  less)  than  “scaled down  versions  of  a  larger 
population” (McEnery and Wilson 2001:19). Corpora are thus finite samples, limited 
both  in  size  and  in  purpose.  Strictly  speaking,  no  corpora  can  adequately  represent 
language.  This  is  at  the  root  of  the  most  frequent  criticisms  levelled  at  corpora. 
However,  the  same  objection  applies  to  the  suggested  alternative,  i.e.  the  linguist’s 
introspection. In Greenbaum’s words (1977:128) “[t]he linguist [also] inevitably fails to 
evoke a complete sample of what would be relevant to the area being studied”.
2 
Finally, McEnery and Wilson (2001:31 32) also point out that a current definition 
of a corpus has to include the expectation of it being machine readable, as well as “a 
tacit  understanding  that  a  corpus  constitutes  a  standard  reference  for  the  language 
variety  which  it  represents”,  which  in  turn  entails  availability  to  the  wider  research 
community. 
I have mentioned earlier that perhaps one of the main benefits derivable from the 
advent of corpus linguistics is that it liberated linguists from their reliance on their own 
(imperfect  and  incomplete)  intuitions  as  their  only  source  of  linguistic  information: 
                                                 
1 Mukherjee (2004:117 fn.) draws an analogy between corpus linguistics and microbiology, in that both 
can be thought of as fields “in which the development of new methods has gradually led to new insights 
and  to  the  establishment  of  a  new  discipline.”  In  this  comparison,  what  the  development  of  the 
microscope did for microbiology is analogous to what the development and availability of the machine 
readable corpus (coupled with cheap computing power) did for corpus linguistics. 
2 In this respect, consider Chomsky’s facetious reply to Hatcher (as quoted in Hill 1962:31). On being 
challenged to name his sources for asserting that the verb perform could not be used with mass word 
objects, Chomsky replied that his native speaker intuition was sufficient evidence. He was wrong (e.g. 
you can perform magic) but very confident.   12
hypotheses  and  intuitions  could  now  be  tested  against  large  corpora  of  naturally 
occurring performance data.
3 Over a relatively short period of time, a lot of authentic, 
systematically organised performance data have become available, simply waiting to be 
put to good use. 
Many  linguists  working  within  the  generative paradigm,  however,  flatly  reject 
corpus  linguistics.  Their  objections  are  essentially  three:  (a)  linguists  should  be 
concerned with competence rather than performance, inasmuch as it is the internalised 
language  that  determines  the  externalised  language,  which  the  corpus  is  meant  to 
represent;  (b)  performance  is  only  a  poor  mirror  for  competence,
4  (c)  corpora  are 
skewed, not representative, and not just useless but pointless as well: Chomsky himself 
is of the opinion that “arrangement of data isn’t going to get you anywhere” (in Aarts 
2000:6).  In  turn,  corpus  linguists  criticise  the  generativists  for  (a)  their  refusal  to 
consider performance data as valid evidence (despite there being no direct access to 
competence), preferring rather to account for language introspectively; (b) failing to 
appreciate linguistic insights derived from frequency data, which are not susceptible to 
recovery via introspection, (c) willingly ignoring that intuitions have been proved time 
and again to be as untrustworthy as they are inconsistent. However, some generativists 
(Smith  2003,  Wasow  2002)  have  indeed  braved  performance  data  and  statistical 
methods, and they haven’t looked back. 
To my mind, there is no valid reason to opt for one kind of evidence over the 
other as source of primary data. Corpus linguistics –as McEnery and Wilson suggest 
(2001:19)– should be a synthesis of introspective and observational procedures, in that 
both types of data complement each other. At the same time, we must not forget that “a 
linguistic theory that can account for [evidence of people’s knowledge of language] is 
preferable to one that cannot” (Wasow 2002:130). 
It  is  the  quantitative  analysis  of  a  corpus  that  allows  for  the  findings  to  be 
generalised to a larger population, i.e. “it enables one to discover which phenomena are 
likely to be genuine reflections of the behaviour of a language or variety and which are 
merely  chance  occurrences”  (McEnery  and  Wilson  2001:76).  Different  statistical 
techniques  are  applied  to  provide  a  rigorous  analysis  of  complex  data.  Quantitative 
analyses have four main goals, in Johnson’s opinion (2008:3): 
                                                 
3 There is, however, no escaping intuition “if you have command of the language you are investigating” 
(Aijmer and Altenberg 2004:47). 
4 As Wasow (2002:13) points out, “generative grammarians have traditionally been concerned only with 
what forms are possible, not with the reasons for choosing among various grammatically well formed 
alternatives”.   13
(1)  a.  data reduction: summarize trends, capture the common aspects of a set of 
observations such as the average, standard deviation, and correlations, among 
variables; 
b.  inference:  generalize  from  a  representative  set  of  observations  to  a  larger 
universe of possible observations using hypothesis tests such as the t test or 
analysis of variance; 
c.  discovery of relationships: find descriptive or causal patterns in data which 
may be described in multiple regression models or in factor analysis; 
d.  exploration  of  processes  that  may  have  a  basis  in  probability:  theoretical 
modelling,  say  in  information  theory,  or  in  practical  contexts  such  as 
probabilistic sentence parsing. 
 
Many of these techniques require the use of computer software in order to be 
made manageable. Crystal (1997:436) warns us that “it is not difficult for researchers to 
be swamped with unmanageable data”, be it raw corpus data or an “unlimited number of 
computer supplied  statistical  analyses”.  Both  occurrences  are  equally  dangerous  to 
corpus linguists, our Scylla and Charybdis. 
In this study, the description of ditransitive constructions is entirely corpus based. 
This means that ditransitive verbs and their alternating patterns (as well as the pragmatic 
reasons behind the speaker’s choice of construction) are described and analysed within a 
corpus environment which allows access to the immediate context of occurrence, as 
well  as  to  the  (discourse)  conversational  dynamics  at  play.  It  is  nonetheless  worth 
remembering that corpus data offers no more than raw material: linguistic analyses and 
theoretical significance still need to be constructed out of these humble bricks. 
The present study has a dual purpose, partly descriptive, partly methodological. 
The  methodology  part  of  the  thesis  demonstrates  that  the  dative  alternation  is 
happening; the theoretical part tries to show why. The overall plan of the present study 
is as follows. After this general introduction to the thesis, chapter 2 provides a review of 
the literature, in which we will look into the diversity of treatments bestowed upon the 
construction from representatives of different grammatical traditions and perspectives. 
There are two main divisions in chapter 2, a first section dealing with the evolution of 
the alternating constructions in time, and a second which analyses the constructions 
without recourse to grammaticalization and other processes of language evolution. In 
turn,  the  latter  section  is  subdivided  into  three  subsections,  each  corresponding  to 
perhaps the most influential approaches to linguistic phenomena in the last 30 years.   14
Indirect  objects  in  particular  have  an  uncertain  status  in  terms  of  verbal 
complementation. Chapter 3 addresses the question of whether the indirect object and 
their prepositional paraphrases have to be considered a necessary complement or an 
optional  adjunct  of  the  verb.  This  in  turn  implies  a  review  of  the  different  criteria 
(semantic, formal, functional) employed for the definition of complements and, more 
specifically,  indirect  objects.  These  have  also  posed  many  definitional  problems, 
inasmuch as they sit on the boundary between formal and functional categories in the 
grammar of a language. An exploration of the issues at play will therefore involve a re 
evaluation  of  indirect  objects,  taking  into  account  (a)  the  thematic  roles  usually 
attributed  to  the  first  postverbal  complement  in  a  V+NP+NP  construction,  (b)  the 
meaning of both the prototypical ditransitive construction and its prepositional alternant, 
and (c) the semantic potential of verbs occurring in ditransitive patterns, whether or not 
they allow for an alternative configuration. The discussion will be supported with data 
extracted from ICE GB, the British component of the International Corpus of English, a 
fully  tagged  and  parsed  corpus  of  one  million  words,  divided  into  2,000  word  text 
samples which represent various kinds of spoken and written English. At the end of 
chapter 3, I will examine the tension between expedient (and rigid) categorization and 
real  linguistic  data  (extracted  from  the  corpus)  with  the  aim  of  showing  that  the 
distinction  between  complements  and  adjuncts  evidences  gradient  categorization 
effects. 
The overall experimental design will be stated in chapter 4. As a first step the 
available data need to be classified both in terms of the verbs being evaluated, and of 
the  positions  in  which  these  patterns  deviate  from  the  basic  idea  of  the  unmarked 
sentence.  This  classification  will  later  be  supplemented  with  the  addition  of  further 
parameters derived from a set of criteria employed to classify speakers’ preferences in 
the choice of construction. When the statistical results are compiled, they will need to be 
interpreted and scanned for recurring patterns.  
As  Leech  (1983:50)  has pointed  out,  formal  linguistic  accounts  cannot  handle 
social  facts  about  language,  which  means  that  these  kinds  of  linguistic  descriptions 
cannot extend beyond the speaker’s linguistic competence (not necessarily a bad thing, 
if we go by Chomsky’s ideas). On the other hand, pragmatic explanations are primarily 
functional and complement the description of the constructions in question. Pragmatic 
explanations of ditransitive alternation are at the core of chapters 5 to 7, where I review 
different  pragmatic  factors  that  are  considered  to  be  instrumental  in  influencing 
speaker’s choice of construction. Among these factors we find those associated with the   15
packaging of information in the clause and those that attribute more importance to the 
syntactic weight and/or  complexity of the alternative constructions. The explanatory 
power and coverage of each of these factors are tested independently against the corpus 
data, with the intention of highlighting several features which I believe can only emerge 
after examining authentic sources (i.e. not (only) by relying on the preconceived ideas 
of linguists).  
Chapter 8 offers a simple statistical model which combines the factors previously 
discussed,  all  of  which  have  some  impact  on  the  pattern  alternation.  This 
methodological approach is claimed to be useful for  (a) contrasting the explanatory 
power  of  different  principles/theories,  (b)  identifying  different  variables,  (c) 
demonstrating the value of having a theory incorporating more than a single variable. 
The last chapter gives an overview of the chief results and conclusions. 16 
2  Review of the Literature 
In  this  chapter  I  discuss  approaches  to  the  ditransitive  construction  under  three 
headings:  diachronic  approaches,  synchronic  approaches,  and  semantic cognitive 
approaches, in accordance with the different weight given to these perspectives in the 
definitions of both double object constructions and their prepositional paraphrases. 
2.1 Diachronic Perspectives 
A  diachronic  perspective  seems  to  offer  a  fairly  consistent  view  of  the  alternation 
between  the  two  complementation  patterns  in  question,  and  agreement  as  to  the 
development  of  prepositional  paraphrases  at  the  expense  of  double  object 
complementation patterns is quite widespread (Curme 1931, Visser 1963 1973, Denison 
1993). Vennemann (1974:339 376) even considers it part of a general and predictable 
trend in language development. 
Vennemann  developed  a  universal  theory  of  basic  word  order  in  terms  of 
“operator” and “operand” categories, the latter being very similar to the notion of head 
in other models. He then proposed a consistency principle for all operator operand pairs 
which he calls the “Natural Serialization Principle”. This principle concerns the relative 
order of operator and operand in binary constructions like P+NP, A+N, V+object, etc.; 
and very roughly states that in VX languages (such as English) operands will precede 
operators, the converse being true in XV languages. This generalisation allows him to 
state that the word order changes in the history of English (i.e. the development of 
prepositional paraphrases of double object verbs, as well as that of of possessives at the 
expense of preposed genitives) can be explained as a move towards greater consistency 
as a VX language, as English was slowly becoming a head first language.
5 
In  the  Old  English  period,  the  two  objects  —direct  and  indirect—  were 
distinguished by case: accusative case marked the direct object, and dative case marked 
                                                 
5 Givón (1979:14 15) is not very happy with Vennemann’s method, which he deems an example of a 
widespread malaise, ‘nomenclature as explanation’:  
[B]y virtue of pointing out that the phenomenon under study is an instance of 
the larger class “XYZ” one has not explained the behavior of the phenomenon, 
but only related it to the behavior of other members of the class. Now, if this is 
followed by explanation of the behavior of the entire class “XYZ,” then indeed 
a  reasonable  methodological  progression  has  been  followed.  Quite  often, 
however,  transformational generative  linguistics  “explained”  the  behavior  of 
“XYZ” either the individual or the class by positing an abstract principle 
which  may  be  translated  as  “all  XYZ’s  behave  in  a  certain  way.”  The 
tautological nature of such a procedure is transparent. 17 
the  indirect  object.  Curme  (1931:103)  states  that  dative  originally  meant  ‘direction 
toward,’ but it was not the only case with that denotation, since accusative shared that 
meaning. However, the implications present in the use of each case went deeper: “both 
accusative  and  dative  indicated  a  goal  or  an  object  toward  which  an  activity  was 
directed. (...) The accusative often indicates that a person or thing is affected in a literal, 
exterior sense, while the dative indicates that a person or thing is affected in an inner 
sense” (Curme 1931:108). He illustrates this with the following examples: in sentences 
like He caused me pain and I preached to them (in Old English, without a preposition), 
the  postverbal  pronouns  are  marked  with  dative  case,  indicating  that  the  person  is 
affected  inwardly.  Additionally,  Sweet  (1891 98:50)  mentions  that  the  dative  is  the 
“interest case,” in that it generally denotes the person affected by or interested in the 
action expressed by the verb. For example, in sentences like That man gave my brother 
an orange, my brother would be put in dative case in Latin or German. 
Jespersen (1924:162) is a bit more careful about the form/semantics correlation as 
regards the concept of case, stating that even if it is generally true that accusatives refer 
to things and datives to persons, there are instances of datives occurring when there is 
only one object, and of both objects being in the accusative. He concludes that the 
difference between dative and accusative is not notional, but syntactic, and depends in 
each case on language specific rules. 
It is generally understood that, as pointed out by Rissanen (2000:268), the case 
marking of nominals allowed for free word order; put differently, the morphological 
endings  at  the  end  of  nominals  were  enough  to  indicate  the  function  they  were 
performing. That is, since the formal distinction supported the semantic interpretation of 
the objects, both give him a book and give a book him were possible.
6 
In  Middle  English,  a  great  many  changes  take  place.  A  gradual  change  in 
pronunciation meant that the final syllables, which carried the inflectional case markers 
(such as the dative endings in weak  e and in  um), stopped being pronounced. The 
formal distinction began to vanish, i.e. case was no longer enough to stop ambiguity 
from creeping into everyday language, and thus word order became increasingly and 
gradually fixed. At this stage, the function of a constituent in the clause was more and 
more dependent on their position. While agreeing with this view, Visser (1963 73:622) 
points out that even word order was immaterial, the interpretation depending more on 
“context and situation, and on the fact that in the majority of cases the indirect object 
refers to a person and the direct object to a thing.” At a later stage, prepositions were 
                                                 
6 Nonetheless, Denison (1993:31) mentions that datives generally preceded direct objects in Old English. 18 
drained  of  their  locative  meanings  and  became  increasingly  important  in  the 
grammatical task of keeping ambiguity at bay, by taking over the discriminative task of 
the difference in case forms. Of course, language changes of this sort do not occur in 
one fell swoop: the roots of these changes can always be traced back to earlier periods.
7 
Furthermore, during the Middle English period, a new set of verbs is borrowed 
from French (e.g. avail, command, escape, favour, please, profit, serve, suffice, etc.). 
These verbs marked the goal phrase with the preposition à. Gropen et al. (1989:221) 
mention that in the process of being assimilated to English, these verbs were given an 
argument structure which was modelled on the French one, hence the preposition to (the 
translation of à) as a mark of the goal argument. This argument structure was later 
applied  to  verbs  of  Anglo Saxon  origin,  which  now  had  two  alternative 
complementation  patterns:  a  double  object  form  and  a  prepositional  form.  Rissanen 
(2000:259) confirms this: given the gradual nature of language change, in early Middle 
English,  many  of  these  verbs  showed  variation  between  the  prepositional  and  the 
prepositionless form. Returning to Gropen et al., their conclusion is that “the verbs that 
take the double object form are the ones that were already in the language when that 
form came into being, and the verbs that fail to take that form came into the language 
more  recently  from  French  (and  Latin),  accompanied  by  a  French like  argument 
structure”. 
In her study of indirect objects in English, Herriman (1995:3) criticizes the early 
English grammarians for having been under the impression that present day English 
could still be analysed as a language with case, that is, as if Modern English were Old 
English (or Latin, or German, at that), only that instead of synthetic case markers (i.e. 
inflectional  endings)  we  now  have  prepositions  performing  that  function. 
Synchronically  speaking Herriman  holds  this  is  a big  mistake,  in  that  only  the 
identity of an object’s semantic role (as opposed to its syntactic features) is used as a 
defining criterion of indirect objecthood. For instance, in Curme’s grammar (1931) no 
distinction is made between the formal and functional properties of noun phrases and 
prepositional  phrases  as  long  as  they  carry  the  same  semantic  content,  e.g.  goal  or 
recipient.  All  the  same,  we  can  better  appreciate  the  motivation  of  the  early 
grammarians from a diachronic perspective: historically, prepositional paraphrases of 
indirect objects (in those verbs which allow an alternation) were a later development in 
                                                 
7 McFadden (2002) tracked the development of the to dative construction in the Penn Helsinki Parsed 
Corpus, where he found empirical confirmation for the gradual spread of the construction. He found that 
despite  sporadic  occurrences  in  the  early  Middle  English  period  (1150 1250),  the  to dative  did  not 
become common until later years (1250 1350). For additional data and a clear analysis of the gradualness 
of this process, see also Allen (1995:417 421). 19 
English,  and  can  be  traced  to  an  original  double  object  structure.  Furthermore,  as 
Vennemann claims (see above), this change is a part of a predictable trend in languages 
of the VX type. 
2.2 Synchronic Approaches 
This  section  will  deal  with  the  differing  views  of  various  grammarians  about 
ditransitives  and  their prepositional paraphrases. The  notion  of  case  will  not play  a 
(major) role in the ensuing discussion. As Jespersen most eloquently put it: “there is not 
the slightest ground for speaking of a dative as separate from the accusative in Modern 
English: it is just as unhistorical as it would be to speak of Normandy and New England 
as parts of the British Empire” (1927:278). 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:248) mention that claiming identity on the 
basis of semantic role can logically lead to absurd consequences. For instance, in both 
clauses in (2) Jill has the same role (recipient), 
(2)  a.  John sent Jill a copy. 
b.  Jill was sent a copy. 
 
yet no one would say that in (2)b Jill is an indirect object: it is clearly a subject. Still, 
certain authors do claim that the prepositional paraphrase is an indirect object, as we 
will see. 
All the same, case is a die hard idea, and terms like dative and accusative —
previously used exclusively to describe case markings— can still be found in later years 
applied  to  the  descriptions  of  functions  (Curme  1931:96)  or  grammatical  relations 
(Sweet 1891 98:43). 
2.2.1 Traditional Grammar 
The old grammarians (Kruisinga, Poutsma, Sweet, Jespersen, and others) looked at the 
development of the ditransitive construction over the years as a starting point for their 
discussion of indirect objects. It was only natural then that the notion of morphological 
case  (accusative, dative, etc.)  figured prominently in their descriptions. However, at 
times case was invested with more descriptive  and explanatory importance than the 
notion of synchronic syntactic description warranted, for example “[t]he word order 
now in part indicates the accusative and dative functions. (...) Sometimes the function 
alone distinguishes accusative and dative: They chose him (acc) king, but They chose 20 
him (dat) a wife” (Curme 1931:96). Using the word dative gives rise to confusion, and 
Jespersen (1927:231) voices his criticism in no ambiguous terms: “[f]rom the modern 
point of view it is of no importance whether the verb in question in OE took its object in 
the accusative or in the dative, as the distinction between the two cases was obliterated 
before the modern period. (...) [W]e shall have no use for the term dative”. 
There is complete agreement as to the formal characteristics of indirect objects: 
these are typically nominals (rarely, if at all, clauses), which appear in their objective 
form if they are pronominalised. Their position is also agreed upon: objects in general 
occur typically after the verb, and Kruisinga adds “[w]hen there are two objects, not 
both personal pronouns,
8  the  indirect  object  stands  first  so  as to  show  its  function” 
(1932:334). Its position next to the verb is considered to be the key identifying factor of 
the indirect object. Sweet also mentions this characteristic “[i]n English, the distinction 
between direct and indirect object is expressed, not by inflection, but imperfectly by 
word order, the indirect coming before the direct object (...)” (1898:43).  
In  semantic  terms,  Poutsma  (1926:176)  holds  that  the  difference  between  the 
direct object and the indirect object is that the former is a “thing object” whereas the 
latter is a “person object” in that it usually refers to animate beings, and especially 
animate beings standing in a recipient relation to the verb. On the other hand, Curme 
(1935:131) states that the indirect object “indicates that an action or feeling is directed 
towards a person or thing to his or its advantage or disadvantage”. His definition of the 
indirect  object  is  based  on  semantic,  at  the  expense  of  syntactic,  considerations.  In 
Curme’s account, a prepositional phrase headed by to can also be an indirect object, the 
preposition  playing  merely  an  inflectional  role  indicating  that  its  complement  noun 
phrase is a dative. The alternation with a prepositional phrase is also noted by Poutsma: 
“[t]he indirect or person object is mostly replaced by a complement with a preposition 
when  the  ordinary  word order  subject predicate indirect  or  person object direct  or 
thing object is departed from” (1926:213 214). 
In  more  recent  times,  Hudson  (1991:333)  groups  Jespersen,  Quirk  et  al., 
Huddleston,  Ziv  and  Sheintuch,  and  himself  as  those  who  share  a  great  many 
assumptions with the early grammarians, except that (a) the link between indirect object 
and prepositional phrases in these newer accounts is severed, and therefore (b) indirect 
                                                 
8 If both objects are pronominal, the syntactic function of word order becomes more relaxed, as it is 
influenced by other, not strictly  syntactic, considerations, as Poutsma (1926:213) illustrates:  “[w]hen 
neither object can be said to be more important than the other, either may stand first. Thus ‘I cannot lend 
them you now’ and ‘I cannot lend you them now’ are equally possible. It should, however, be added that 
in ordinary English the ‘you’ of the first sentence would be changed into ‘to you’.” 21 
object is now a strictly syntactic (as opposed to semantic) category. In this vein, the 
latest major grammar of English (Huddleston and Pullum et al. 2002:248) considers 
prepositional paraphrases not to be indirect objects: the noun phrase Mary (in John gave 
a book to Mary) is an oblique,
9 and thus not a possible object of the verb. 
Quirk  et  al.  (1985:726 727)  define  indirect  objects  in  terms  of  four  different 
criteria:  form,  position,  syntactic  function,  and  semantic  properties.  Their  typical 
indirect object is then realized by a noun phrase or nominal clause,
10 and is typically 
found after the subject and immediately after the verb; it carries the objective form if it 
is a pronoun, while in passive paraphrases it may be retained as object or it can become 
itself the subject of a passive sentence. Finally, it can generally be omitted without 
affecting the semantic relations between the other elements (their example is save me a 
seat),
11 and it prototypically corresponds to a prepositional phrase headed by either to or 
for. As regards the semantic properties of indirect objects, Quirk et al. point out that 
while the direct object typically refers to an entity that is affected by the action, the 
indirect object typically refers to an animate being, deemed to be the recipient of the 
action.  
It has long been pointed out that the standard order in English finds the indirect 
object immediately following the verb, and the direct object after the indirect object.
12 A 
clear illustration of the fixed relative order of objects is provided by Huddleston and 
Pullum  et  al.  (2002:248).  They  show  that  inverting  their  relative  order  results  in  a 
change of their functions, which in turn results in an anomalous sentence, or in one with 
a very different meaning:
13 
(3)  a.  They  offered  [IO  one  of  the  experienced  tutors]  [DO  all  of  the  overseas 
students]. 
b.  They offered [IO all the overseas students] [DO one of the experienced tutors]. 
 
                                                 
9 Obliques are defined by Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:215) as NPs indirectly related to the verb 
by a preposition, as in the example sentence in the text. These authors, however, still classify the PPs as 
complements, as opposed to adjuncts. 
10 In general, as Biber et al. (1999:193) note, a finite nominal (wh ) clause, e.g. ‘Give whoever has it your 
old Cub’. 
11 Although omitting the indirect object can result in ambiguity, as in the joke: 
A: I say, waiter, do you serve crabs? 
B: Sit down, sir. We serve anybody. 
12 Indirect objects are thus quite a desperate lot: they must not stray from their position if they want to go 
on existing as such. 
13 The switch in position generally results in anomaly because in the great majority of such clauses the 
indirect object is human and the direct object is inanimate. 22 
Jespersen  (1927:278 287)  considers  that  the  use  of  a  prepositional  paraphrase 
‘discards’ the indirect object from the verb. This ‘discarding’ is in fact the result of a 
deeper relationship between verb and direct object. In his words “the direct object is 
more essential to the verb and more closely connected with it than the indirect object, in 
spite of the latter’s seemingly privileged position close to the verb”. This idea has been 
expanded by Tomlin (1986:4), under the name Verb Object Bonding. In his book, he 
shows, by means of data from at wide variety of languages, that in transitive clauses it is 
more difficult to interfere with the syntactic juxtaposition and semantic unity of the verb 
and object, than it is to interfere with that of the verb and subject, e.g. in the case of the 
placement of sentence adverbials.
14 
(4)  a.  *John cooked unfortunately the fish. 
b.  John unfortunately cooked the fish. 
 
According to this basic relationship verb direct object, the post verbal, post direct 
object  position  occupied  by  the  prepositional  paraphrase  will  then  be  the  natural 
position for the beneficiary role. Why is it then that an indirect object can occur between 
the verb and the direct object? In Jespersen’s terms, the indirect object’s ‘privileged 
position’ is explained because of the ‘greatest interest felt for persons’, which leads to 
their  occurrence  before  the  direct  object.  In  this  extract,  Jespersen  is  anticipating 
Givón’s  idea  of  a  topicality  hierarchy  (discussed  in  §5.4.3),  whereby  a  human  bias 
present in language leads to human beings being privileged in the competition for filling 
grammatical slots. 
Jespersen  warns  the  reader  that  even  if  two  constructions  are  practically 
synonymous,  they  can  still  be  grammatically  different.
15  He  goes  on  to  explain  the 
alternation:  whereas  the to phrase  is placed  in  another  relation  to  the  verb  than  the 
indirect object, and can be equated to other ‘subjuncts’ (i.e. noun phrases functioning 
adverbially),  the  indirect  object  is  closely  connected  with  the  verb,  “though  not  so 
intimately connected with it as either the subject or the direct object” (1927:292). 
Additionally,  the  to phrase  can  serve  other  purposes,  such  as  (a)  marking 
emphasis, or (b) as an alternative when the indirect object position between verb and 
                                                 
14 See also §3.1.4. 
15 Fries (1957:185) also has something to say about this: “To call such expressions as to the boy an 
‘indirect object’ in the sentence the man gave the money to the boy leads to confusion. The expression to 
the boy does express the same meaning as that of the indirect object, but this meaning is signalled by the 
function word to, not by the formal arrangement which constitutes the structure ‘indirect object.’ ” 23 
direct object is for some reason not possible, as in the case of Heavy Noun Phrase Shift 
(HNPS). This is illustrated in the examples below: 
(5)  a.  He gave it to him, not to her. 
b.  He gave it to the man in the brown suit standing near the flower shop. 
 
The different syntactic behaviour of indirect objects and prepositional paraphrases 
in terms of their accessibility to a number of syntactic processes has been demonstrated 
by Ziv and Sheintuch (1979:398 399). Some of these processes are illustrated below, 
where the (a) examples are representative of indirect objects and the (b) examples of 
prepositional paraphrases. 
(6)  Passivisation: 
a.  She was given a book.  
b.  */??She was given a book to. 
(7)  Tough movement: 
a.  *This girl is hard to tell a story. 
b.  ?This baby is hard to knit a sweater to/for. 
(8)  Relative clause formation: 
a.  *The girl ∅/that/which/who I gave flowers is here. 
b.  The girl to whom you gave flowers is here. 
b’. The girl you gave flowers to is here. 
(9)  Topicalisation:
16 
a.  ???My landlord, I give a check every month. 
b.  This girl I gave a book to. 
 
Ziv and Sheintuch take this as evidence against considering indirect objects and their 
prepositional paraphrases as members of the same grammatical category. 
In a similar fashion, Hudson (1991) proves that indirect and direct objects follow 
quite different rules:  
                                                 
16 This resistance to fronting on the part of indirect objects is considered by Huddleston (1984:195 203) 
to be their chief distinctive characteristic.  24 
 
•  The indirect object passivises more easily than the direct object. 
(10)  a.  Paolo gave Harriet the duvet. 
b.  Harriet was given the duvet. 
c.  %The duvet was given Harriet.
17  
 
•  The  direct  object  can  be  moved  by  HNPS,  but  this  is  quite  impossible  for  the 
indirect object. 
(11)  a.  Paolo gave [IO Harriet] on Sunday [DO some lovely flowers that he had bought 
in the market the day before]. 
b.  *Paolo gave [DO some flowers] [IO the girl he had met at the party the night 
before]. 
c.  *Paolo gave on Sunday [IO the girl he had met at the party the night before] 
[DO some beautiful flowers he had bought in the market the day before]. 
 
•  The  direct  object  is  always  lexically  specified  in  the  verb’s  valency  (i.e. 
subcategorization), but the indirect object often is not. 
•  Indirect  objects  are  typically  human,  whereas  direct  objects  are  typically  non 
human. 
•  Direct objects are frequently part of an idiom with the verb (e.g. lend _ a hand, give 
_ the cold shoulder) but indirect objects rarely, if ever, are. There are no idioms of 
the form V+IO+DO, where the indirect object is fixed and the direct object is not.  
 
It  therefore  seems  to  be  the  case  that  indirect  objects  and  their  prepositional 
paraphrases are not to be equated. But clearly there is at least some similarity between 
sentences  such  as  John  gave  Mary  the  book  and  John  gave  the  book  to  Mary. 
Transformational  Grammar  to  be  discussed  in  the  following  sections  took  this 
similarity  as  evidence  that  the  two  sentences  must  be  not  just  related,  but 
transformationally so. This claim resulted in the controversial ‘Katz Postal hypothesis’ 
(see §2.2.2.2), which roughly states that sentences with the same meaning must share 
the same deep structure. 
From  more  descriptive  quarters,  in  Quirk  et  al.  (1985:57)  transformations  are 
called ‘systematic correspondences between structures’, which they define as follows: 
“A relation or mapping between two structures X and Y, such that if the same lexical 
                                                 
17 The percentage symbol in example (10)c is used by Hudson to indicate that the example is dialectally 
restricted. 25 
content occurs in X and in Y, there is a constant meaning relation between the two 
structures. This relation is often one of semantic equivalence, or paraphrase”. 
The alternation indirect object/prepositional paraphrase is viewed as one example 
of these correspondences, one which enables SVOO clauses to be converted into SVOA 
clauses. This possibility of turning the indirect object into a prepositional phrase (which 
is based on semantic considerations) is seen by Quirk et al. not as a defining criterion 
for indirect object hood, but as a distinguishing characteristic. 
Huddleston  (1984:197)  objects  to  the  idea  of  a  transformational  relationship 
between the indirect object and a prepositional paraphrase on a number of counts: (i) the 
relationship  is  not  systematic  enough;  (ii)  the  transformation  does  not  apply  to  all 
prepositional  phrases  with  to  or  for;  (iii)  there  exists  a  variety  of  patterns  besides 
prepositional phrases with to/for; (iv) the relationship between indirect objects and their 
prepositional paraphrases is based on the identity of the semantic role, not on syntactic 
grounds, etc. The examples below are meant to illustrate these points. 
(12)  a.  John gave Mary a book / John gave a book to Mary 
b.  John envied Mary her car / *John envied her car to Mary 
c.  John sent a book to Mary / John sent Mary a book 
d.  John sent a book to NY / *John sent NY a book 
e.  John blamed Mary for the crash / John blamed the crash on Mary 
f.  John supplied Mary with drugs / John supplied drugs to Mary 
 
A  transformational  relationship  indirect  object/prepositional  paraphrase  is  also 
questioned by Anderson (1988:291), who believes that the different complementation 
patterns  a  verb  can  take  are  ‘an  idiosyncratic  lexical  property’,  which  needs  to  be 
described in the lexicon (a solution TG will independently arrive at; see §2.2.2.3.3). 
A thorough description of this ‘idiosyncratic lexical property’ of verbs has been 
attempted by Allerton (1982) in his valency framework. It is the verb that determines 
the number and type of necessary constituents. The different complementation patterns 
of ditransitive verbs are therefore lexically determined and subcategorised for. Allerton 
lists a large number of different complementation patterns of verbs, and his efforts are 
quite noticeable in ditransitive, or rather —in his own terms— trivalent verbs. 
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  Valency Structure  Sample sentence 
122  SUBJECT+V+OBJECT+INDIRECT OBJECT 
SUBJECT+V+ INDIRECT OBJECT+OBJECT 
Fido gave the bone to me 
Fido gave me the bone 
122X  SUBJECT+V+OBJECT+OBLIQUE OBJECT  Fido  forgave  me  (for)  my 
cruelty 
123  SUBJECT+V+OBJECT+OBJOID  Fido fined me five pounds 
126  SUBJECT+V+OBJECT+PREPOSITIONAL 
OBJOID 
Fido deprived me of my slippers 
133  SUBJECT+V +INDIRECT OBJOID+OBJOID  Fido cost me five pounds 
Table 1: Allerton’s Ditransitive Valency Classification (1982) 
The first category is made up of verbs such as give, buy, bring, which show an 
alternation between the double object construction and a prepositional paraphrase with 
to/for,  and  allow  two  passive  structures.  122X  is  a  variant  of  the  indirect  object 
construction, but no reordering of the objects is possible; the category is practically 
limited to the verbs envy, excuse, forgive, and ask. The third is a one verb category, 
covering  a  verb  (fine)  which  allows  only  the  prepositionless  construction.  The  first 
postverbal element Allerton considers not an indirect but a direct object, and the second 
element an ‘Objoid,’ which Allerton defines as a non passivisable object (in this case 
denoting ‘measure’). Verbs with valency structure 126 (announce, attribute, dedicate, 
introduce, mention, say) allow only the construction with a preposition, whereas those 
in 133 (cost, take) allow only the prepositionless construction, and have no passive 
version/s. The first postverbal element is regarded as a subvariety of the category of 
objoids (classified into measure, match and possession objoids). Allerton chooses to 
label it ‘indirect objoid’ because it does not share any characteristics with his previous 
characterisation  of  objoids  in  transitive  structure,  while  sharing  features  of  indirect 
objects in ditransitive structure. It is hard not to agree with Schopf (1988:113) when he 
says that Allerton’s classification is more detailed than justified “by a merely valency 
theoretical approach”.  
On  a  final  note,  Herriman  and  Seppänen  (1996:499)  join  previous  authors  in 
arguing for a syntactic definition of indirect objects. They attribute the ‘bewildering 
variety’ of opinions about indirect object hood to extensions of the category of indirect 
object. Their article is perhaps most noticeable for the call to recognise the existence of 
‘recipient adverbials’ (which they also call valency bound adverbials), that is, adverbial 
elements which do not function simply as circumstantial elements, but are required by 
the verb and thus (verb) arguments.  27 
2.2.2 Transformational Grammar 
Ditransitive verbs also pose a problem for linguistics in terms of their representation. It 
is quite a truism of current linguistics that sequences (or linearity) are mere accidents, 
and truth is to be found in (syntactic) trees. But not everybody agrees on what is an 
adequate representation for ditransitives in tree diagrams.  
This section will discuss the different versions of TG, paying particular attention 
to the version specific theoretical mechanisms used to account for indirect objects and 
their prepositional paraphrases.  The  development  of  TG  can be  traced  by  means  of 
[Chomsky’s] representative publications articulating the different grammatical models. 
Thus, Early Transformational Grammar is associated with Syntactic Structures (1957), 
the Standard Theory with Aspects of the Theory of Syntax  (1965), Government and 
Binding Theory with Lectures on Government and Binding (1981), Minimalism with 
The Minimalist Program (1995).
18 We will start with early TG. 
2.2.2.1 Early TG 
A summary of the theoretical machinery of Syntactic Structures can be described in this 
way: a set of phrase structure rules generates a number of underlying phrase markers, 
which in turn provide the input for a set of transformations (some obligatory and some 
optional) to apply to. These turn the phrase markers into their pre final shapes. The last 
step is carried out by morphophonemic rules, whose function is to put some flesh on the 
structural skeleton. 
This account, of course, needs further qualification. The rules of phrase structure 
expand the sentence into constituents. A transformation “operates on a given string (...) 
with a given constituent structure and converts it into a new string with a new derived 
constituent  structure”  (Chomsky  1957:44).  Furthermore,  the  order  of  application  of 
these transformations must be defined to allow later rules access to the output of earlier 
rules. The insertion of the actual words is carried out by means of the phrase structure 
(PS)  rules,
19  while  they  are  transformed  into  utterances  by  the  morphophonological 
rules of the model. The following clarifies the way this model operates. 
 
                                                 
18 We will not concern ourselves with the Extended Standard Theory, nor with the so called Revised 
Extended Standard Theory, inasmuch as the theoretical developments in those models (trace theory, the 
lexicalist hypothesis, logical form, among others) are best evaluated in the framework of GB, where they 
have been integrated with the component modules. 
19 In the Aspects model, lexical insertion rules (LIRs) were called upon to perform this task. LIRs simply 
plug in a lexical item X in a socket Y, with the requirement that the (subcategorization) features of X and 
Y be compatible (see Figure 4 below). 28 
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Figure 2: Chomsky’s 1957 Model 
The figure below might help us understand the early transformational grammar 
proposals. 
PS rules  Tree diagram 
S￿NP+VP 
NP￿T+N 
VP￿Verb+NP 
T￿the 
N￿man, ball, etc. 
Verb￿Aux+V 
V￿hit, took, etc. 
Sentence
VP
NP Verb
V T N
the ball
NP
T N
the man
hit
Aux
 
Example of a transformation 
Passive   optional: 
Structural Analysis: NP Aux V  NP 
Structural change: X1   X2   X3   X4 ￿ X4 – X2 + be + en – X3   by + X1 
Figure 3: Passive transformation according to Syntactic Structures (1957) 
Sentences to which only obligatory transformations (e.g. Number Transformation, 
Do  Transformation,  or  Auxiliary  Transformation)  have  applied  are  called  ‘kernel 
sentences’ in this model.  
It is perhaps worth noting —as Herriman (1995:21) does— that early TG assumed 
that “NPs and PPs are alternative forms of the indirect object. In this respect, TG is 
reminiscent of the earlier descriptive analyses, where indirect object status was also 29 
assigned  both  to  NPs  and  PPs  on  the  grounds  of  semantic  similarity”  [my  italics]. 
Nothing  is  said  in  Syntactic  Structures  about  how  to  deal  with  double  object 
constructions.  We  can  nonetheless  gain  some  insight  from  Fillmore  (1965),  who 
proposed a transformational account of the alternation between ditransitives and their 
prepositional paraphrases while working within the early TG model. Fillmore suggests 
two  different  transformations,  to Dative  Movement  and  for Dative  Movement,  to 
account for pairs such as He gave her a hat / He gave a hat to her, and He bought her a 
hat  /  He  bought  a  hat  for  her,  respectively.  Recall  that  the  application  of 
transformational  rules  must  be  ordered.  Fillmore’s  rules  differ  in  that  to Dative 
Movement  comes  before  the  Passive  transformation,  whereas  for Dative  Movement 
comes after Passive. The ordering of the transformations (or ‘traffic rules’, as Fillmore 
calls them) is meant to account for the impossibility of sentences like *I was bought a 
hat.
20  In  Fillmore’s  framework,  indirect  objects  related  to  for prepositional  phrases 
allow no passive counterparts because for Dative Movement only occurs after Passive. 
Let’s exemplify his proposal. The underlying order of constituents for a sentence 
like He gave a book to Mary is He [gave to Mary] a book; the transformation below 
simply erases the preposition to.
21 Fillmore’s structural description (SD) and structural 
change (SC) for the above sentence are presented below: 
(13)  First indirect object rule 
Structural description (SD):  X     Vtiot
22   TO    Y  Z 
          1  2    3  4  5 
Structural change (SC):     1  2   ∅  4  5 
SD:   John+gave+TO+Mary+a book 
SC:    John+gave+∅+Mary+a book 
                                                 
20 Starred in the original. 
21 Denison (1993) points out that although the dative marking of noun phrases precedes —historically 
speaking—  the  appearance  of  to phrases,  in  most  TG  descriptions  (Chomsky  1965,  Fillmore  1965, 
Emonds 1972, and even Larson 1988) the order is inverted: the to phrase is taken to be basic whereas the 
dative noun phrase is derived. Denison posits the following question: “does the chronological priority of 
the  non prepositional  construction  have  any  legitimate  bearing  on  the  transformational  analysis  of 
Present Day English? (or, to phrase the question as a slogan, does synchrony recapitulate diachrony?)” 
(Denison 1993:123). This issue is tangential to our study and we are not going to delve into it. Still, 
Denison’s observation is worth bearing in mind as an illustration of the tension between traditional and 
transformational grammar, specifically as reflected in the different status assigned in each theory to the 
notions of coverage and depth of insight (see for example Chomsky 1982:82 83). 
22 Vtiot refers to a class of verbs allowing for to Dative Movement, such as give, hand, lend, offer, send, 
show, etc. 30 
Consider now Fillmore’s for Dative Movement rule: 
(14)  Second indirect object rule 
Structural description (SD):  X     Viof
23   Y  FOR    Z 
          1  2  3    4  5 
Structural change (SC):     1   2  5    3 
SD:   John+bought+a book+FOR+Mary 
SC:    John+bought+Mary+a book 
The SD above corresponds to a sentence like He built a table for her, and —in 
contrast with Fillmore’s analysis of He gave a book to her— it is perfectly identical 
with the surface sentence. In this case, the transformation erases the preposition for and 
reshuffles the noun phrases, thus achieving He built her a table, as seen in the SC. 
As  Jackendoff  and  Culicover  (1971:399)  point  out,  the  main  problem  with 
Fillmore’s proposal is its failure to capture the generalization that both transformations 
swap objects and delete a preposition. The rules should then be very similar, if not 
identical. Unfortunately, in Fillmore’s formalization the rules cannot be collapsed. And, 
by the time Fillmore’s paper was published, TG had moved on, thus rendering his work 
obsolete. 
2.2.2.2 The Standard Theory 
The  model  that  came  to  be  known  as  the  Standard  Theory  was  initiated  by  the 
publication  of  Aspects  of  the  Theory  of  Syntax  in  1965.  Generative  grammar  was 
defined  as  “a  system  of  rules  that  (...)  assigns  structural  descriptions  to  sentences” 
(Chomsky 1965:8). There are two essential elements to the theory: deep structure —a 
modification of the concept of kernel sentences— and surface structure —determining 
the phonetic interpretation of sentences. Surface structure (SS) is in turn “determined by 
repeated  application  of  (...)  grammatical  transformations  to  objects  of  a  more 
elementary sort” (Chomsky 1965:16).  
Chomsky summarizes the workings of his new model in this way: “A grammar 
contains a syntactic component, a semantic component, and a phonological component 
(...). The syntactic component consists of a base and a transformational component (...). 
The base generates deep structures. A deep structure enters the semantic component and 
receives a semantic interpretation; it is mapped by transformational rules into a surface 
structure”  (1965:141).  The  following  graph  might  help  us  understand what  the  new 
model looks like: 
                                                 
23 Viof refers to a class of verbs allowing for for Dative Movement, such as build, buy, get, make, save, 
spare, etc. 31 
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Figure 4: Chomsky’s 1965 Model 
In this model, it is claimed that “the deep structure of a sentence fully determines 
its  meaning”  (Chomsky  1975:22),  which  implies  that  (i)  sentences  with  the  same 
meaning  should  share  the  same  deep  structure,  and  that  (ii)  transformations  do  not 
change meaning. These claims were collectively known as the Katz Postal Hypothesis, 
which was eventually rejected when further research showed that surface structure did 
play a role in the interpretation of sentences, and that some transformations did change 
meaning, as the famous sentences show below.  
(15)  a.  Everyone in Cormorant Island speaks two languages. 
b.  Two languages are spoken by everyone in Cormorant Island. 
 
Sentence (15)a is the kernel of sentence (15)b; the same meaning is therefore 
expected to be present in both sentences. The interaction of the passive transformation 
with quantifiers, however, ensures that this is not the case. Sentence (15)a favours an 
interpretation whereby everyone on the Island seem to possess the ability of speaking 
any two languages, whereas the islanders in sentence (15)b are believed to speak the 
same two languages.  Furthermore, in terms of truth conditions, it is not difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which (15)a is true and (15)b is false.  
Another characteristic of the Aspects model is the claim that grammatical relations 
can be defined configurationally, i.e. read off a tree. In our case, the indirect object is 
defined as the first NP dominated by VP, whereas its oblique paraphrases are defined as 
the NP dominated by a PP which in turn is dominated by VP. These alternative forms 32 
are said to originate from the same DS and to be transformationally related to each other 
by means of Dative Movement. The problem is that the Aspects model cannot generate 
a structure containing two immediately successive NPs, as Chomsky’s rewrite rule for 
VP shows (1965:107). 
(16)  VP￿V (NP) (PP) (PP) (Manner)  
 
A new version of Dative Movement provided some sort of answer to the problem 
by deleting the preposition and reordering the resulting NPs, effectively moving the 
indirect object NP to a position immediately after the verb and thereby making it the 
new direct object. 
(17)  Dative Movement 
Structural description (SD):   V  NP1  {for/to}  NP2 
        1   2      3     4 
Structural Change (SC):  1+4   2      ∅     ∅ 
SD:   gave+a book+{for/to}+Mary 
SC:   gave+Mary+a book 
 
This is very much the same as Fillmore’s second indirect object rule. However, as 
Schopf  points  out  (1988:121),  NP2  in  the  formulation  (i.e.  4)  is  moved  into  a 
syntactically undefined position, as can be seen in Figure 5 below. In other words, the 
transformation is not ‘structure preserving,’ a requirement at the time. 
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Figure 5 
And even if we think that it is NP1 which actually moves, Schopf’s objection 
holds: 
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(18)  Dative Movement 
Structural description (SD):   V  NP1  {for/to}  NP2 
        1   2      3     4 
Structural Change (SC):  1   ∅      ∅     4+2 
SD:   gave+a book+{for/to}+Mary 
SC:   gave+Mary+a book 
 
VP
V NP PP
P NP
to Mary
give a book
∅
?
 
Figure 6 
A way out of this problem was put forward by Emonds (1976:80). As a first step 
in his formulation, Emonds equates the behaviour of particles (e.g. up in carry up the 
trunk)  to  that  of  prepositional  phrases,  by  considering  the  former  instances  of 
intransitive prepositions, or prepositions not requiring a complement. He then shows 
that  both  kinds  of  prepositional  phrases  must  follow  the  direct  object  in  DS. 
Consequently, if the indirect object is originally a prepositional phrase, then ditransitive 
complementation  is  the  result  of  transformations.  His  transformation,  however,  is 
special in that is said to be ‘structure preserving’. If “items of category X can only be 
moved to a position dominated by the category X” (Chomsky 1975:23), then only two 
identical categories can swap positions. 
(19)  Dative Movement 
Structural description (SD):   V  NP1  {for/to}  NP2 
        1   2      3     4 
Structural Change (SC):  1   4      ∅     2 
SD:   gave+a book+{for/to}+Mary 
SC:   gave+Mary+Ø+a book 
According to this transformation, the preposition is deleted and the two NPs swap 
places. A curious aspect of this interpretation is the fact that in the resulting (double 
object) structure, the direct object (i.e. 2) is an NP in a prepositional phrase with a null 
preposition at surface structure, as illustrated below:  
 34 
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(John) gave Mary a book 
Figure 7 
This version of TG was discarded, and more recent TG held that the restrictions 
and lack of productivity evident in the alternation between the indirect object and its 
prepositional  counterpart  point  us  in  the  direction  of  a  lexical  rather  than 
transformational relationship, a position which resembles that of Allerton (discussed in 
§2.2.2.1). 
2.2.2.3 Government & Binding Theory 
In more than one sense, GB Theory might be considered an offshoot of the Standard 
Theory. However, despite its historical links, GB stands a lot of the previous ideas on 
their  heads.  The  most  important  change,  or  the  one that  subsumes  and justifies  the 
others, is a shift in perspective. Chomsky (quoted in Harris 1993:179) mentions that 
“the gravest defect of the theory of TG is its enormous latitude and descriptive power”. 
This power needs to be curtailed somehow. However, rather than stipulating via phrase 
structure rules the different constructional possibilities of a language, GB operates via 
constraints interacting with its different modules. In other words, the GB point of view 
is not that movement to a certain position must be specified (as was assumed in the 
Standard Theory), but rather that movement to certain positions must be prevented. The 
core of GB looks like this. 
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Figure 8: Chomsky’s 1981 Model
24 
GB is a modular theory, that is, it incorporates subtheories. The basic facts of 
language are held to fall out from these modules. Transformations —in the guise of 
movement— are collapsed under one very general rule, Move α, which states that in 
principle anything goes in the syntax. To stop Move α from producing word salad, GB 
employs a number of filters and constraints. In this way, only grammatical sequences 
reach surface structure. The intuition behind GB is that there is a set of very simple and 
broad principles which  do not refer to specific constructions, and whose interaction 
accounts gracefully for linguistic phenomena. 
We will not deal with every single module in GB, only with the ones that are the 
most relevant to the discussion of ditransitive complementation. We will present the 
difficulties these modules have in dealing with double complement constructions, and 
we will then move on to present some of the solutions that have been proposed. 
2.2.2.3.1  X Bar Theory 
As mentioned before, GB does away with fully specified phrase structure rules, and 
replaces them with the X bar template. Developed in the 1970s, X bar theory provides 
GB with a cross linguistic blueprint for the structure of phrases. With X bar theory, GB 
seeks  to  capture  the  similarities  between  different  categories  of  lexical  phrases  by 
assigning the same structure to them. The idea is that any structure can be built out of 
any category, but only those conforming to Figure 9 below will be well formed.  
 
                                                 
24 Figure based on Cook and Newson 1996. 36 
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Figure 9 
Binary Branching (Kayne 1984) is generally accepted as a requirement on this 
sub theory, stating that a node cannot have more than two branches. Now, how do we 
accommodate  a  verb  and  two  complements  under  a  binary branching  node?  The 
following is a possibility: 
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Figure 10 
This is not very satisfactory, since the direct object is expressed as an adjunct 
represented as a sister to a bar level category and the indirect object is shown as 
having a closer relation to the verb than the direct object itself. We will return to this 
issue presently.  
2.2.2.3.2  Case Theory 
Case  Theory  is  another  GB  module.  It  is  based  on  the  traditional  notion  of 
morphological case (spelt with a lower case c), which is manifested in many languages. 
There are two differences, however. In GB, abstract Case (spelt with a capital C) is 
determined  structurally  (i.e.  it  is  assigned  to  positions),  and  it  need  not  be 
morphologically  manifested.  As  Hudson  points  out  (1995:281 282)  the  relationship 37 
between Case and case is an asymmetrical one: whereas Case need not be manifested by 
case, every example of case is always taken to be a surface manifestation of Case.  
In GB, each NP must be assigned Case, and this is stipulated by the Case Filter. If 
some NP fails to be assigned Case,
25 then the structure is ruled ungrammatical. If an NP 
wants to survive the Case Filter, it needs to get Case somehow, and this usually means 
moving to a position where Case is assigned.
26 Case Theory thus provides GB with both 
a reason for and a constraint on movement. 
Case  is  assigned  under  adjacency,  i.e.  nothing  may  intervene  between  a  Case 
assigner and its assignee.
27 Case is additionally linked with the assignment of θ roles 
(i.e. semantic roles), in that Case assignment makes an argument ‘visible’, and only 
visible arguments can be θ marked. Verbs and prepositions assign Case to their objects, 
or  rather  to  the  positions  their  objects  occupy;  this  is  known  as  structural  Case 
assignment.  Structural  Case  is  assigned  at  S structure,  after  movement  takes  place. 
There is a further instantiation of Case assignment, namely inherent Case. Inherent Case 
is  ‘assigned’  at  D structure,  before  movement  takes  place,  and  does  not  require  an 
assigner, as it is considered to be a property of certain arguments of predicates. In not 
requiring an assigner, inherent Case does not need to be assigned under adjacency. 
Ditransitive complementation poses a problem for the requirement of adjacency in 
Case assignment. In a sentence like John gave Mary a book, the first NP can be Case 
marked by the verb, but how does the second NP get its Case? We will return to this 
issue in the following sections. 
2.2.2.3.3  The Projection Principle 
As a point of departure for this section, consider the following quotation from Harris 
(1993:109): “[m]uch work in early transformational research simply projected [back] 
the wide variety of surface categories onto the underlying representation.” That is to 
say,  rather  than  reducing  the  enormous  range  of  surface  phenomena  to  a  desired 
minimal set of underlying  categories, GB theoreticians found it easier  to let ‘basic’ 
categories  proliferate.  This  set  of  entirely  new  categories  is  licensed  in  GB  by  the 
Projection Principle.  
The Projection Principle is a general constraint on syntactic representation, which 
states that: “[r]epresentations at each syntactic level (...) are projected from the lexicon, 
in  that  they  observe  the  subcategorization  properties  of  lexical  items”  (Chomsky 
                                                 
25 Or more strictly, fails to be in a position where Case is assigned. 
26 In practice, the Case Filter implies that every noun must be either a subject or a complement. 
27 Case can also be assigned under Spec head agreement, see Ouhalla (1999:194 195). 38 
1981:29). Syntactic structure is thus required to accommodate the properties of each 
lexical item. Complement structure is viewed as part of the properties of verbs in the 
lexicon. In this light, the lexical entry for a ditransitive verb specifies two alternative 
subcategorization  frames:  [_  NP  NP]  and  [_  NP  PP].  This  renders  earlier 
transformations such as Dative Movement unnecessary, in that the relationship between 
double  object  constructions  and  their  prepositional  counterparts  becomes  lexical,  as 
opposed to transformational. 
The Projection Principle states that if there is an NP position at one level, then 
that NP position must be present at all levels, even if it is not visible. This effectively 
opens the floodgates for empty categories, because as a consequence, a position will 
exist in syntactic structure just in case some lexical item requires it to exist. Schopf 
(1988:122) has been vocal in criticizing GB solutions which resort to allowing the base 
rule to generate empty nodes which will only be filled in the event of transformation, as 
opposed to lexical insertion. An empty category is either an empty NP position vacated 
by Move α, or a position which is empty for an NP to move to. 
Baker (1988:421) states that “the Projection Principle says that there is in some 
cases more syntactic structure than meets the eye”, and the ditransitive construction is 
no exception. In the next section, we will deal with the way different authors have put 
empty  categories  to  work  in  trying  to  find  an  answer  to  the  problems  ditransitive 
complementation poses for GB. 
2.2.2.3.4  Piling up the empties 
All the above modules present the analyses of ditransitives within GB with a number of 
problems, particularly (a) the assignment of Case to the second NP in a double object 
construction,  and  (b)  the  adequate  internal  hierarchical  structure  of  the  VP  in  both 
double object constructions and their prepositional paraphrases. Different authors have 
proposed different solutions, but all tend to rely more and more on the use of empty 
categories as an escape hatch. Empty categories are not observable, but GB treats them 
just like ordinary categories. The empty categories that were called upon to account for 
the behaviour of double object constructions fall into different groups: null prepositions 
(Hornstein and Weinberg 1981, Czepluch 1982, Kayne 1984, Iwakura 1987), traces of 
the main verb (Larson 1988), empty verbs (Aoun and Li 1989, Johnson 1991), and 
traces of Preposition Incorporation (Baker 1988, Pesetsky 1995). 
In §2.2.2.3.2, the question remained open: in John gave Mary a book, how does 
the second NP get Case? The adjacency requirement on Case assignment, coupled with 39 
the binary branching restriction on X bar theory, does not allow a verb to Case mark 
two NPs. A GB analysis stipulates that although a book must be Case marked, its Case 
assigner  must  not  be  the  verb.  This  leaves  us  with  two  options:  either  a  book  is 
inherently Case marked, as determined by the properties of the verb
28 —an approach 
which is “purely ad hoc”, in the words of Bowers (1993:644) — or we need a new 
Case assigner.  
The Passive construction should allow us to decide between the alternatives. In 
GB, when the passive morpheme attaches itself to the verb, it takes away the verb’s 
Case assigning properties. The object of the verb in question must then move (to the 
subject position of the sentence) in order to get Case. Now, if the first NP in the VP is 
the only one getting its Case from the verb, then only it should be forced to move in the 
Passive construction. However, if both indirect and direct passive versions of the same 
sentence are possible, the conclusion is that the second NP also gets its Case from the 
verb. And this is indeed what seems to happen, at least in some dialects (as indicated by 
the %): 
(20)  a.  John gave Mary a book. 
b.  Mary was given a book. 
c.  %A book was given Mary. 
 
However, GB places an asterisk on the third example above, and concludes that 
since it is shown that the second NP is not assigned Case by the verb, a book must be 
inherently Case marked.
29 This is a far from satisfactory solution for many authors who 
have looked at alternative possibilities. 
What the following approaches to the problem have in common is the use of an 
empty category, as some sort of new Case provider. Paradoxically, this empty category 
(usually  a  preposition)  has  generally  been  made  to  Case mark  NP1,  that  is,  the  NP 
which  a  priori  does  not  seem  to  have  a  Case  problem.  As  a  consequence,  Case 
assignment to NP2 is carried out by (i) the verb, either directly (thus breaking adjacency 
or binary branching requirements) or indirectly (by means of a Case relaying empty 
category); or (ii) by the empty category itself (without any intervention from the verb). 
                                                 
28 Chomsky himself seems to have provided for this possibility: “[t]hus we assume that certain verbs have 
the property of assigning a secondary Case to their secondary object, given the form of the adjacency 
condition” (1981:94). 
29  Unlike  structural  Case,  inherent  Case  is  not  lost  but  absorbed  by  the  passive  morpheme  under 
passivisation (Haegeman 1994:188). 40 
Hornstein and Weinberg (1981:74) suggest that verbs taking the double object 
construction mark the two NPs with a different Case: NP1 is assigned oblique Case by 
an empty preposition, and NP2 gets objective Case from the verb. Adjacency is not in 
the  picture  painted  by  Hornstein  and  Weinberg.  Baker  (1988:297)  criticizes  their 
approach for being dependent on assumptions which are not confirmed or falsified in 
English, since there is no overt distinction between objective Case and oblique Case. 
Moreover, in languages with an overt distinction —Baker continues— the first NP in a 
double  object  construction  gets  objective  Case,  not  oblique.  Czepluch’s  approach 
(1982)  is  very  similar  to  Hornstein  and  Weinberg’s,  and  suffers  from  the  same 
shortcomings.  
Kayne (1984) tries to capture the special relation between the NPs in a double 
object construction. As noted by Green (1974), there seems to be a kind of possession 
relation between them in sentences like John gave Mary a book, Mary coming into 
possession of the book. He suggests analyzing Mary a book as a small clause (sc), the 
first NP standing in a subject relation to the second NP. Additionally, this small clause 
involves an empty preposition (Pe),
30 as seen in Figure 11. 
 
VP
V
NP2 PP
NP1 Pe
sc
 
Figure 11 
Kayne mentions (1984:195) that an empty preposition cannot be the source of 
Case. Since NP1 must be assigned Case, and Pe cannot do it, NP1 must receive Case 
from V through the intervention —as a Case relayer— of Pe. Inasmuch as NP2 is the 
head of the small clause, it gets its Case from V. 
But why have one empty category when it is easier to have two? This seems to 
have  been  the  thought  behind  Iwakura’s  paper  (1987).  He  does  away  with  binary 
branching, and puts forward the following structure for ditransitives: 
 
                                                 
30 “in the spirit of a trace theory” (Kayne 1984:195). 41 
VP
PP1 PP2 V
P NP1 P NP2
∅ ∅ give Mary a book
 
Figure 12 
In Figure 12 above, NP1 appears as the object of an empty preposition which 
functions as a Case assigner, just like in Kayne’s and Czepluch’s analyses. NP2 also 
appears as the object of an empty preposition, just like Emonds proposed in his 1976 
analysis  (see  Figure  7).  In  this  way,  Case assignment  complies  with  the  adjacency 
requirement. The prepositions ∅ assign Case to NP1 and NP2. Oddly enough, Iwakura 
has  the  transitive  verb  give  assign  Case  to  its  adjacent  PP,  despite  the  fact  that 
prepositional phrases do not need Case.  Iwakura dismisses the potential problem of 
having a doubly Case marked phrase by assuming that the preposition ∅ deletes when it 
is adjacent to the verb, although there is something certainly suspicious in a framework 
that needs to resort to deleting an empty element. 
In 1986, Bars and Lasnik published a much quoted paper that not only changed 
linguists’ perspectives on the double object construction, but also furnished them with a 
new challenge in terms of Binding Theory. But some words on Binding Theory first. 
According to Cook and Newson (1996:252), “binding is a structural relationship which 
governs  the  co reference  properties  of  elements  in  a  sentence”.  Co reference  and 
binding between NPs are restricted to, and apply over, a local domain in which both the 
pronoun and its governor are to be found. The local domain of the pronoun is known as 
its governing category.  
Binding relationships differ according to the kind of NP in question, whether an 
anaphor, a pronoun, or a referring [R ] expression. Specifically, anaphors must find an 
antecedent within the same binding domain, pronouns cannot have an antecedent within 
that domain, and R expressions must be unbound everywhere. 
To go back to Bars and Lasnik’s findings, by looking at the anaphoric behaviour 
of the NPs in both the double object construction and its prepositional paraphrase, they 
showed that an asymmetrical relation obtains between NP1 and NP2 in terms of binding.  
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(21)  a.  I showed John/him himself (in the mirror). 
b.  *I showed himself John (in the mirror). 
 
In  the  sequence  [V  NP1  NP2],  NP1  can  bind  NP2  but  not  conversely.  This  is 
illustrated in the first pair of examples: in (21)a John binds himself, but in (21)b himself 
does not bind John. 
In (22), it is quantifier NPs which are related to pronouns. Pronouns can only be 
anaphorically bound to quantifier NPs if they are found within the structural domain of 
the quantifier NP.
31 
(22)  a.  I denied each worker his paycheck. 
b.  I showed every friend of mine his photograph. 
c.  I denied its owner each paycheck. 
d.  I showed its trainer every lion. 
 
These examples from Bars and Lasnik’s illustrate that only in (22)a and (22)b, but 
not  in  (22)c  and  (22)d,  can  the  pronouns  be  interpreted  as  bound  variables.  The 
availability  of  the  bound  pronoun  reading  in  the  above  sentences  posed  some  new 
problems  for  the  structure  of  the  VP.  In  brief,  in  ditransitive  clauses NP2  is  in  the 
domain of NP1, but NP1 is not in the domain of NP2. It would fall to Larson (1988) to 
demonstrate that this is also true in prepositional paraphrases.  
The notion of ‘domain’ is explained in terms of c command, but with a twist. C 
command  is  a  formalization  of  the  intuitive  relation  ‘higher  in  the  tree  than’.  The 
commonly used definitions of c command (e.g. “X c commands Y iff every maximal 
projection  that  dominates  X  also  dominates  Y”  (Aoun  and  Sportiche  1981))  fail  to 
define a ‘domain’ which can accommodate Bars and Lasnik’s findings. These authors 
propose, instead, a definition of ‘domain’ along the following lines: “Y is in the domain 
of  X  iff  X  c commands  Y  and  X  precedes  Y  [my  italics]”,  thus  bringing  linear 
precedence  into  the  picture.  And  this  is  exactly  the  nub  of  the  matter:  without  the 
proviso  on  the  definition  of  c command,  Bars  and  Lasnik’s  data  contradicted  the 
expectation that trees represent hierarchy and linearity.  
Bars  and  Lasnik’s  findings  rendered  a  number  of  previous  analyses  obsolete 
inasmuch as the relationship between the two NPs had been claimed to be symmetrical. 
Larson (1988) set out to accommodate the new found evidence into his analysis, as well 
                                                 
31 “[A]t S structure”, Bars and Lasnik add. 43 
as  to  demonstrate  that  the  asymmetries  observed  by  Bars  and  Lasnik  in  V NP NP 
constructions were also present in V NP PP structures, as is shown in the following 
examples  (from  Snyder  2003:7 15),  where  (a)  and  (b)  instantiate  double  object 
constructions and (c) and (d) their prepositional counterparts. 
(23)  Anaphor binding 
a.  I showed John him/himself (in the mirror). 
b.  *I showed himself John (in the mirror). 
c.  I showed Mary to herself. 
d.  *I showed herself to Mary. 
(24)  Quantifier binding 
a.  I denied every worker his paycheck. 
b.  *I denied its owner every paycheck. 
c.  I gave every check to its owner. 
d.  ??I gave his paycheck to every worker. 
 
Breaking with the then current (i.e. lexical) view of the variants, Larson returns to 
the transformational version of Dative Shift, suggesting that the structure underlying 
ditransitives and their prepositional paraphrases is the same, the former derived from the 
latter.  As  stated  earlier,  the  aim  of  his  article  is  to  account  for  Bars  and  Lasnik’s 
observations, so he is out to demonstrate how (regardless of the semantics of the NPs in 
question) NP1 asymmetrically c commands NP2 (but not the other way around), in both 
the double object constructions as well as in their prepositional paraphrases.  44 
Larson’s structure for John gave a book to Mary looks like this: 
  VP1 
Spec  V’ 
V  VP2 
NP1  V’ 
V  PP 
NP2 
e 
a book 
give 
P 
Mary  to   
Figure 13 
The  above  structure  which  Larson  claims  was  first  proposed  in  Chomsky 
(1975)  later became known as a VP shell, so called because of the embedding of a 
VP (VP2) within a higher one (VP1). VP shells provide GB with a structure consistent 
with the binary branching requirement.  
In this type of structure, a verb like give is split into two parts: Ouhalla (1999:141) 
calls the higher one (i.e. e in Figure 13 above) a ‘light verb’ and the lower one ‘an 
impoverished version of the verb itself.’ As we can see in Figure 14 below, the empty 
element that is used (ti) is a trace of the main predicate of (the highest) V’ itself.  
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  VP1 
Spec  V’ 
V  VP2 
NP1  V’ 
V  PP 
NP2 
givei 
a book 
ti 
P 
Mary  to   
Figure 14 
Give raises to an empty V position, in order to assign Case to the NP a book, thus 
allowing a book (NP1) to asymmetrically c command Mary (NP2), a fact which is in 
accordance with Bars and Lasnik’s observations. Some problems remain: why is the 
direct object (i.e. NP1) placed in a typical subject position, namely Spec of VP? The 
above representation seems to state that ‘a book’ is more a subject than a complement. 
On a different note, Figure 14 above entails that give takes the complement to 
Mary, forming a constituent give to Mary. Larson claims that the verb and its outer 
complements  form  “a  single  thematic  complex”,  and  quotes
32  the  existence  of 
discontinuous idioms like send __ to the showers and take __ to task as evidence.  
Larson’s version of Dative Shift shares some characteristics with Passive. Both 
syntactic operations involve moving one NP upwards in the tree a recipient in Dative 
Shift, a patient in the Passive and “demoting” one NP theme in Dative Shift, agent 
in Passive. The transformation in question is a three step process:  
 
                                                 
32 From Emonds (1972). 46 
•  With the structure in Figure 13 as starting point, first give moves to e as before; the 
transformation then absorbs the Case assigned to Mary within PP, to is absorbed and 
to Mary becomes Mary; this results in Figure 15; 
 
  VP 1 
S pec  V’ 
V  VP2 
NP  V’ 
V 
e 
a book 
give 
NP 
Mary   
Figure 15 
•  the theta role assigned to a book is demoted, the argument moving (downwards and 
leftwards) to adjunct position;  
 
  VP1 
S pec  V’ 
V  VP2 
e 
NP 
a book 
V’ 
V 
give 
NP  
M ary 
t  V’ 
 
Figure 16 47 
•  Mary undergoes NP movement to the position vacated by a book, thus obtaining 
Case from give, which had raised into V head position. 
 
  V P 1 
Spe c  V ’ 
V   V P 2 
N P   V ’ 
giv ei 
M aryj 
V   N P 
tj  t i 
N P  V ’ 
a bo ok 
 
Figure 17 
In  the  resulting  structure  (Figure  18  below),  Mary  (originally  NP2,  now  NP1) 
asymmetrically c commands a book (originally NP1, now NP2), again in keeping with 
Bars and Lasnik’s observations.  
 
  VP1 
Spec  V’ 
V  VP2 
NP  V’ 
givei 
Maryj 
V  NP 
tj  ti 
NP  V’ 
a book 
 
Figure 18 48 
In accounting for the source of Case for the two NPs, Larson resorts to the idea 
that  transitive  structure  involves  two  Objective  Cases,  one  structural  and  another 
inherent. Ditransitives represent an instance where the two Cases —by some mysterious 
process which Larson fails to explain— are “pulled apart” and are assigned to different 
arguments. He assumes that Infl is also a Case assigner, and a very special one at that, 
since it can assign Case only indirectly, by means of a ‘host’ V. If V governs and is 
adjacent to the Case recipient, then Infl discharges its structural Objective Case. The 
process is illustrated in Figure 19 below:  
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Figure 19 
Structural Case is assigned to Mary by Infl via the higher V. Having Infl assigning 
Case is quite a departure from more traditional views within transformational grammar, 
and has earned Larson little sympathy among advocates of the same theory. 
On the other hand, Case assignment to a book is licensed by V’ Reanalysis, a 
process whereby a V’ with an undischarged theta role becomes a V. In the above graph, 
the outer NP complement a book is thus the sister of a V (no longer V’) node, the 
canonical configuration of direct objects, and therefore gets Case from this node. 
This very idiosyncratic analysis made Larson the target of vitriolic criticism from 
some of his GB colleagues, notably from Jackendoff. It is perhaps worth noticing that 
much of the argument between Larson and Jackendoff revolved not around linguistic 
data  but  around  “what  theoretical  construct  in  generative  grammar  is  preferable  to 
analyze the distributional facts” (Croft 2001:42 44). 49 
Jackendoff takes Larson to task on a number of counts: 
•  Larson’s  claim  that  a  book  to  Mary  is  a  constituent  is  based  on  evidence  from 
conjunction, i.e. sentences such as: 
(25)  John gave [a book to Mary] and [a croissant to Peggy].  
 
However, Gapping accounts for conjuncts which are superficially constituents; for 
example (Jackendoff 1990:439): 
(26)  a.  On Tuesday, we’ll visit Harry, and on Thursday, Ralph. 
b.  At 6:00, Sue came, and at 7:00, Fred. 
c.  Bill hates Harry and Henry, Ralph. 
 
Jackendoff goes on to say that given that Gapping can unite non constituents, it is 
conceivable  that  Larson’s  examples  (see  above)  are  also  cases  of  non constituents 
joined by Gapping. 
 
•  The assumption that give assigns two theta roles violates the standard version of the 
Theta Criterion (Chomsky 1981), which requires a one to one match of syntactic 
arguments and theta roles. 
•  Larson’s  analysis  assumes  that  theta assignment  is  not  complete  in  D structure. 
Only after the verb raises does it assign its Agent role to the NP in the Spec of the 
higher V position. 
•  Larson’s view (1988:345fn.) that time and manner PPs are not “outermost adjuncts 
(...) but rather must be innermost complements” neutralizes the structural distinction 
between arguments and modifiers. This will be discussed in more depth in chapter 
3.
33 
 
Let us return at this point to other authors who have also made ingenious use of 
empty categories. Aoun and Li (1989) present a variation of Larson’s analysis which 
incorporates a small clause (just like in Kayne’s analysis) and an empty verb denoting 
possession,  in  keeping  with  the  already  mentioned  possession  relation  perceived  in 
Green (1974). Their analysis can therefore account both for the possession element and 
inasmuch as their analysis is largely inspired by Larson’s for Bars and Lasnik’s 
asymmetries as well.  
                                                 
33 This provides justification for Croft’s claim (2001:42 44) that the Larson Jackendoff debate is a case of 
“language internal methodological opportunism”. 50 
In Aoun and Li’s acount (in keeping with Larson’s work), the relation obtaining 
between  a  double  object  construction  and  its  prepositional  paraphrase  is  held  to  be 
transformational, except that the double object clause is taken as the one being base 
generated. Another difference with Larson’s account is that the empty element is not a 
trace of the main verb, it is an empty verb which stays empty. Case is assigned to NP1 
by the main verb, and to NP2 by the empty verb, in both cases under adjacency. Their 
mechanism is in Figure 20 below: 
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Figure 20 
Empty  categories  have  also  been  assigned  a  slightly  different  job  in  related 
proposals,  such  as  Baker’s.  This  author  draws  an  analogy  between  applicative 
constructions and Dative Shift. An applicative construction is a type of double object 
construction  frequently  found  in  Bantu  languages.  Applicatives  change  grammatical 
functions. An applicative affix on the verb encodes as objects a range of roles, e.g. 
benefactive  and  locative.  By  means  of  applicative  constructions,  locative,  goal, 
benefactives, or instrumental obliques can become objects. In other words, applicatives 
allow an oblique (usually a prepositional phrase) to become the ‘object’ of the clause it 
appears in. 51 
Consider the following example from Chichewa (Baker 1988:229): 
(27)  Mbidzi zi na    perek a    msampha kwa nkhandwe. 
zebras SP PAST hand AS    trap      to     fox 
‘The zebras handed the trap to the fox.’ 
(28)  Mbidzi zi na    perek er a  nkhandwe msampha. 
zebras SP PAST hand to ASP   fox       trap 
‘The zebras handed the fox the trap.’
34 
 
In (27), the verbs (both in the Chichewa example and in the English gloss) take a 
PP complement and a NP complement. In (28), the Chichewa verb is morphologically 
complex, appearing with an applicative suffix ( er). Also, a second NP replaces the 
former PP complement. 
Incorporation is the process whereby one word is moved by syntactic rules to a 
new position ‘inside’ another word. Preposition Incorporation (PI) is a movement rule 
that  takes  a  preposition  out  of  a  prepositional  phrase  and  plants  it  inside  a  verb. 
Applicative constructions can be seen as instances of PI. 
Baker  (1988)  considers  sentences  such  as  John  gave  Mary  a  book  to  be 
applicative  constructions  derived  by  Preposition  Incorporation,  despite  their  not 
exhibiting  an  applicative  morpheme.  The  only  difference  between  Preposition 
Incorporation and Dative Shift structures is that, in the case of a closed set of verbs 
(which  focus  on  goal  or  benefactive  arguments),  the  preposition  is  morphologically 
invisible  but  nonetheless  syntactically  present.  This  seems  like  the  prototypical 
definition  of  an  empty  category,  only  in  Baker’s  account  we  have  a  trace  of  an 
incorporated preposition. As illustration, the process starts in Figure 21 and ends in 
Figure 22. 
                                                 
34 SP refers to a subject agreement prefix, PAST to past tense, and ASP to a marker of aspect or mood. 52 
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Figure 21 
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Figure 22 
Preposition  Incorporation  automatically  changes  government  and  Case 
assignment relationships, such that the NP stranded by the incorporated P behaves like a 
standard object in many ways, in particular with respect to government and Case theory. 
The similarity in the behaviour of the two resulting NPs, however, is not to be confused 
with  identity.  The  moved  P  leaves  a  trace,  which  still  heads  a  PP  containing  the 
thematically oblique NP. The correct structure for a dative shifted sentence is Figure 23, 
not Figure 24: 
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S
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NP V PP
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Figure 23 
S
VP NP
NP V NP
V P
 
Figure 24 
Baker remarks that what recommends his account over others is that the process is 
productive and morphologically visible in other languages. On the other hand, binary 
branching and adjacency are not taken into account, and Bars and Lasnik’s asymmetries 
are not answered.
35 
It has been mentioned that Green (1974) has shown that a constant element in the 
meaning of double object constructions in English is a possession relation that holds 
between  the  first  and  the  second  NPs.  Johnson  (1991)  posits  a  null  element  π 
embodying that possession. He does not specify what this element is, but it seems to 
correspond to an empty verb, and thus places Johnson among the advocates of small 
clause structure. The two NPs form a small clause, in which NP1 is in a subject like 
relation to NP2. The empty verb has a Case relation with NP2. It is worth noting that 
                                                 
35 For a similar treatment of empty elements incorporating into the verb, see Pesetsky (1995). 54 
Johnson’s postulation of this null element is just a cog in his very complex theoretical 
machinery. 
2.2.2.4 The Minimalist Program (MP) 
Minimalism  is  the  latest  of  Chomsky’s  projects,  drawing  on  concepts  from  his  late 
1980s  papers,  such  as  Full  Interpretation  and  Economy  of  Representation  and 
Derivation. Briefly expressed, the Principle of Full Interpretation states that there are no 
redundant elements in a sentence, whereas the Principle of Economy requires that all 
representations (and processes used to derive them) be as economical as possible. 
Cook  and  Newson  (1996:318)  mention  that  Minimalism  improved  on  certain 
areas of GB which were becoming more and more unsustainable, for example the idea 
of  inflectional  elements  lowering  onto  the  verb.  Under  the  Minimalist  Program,  an 
already ‘inflected’ Verb is inserted in the tree, which means that the verb does not have 
to move anywhere to become inflected. The inflectional nodes perform the function of 
‘checking’ that the inserted Verb has the appropriate features when it moves into them. 
‘Checking’ a feature cancels it out so that it does not reach the expression stage. Cook 
and  Newson  (1996:329)  observe  that  in  the  Minimalist  Program,  “Case marking  is 
reduced to Case checking.” 
It is not just verbs that check their features, the same applies to NPs (or DPs, as 
they are now called). These phrases have Case features in their original positions, and 
have to raise to the specifier position of an agreement projection to check them off. For 
example,  nominative  DPs  need  to  raise  to  Spec  of  AgrSP  (Subject  Agreement 
Projection) in order to check their nominative case head feature.  
The same is true of objective DPs, who also have to climb up the tree to their own 
Spec  of  AgrOP  (Object  Agreement  Projection).  When  two  objects  are  involved  as 
internal arguments of a verb, both direct and indirect objects must check their features 
off by moving to their projection of Spec of AgrP. Thus, DPs carrying dative Case also 
raise to check their Case feature to the Spec position within an IO agreement projection 
(AgrIOP) which is positioned immediately above AgrOP. To finalise matters, the verb 
in question must raise first to adjoin to AgrO (a direct object agreement morpheme), 
then  to  AgrIO  (an  indirect  object  agreement  morpheme),  and  finally  to  v.
36  The 
operations I have just described are exemplified and illustrated by Radford (1997) over 
many pages; his final tree for the sentence The crew handed back the passengers their 
passports look something like this: 
                                                 
36 VP shells are still present in the MP. Notice also the DP occurring in Spec of vp. 55 
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Figure 25
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The  greater  complexity  is  supposed  to  compensate  for  the  possibility  of 
maintaining the position that “case checking in English canonically involves a spec 
head  relation  between  a  functional  (agreement)  head  and  its  specifier”  (Radford 
1997:60).
38 
2.2.2.5 Relational Grammar 
Although  not  strictly  part  of  the  Transformational  Grammar  framework,  Relational 
Grammar is widely considered an offshoot of TG. Recall that in TG, notions such as 
‘subject’ and ‘object’ are defined structurally: i.e. ‘subject’ and ‘object’ can be read off 
a tree, and are thus derived entities. Aspects defines ‘subject’ as the first NP of an S, and 
‘object’ as the first NP of a VP.  
However, in Relational Grammar (RG), the grammatical relations (subject, direct 
object,  and  indirect  object)  play  a  central  role  in  grammatical  description,  and  are 
regarded as universal, undefined primitives of grammatical theory. That is, grammatical 
relations  cannot  be  defined  in  terms  of  other  notions  such  as  word  order,  phrase 
structure  configurations,  or  case  marking.  To  illustrate  the  difference  between  a 
transformational and a RG approach, consider the following example from Perlmutter 
and Postal (1983a:84).  
                                                 
37 Example from Radford (1997), p.243. 
38 Mention should also be made (in passing, at least) of a generative study of a ditransitive verbs, namely 
Anagnostopoulos (2001). In this study, the generativist theoretical apparatus (e.g. VP shells and light 
verbs)  is  applied  by  the  book,  with  no  forthcoming  theoretical  innovation  and/or  criticism  of  the 
framework. 56 
(29)  a.  I sent the machine to Marie. 
b.  I sent the machine to Paris. 
TG would analyse both (29)a and (29)b as having PP constituents attached to 
either the clause or the VP levels. However, in RG terms, the relation of Marie to the 
clause in (29)a is called the ‘indirect object relation’ (or rather, ‘3’), while Paris in 
(29)b has a different relation to the clause, namely ‘directional element,’ or ‘Dir.’ A 
clause  is  thus  a  network  of  grammatical  relations,  and  not  simply  a  string  of 
constituents, or phrase structure markers. 
One of the main arguments for the necessity of this theory is its concern with a 
universal base, and the ease with which it deals with phenomena which have proved to 
be very difficult to tackle from a TG perspective. Accounting for phenomena such as 
passivisation is easier in terms of grammatical relations (which are quite stable across 
languages) than in terms of word order (which is much less stable cross linguistically). 
Perlmutter (1980:213) remarks in this respect:  
It has turned out that when grammatical constructions are conceived of in terms 
of  grammatical  relations,  the  same  constructions  reappear  in  language  after 
language,  although  the  languages  in  question  differ  with  respect  to  other 
properties, such as word order and case marking patterns. 
Still in keeping with its transformational origins, RG recognises two levels or 
‘strata,’ an initial one quite analogous to deep structure, and a final one which is arrived 
at  by  means  of  operations  called  ‘revaluations’,  or  thinly  disguised  transformations. 
Revaluations change the grammatical function of a constituent, and among them we 
find subject promotion (a.k.a. passive in other frameworks), which converts an object 
into a subject.  
RG recognizes the following grammatical relations: subject, direct object, indirect 
object,  and  a  number  of  oblique  relations  such  as  directional,  instrumental,  and 
benefactive. Subject, direct object, and indirect object are called ‘terms’ and are also 
referred to by means of numbers (1, 2, and 3, respectively). The concept chômeur —a 
French word for ‘unemployed’ or ‘idle’— denotes the relation held by nominals which 
are displaced from term status, i.e. from the scheme of basic complement relations. 
Perlmutter and Postal (1983b:12) state that the assignment of such labels as ‘subject’, 
‘object,’  etc.  to  the  nominals  in  question  is  ‘universally  determined  by  principles 
referring to the semantic role of the nominal’ [my italics]. 
And what about indirect objects? Consider the following pair. 57 
(30)  a.  John gave a book to Mary. 
b.  John gave Mary a book. 
 
The  RG  ‘indirect  object’  refers  to  the  recipient  in  (30)a,  i.e.  to  Mary.  The 
construction with to is held to reflect the initial grammatical relations directly, and thus 
has only one stratum, as illustrated in Figure 26 below. 
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Figure 26 
The first object of (30)b (i.e. Mary) is not considered to be an ‘indirect object’ in 
RG, in that it involves the promotion of an initial indirect object to direct object (or ‘3 
to 2 advancement’), and the demotion of the initial direct object to chômeur. This can 
only be so if the clause in question involves two strata.  
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Figure 27 
The  RG  analysis  of  ditransitive  constructions  is  remarkably  similar  to  the  old 
Dative Movement transformation. From an RG perspective, only prepositional phrases 
such  as  to  Mary  are  considered  indirect  objects,  their  noun  phrase  counterparts  in 
ditransitive complementation being regarded as direct objects. From different quarters, 
Givón (1993:95) also seems to subscribe to the prepositional nature of indirect objects 
in English, the preposition marking the semantic role of the participant occupying the 
indirect object grammatical role. 58 
From the point of view of semantic roles, we find that recipients or benefactives 
can be encoded either as noun phrases or as prepositional phrases (see above). Faltz 
(1978:78) proposes that roles which utilize the strategy that marks them as direct objects 
(i.e noun phrases) are indeed direct objects, whereas roles that utilize the strategy that 
marks them as obliques (i.e. prepositional phrases) are in fact true obliques.
39 Therefore, 
there is no such thing as a (noun phrase) indirect object in English. 
The facts offered in support of the RG analysis have to do with passivisation, 
since RG considers that it is the first object but not the second that can be the subject of 
a corresponding passive: 
(31)  a.  Mary was given a book by John. 
b.  *A book was given Mary by John. 
 
The kind of sentence represented by (31)b has been frowned upon and asterisked 
by many linguists. Hudson (1990:337 338) mentions that although these sentences are 
fine for some speakers (among them Jaeggli 1986, Zwicky 1987), it is often assumed 
that everyone rejects them.
40 
Dryer (1986) came up with a different idea. He breaks with RG orthodoxy by 
suggesting  it  is  the  double  object  construction  (i.e.  V+NP+NP)  that  is  the  basic 
sentence, their prepositional counterpart being derived by demoting the first object to 
peripheral status, as can be seen by its being marked by a preposition.
41 This demotion 
of notional indirect objects to final chômeurs he calls ‘Antidative’.
42 
                                                 
39 Faltz later admits in a footnote that indirect objects of the oblique type sometimes manifest syntactic 
properties which set them apart from other obliques. Specifically, oblique indirect objects (and not other 
obliques) must follow the direct object, a situation which seems to highlight the fact that oblique indirect 
objects straddle the boundary between complements and adjuncts in English. 
40 However, this does not make the use of an asterisk a less useful tool in syntactic argumentation. 
41 Palmer (1994:171) mentions that even if to can indicate demotion, “there is no marker [indicating 
demotion] in the verb, and, more importantly, (...) if the double Object form is considered basic, the first 
Object  ought  to  have  the  characteristics  of  the  single,  prototypical  Object”,  and  as  Hudson  (1992) 
demonstrated, this is far from being the case. Croft (1991:296 fn) also levels some criticism at Dryer’s 
proposal, when he notes that in ditransitive constructions, although the possessor (recipient argument) 
precedes the possessed (theme argument), it is the possessor that requires a preposition if one of the 
arguments is absent: 
i.  He gives $50 every year. 
ii.  Our relatives give *us / to us every Christmas. 
42 In his analysis, Dryer (1986) introduces the terms Primary Object and Secondary Object. Secondary 
Object (SO) refers only to the second object (i.e. the direct object) in a double object construction, while 
Primary Object (PO) refers both to the first object (indirect object) of a double object construction, and to 
the only object (direct object) of a monotransitive clause. Notice that this classification is carried out in 
terms of the position of the objects in the clause, thus severing the link between objects and semantic 
roles. In other words, a Primary Object is the one found immediately after the verb, regardless of whether 
the clause is monotransitive or ditransitive. In the former case the PO will be a Patient (theme); in the 
latter, it will be a Recipient (beneficiary). By contrast, a Secondary Object will always have another 
object between its position and the verb, and will always be a Patient (theme) in a ditransitive clause. 59 
Dryer  claims  his  analysis  is  supported:  (a)  by  the  fact  that  the  double  object 
construction  is  the  preferred  alternative  across  languages,  and  should  therefore  be 
analysed as having only a single stratum (no revaluations); and (b) by analogy with 
passivisation, where the demotion of a core relation (subject) to peripheral status is 
clearly marked by a preposition (by). Hence, demotion in the case of an indirect object 
in  a  double  object  construction  is  similar  to  passive,  and  it  is  also  marked  by  a 
preposition,  namely  to.  As  regards  Benefactives  marked  by  for,  Dryer  (1986:838) 
returns to the traditional RG account, treating sentences like John bought a book for 
Mary as basic.  
Dryer’s  proposal  —says  Blake  (1990:55 57)—  is  “essentially  a  return  to  the 
traditional  analysis  (...),  and  captures  the  fact  that  the  recipient  normally  takes 
precedence over the patient and the fact that the patient retains grammatical privileges 
even when the recipient takes precedence”. 
Relational Grammar has been taken to task by various authors. The standard RG 
account  of  ditransitive  constructions  quite  obviously  conflicts  with  the  traditional 
analysis in which the first object of the double object construction is called the indirect 
object  and  the  second  the  direct  object.  Allerton  (1982:82)  voices  his  criticism  by 
pointing out that the relation between John gave Mary a book and John gave a book to 
Mary  is  —in  his  opinion,  at  least—  a  minor  stylistic  variation,  in  that  even  if  the 
sequence of elements is inverted and a preposition is either inserted or deleted, both 
objects remain to the right of the verb, there is no change in verb agreement, no need for 
extra  verbal  auxiliaries,  no  change  in  grammatical  case,  and  no  change  in  the 
obligatoriness of elements. He concludes: “[i]t therefore seems unrealistic to follow RG 
in regarding a prepositional phrase as being ‘promoted’ to object position only when it 
is fronted and loses its preposition” (Allerton 1982:74). 
A more radical criticism of RG is made by Bhat (1991:158), who starting from 
the title of his book makes no bones about his opinion of grammatical relations. This 
author considers that RG (together with LFG) has failed to realise that grammatical 
relations are theoretical constructs meant only to “mak[e] our descriptions of language 
more explicit,” and that language in and of itself does not require their presence, even if 
some theories do. 
2.2.3 Semantic and Cognitive Approaches 
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the emergence and convergence of various 
cognitive  approaches  to  linguistic  problems.  Lakoff  (1987:xi)  refers  to  this  new 60 
framework  as  one  that  “brings  together  what  is  known  about  the  mind  from  many 
academic  disciplines:  psychology,  linguistics,  anthropology,  and  computer  science”. 
The overarching claim is that language is based on cognition.  
The approach can be illustrated in terms of certain definitional characteristics. 
Language is considered to be a conceptual network. Cognitive approaches do not allow 
for different levels of grammar such as deep and surface structure and therefore 
transformations or their functional equivalents are ruled out. Language is conceptualised 
as  a  symbolic  system,  designed  to  express  meanings  produced  by  the  cognitive 
processes of human beings, with human experiences of the world feeding into these 
cognitive processes.  Linguistic categories  are assumed to have the characteristics of 
prototypes, and to be thus defined with reference to ‘best examples’ rather than in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
Many authors have worked and work within this framework. In this and the next 
sections we will concern ourselves mainly with the works of George Lakoff, Ronald 
Langacker, Richard Hudson and Adele Goldberg. If language is part of cognition, it 
follows that language structure is a special form of cognitive structure. This assumption 
has been exploited in this framework by different authors in different ways, but mostly 
by claiming a relationship of identity between linguistic structure (constructions being 
perhaps the most obvious example) and cognitive structure (e.g. the notion of schemas). 
Shibatani (1996:165) mentions that: 
[t]he notion of schema is familiar to those who are exposed to the rudiments of 
cognitive psychology. The idea is that we tend to interpret the world according 
to preconceived notions and principles, sometimes imposing information or a 
particular structure that is not even there. 
Charles Fillmore (1977) introduces the notion of ‘perspective’ or ‘schema’ 
on a scene, by which he means an organization imposed on the semantic content of an 
utterance,  a  way  in  which  the  speaker  conceptualizes  an  external,  non linguistic 
situation. Fillmore (1977:73) even goes on to say that “[t]he study of semantics is the 
study of the cognitive scenes that are created or activated by utterances”. By appealing 
to the identity between conceptual and linguistic structure, Lakoff (1987:68) can claim 
that “the structure of language can be compared to the structure of cognitive models”, 
and postulate the existence of idealized cognitive models (ICMs), which are pairs of 
form content. Coming from a different perspective, Langacker (1987, 1991) talks of 
‘symbolic assemblies’ or ‘sentence schemas’ that have become ‘entrenched’ through 
repeated use. 61 
In turn, Goldberg (1995:5) also identifies cognitive and linguistic structure when 
asserting  that  “[s]imple  clause  constructions  are  associated  directly  with  semantic 
structures which reflect scenes basic to human experience.” In the next sections we will 
see how these different and, at the same time, similar conceptions have been further 
elaborated. 
2.2.3.1 Cognitive Grammar 
Syntax has its basis in a codification of semantic relationships. (P.H. Matthews 
1982:124) 
Cognitive Grammar (CG) is a theory of language structure which is embedded in a 
theory of human knowledge. Modular views of language have long been paying lip 
service to the idea of linguistics as an integral part of a larger psychological enterprise, 
while  simultaneously  holding  that  language  is  different  from  everything  else.  CG 
opposes  this  idea,  claiming  that  language  knowledge  is  just  a  particular  kind  of 
knowledge, and is closely integrated with the rest of cognition. Linguistic knowledge is 
claimed to share the cognitive structures found in other kinds of knowledge. 
Another point in which CG clashes with the Chomskyan paradigm is in its stance 
on the so called ‘autonomy of syntax’ issue. On the second page of his monumental 
‘Foundations of Cognitive Grammar’, Langacker, one of the founding fathers of CG, 
states  with  programmatic  force  that  “[g]rammar  (or  syntax)  does  not  constitute  an 
autonomous  formal  level  of  representation.  Instead,  grammar  is  symbolic  in  nature, 
consisting in the conventional symbolization of semantic structure” [my italics]. 
This quote also gives a clear indication of CG’s stand on the role of grammar in 
language.  CG  sees  grammar  as  a  means  whereby  cognitive  content  is  given 
(phonological)  shape.  By  linking  semantics  and  phonology,  the  role  of  grammar  is 
merely ‘symbolic,’ limited to the structuring and symbolization of conceptual content. 
By the same token, syntax and semantics are also yoked together. The units in language 
are ‘signs’, construed as pairings of sound and meaning. 
Transformations, or indeed different levels of representation, are not allowed in 
CG’s framework. As regards indirect objects, Langacker points out that while they are 
closely  associated  with  particular  semantic  roles  (recipient  with  verbs  of  transfer, 
addressee  with  verbs  of  communication;  see  below),  the  nominals  which  instantiate 
these roles often do not provide solid grammatical clues as to the distinct grammatical 
relation they represent. 62 
Let’s consider the following examples. 
(32)  a.  John sent the book to Mary. 
b.  John sent Mary the book. 
 
(33)  a.  John nailed the notice to the wall. 
b.  *John nailed the wall the notice. 
(34)  a.  John delivered the book to Mary. 
b.  *John delivered Mary the book. 
 
From  a  strictly  syntactic  point  of  view,  Mary  in  (32)a  is  a  nominal  that  can 
participate in Dative Shift (i.e. move to an immediate postverbal position and lose the 
preposition), and as such can be said to be an indirect object. From the same viewpoint, 
the wall in (33)a is not an indirect object, given the impossibility of (33)b. Notice that 
analysing  each  sentence  in  isolation  gives  us  no  grounds  to  think  that  Mary  is  an 
(oblique) object in (32)a while being an indirect object in (32)b. It is only when we 
compare the two that we can arrive at a separate notion of indirect objecthood.  
However,  this  comparison  is  not  always  possible,  as  sentences  (34)a b  show. 
While (34)a is semantically parallel to (32)a, so that Mary can be regarded as an indirect 
object, the impossibility of (34)b leaves this analysis without grammatical support.  
Langacker (1991:326) states CG’s position regarding indirect objects clearly: he 
believes that the alternation shown in sentences (32)a b has to be regarded as “simply a 
matter of coexisting constructions”. Mary is thus considered to be the direct object in 
(32)b, not an indirect object “masquerading” as a direct object. This belief has more 
than a passing resemblance to the stance of RG and Givón’s regarding indirect 
objects. 
Despite this syntactic lack of cohesion, Langacker believes that indirect objects 
nonetheless evidence clear semantic consistency. To understand this consistency, we 
need to have a look at his modelling of the connections among the typical semantic 
roles in a ditransitive clause. 63 
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AGENT EXPERIENCER
INSTRUMENT THEME  
Figure 28: Semantic roles in ditransitives
43 
The  sequence  AG===>INSTR===>TH  constitutes  an  action  chain,  indicating 
transfer of energy, as opposed to the relationship EXPER    >TH, which is not an action 
chain (there is no transfer of energy), but rather corresponds to a conceptual relationship 
in which the experiencer establishes mental contact with the theme. Finally, agent and 
theme are drawn with heavy lines to suggest their cognitive salience. The import of 
Figure 28 will become clearer in the next paragraph. 
Langacker defines indirect objects as active experiencers in the target domain. An 
experiencer is placed in the target domain because (in contrast with the agent and the 
instrument) it does not transfer energy to another participant. The agent is obviously an 
active participant in that it initiates an interaction. Not so immediately obvious, the 
experiencer is also an active participant, inasmuch as “there must be some respect in 
which its initiative capacity is called into play, or in which it is distinguished from a 
thematic direct object” (Langacker 1991:328).
44 For example, in the sentence John gave 
Mary the book, the action chain is initiated by the agent (John); the agent transmits 
energy to the patient or theme  (the book) using the unexpressed instrument (John’s 
hand?) as an intermediary. The experiencer (Mary) initiates a mental interaction with 
the patient of the action chain. As a result, the experiencer (Mary) recognizes that she 
will be the beneficiary of the action of giving.  
Figure  28  should  be  interpreted  as  being  part  of  the  larger  CG  picture  of  the 
interaction between cognitive and grammatical meaning. Cognitive Grammar equates 
meaning with conceptualization. Langacker believes that in every sentence there are two 
major areas of cognitive prominence, two positions at which the spotlights of syntactic 
                                                 
43 Figure based on Langacker (1991), p.326. 
44 Nilsen (1972) also analyses the basic roles in terms of binary oppositions. For instance, agent and 
instrument are respectively understood to be animate and inanimate ‘causes;’ and experiencer and patient 
are considered to be animate and inanimate effects. 64 
saliency are aimed. In a simple transitive clause, the subject corresponds to the clausal 
trajector  (or  figure),  the  object  to  the  clausal  landmark  (or  ground),  and  the  verb 
expresses the relationship in which these two elements stand to each other. For example, 
ditransitive  verbs  such  as  give,  receive  and  take  are  closely  related  to  each  other, 
inasmuch as they denote the transfer of a certain entity from one person to another. The 
fact that speakers can choose between three different verbs is explained in CG as the 
result of several cognitive processes governed by different arrangements of figure and 
ground. Langacker (1987:3) points out that grammar  
(...) embodies conventional imagery. By this I mean that it structures a scene in 
a  particular  way  for  purposes  of  linguistic  expression,  emphasizing  certain 
facets of it at the expense of others, viewing it from a certain perspective, or 
construing it in terms of a certain metaphor. 
In  accordance  with  this  statement,  two  sentences  with  the  same  propositional 
content  (and  even  the  same  words)  which  differ  in  their  grammatical  structures  are 
claimed  to  be  semantically  distinct,  precisely  because  of  their  different  symbolic 
structure. Let’s see how this applies in our earlier pair of sentence, repeated here. 
(35)  a.  John sent the book to Mary. 
b.  John sent Mary the book. 
 
Sentence (35)a employs the preposition to, and thus emphasizes the path of the 
book with Mary as goal. In contrast, sentence (35)b emphasizes the possession relation 
which obtains between Mary and the book. In this sentence, the indirect object, rather 
than  the  theme,  is  the  secondary  figure  in  the  clause  (the  primary  figure  being  the 
subject).  The  English  construction  requires  in  particular  that  the  theme’s  movement 
results in a possessive relationship between theme and recipient. Langacker assumes 
that this possessive relationship is symbolized (grammatically) by both the juxtaposition 
and linear ordering of the two nominals.  
Langacker goes on to qualify this difference in meaning: it is not the case that the 
notion of a path is lacking in sentence (35)b, or the notion of possession in sentence 
(35)a:  rather,  it  is  the  relative  salience  of  these  notions  which  differs  in  the  two 
sentences,  a  difference  rooted  in  their  different  grammatical  encoding.  It  is  this 
difference  which  enables  a  speaker  to  present  the  (same)  scene  through  different 
images. 65 
2.2.3.2 Word Grammar 
Word Grammar (WG) has been created and developed by Richard (Dick) Hudson. The 
main  claim  of  this  theory,  as  part  of  a  larger  cognitive  grammar  enterprise,  is  that 
language is a conceptual network, linking —and incorporating into the analysis of a 
sentence— not just words but a vast array of different kinds of knowledge. The analysis 
is monostratal, i.e. there is no recourse either to deep and surface structures, as in TG, or 
to strata as in RG. Nonetheless, WG is related to RG in that both theories consider 
syntactic  structure  to  be  based  on  grammatical  relations,  rather  than  on  constituent 
structure (Hudson 1990:10 11). Thus, concepts such as ‘subject’ and ‘object’ do not 
need to be read off a tree —as in TG— for two main reasons: (a) there are no trees, (b) 
grammatical relations are explicitly shown. 
The  two  main  tenets  of  the  theory  are  dependency  structure  and  default 
inheritance.  Dependency  structure  is  essential  to  WG,  inasmuch  as  WG  is  a  theory 
which does not recognise phrases, the longest unit admitted being the word. Syntactic 
structure is thus handled in terms of relations between single words. Also, dependency 
structure allows WG to incorporate grammatical functions into the syntactic analysis, 
since they are all sub divisions of ‘dependent’. 
The  concept  of  default  inheritance  —which  states  that  “words  inherit  all  the 
characteristics  of  a  super category  unless  these  are  overridden”—  is  a  very  useful 
mechanism  both  for  making  generalisations,  and  for  capturing  the  contrast  between 
kernel  (i.e.  unmarked  or  underlying)  sentence  patterns,  and  marked  ones.  Default 
inheritance is allowed for by an important relationship which obtains between words, 
and in general between nodes, namely the ‘isa’ relationship, whereby the lexical form 
‘dog’ isa (i.e. is linked to the meaning ) ‘animal’ and the lexeme DOG isa common 
noun. 
A WG analysis of a sentence is basically, in Hudson’s words (1990:12 13), “an 
analysis of each word, in terms of a hierarchy (...) of word categories, plus an analysis 
of  each  word’s  relations  to  at  least  one  other  word,  again  done  in  a  hierarchy  of 
categories  (namely,  relational  categories)”.  The  WG  hierarchy  of  categories  is 
illustrated in Figure 29 below. 
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head dependent
complement adjunct predependent
subject preadjunct etc. indirect object particle etc.  
Figure 29 
In Figure 29 we can find different functions, ranging from the most general ones, 
such  as  ‘head’  and  ‘dependent’,  through  general  subtypes  of  dependents  like 
‘complement’  and  ‘adjunct’,  to  particular  functions  like  ‘object’,  a  type  of 
‘complement’.  This  hierarchy  allows  statements  about  grammatical  functions  to  be 
formulated at different degrees of generality. Default inheritance allows us to state (by 
moving upwards from the bottom of the graph) that if some word is an indirect object of 
a verb, it is automatically a complement, and a dependent as well, of that verb. 
Hudson  (1992:266 268)  mentions  that  an  indirect  object  is  a  very  typical 
complement. It is an noun phrase;
45 it can passivise; it is limited to only one occurrence 
per verb; it is (usually) required by the verb’s subcategorization properties; and it occurs 
next  to  the  verb.  All  these  characteristics  of  prototypical  complements  will 
automatically  be  inherited  by  indirect  objects  if  we  classify  them  as  a  kind  of 
complement in an ‘isa’ hierarchy. A clear illustration of how this is done is found in 
Figure 30 below. 
 
John gave Mary a book
indirect object subject
predependent complement complement
dependent dependent dependent
 
Figure 30 
                                                 
45  WG’s  definition  of  indirect  object  is  strictly  syntactic,  as  opposed  to  semantic.  A  prepositional 
paraphrase,  even  if  semantically  similar  to  an  indirect  object,  falls  outside  this  definition,  and  is 
considered instead a prepositional object. 67 
2.2.3.3 Construction Grammar 
Traditionally, the object of grammar has been considered to be the “description and 
analysis  of  structures  (...)  in  terms  of  recurrent  patterns  (...)”  (Robins  1964:190). 
However, during the second half of the twentieth century, the importance of this notion 
of ‘construction’ has been downgraded, mainly as a result of the views emanating from 
the Chomskyan paradigm. From this perspective, constructions were (and still are) seen 
as a by product of the interaction of rules and constraints with the lexicon, and as such 
of no theoretical import due to their lack of explanatory power.
46 
Pioneering work in the field can be found in early Construction Grammar papers 
such as Fillmore et al. (1988) on the let alone construction, as well as Kay (1990) on 
even constructions. Of late, constructions have been resurrected, placed in a different 
framework, and invested with a new significance. In his book Radical Construction 
Grammar,  Croft  (2001:14)  recognises  four  different  strands  in  the  treatment  of 
constructions, represented by the works of Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff, Ronald 
Langacker, and Adele Goldberg. All of these authors have cognitivist proclivities, and 
thus the old construction (a kind of skeleton, an ordered sequence of slots) is now taken 
to represent a unit not just of grammatical but of cognitive value as well. In Taylor’s 
words (1995:197): “[f]or the cognitive linguist (...) syntactic constructions provide some 
of the most compelling evidence for the similar structuring of linguistic categories on 
the one hand, and the categories of non linguistic reality on the other”. 
It  is  thus  not  surprising  that  Construction  Grammar  is  as  a  theory  at 
loggerheads with the central tenets of transformational grammar, and closely related to 
the claims of cognitive linguists. Construction Grammar holds that language is, by and 
large, idiosyncratic, and thus must be learned, i.e. cannot be innate. The theory has been 
described as monostratal (i.e. there is just one level of grammar, no deep or surface 
structure), non derivational (there are no transformations or similar operations
47) and 
non modular (language is considered to be an integral part of cognition).  
Construction  Grammar  holds  that  language  is  a  repertoire  of  constructions  (or 
‘constructicon’). A central implication of the theory is that words and phrases are the 
                                                 
46 A very important aspect of generative grammar from the GB model onwards is the assumption that 
there are no construction specific rules. While early TG had rules (transformations) of e.g. Passive, in GB 
this construction is decomposed into more elementary operations which are motivated without recourse to 
the notion of construction. In Chomsky’s words (2002:94 95): “there aren’t any constructions anyway, no 
passive,  no  raising:  there  is  just  the  option  of  dislocating  something  somewhere  else  under  certain 
conditions, and in certain cases it gives you a question and so on, but the grammatical constructions are 
left as artifacts. In a sense they are real; it is not that there are no relative clauses, but they are a kind of 
taxonomic artifact. (…) It’s the interaction of several things (…).” 
47 As Langacker (1987:46) points out, ‘general structure is almost entirely overt.’ 68 
same basic type of entity: pairings of form and meaning/use. Therefore, both single 
words  and  strings  of  words  are  just  extremes  in  a  continuum,  the  notion  of 
‘construction’ applying then to any grammatical structure, as well as to any lexical item. 
In this view constructions refer to combinatorial processes operating not only across 
word boundaries but morpheme boundaries as well, i.e. word formation processes are 
considered  to  be  within  the  remit  of  Construction  Grammar.
48  Typically,  particular 
sentences instantiate several constructions simultaneously: Elena faxed Ken a letter, for 
example, exemplifies the subject predicate construction, the ditransitive construction, 
the determination construction (i.e. a nominal preceded by a determiner specifying the 
referent,  e.g.  a  letter),  the  past  tense  construction  (fax ed),  as  well  as  the  simple 
morphological constructions which correspond to each word. 
One  of  the  main  tenets  of  Construction  Grammar  is  that  constructions  carry 
unique  semantic,  pragmatic,  and  grammatical  properties  which  are  to  some  extent 
independent  of  the  lexemes  that  instantiate  the  construction  in  question.  Several 
definitions have been proposed of constructions; they all coincide in taking them to be a 
yoking together of a specific semantic structure with an associated formal expression,
49 
very much in keeping with Langacker’s symbolic conception of grammar. Figure 31 
below illustrates the pairing form/meaning. 
 
syntactic properties
morphological properties
phonological properties
semantic properties
pragmatic properties
discourse functional properties
CONSTRUCTION
FORM
symbolic correspondence (link)
(CONVENTIONAL) MEANING
 
Figure 31: Form/meaning pairings
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Goldberg (1992:48) further defines constructions by stating that as is the case 
with idioms the correspondence between form and meaning in a construction is not 
                                                 
48 Croft very graphically illustrates this situation when he claims (2001:17) that “[t]he constructional tail 
has come to wag the syntactic dog.” 
49 For other definitions, see Lakoff (1987:467), Goldberg (1996:31), Fillmore (1988:500 501). 
50 Based on Croft (2001), p.18. 69 
predictable  either  from  the  component  parts,  or  from  knowledge  of  the  rest  of  the 
grammar; i.e. as Croft (2001:18) points out, constructions are at least partially arbitrary. 
As can be seen from Figure 31, the ‘meaning’ part of the construction includes both 
pragmatic and discourse related matters.  
Constructions  are  claimed  to  “reflect  scenes  basic  to  human  experience” 
(Goldberg 1992:4). If we think of them as a cognitive construct, we have to concur with 
Taylor’s view (1995:197) that constructions need to be regarded as prototype categories, 
with some instantiations counting as better examples of the construction than others. 
Both the meaning and the form of a construction have to be stated with reference to 
central cases, so much so that prototype effects become evident. A construction may be 
used to express meanings which differ to a greater or lesser extent from the central 
specification.  
Let us move on to the ditransitive construction. In a widely quoted paper and a 
case of Construction Grammar avant la lettre Gropen et al. (1989:206) establish a 
number of semantic conditions for the acceptability of a ditransitive construction. The 
most important is the one which requires that the (referent of the) indirect object must 
be the prospective possessor of the (referent of the) direct object. Possession is a very 
important  semantic  property  which  determines  the  well formedness  of  ditransitive 
expressions. 
Gropen  et  al.  (1989:206)  posit  a  rather  complex  theory  to  account  for  the 
alternation of complementation patterns. In their view, dative shift turns out to be an 
operation changing semantic structure. Each grammatical construction is made up of 
two parts: the semantic structure itself, and a syntactic argument structure, associated to 
each other “according to universal linking rules” (1989:206). The meanings of the two 
different alternatives is considered to be as follows: 
 
•  Meaning of the prepositional dative: X causes Y to go to Z 
•  Meaning of the double object dative: X causes Z to have Y
51 
 
Following their argument, the dative rule changes one of these structures into the 
other, thus causing a reinterpretation of facts: from understanding an event as causing a 
thing to change location to construing it as causing a person to change their possessions. 
A  problem  with  their  proposal  is  that,  while  providing  a  neat  categorisation  of 
                                                 
51 Evidence for the existence of a difference in meaning between the two constructions can be found from 
the process of generalisation in child language. See Lee (2001:74 78). 70 
alternating and non alternating verbs, it does not actually explain why verbs fall into the 
different classes. 
Anna  Wierzbicka  (1988:359),  not  a  construction  grammarian  herself,  offers  a 
different  analysis  of  the  same  construction.  She  represents  ditransitives  with  the 
following formula: 
 
•  NP1 (human) V (action) NP2 (human) NP3 (concrete) 
 
The  double  object  construction  (or  ‘internal  dative’  in  her  terms)  implies  a 
comparison of NP2 and NP3. A sentence with an internal dative construction has two 
direct objects instead of one, neither of these being a ‘full’ direct object. The presence 
of two ‘objects’ represents an instance of what this author calls ‘divided transitivity’: 
instead of one entity presented as affected by the action, the construction presents two 
entities, each affected to a certain degree.
52 When using a double object construction, 
the speaker’s attention is focused primarily on the effect of the action on the target 
person.
53  
The speaker is thus faced with a choice: will s/he focus on the effect of the action 
on the patient, or will s/he focus on the effect of the action on the target? Wierzbicka 
(1988:363) mentions that English constrains this choice in two ways, by means of what 
she  names  the  target  condition  and  the  patient  condition.  The  target  person  can  be 
focused “upon, over and above” the patient if: 
 
•  the  effect  of  the  action  on  the  target  person  is  tangible,  i.e.  specifiable  and 
potentially desirable (see below for an example);  
•  the effect of the action upon the patient does not involve a drastic change of 
state.  Sentences  like  ?Kill  me  a  spider  are  therefore  unacceptable  for 
Wierzbicka. 
 
‘Exceptions’  to  this  framework  (i.e.  verbs  that  do  not  alternate  between  the 
ditransitive and the prepositional paraphrase constructions) are understood as violations 
of either of the above conditions. To be successful, the ditransitive construction requires 
a specifiable effect of the action on the target, and is incompatible with the presence of a 
                                                 
52 Incidentally, this accounts for the non omissibility of NP3, since a comparison requires two objects to 
be compared. 
53  This  seems  to  be  what  Groefsema  (2001:536  fn.)  has  in  mind  when  stating  that  in  a  ditransitive 
construction we ‘zoom in’ on what happens to the patient, whereas in the prepositional alternant we zoom 
in on the recipient. 71 
component which either implies the relative unimportance of the target or stresses the 
special  importance  of  the  patient.  This  is  the  reason  why  verbs  such  as  announce, 
donate, and select (as opposed to their nearly synonymous counterparts tell, give and 
choose) cannot alternate between the two constructions.  
To  spell  out  the  implications,  Wierzbicka  (1988:373 374)  holds  that  donate 
implies that the target is not really a person but an institution, and as such it is not easy 
to  see  it  significantly  affected  by  a  single  donation,  thereby  violating  the  target 
condition. Announce focuses on the object of the communication, i.e. the focus is on the 
message, therefore we have a violation of the target condition. The fact that it is the 
message that is focused upon can be appreciated from the fact that the addressee can be 
deleted. Lastly, one selects a few items out of many by comparing all the items with one 
another; but one chooses one or more items based on the personal inclination of the 
intended recipient. For example, you may select a wine out of many, but you normally 
do not select your spouse; rather you choose him/her. Select then focuses on the objects 
compared and thus violates the target condition. 
The meanings of these Latinate verbs indicate a different perspective, one which 
is incompatible with the meaning of the construction, and the result —according to this 
account—  has  to  be  infelicitous.
54  This  seems  to  fit  nicely  with  Lakoff’s  dictum 
(1987:582):  “[a]  great  many  syntactic  properties  of  grammatical  constructions  are 
consequences of their meanings”. 
Let’s see how all these theoretical considerations apply to the case of ditransitive 
complementation. A verb can occur in more than one syntactic argument structure, and 
can adapt its meaning, chameleon like, to its syntactic context. To restate the claim, 
each verb carries its own obligatory participant roles (e.g. for the verb to give: giver, 
receiver, thing given), just as every construction carries its own argument roles (e.g. in 
the  ditransitive  construction:  ‘agent’,  ‘recipient’,  ‘patient’),  thereby  specifying  a 
semantic macro structure. For a construction to be felicitous, the roles a verb brings to 
the construction structure must blend (or ‘fuse’) with the roles of the construction itself. 
Additionally,  the  semantic  macro structure  of  the  construction  links  each  of  its 
argument roles with the typical syntactic roles (subject/object/oblique) which instantiate 
it. 
                                                 
54 Groefsema (2001:548) adds that Latinate verbs tend to encode more specific meanings (than Anglo 
Saxon verbs) and are often specifically concerned with the effect of the action described by the verb on 
one  of  the  two  affected  participants  (i.e.  target  and  patient),  whereas  the  effect  on  the  remaining 
participant is covered by the native verb, as observed in pairs such as give donate and tell report. As we 
can see from Wierzbicka’s discussion of donate, announce, and select, these Latinate verbs focus on the 
effect of the action on the patient, and as such are incompatible with the construction’s target condition.  72 
Verbs  can  constrain  the  type  of  constructions  they  can  combine  with  by  their 
obligatory roles. Whether a verb can fit into a construction depends on whether the 
(verb’s and construction’s) roles can ‘fuse.’ For example, Shibatani (1996:168) claims 
that verbs such as buy, make, bake which appear in the ditransitive construction do not 
inherently have the notion of transfer typical of ditransitive uses
55 in their semantic 
specifications  (as  attested  by  their  regular  monotransitive  use);  hence  this  meaning 
should be specifically associated with the ditransitive construction. This fusion of the 
meanings  of  construction  and  verb  is  also  subscribed  to  by  Goldberg  (1995)  and 
(2006).
56 In her analysis (1995:49), the central sense of the ditransitive construction is 
defined  as  “successful  transfer  between  a  volitional  agent  and  a  willing  recipient.” 
Ditransitives  prototypically  construe  a  scene  as  involving  some  object’s  ‘successful 
transfer’ from one party to another, having as their central sense the semantic structure 
CAUSE RECEIVE  <agt  rec  pat>.  Ditransitive constructions  are  associated  with  the 
semantics ‘X CAUSE Y TO RECEIVE Z’.
57 The construction specifies which roles of the 
construction are obligatorily fused with roles of the verb (indicated by a solid line). The 
construction also specifies the way in which the verb is integrated into the construction 
—what type of relation R can be.
58 
 
Sem C A USE  R E C E IV E <    agt rec pat    >
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Figure 32: Composite Fused Structure: Ditransitive construction + hand
59 
As has been mentioned before, Construction Grammar holds that the systematic 
differences in meaning  between the same verb  in different constructions have to be 
                                                 
55 Allerton (1978:30) also bases his ‘cline of indirect object ness’ on the concept of ‘transfer’: “[t]here is 
something like a scale or cline of indirect object ness which gains in strength the more a clear act of 
giving is seen to be involved.” 
56 Specifically, Goldberg claims that “[t]he [recipient] argument role of the [ditransitive] construction 
may be contributed by the construction without a corresponding role existing as part of the inherent 
verbal meaning. That is, a corresponding participant role of the verb may exist, but need not” (2006:21). 
57 Notice the similarity with Gropen et al. (1989:206). 
58 Groefsema (2001:535 fn.) criticises Goldberg’s approach by noting that the conceptual structure ‘X 
causes Y to have Z’ does not exhaust ditransitive semantics. For example, in MIT made Peter a linguist, 
the implication is that MIT caused Peter to be(come) a linguist, not that MIT caused Peter to have one. By 
attributing these meanings directly to the construction (and not the verb), Goldberg’s claim entails that 
every occurrence of a verb in a ditransitive frame will be ambiguous between a ‘cause to have’ and ‘cause 
to be’ interpretation. 
59 Based on Goldberg (1995), p.51. 73 
attributed directly to the particular constructions. Goldberg (1995:4) is of the opinion 
that the ditransitive construction exists independently of the individual verbs that may 
occur with it; i.e. it is the construction itself that contributes semantics not attributable 
to the lexical items involved. If this is true, then the semantic constraints that have been 
usually attributed to the verbs participating in the construction should be traced instead 
to the construction itself.  
Goldberg  explains  the  alternation  between  the  double  object  construction  and 
prepositional paraphrases by claiming that constructions, just like lexical items, can be, 
and indeed are, polysemous. She defines this constructional polysemy as the pairing of 
one and the same form with different but related meanings (1992:51). This polysemy 
presumably  resulted  from  an  historical  process  in  which  the  central  sense  has  been 
extended to cover ‘similar’ scenes.
60 The relationship between the central meaning of a 
construction and other more peripheral meanings, as well as between the semantics of 
different but related constructions, is represented in Goldberg’s account by means of 
metaphorical extension inheritance links (represented as IM in Figure 33). This means 
that  verbs  can  ‘alternate’  between  two  constructions  provided  their  meaning  can  be 
integrated  with  each  of  the  two  constructional  senses.  Verbs  participating  in 
prepositional paraphrases can then tinge themselves with ditransitive semantics thanks 
to these metaphorical extensions.  
Goldberg (1995:90) posits the existence of a metaphor whereby the transfer of an 
entity to a recipient is understood as causing the entity to move to that recipient, and the 
transfer of ownership away from a possessor is understood as taking that entity away 
from  that  possessor.  The  to prepositional  is  thus  considered  to  be  a  metaphorical 
extension of the independently existing Caused Motion construction which exhibits a 
similar semantics, characterized as [CAUSE MOVE <cause goal theme>]. The links 
between  the  Caused  Motion  construction  and  the  resulting  Transfer Caused Motion 
construction (i.e. prepositional paraphrase), and their effect on complementation can be 
seen in Figure 33. 
 
                                                 
60 For a related view, see Herriman and Seppänen (1996). 74 
 
Sem  CAUSE MOVE  <  cause  goal  theme  > 
PRED  <  > 
Syn  V  SUBJ  OBL  OBJ 
(  e.g. ‘Joe kicked the 
bottle into the yard.’) 
Caused Motion construction 
I  M  : Transfer of Ownership 
as Physical Transfer 
Transfer Caused Motion 
construction 
Sem  CAUSE   RECEIVE  <   agt  rec  pat      > 
PRED  <  > 
Syn  V  SUBJ  OBL  OBJ 
(  e.g. ‘Joe gave his 
house to the Moonies 
 
Figure 33
61, 
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The metaphor allows the Caused Motion construction (whose meaning is that of 
movement) to be used to encode the transfer of possession (a metaphor motivated by the 
fact  that  giving  prototypically  correlates  with  movement  from  a  possessor  to  a 
recipient), and that is just the semantics associated with the ditransitive construction.  
In turn, there is also a metaphorical link between the resulting Transfer Caused 
Motion construction and the ditransitive construction. The semantic extension of the 
Caused  Motion  construction  is  semantically  synonymous  with  the  ditransitive 
construction, both designating ‘X CAUSE Y TO RECEIVE Z.’  
 
                                                 
61 Based on Goldberg (1995), p.90. 
62 It is perhaps worth noting that the labels of the semantic roles used by Goldberg are not to be associated 
with  any  theoretical  claims;  in  her  own  words  (1995:51)  the  labels  “are  only  intended  to  identify 
particular  participants  in  the  verb’s  frame  semantics”.  Additionally,  the  order  in  which  the  roles  are 
presented is also a matter of presentational convenience, and no implication is to be derived from it. 75 
 
Sem  CAUSE   RECEIVE  <   agt  rec  pat      > 
PRED  <  > 
Syn  V  SUBJ  OBJ  OBJ 2 
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PRED  <  > 
Syn  V  SUBJ  OBL  OBJ 
CAUSE   RECEIVE 
 
Figure 34 
Goldberg  points  out  that  semantic  synonymity  is  not  to  be  confused  with 
pragmatic synonymity: she agrees with Erteschik Shir’s analysis (1979) in considering 
that the ditransitive construction is used when the recipient is ‘nondominant’, therefore 
placing the patient in focus; the converse is true in the case of the Transfer Caused 
Motion construction, which focuses on the recipient. 
As Snyder (2003:3) points out, Goldberg’s key insight is to be found in her idea 
that speakers in fact choose from the range of (syntactic) options available to them 
based on processing considerations, and as such “a speaker’s choice of form (but not a 
language’s  range  of  options)  is  in  fact  motivated  by  the  discourse  function  of  her 
utterance”. 
This chapter has provided an overview of (some of) the problems ditransitives 
have  caused  to  linguists,  especially  to  those  more  interested  in  building  linguistic 
theories, very often at the expense of the simple job of accounting for facts. The indirect 
object  in  particular  has  exercised  linguists’  minds  across  many  decades,  given  this 
element’s  notorious  refusal  to  conform  to  (formal  and  functional)  categories.  The 
following chapter looks in more detail into some of the challenges indirect objects have 
posed for syntactic analysis. 
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3  The Indirect Object as Complement of the 
Verb 
In a sentence like John gave Mary a book we will have no problems in calling both 
post verbal noun phrases complements to the verb. But what about John gave a book to 
Mary? Can we call the prepositional phrase to Mary a complement? Or is it better to call 
it an adjunct? In ICE GB, the wide range of post verbal ditransitive complements boils 
down to two patterns: NP+NP/CL, and NP+PP. In order to determine which structures 
can accurately be called complements, a number of syntactic and semantic criteria have 
been used. Before discussing these criteria, however, a short general introduction on 
complements  and  adjuncts  is  required  in  order  to  illustrate  a  number  of  different 
approaches to the issue at hand. 
This chapter discusses various criteria and tests instrumental for the identification 
of  complements.  In  so  doing,  it  attempts  to  answer  two  questions:  (i)  what  is  a 
complement?, and (ii) is the indirect object a complement? Later sections specify the 
criteria  employed  for  determining  constituency  in  indirect  objects  (especially  when 
postmodification is involved), the semantic roles typical of indirect objects, and the 
possibility of positing a gradient continuum in the classification of indirect objects.  
3.1 Definitional Criteria 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:219) mention that complements are more closely 
related to the verb (in its role as clausal head) and more clearly differentiated by their 
syntactic properties than adjuncts are.
63 However, there is also widespread agreement on 
the fact that complements seem to be required in clause structure for both syntactic and 
semantic reasons. It is therefore only natural to proceed to an examination of both types 
of properties. The following discussion dwells mainly on points raised in Huddleston 
and Pullum et al. (2002) and Hudson (1990). 
3.1.1 Notional Criterion 
The  first  criterion  for  differentiating  complements  from  adjuncts  is  a  notional  one, 
arising from Tesnière’s discussion (1959:102) of ‘actants’. In his account, the clause is 
said to express a performance (“tout un petit drame”) which may be characterised by its 
setting and the behaviour of the performers. Participants in the performance are called 
                                                 
63 Adjuncts, on the other hand, are easier to identify and classify by their semantic properties, as we can 
see by their nomenclature (e.g. adjuncts of time, duration, manner, degree, etc.).  
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actants  and  typically  correspond  to  arguments/complements;  the  setting,  props  and 
other  optional  items  describing  the  circumstances  of  the  performance  are  called 
circonstants, and typically correspond to non arguments/adjuncts. 
To illustrate, a ditransitive verb such as give describes an event in which three 
participants are usually present or required: a giver, a gift, and a recipient of the gift. To 
use an example from Matthews (1984), in I gave you the book yesterday there is a sense 
in which any of the three participants (I,  you,  and the book) is a more essential or 
necessary part of the event than yesterday is. The noun is only providing a temporal 
indication for the event described by give.  
Croft (2001:124) holds that the notional criterion is only useful as some sort of 
rule  of  thumb  throwing  light  on  the  semantic  distinction  between  complements  and 
adjuncts, having nothing to contribute to the analysis of their syntactic behaviour.
64 
3.1.2 Maximum Number 
The  verb  determines  both  the  minimum  and  maximum  number  of  complements. 
Adjuncts, on the other hand, are ‘stackable’: there is no maximum number which a 
clause can tolerate, they can be added ad infinitum. 
(36)  I gave Peter the book (on Monday) (in the rain) (in Cambridge), etc. 
 
Since complements of a particular kind can occur in a clause to the maximum of 
one,  Matthews  (1981:127)  suggests  another  test  for  complementhood,  this  time  by 
assessing the possibility of grafting a constituent onto a clause. Applying Matthews’s 
test yields examples such as (37)d and (37)e. 
(37)  a.  ?He gave an example. 
b.  He gave an example to the students. 
c.  He gave an example to the dog. 
d.  *He gave an example to the dog to the students. 
e.  *John carved a figurine to Mary. 
 
Adding to the students to (37)a brings to the surface the latent participant in the 
event of giving, but adding the same phrase to (37)c leads to ungrammaticality, as (37)d 
shows, which is evidence that to the dog in (37)d is actually a complement of the verb, 
                                                 
64  See also §3.1.7.  
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although  of  a  different  type  from  the  other  verbal  complement,  i.e.  an  example. 
Example (37)e illustrates that to phrases cannot be added freely. 
3.1.3 Determination of Form 
Borsley (1999:67) states that a clearly important difference between complements and 
adjuncts is that “complements are associated with specific words in a way that adjuncts 
are not. Particular words co occur with particular complements, whereas an adjunct (…) 
is  generally  possible  in  any  phrase  of  a  particular  kind  whatever  its  head  is”.  Put 
differently, heads impose restrictions on their complements, but not on the adjunct/s 
which may be present. Example (38) below illustrates how the head verb requires its 
complement to have a certain form.  
(38)  I saw him / *he. 
 
Certain verbs can occur only with certain attending complements (and vice versa), 
whereas adjuncts can join virtually any phrase or clause. This criterion is especially 
relevant  for  prepositional  phrases.  In  prepositional  complements,  the  choice  of 
preposition heading the phrase is highly restricted. Poutsma (1926:177) defined these 
prepositional complements as those “whose relation to the predicate is expressed by a 
preposition”. The situation is compounded by the fact that very often adjuncts also take 
the form of prepositional phrases. The difference between prepositional complements 
and adjuncts headed by a preposition has proved to be rather elusive. Curme (1931:113) 
attributes  this  difficulty  to  the  fact  that  between  prepositional  complements  and 
prepositional  adjuncts  “there  is  never  a  difference  in  form  and  no  fundamental 
difference  in  function.”  Nonetheless,  Poutsma  (1926:29ff)  has  provided  some 
guidelines. 
 
•  If the element is “felt” to be a necessary complement of the verb, it is then an 
object, i.e. a complement. This is no more than a reformulation of the notional 
criterion discussed in §3.1.1. 
•  If  a  (pro)noun  in  a  prepositional  object  can  be  passivised  (thus  leaving  the 
preposition stranded), the prepositional phrase is very likely to be a complement, 
since this syntactic operation is notoriously more difficult in the case of adjuncts 
(see also §3.2.1). 
•  If the preposition is vague in meaning, “conveying little or none of the relations 
of time, place, cause, purpose, agency, instrumentality, etc.”, the prepositional  
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phrase is very likely to be a complement. The function of the preposition in 
prepositional objects is, rather, geared towards the identification of the semantic 
role of the noun phrase.
65 
 
Huddleston  and  Pullum  et  al.  (2002:220)  further  state  that  the  preposition  in 
prepositional objects/complements is often specified by the verb, e.g. 
(39)  a.  It consists of egg and milk. 
b.  He didn’t look at her. 
c.  I blame it on Kim. 
d.  He gave it to Pat. 
 
Additionally,  these  authors  demonstrate  that  just  as  a  head  selects  its 
complement/s,  a  complement  can  also  be  dependent  on  the  occurrence  of  the 
appropriate head. They illustrate the point with prepositional objects, by altering the 
verb and keeping the preposition intact, e.g. *it contains of egg and milk, *he bought it 
to Pat.  
Additional difficulties surface when the prepositional phrase is headed by to, as it 
can be difficult to find where the directional component (typical of adjuncts) of the 
preposition starts, and where it yields to the vague meaning identified by Poutsma as 
typical of complements. Examples (40) and (41) below, for instance, lead Matthews 
(1981:130) to believe that the indirect object tends to merge with other elements that are 
not participants.
66 
(40)  a.  I sent some books to Jill. 
b.  I sent Jill some books. 
c.  Jill was sent some books. 
(41)  a.  I dispatched some books to my sister. 
b.  ?My sister was dispatched some books. 
c.  ?I dispatched my sister some books. 
                                                 
65  Givón  (1993:95)  subscribes  to  the  idea  of  certain  prepositions  marking  the  semantic  role  of  a 
participant, typically one occupying the indirect object grammatical role. Sag and Wasow also claim that 
in some uses, prepositions in English simply function as argument markers, i.e. “they indicate what role 
their object plays in the situation denoted by the verb of the clause they appear in” (1999:155 156). 
66 In order to distinguish (terminologically, at least) prepositional objects/complements from prepositional 
phrases functioning as adverbials, Biber et al. (1999:129 130) suggest analysing to phrases corresponding 
to indirect objects as recipient adverbials.  
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3.1.4 Word Order 
When  both  complements  and  adjuncts  are  present,  complements  are  generally  both 
closer and more closely linked to the head.
67  In  general, there is a basic or default 
position for complements: subject complements tend to follow the verb, indirect objects 
tend to follow the verb and precede the direct object, and so on. By contrast, adjuncts 
are more mobile. An adverbial like yesterday can occur in any of the positions indicated 
by an x in (42) below. 
(42)  x John x gave the book x to the assistant librarian x. 
 
The idea of a default position for complements is not to be interpreted as meaning 
that word order is completely fixed. Deviations from the unmarked linear order head + 
complement are not hard to find in corpus data, and subsequent chapters provide more 
detailed explanations in terms of both information structure (whereby given information 
tends to precede relatively new information), and weight (whereby heavier constituents 
tend to occur towards the end of the clause).  
Consider  the  latter:  it  is  a  well  known  fact  that  the  heavier  a  constituent  is 
(especially in relation to other clausal elements), the higher are its chances of being 
postponed.  This  is  usually  known  as  the  principle  of  end  weight  (PEW),  of  which 
Heavy NP Shift (HNPS) is one of the manifestations. For example, in (43)b below, the 
direct  object  has  been  shifted  over  the  adjunct  on  Saturday  towards  the  end  of  the 
sentence. 
(43)  a.  Paolo kicked [DO the ball] on Saturday. 
b.  Paolo kicked on Saturday [DO the ball that his parents said had belonged to a 
renowned serial killer turned professional football player in Italy]. 
 
The indirect object, however, cannot be moved by HNPS: no matter how heavy it 
is, it still needs to stay in immediately post verbal position, as can be seen in (44). 
(44)  a.  Paolo gave [IO the girl] some flowers. 
b.  *Paolo  gave  some  flowers  [IO  the  girl  he  had  met  at  the  party  the  night 
before]. 
 
                                                 
67 See, among others, Huddleston (1984:264); Tomlin (1986:4); Radford (1988:178, 191); Haegeman 
(1991:95).  
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A  curious  phenomenon  is  reported  by  Biber  et  al.  (1999:928),  whereby  a 
redundant preposition is added to the indirect object, presumably “because it is felt to be 
a clearer marker of syntactic relations than word order”, as seen in their examples in 
(45). 
(45)  a.  This irregularity in her features was not grotesque, but charming, and gave to 
Anastasia’s face a humor she herself did not possess. 
b.  These include principally the discovery of America and the rounding of the 
Cape, which gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never 
before known. 
 
The apparently unnecessary use of the preposition serves the purpose of clarifying 
the  syntactic  relations  which  might  have  been  muddled  by  the  heaviness  of  the 
constituents.
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3.1.5 Noun vs. Preposition 
Complements are most often noun phrases, and conversely, noun phrases are usually 
complements. Where the preposition heading a prepositional phrase is determined by 
the  verb  (e.g.  rely  on,  give  to),  Huddleston  and  Pullum  et  al.  (2002:216)  treat  the 
prepositional phrase as a complement. For these authors, however, these prepositional 
phrases are not core complements (a label reserved exclusively for noun phrases) but 
rather non core ones or obliques. Huddleston and Pullum et al.’s view of functions can 
be represented as follows: 
 
functions
complement adjunct predicator
core oblique  
Figure 35: Functions in Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002)
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68 These are not to be confused with other cases which can optionally be followed by a preposition, as 
noted by Quirk et al. (1985:1213), e.g. He promised ((to) me) that the debt would be repaid. 
69 The term oblique is defined by Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:215) as a noun phrase indirectly 
related to the verb by a preposition, e.g. Mary in John gave a book to Mary. Van der Leek (1996:327 328) 
warns us about conflating NPs and obliques “[t]here is an essential difference between the function of an 
NP argument (both subjects and objects) and an NP in an oblique [i.e. prepositional] complement. The 
semantic role of the latter is (…) determined in terms of its preposition, and not (…) in terms of the verbal  
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3.1.6 Obligatoriness 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:221) define an element as obligatory “if it cannot be 
omitted  without  loss  of  grammaticality  or  an  unsystematic  change  of  meaning”. 
Complements are said to be obligatory and adjuncts to be optional. However, if we 
invert  the  relationship,  we  find  that  whereas  an  obligatory  element  has  to  be  a 
complement, an optional element can be either a complement or an adjunct, as seen in 
example (46) below (also from Huddleston and Pullum et al. 2002: 221). 
(46)  a.  She perused the report. / *She perused. (obligatory complement) 
c.  She read the report. / She read. (optional complement)
70 
d.  She left because she was ill. / She left. (optional adjunct) 
 
The  status  of  indirect  objects  (especially  those  alternating  with  for)  is  still 
undetermined  between  that  of  obligatory  or  optional  elements.  Some  authors  have 
contrasted the behaviour of indirect objects and direct objects as a way of grounding 
their opinions on syntactic phenomena. For instance, Jespersen (1927:279) considers the 
direct object more closely connected to the verb than the indirect object, on the evidence 
that it is possible to isolate the direct object (as in (47)b), but not the indirect object (as 
in (47)c). Being non omissible makes the direct object the obligatory complement, at 
the expense of the indirect object.
71 
(47)  a.  They offered the man a reward. 
b.  They offered _ a reward. 
c.  *They offered the man _. 
 
However, there remain some problems in treating non omissibility as criterial for 
determining complement status. As Jespersen was well aware (1927:295), some verbs 
allow  the  possibility  of  treating  one  of  the  two  objects  (but  not  the  other)  as  non 
                                                                                                                                               
predicate, and the oblique complement as a whole does not function as an argument of the verb but as a 
subpredicate that pins down the verbal meaning more specifically.” 
70 Matthews (1981:125) warns that omitting an element as a test of its obligatoriness can be difficult to 
control, due to the possibility of ellipsis (and its attendant notion, latency; cf. §3.1.8) on the one hand, as 
well as to the different senses of lexemes, on the other. He illustrates the former notion with the pair Are 
you watching football tonight? and Are you watching tonight?, the latter with I can see you this afternoon 
and I can see. 
71 Moreover, Jespersen (1927:278) believes that it is not unusual for normally ditransitive verbs to not 
require two objects: “[s]ome verbs frequently or even regularly have two objects; we shall first mention 
the type: he gave the boy a shilling” [my emphasis]. In this, he anticipates Matthews’s (1981) notion of 
latent objects (see §3.1.8).   
83 
omissible (examples (48) and (49)); while other verbs
72 never allow its objects to be 
omitted (examples (50) and (51)).  
(48)  a.  Strike him a heavy blow. 
b.  Strike him _ . 
c.  Strike _ a heavy blow. 
(49)  a.  Ask John a few questions. 
b.  Ask John _ . 
c.  Ask _ a few questions. 
(50)  a.  Hand Jones a hot potato. 
b.  *Hand _ a hot potato. 
c.  *Hand Jones _ . 
(51)  a.  Promise Jones a job. 
b.  *Promise _ a job. 
c.  *Promise Jones _ . 
 
If no object can be omitted, then both are obligatory. If both are obligatory, does 
this mean that these verbs have not simply two complements but two direct objects? 
Jespersen suggests that this is indeed the case. However, where one of the direct objects 
can  alternate  with  a  prepositional  paraphrase  with  to  (or  for),  Jespersen  prefers  to 
consider it an indirect object. 
(52)  a.  He teaches boys _ . 
b.  He teaches _ French. 
c.  He teaches the boys French. 
d.  He teaches French to the boys. 
(53)  a.  I told the teacher _ . 
b.  I told _ my story. 
c.  I told the teacher my story. 
d.  I told my story to the teacher. 
 
In  the  above  examples,  both  objects  can  appear  alone,  but  the  existence  of  a 
prepositional paraphrase marks one of them as an indirect object. 
                                                 
72 On these verbs, see also Anderson (1988), and Baker (1988), inter alia.  
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3.1.7 Subcategorisation 
Subcategorisation  is  a  type  of  dependence  between  complements  and  (mainly)  their 
head  verbs  in  clause  structure.  Inverting  the  relationship  between  head  and 
complements,  Huddleston  and  Pullum  et  al.  (2002:219)  suggest  that  “complements 
require the presence of an appropriate verb that licenses them”, e.g. 
(54)  a.  She mentioned the letter. 
b.  *She alluded the letter. 
 
Adjuncts, on the other hand, can occur with any kind of verb. Elements such as 
yesterday,  because  I’m  generous,  and  after  you  left  can  be  added  to  virtually  any 
sentence containing a verb. 
Sag and Wasow (1999:77) state that the semantics of a verb is closely related to 
its subcategorisation or valency, but that there is some syntactic arbitrariness present in 
subcategorisation  as  well.  They  illustrate  with  eating  verbs  such  as  eat,  dine,  and 
devour, activities which involve food and an eater. In this light, we should expect them 
to be transitives, requiring a subject (the eater) and a direct object (the food). However, 
dine  is  intransitive,  devour  is  transitive,  and  eat  can  be  used  intransitively  or 
transitively, as seen in (55) below.
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(55)  a.  The guests devoured the meal. 
b.  *The guests devoured. 
c.  *The guests dined the meal. 
d.  The guests dined. 
e.  The guests ate the meal. 
f.  The guests ate. 
 
Thus,  these  authors  conclude,  despite  the  link  between  meaning  and 
subcategorisation,  the  latter  is  better  specified  syntactically.  As  Borsley  (1999:78) 
indicates, although the number of complements taken by a head is related to meaning, 
“it is also clear, however, that what complements appear is not completely predictable 
from semantic considerations.” This position is seen again in Government & Binding 
                                                 
73 See Wierzbicka (1988) and Goldberg (1995) in §2.2.3.3.  
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Theory, where it is the lexicon that takes care of postverbal complementation; i.e. the 
verb’s lexical entry stipulates which complements it takes.
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Assuming that to /for phrases acting as paraphrases of indirect objects are indeed 
complements,  it  is  possible  to  say  that  ditransitive  verbs  can  occur  in  two 
subcategorisation frames: they can be followed either by two noun phrases, or by a noun 
phrase  and  a  prepositional  phrase  headed  by  to  or  for.  However,  there  are  some 
peculiarities worth mentioning. 
(56)  a.  I gave you the book. 
b.  I gave the book to you. 
(57)  a.  I bought a book. 
b.  I bought Mary a book. 
c.  I bought a book for Mary. 
(58)  a.  John peeled Mary a grape. 
b.  Sing me an aria. 
c.  Carolina fixed me a sandwich.
75 
 
In (56), it is plain to see that the recipient of the giving of the book is a required 
participant, both semantically and syntactically. In (57), however, there is nothing in the 
act of buying that requires a beneficiary, as seen in example (57)a: I can buy a book for 
myself, or just buy it with no intended beneficiary in mind. These beneficiary roles 
usually alternate with a prepositional phrase headed by for. The question remains: do 
these transitive verbs in (58) need to be subcategorised for NP+NP as well?
76 Is the first 
postverbal  noun  phrase  a  complement,  despite  not  being  included  in  the  verb’s 
subcategorisation frame? This point will be taken up in §3.3.3 and §3.4. 
                                                 
74 Croft’s (2001:247) is a very typical example of criticism aimed at the way in which Government & 
Binding  Theory  handles  complementation:  “[t]he  usual  characterization  of  subcategorization  in 
generative syntax assumes there is a particular directionality, so that the subcategorizand determines the 
subcategorization that it requires. This is questionable to the extent that the subcategorization [sic] is not a 
function in the mathematical sense, that is, there is a unique categorization for each lexical head. This is 
not generally the case, particularly in English.” 
75 The examples in (58) are taken and/or adapted from Jackendoff (1990a). 
76 Jackendoff (1990a:449) prefers to treat these immediately postverbal NPs as adjuncts, because “[t]here 
is nothing in the inherent meaning of singing an aria, peeling a grape, or fixing a sandwich that requires 
an intended Beneficiary one could just be doing these things for the hell of it.”  
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3.1.8 Latency  
Latency is closely linked to the obligatory/optional distinction. Croft (2001:275) adds to 
the discussion by claiming that obligatoriness and latency are cross linguistically valid 
criteria  for  complementhood.  Matthews  (1981:124 126)  defines  latency  as  “the 
requirement  for  a  definite  interpretation  of  a  dependent  if  that  dependent  is  left 
syntactically  unexpressed”.  When  a  constituent  is  omitted  in  order  to  test  for  its 
(syntactic or semantic) necessity, the remaining elements typically produce a plainly 
ungrammatical sentence (e.g. *I devoured). However, the absence of a constituent may 
be filled pragmatically: the hearer then searches the preceding discourse context for a 
referent  to  fill  the  position  of  the  omitted  element.  Language  users  can  arrive  at  a 
felicitous interpretation of an incomplete syntactic sequence by resorting to the principle 
of pragmatic relevance. For example, if a speaker says I didn’t finish, s/he believes that 
the addressee can fill the gap by looking in the discourse or situational context for the 
element that will complete the meaning of the clause (the job, the book, etc.). 
Some transitive verbs can occur without an object participant role: one can say I 
am eating, or I am reading without specifying what is it that goes in your mouth or 
before your eyes. The same applies to ditransitive verbs, as discussed in §3.1.6: the verb 
teach, for example, describes an event involving a teacher, at least one student, and the 
topic being taught. However, any of the three arguments can be left out in a sentence 
with teach (see example (52) above). 
3.1.9 Collocational Restrictions 
Matthews (1981:124 125) suggests using the presence of collocational relations as a 
diagnostic for complement status. For instance, the fact that it is more natural to say 
give protection but not *give defense means that there is “a direct constructional link 
between the object and the predicator”, that is to say, protection is a complement of 
give. This criterion is useful for ditransitive verbs, especially since give occurs with a 
very large number of collocations (give an opportunity, give assurance, give credence, 
give confidence, etc.). By contrast, collocational restrictions do not apply to adjuncts.  
Hudson (1990:206) sums up the discussion of complements and adjuncts thus: 
“the role, in both syntax and semantics, of the complement is fixed by the head, whereas 
that of the adjunct is fixed by the adjunct itself”. It is the adjunct which is far more 
independent, fixing its own form and function. The complement, on the other hand, is  
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always  in  thrall  to  its  head,  both  formally  and  functionally.  I  will  return  to  the 
distinction between complements and adjuncts in §3.5. 
3.2 Constituency Tests 
The preceding sections introduced some instrumental criteria for determining whether a 
clausal element is a complement or an adjunct. Yet, in an example like Just offered the 
girl  next  to  me  10p  for  one  Rolo  <ICE GB:W1B 010  #78:2>,  knowing  which  elements  are 
required by the verb is as important as ascertaining where each element begins and 
ends. In what follows, I introduce other tests used in this study in order to establish the 
constituency of both complements and adjuncts.  
3.2.1 Extraction 
This test involves the extraction of an (oblique) noun phrase which is the complement 
of  a  preposition.  According  to  Radford  (1988:191),  this  is  more  easily  done  with 
complement prepositional phrases than with adjunct prepositional phrases.
77 
(59)  a.  What field of linguistics are you a student of? 
b.  *What kind of personality are you a student with? 
 
In example (59)a, the possibility of stranding the preposition indicates that the 
prepositional phrase functions as a complement (of a noun phrase). In example (59)b 
where the preposition introduces an adjunct prepositional phrase, the stranding is not 
possible.  
This test has been used to ascertain whether a prepositional phrase in the verb 
phrase  is  functioning  as  a  complement  or  as  an  adjunct,  especially  in  the  case  of 
prepositional phrases headed by for. 
(60)  a.  John gave a book to Mary on Tuesday. 
b.  Who did you give a book to on Tuesday? 
c.  *What day did you give a book to Mary on? 
(61)  a.  John peeled a grape for Mary in Paris. 
b.  Who did John peel a grape in Paris for? 
c.  *Which city did John peel a grape for Mary in? 
                                                 
77 Recall that Poutsma also used stranding (although via passivisation) as a guideline for the identification 
of prepositional complements (§3.1.3). See also §3.3.  
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This test was used where possible, but the resulting sentences varied greatly in 
acceptability, thereby making it necessary to supplement it with other tests.  
3.2.2 Anaphora: Substitution 
Substitution  by  a  proform  has  long  been  used  to  determine  constituent  structure. 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:222 223) advocate the use of the do so anaphoric 
test: “[t]he fact that complements are more closely related to the verb than adjuncts is 
reflected  in  the  scope  of  certain  anaphoric  expressions,  notably  do  so.  (…)  The 
antecedent  of  do  so  must  embrace  all  internal  complements  of  the  verb.”  The 
functionality  of  this  test  relies  on  the  fact  that  in  a  structural  analysis  of 
complementation, the verb and its complement/s form a constituent together.  
(62)  a.  John bought Mary flowers on Friday. 
b.  John [bought Mary flowers] on Friday and James did so on Saturday. 
c.  *John  [bought  Mary]  flowers  on  Friday  and  James  did  so  a  watch  on 
Saturday.
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A  comparison  between  examples  (62)b  and  (62)c  shows  that  both  Mary  and 
flowers  must  be  within  the  scope  of  do  so,  thereby  making  both  qualify  for 
complementhood, whereas on Saturday does not necessarily have to be within the scope 
of the expression. If other elements (e.g. on Saturday) can combine with do so, this is 
sufficient to show that they are adjuncts. 
The same is true of the examples in (63). 
(63)  a.  John peeled Mary a grape on Friday. 
b.  John [peeled Mary a grape] on Friday and James did so on Saturday. 
c.  John [peeled a grape for Mary] on Friday and James did so on Saturday. 
d.  *John [peeled a grape] for Mary on Friday and James did so for Jane on 
Saturday. 
 
Example (63)d is particularly interesting, in that it is not ungrammatical with a 
deputive  reading,  i.e.  where  the  activity  is  performed  not  for  the  enjoyment  of  a 
beneficiary,  but  rather  so  that  the  said  beneficiary  does  not  have  to  do  something 
                                                 
78 All the same, it is not unusual for an adjunct to be included in the scope of the do so proform. For 
example, in John bought [Mary flowers on Friday] and James did so too, we can see that on Friday 
(clearly and adjunct) can still occur within the scope of do so.  
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him/herself, e.g. John peeled a grape for Mary on Friday, and James peeled a grape for 
Mary on Saturday so that Jane didn’t have to (peel Mary a grape). Examples like these 
are further discussed in §3.3.3 and §3.5. 
3.2.3 Cleft Constructions 
These constructions serve the purpose of highlighting clausal elements, but it is only 
constituents which can occur in the focus position of a cleft or pseudo cleft. And there 
lies  its  usefulness,  for  as  Aarts  (2001:227)  suggests  these  constructions  can  be 
employed as tests for syntactic constituency. 
The cleft construction can be described using the following template: it + be + 
focused element + clause. Like the pseudo cleft, it is a flexible construction in that the 
highlighted item may consist of an array of different elements. As mentioned earlier, the 
focus position in the cleft is reserved for constituents only.
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Indirect objects do not sit very comfortably in the focus position of cleft sentences 
(as in (64)), but their prepositional paraphrases seem to be less choosy, as can be seen in 
(65). 
(64)  a.  John gave Mary a book. 
b.  ?It was Mary John gave a book. 
(65)  a.  John gave a book to Mary. 
b.  It was Mary John gave a book to. 
c.  It was to Mary John gave a book. 
 
The pseudo cleft construction, on the other hand, consists of the verb to be and a 
wh clause.
80 The position following the verb to be is called the focus position, and it 
hosts different kinds of constituents:  
 
 
                                                 
79 Grammars, however, do not agree as to what elements can be focused in a cleft sentence. Jackendoff 
(1977:17)  claims  that  only  NPs  and  PPs  can  occur  in  this  position  whereas  Baker  (1989:376)  gives 
examples of NPs and adverb phrases in focus position. Quirk et al. (1985:1385) include a list of possible 
elements but clearly state that predicatives, indirect objects and verbs are excluded: 
i.  ?It’s very tall you are. 
ii.  ?It’s me (that) he gave the book. 
iii.  *It’s wore that John a white suit at the dance. 
80  The  wh word  is  the  fused  relative  what,  which  is  understood  to  mean  roughly  ‘that  which’,  i.e. 
antecedent + relative pronoun.  
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(66)  a.  John gave Mary a book on Tuesday. 
b.  What John gave Mary on Tuesday was a book. 
c.  What John did was give Mary a book on Tuesday. 
d.  What John did on Tuesday was give Mary a book. 
e.  ?Who gave Mary a book on Tuesday was John. 
f.  ?Who John gave a book on Tuesday was Mary. 
 
Pseudo clefts are more limited than clefts proper, say Quirk et al. (1985:1388), 
since the wh clause can very rarely start with who, where and when. However, they also 
suggest this difficulty can be bypassed by using noun phrases of general reference in 
place of the wh item in question. Therefore, examples (66)e and (66)f can be patched as 
in (67)a and (67)b. 
(67)  a.  The person who gave Mary a book on Tuesday was John. 
b.  ?The person John gave a book on Tuesday was Mary. 
 
Still, sentence (67)b is still not very natural. Pseudo clefts are more amenable to 
prepositional objects (headed by to or for) than they are to plain noun phrase indirect 
objects, as illustrated in (68) and (69) below. 
(68)  a.  John gave a book to Mary on Tuesday. 
b.  The person John gave a book to on Tuesday was Mary. 
(69)  a.  John bought a book for Mary on Tuesday. 
b.  The person John bought a book for on Tuesday was Mary. 
 
Clearly, some of the resulting sentences seem dubious when taken out of context. 
Nonetheless,  the  validity  of  each  test  is  not  compromised  if  we  consider  them  as 
indicators rather than as absolute proof of constituency. 
These criteria were applied in a principled way to the corpus examples. All the 
same, it is worth noting that in clear cases of ditransitivity, one criterion was usually 
enough, whereas in unclear or ambiguous cases, several criteria had to be employed.  
3.3 Semantic Roles 
Most  frameworks  have  to  deal  with  meaning  in  one  way  or  another,  and  thus  it  is 
generally recognised that the type of complement a head takes has something to do with 
meaning.   
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At first (syntactic) blush, there is no obvious way of distinguishing between, e.g. a 
prepositional phrase encoding a locative role from a prepositional phrase encoding a 
recipient role. However, this difference in roles has consequences for the behaviour of 
the phrases in question in relation to the verb they co occur with: while a locative can be 
a complement with certain verbs, it is not required by others, thus acting as an adjunct. 
In this light, semantic roles have some bearing on the complement/adjunct distinction. 
Verbs  are  generally  classified  by  the  number  of  arguments  they  take.  In 
Government & Binding Theory, the arguments of propositions are assigned thematic 
relations or theta roles (i.e. semantic roles) such as Agent, Patient and Theme. The 
ultimate semantic role of a noun phrase depends on the lexical properties of its head. 
Borsley (1999:77) mentions that Government & Binding Theory assumes that “word 
level  heads  are  associated  with  a  specific  number  of  theta roles  and  that  every 
complement  must  be  assigned  one  and  only  one  theta role.” 
81  In  summary,  a  verb 
subcategorises for its complement/s and assigns one (and only one) theta role to each.  
3.3.1 Locative 
The  preposition  to  can  be  used  to  encode  either  a  recipient  or  a  locative  role. 
Ditransitive  complementation  is  only  normally  possible  with  a  recipient  reading  of 
prepositional phrases headed by to. Consider the following examples: 
(70)  a.  John sent the book to London. 
b.  *John sent London the book. 
 
Example (70)b is clearly unacceptable, unless London is considered to be animate, 
for example, as shorthand for ‘the people at the London branch of a company.’ By 
personifying London, the prepositional phrase in (70)a stops being a locative to become 
a recipient.
82 
3.3.2 Recipient 
Quirk  et  al.  (1985:741 753)  state  that  indirect  objects  typically  have  the  role  of 
‘recipient  participant’,  i.e.  of  the  animate  being  that  is  passively  implicated  by  the 
happening or state. This recipient role is particularly evident with verbs instantiating 
                                                 
81  Theta role  assignment  is  intimately  related  to  subcategorisation,  since  in  Government  &  Binding 
Theory the latter is usually assumed to presuppose the former. 
82 See also Baker (1988) and Hornstein and Weinberg (1981) for a discussion of ‘inner’ (i.e. argument) 
locative PPs, and ‘outer’ (i.e. adjunct) locative PPs, and their difference in syntactic behaviour.  
92 
actual transfer, such as give, hand, and throw. Recipient indirect objects are the most 
amenable to prepositional paraphrases, usually involving the preposition to.  
3.3.3 Beneficiary 
If we apply the criteria presented in §3.1 to (71)a below, there is enough evidence to say 
that the indirect object  is a very typical complement.  It is  a noun phrase, it occurs 
immediately after the verb head (and before the direct object), and it is limited to one 
occurrence per verb. However, it is not a typical complement in not being invariably 
required by the verb’s subcategorisation. Examples (71)b, (71)c, and (71)d show the 
indirect object added on to run of the mill transitive verbs. 
(71)  a.  I bought Mary a present. [i.e. I bought a present for Mary] 
b.  John peeled Mary a grape. 
c.  Sing me an aria. 
d.  Carolina fixed me a sandwich. 
 
Considering then that these transitive verbs subcategorise for a direct object and 
do not subcategorise for a beneficiary role, the ‘add on’ element should not be expected 
to occur in such a privileged position next to the verb, a position that is expected to 
correspond to the direct object. Still, the complements are ordered just like they are in a 
prototypical ditransitive clause. These ‘guest’ indirect objects usually alternate with a 
prepositional phrase headed by for.  
(72)  a.  John peeled a grape for Mary. 
b.  Sing an aria for me. 
c.  Carolina fixed a sandwich for me. 
 
The role of the guest indirect objects and of their for phrase counterpart is called 
benefactive or beneficiary in the literature, to distinguish it from recipient. Traditional 
grammarians such as Kruisinga (1932:186ff) and Poutsma (1926:29ff) suggested calling 
them pseudo object or adjunct of benefit. They refuse to grant them complement status 
because: (a) they are not required by the verb, and can therefore be omitted,
83 (b) they 
                                                 
83 Marantz (1984) is another author who agrees that beneficiaries are adjuncts, based on subcategorisation 
evidence. However, he does point out that if it is true that beneficiaries are not required by any verbs, it is 
also true that no verbs clearly forbid them either.   
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do not passivise easily, (c) and their contribution is more adjunct like than object like, 
in that they state in whose behalf an action is said to take place. 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:310 311) distinguish between beneficiaries of 
goods and beneficiaries of services, the difference being syntactically relevant in that 
prepositional paraphrases of indirect objects tend to be “restricted to cases where it is a 
matter of goods rather than services”, perhaps because the notion of transfer (inherent in 
ditransitive constructions) is much more evident and concrete when goods (not services) 
are  involved.  That  is,  “a  goods beneficiary  is  much  closer  to  a  recipient,  the  most 
central semantic role for indirect object” (ibid.). 
(73)  a.  I’ll do you a quiche.       (goods) 
b.  *I’ll do you the washing up.  (services) 
 
These  authors  also  note  that  a  for phrase  may  have  a  wider  range  of 
interpretations than a recipient indirect object: 
(74)  a.  He made the cake for Mary.      Beneficiary or ultimate recipient 
b.  He made Mary the cake.   Beneficiary 
 
Example (74)a has two possible interpretations: he could have made the cake for 
Mary to eat, or simply so that Mary did not have to make it herself. This second reading 
(which involves a role sometimes referred in the literature as deputive) is not possible in 
(74)b: he made the cake for Mary’s enjoyment. 
A few verbs can take either a recipient or a goods beneficiary; in the prepositional 
variant the roles are distinguished by the preposition, but in the ditransitive alternant the 
distinction is not encoded. 
(75)  a.  He wrote her a letter.        (recipient or beneficiary) 
b.  He wrote a letter to her.    (recipient) 
c.  He wrote a letter for her.    (beneficiary) 
3.4 The Dativus Ethicus 
Closely related to the adjuncts of benefit (§3.3.3) are what Kruisinga called obliques of 
interest, Jespersen affective (or emotional) indirect objects, and are more usually known 
as ethical datives. The term refers to a particular use of the dative case in Latin (which 
was rather successfully imported into Old and Middle English) to denote “the person  
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who  takes  an  interest  in  the  action  or  whose  interest  is  appealed  to”  (Kruisinga 
1932:190), but who does not have an “intimate interest or participation in the action or 
state denoted by the predicate” (Poutsma 1926:177). Textually, Jespersen points out, it 
is used “to enliven the style by introducing a personal element” (Jespersen 1927:284 
285). Examples like those in (76) below are very common in literature.
84 
(76)  a.  Nothing introduces you a heroine like soft music. 
b.  Come me to what has done to her. 
c.  He could knock you off forty Latin verses in an hour. 
d.  She smiled him her thanks.  
e.  One Colonna cuts me the throat of Orsini’s baker. 
f.  Do not preach me sermons tonight.  
g.  He pluck’d me ope his doublet and offered them his throat to cut. 
h.  This septuagenarian youngster peppers you his page with allusions. 
i.  Ann flowered me a most lovely collar.  
j.  Give me leave to introduce you the amiable Lady C.  
 
The  italicised  noun  phrases  in  (76)  fly  in  the  face  of  subcategorisation 
requirements, even more than the beneficiaries mentioned in §3.3.3 do. Clearly, they are 
not part of the verb subcategorisation: they do not fulfill a participant role and as such 
are easily omissible. Another shared characteristic with beneficiaries is the fact that they 
cannot passivise. What’s more, ethical datives are subject to a number of surprising 
restrictions: 
 
•  They  are  typically  associated  with  offers  and  commands,  as  pointed  out  by 
Davidse (1998:176 177). 
•  They are almost always 1
st and 2
nd person (and then only pronominal, i.e. me and 
you), although occasionally a 3
rd person occurs as a proper name (but see (76)d). 
•  They can only occur in the prototypical indirect object position, i.e. immediately 
after the verb (Davidse 1998:176 177). 
•  They cannot be informationally new (by virtue of the fact that they are realised 
mostly as pronouns). 
•  They cannot be thematised (topicalised). 
                                                 
84  Examples  (76)a d  are  from  Jespersen  (1927:282),  (76)e g  from  Poutsma  (1928:237),  (76)h  from 
Kruisinga (1932:190), and (76)i j from Kirchener (1936:220).  
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To illustrate the last bullet point, as well as their inability to passivise, Halliday 
(1967 [part I]:55 56) offers the following examples. 
(77)  a.  He expressed me his opinions.  
b.  *I was expressed his opinions. 
c.  *Me he expressed his opinions. 
 
An additional point can be made, and that is the fact that ethical datives do not 
seem to have a prepositional paraphrase.  
3.5 Gradience 
The best way to approach the distinction between complements and adjuncts is 
probably  (...)  to  expect  each  of  the  categories  to  be  organized  round  a 
prototypical  centre,  with  more  or  less  deviant  subcategories  related  to  it. 
(Hudson 1990:203) 
Having discussed semantic roles and ethical datives, I would like to return now to the 
complement adjunct distinction. In light of the previous discussion, it is apparent that 
attempting  to  apply  the  definitional  criteria  to  language  examples  shows  that  this 
complement adjunct  distinction  is  far  from  a  clear cut  dichotomy,  with  many  gray 
areas. This is made more complex by the fact that not all criteria are applicable to all 
verbs.  
Allerton  (1978b),  Hawkins  (1980),  Hudson  (1990),  and  Halliday  (1994)  are 
among those who hold that there is indeed fluidity in the categorical boundary between 
complements and adjuncts, and their conclusion seems unavoidable.
85 
Allerton devised an acceptability test (which incorporated variables such as the 
semantics of the verb, the role of the object, the determiner in the object noun phrase) in 
order to test for grammaticality judgements and acceptability of both indirect objects 
and prepositional paraphrases. The results led him to believe that speakers’ acceptability 
judgements of ditransitive structures depend “not on the V NP NP pattern alone, not on 
the definiteness (etc). of the NP object alone, but on the total semantic configuration 
produced by the interaction of these and perhaps other factors” (1978b:30). This ‘total 
semantic  configuration’  hinges  on  a  general  notion  of  giving,  which  Allerton  finds 
instrumental for postulating a cline of “indirect objectiness”: the more an act of giving 
                                                 
85 Aarts (2007:79) calls this fluidity ‘intersective gradience.’  
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is perceived, the more the elements in question are considered to be indirect objects, and 
thus complements.
86 
Hawkins (1980) uses evidence from subcategorisation to argue for the existence 
of a cline of ‘benefactivity’ (rather than Allerton’s “indirect objectiness”) affecting the 
dative  alternation.  By  recasting  Allerton’s  argument  in  terms  of  thematic  relations, 
Hawkins  is  able  to  claim  (1980:8)  that  “[t]he  more  an  NP  can  be  interpreted  as  a 
Benefactive [e.g. example (74)b, where the cake is for Mary to eat] and the less like a 
Deputive [e.g. example (74)a, where Mary is the ultimate recipient of the cake but will 
not (necessarily) ingest it], the more it is likely to be under Dative Movement”, and thus 
the more it will thought of as a complement. 
It seems that, indeed, some notion of gradience is present in the classification of 
indirect  objects  and  their  prepositional  paraphrases,  but  I  think  searching  for  the 
ultimate classificatory principle (whether syntactic, semantic, or thematic) is misguided, 
in that (necessarily) other factors end up being eclipsed by the one favoured by the 
framework in question. I propose below my own version of gradient classification in 
ditransitives,  taking  into  account  various  definitional  elements  of  both  constructions 
(without giving any one of them precedence over the other) and using the resulting set 
to build a matrix chart. The criteria employed are (a) whether the element in question is 
a noun phrase (prototypical complement), (b) whether the element usually appears in 
immediately postverbal position, (c) whether the semantic notion of transfer is present 
in the construction, (d) whether the element is subcategorised for by the verb, and (e) 
whether the element (nominal or oblique) can passivise. The more of these criteria an 
element meets, the more strongly its claim to  complementhood would be. 
The elements subjected to these criteria are: (1) noun phrases encoding recipients, 
(2) noun phrases encoding beneficiaries, (3) noun phrases deemed to be ethical datives, 
(4) prepositional phrases headed by to encoding recipients, (5) prepositional phrases 
headed  by  for  encoding  beneficiaries,  and  (6)  prepositional  phrases  headed  by  for 
encoding deputives (alternatively known as ultimate recipients).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 ‘Subsective gradience,’ in Aarts’ framework (2007:79).  
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  NP(rec)  NP(ben)  NP(eth. dat.)  PP(rec)  PP(ben)  PP(dep) 
Noun Phrase  √  √  √  X  X  X 
Position (V _ )  √  √  √  X  X  X 
Transfer  √  √
87  X  √  √  X 
Subcategorisation  √  X  X  √  X  X 
Passivisation  √  X  X  X  X  X 
Table 36: Gradience between indirect objects and prepositional variants 
What  we  can  appreciate  in  Table  36  is  that  the  prototypical  indirect  object  is 
indeed  a  very  good  example  of  a  complement.  Beneficiary  indirect  objects  are  still 
complements, but not as well behaved. Ethical datives, surprisingly, are tied in their 
position  with  prepositional  paraphrases  of  recipient  indirect  objects,  whereas 
prepositional  paraphrases  of  beneficiary  indirect  objects  are  one  step  removed  from 
complete  adjunct  status,  a  position  occupied  by  deputive  readings  of  prepositional 
phrases headed by for. Last of all, deputive prepositional phrases are indeed very good 
adjuncts.
88 
Perhaps a better way of visualising these claims is by turning Table 36 into a 
sliding  scale.  The  graph  below  shows  how  the  analysed  elements  are  distributed 
between the poles of absolute complement and adjunct status. 
 
                               gradient                                   
[NP(rec)>NP(ben)>ethical dative=PP(rec)>PP(ben)> PP(dep)] 
complement                                                     adjunct 
 
This  chapter  has  dwelled  on  a  battery  of  criteria  and  tests  necessary  for  an 
identification of indirect objects and complements. Constituency, semantic roles and 
gradience  were  also  seen  to  play  a  part  in  determining  what  is  and  what  isn’t  a 
complement.  
 
                                                 
87 Beneficiary noun phrases do not seem to involve transfer at all. However, Goldberg (1995) suggests 
that this is not totally accurate: what beneficiaries encode is metaphorical transfer. The metaphor at work 
is:  “actions  which  are  performed  for  the  benefit  of  a  person  are  understood  as  objects  which  are 
transferred to that person” (1995:150). 
88 At this point, it is worth recalling Allerton’s (1982) notion of indirect objoid. These are quasi indirect 
objects, which do not have a prepositional alternant, nor any passive version. These have been discussed 
in §2.2.1, and are not considered here as they are only found with a couple of verbs, namely cost and take, 
e.g. Fido cost me £5.  
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4  Dataset and Experiment Design 
This section introduces my dataset and a set of experiments designed to test the effect of 
different factors on ditransitive complementation. For the purpose of these experiments, 
ditransitive verbs may be defined as those verbs taking two nominal complements (see 
(78)a below), referred to as the double object construction (DOC). In English, most of 
these verbs can occur with an alternative complementation pattern, namely a nominal 
complement followed by a prepositional phrase (see (78)b below), which I will call 
DAT (dative).  
In  prototypical  ditransitive  complementation,  when  a  speaker  reaches  the  verb 
(gave in this case), s/he has a choice to make: either opt for the recipient argument first, 
or alternatively mention the theme argument first, as illustrated in (78)c.  
(78)  a.  John gave Mary a book 
b.  Mary gave a book to John 
c.  John gave              Mary a book 
                            a book to Mary 
 
It  has  been  claimed  that  the  speaker’s  choice  between  the  two  competing 
complementation patterns a choice often referred to as dative alternation or dative 
shift  is  determined  (or  at  least  affected)  by  the  givenness,  heaviness  and/or 
complexity  of  the  constituents  involved  in  both  realisations  (Prince  1981,  Hawkins 
1994, Wasow 2002, inter alia). In most unmarked cases, these three factors predict the 
same  constituent  ordering,  namely  that  the  newer,  heavier,  and  more  complex 
constituent will tend to be found in the second postverbal position in both constructions. 
In chapters 5 to 8 I intend to find answers to the following questions:  
(79)  Research Questions 
a.  Do  information  status,  weight,  and  complexity  indeed  affect  the  dative 
alternation? 
b.  What is the relationship between these three factors? 
c.  Can  corpus  data  help  establish  a  model  of  the  interaction  between  these 
factors/variables? 
d.  Can these factors be manipulated into predicting speakers’ choices?  
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In this chapter, I describe the criteria, assumptions and definitions instrumental in 
the  building  of  my  dataset  (§4.1);  I  provide  a  characterisation  of  the  different 
complementation patterns and verbs appearing in ditransitive complementation in ICE 
GB (§4.2 and §4.3); I discuss the relevant exclusions (§4.4) and the overall design of 
the experiments described in subsequent chapters (§4.5).  Finally, the statistical tests 
employed throughout are also introduced (§4.6).  
4.1 The Dataset 
The methodology applied in this study was partly inspired by Herriman (1995). A list of 
ditransitive verbs allowing for alternation was compiled from the literature (Jespersen 
1927, Quirk et al. 1985, Levin 1993, Herriman 1995, Huddleston and Pullum et al. 
2002).  A  first  selection  was  then  made  so  as  to  exclude  cases  (verbs  and/or 
complementation patterns) which were not relevant to our purposes in this study (see 
§4.2 below). A matrix chart was then built based on these verbs. 
Only verbs which could and did alternate between the two constructions (i.e. DOC 
and DAT) were considered for statistical purposes. These verbs were first investigated 
using the British component of the International Corpus of English (ICE GB), and then 
grouped quantitatively according to a series of parameters (defined below).  
ICE GB is a fully parsed corpus of approximately one million words. One of the 
first advantages of employing ICE GB is its size: at slightly over a million words, it 
allows for manual, unmediated analysis of the data.
89 Both spoken and written language 
are represented in ICE GB, with over 600,000 words recorded in spoken language, and 
400,000 odd words in written language. The grammatical structure of every sentence 
(or, to be more precise, of every parsing unit) in ICE GB is represented by a syntactic 
tree: ICE GB contains approximately 84,000 trees. In turn, every node of every tree is 
annotated  for  three  different  aspects:  form,  function,  and  additional  features  (if 
available). For example, in the sentence I am the walrus, I is analysed as a pronoun 
(form), which acts as head of a noun phrase (function), and carries the features personal 
and singular. In addition, this noun phrase is assigned the function subject. 
The  dedicated  retrieval  software,  called  the  ICE  Corpus  Utility  Program 
(ICECUP), allows the user to conduct searches in ICE GB using syntactic features (for 
example, ‘retrieve all instances of transitive verbs’), as well as topological searches for 
portions of tree structures by means of so called Fuzzy Tree Fragments, or FTFs (see 
                                                 
89 This advantage is often overlooked. Indeed, “there is no point in having bigger and bigger corpora if 
you cannot work with the output” (Kennedy 1998:68).  
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Aarts et al. 1998, Nelson et al. 2002). FTFs can be thought of as a grammatical query 
system, allowing users to construct templates of structures (or partial structures) which 
ICECUP  matches  against  similar  structures  in  the  corpus.  Nodes  can  be  exactly  or 
inexactly  specified  (hence  fuzzy),  thus  enabling  searches  for  specific  categories  or 
structures, regardless of the lexical items instantiating them. In this study, FTFs (as 
illustrated in Figure 37 and Figure 39 below) are to be read left to right rather than top 
to bottom.  
The  parsing  scheme  of  ICE GB  is  based  on  Quirk  et  al.  (1985).  Since  the 
experiments reported in this study lean heavily on ICE GB’s parsing scheme, special 
attention was paid to the grammatical definitions built into ICE GB: statistical results 
are considerably more difficult to obtain without accepting most of these definitions. In 
the  case  of  prepositional  paraphrases  of  indirect  objects  (i.e.  DAT),  however,  other 
definitions  had  to  be  taken  on  board  which  override  those  provided  in  the  parsing 
scheme  of  ICE GB.  Thus  the  experiments  both  exploit  and  deviate  from  ICE GB’s 
grammar,  especially  in  DAT  cases.  In  other  words,  what  could  not  be  retrieved  by 
relying on automatic searches based on (ICE GB’s) fixed grammatical definitions had 
to be obtained by working around these definitions and specifying our searches/cases by 
means of purpose built FTFs. This will be made clearer when considering the FTFs 
employed in these experiments.  
A  major  problem  for  retrieval  was  the  fact  that  prepositional  paraphrases  of 
indirect objects (DATs in our parlance) are not coded in ICE GB. For example, in I sent 
the  book  to  Mary  and  I  sent  the  book  to  Finsbury  Park,  the  function  of  both 
prepositional phrases is consistently analysed in ICE GB as adverbial, despite the fact 
that one but not the other allows for an alternative construction. There is no principled 
way to automatically distinguish between (and therefore to automatically retrieve) the 
two in the corpus (i.e. semantic roles are not part of the annotation of ICE GB). In other 
words, both are automatically retrievable but not distinguishable. To overcome this, an 
FTF was necessary so as to find an identifiable formal/syntactic structure which could 
be associated with DATs. 
The FTF in Figure 37 below consists of an empty node which functions as an 
anchor  from  which  three  children  branch  out:  a  verbal  element,  followed  by  an 
element functioning as direct object, followed in turn by a prepositional phrase with an 
adverbial function. This prepositional phrase has a daughter node, a preposition (with its 
attendant prepositional function), and not just any preposition: to and for were specified  
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as  the  lexical  element  associated  with  the  P/PREP  node.
90  Therefore,  although 
prepositional paraphrases cannot be retrieved automatically as such by ICECUP, we can 
still derive the set of cases using this query. The feature montr (monotransitive) in the 
VB node is explained further down. 
 
 
Figure 37: An FTF search pattern for DAT
91 
FTFs contain optional constraints between nodes, which allow the user to be as 
flexible or as strict as s/he pleases in specifying the order in which the nodes of an FTF 
occur in a sequence (e.g. ‘find structures in which give and to Mary are both part of the 
same clause, and which occur in that order’). This sequence definition is made possible 
by means of the ‘next’ link, located between sibling nodes in the FTFs below. This link 
has 6 possible values (Nelson et al. 2002:137):  
                                                 
90 Notice that the nominal complement of the prepositional phrase headed by to is not shown on the FTF 
in Figure 37. Specifying such a complement is of no consequence, since these elements are retrieved all 
the same. 
91 The principal terms for this FTF are as follows: VB= Verbal, OD= Direct Object, A= Adverbial. 
 
 
 
 
the ‘next’ links  
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(80)  ‘Next’ link values 
•  Immediately after     
any second element in an FTF must match a node immediately following 
the node matching the first element, 
•  After         
the second element (node) must follow the first one, 
•  Just before or just after   
a second element must immediately precede or immediately follow the 
first, 
•  Before or after      
a second element must either precede or follow the first, 
•  Different branches     
both elements occur in different branches (i.e. one cannot be the parent of 
the other), 
•  Unknown       
no restriction is imposed. 
 
The white arrows between the nodes in the DAT FTF indicate that the nodes must 
be in sequence, but there may be intervening material between them (i.e. the link is set 
as  after).  This  flexible  sequence  specification  allowed  mainly  pauses  and  adverbial 
elements to occur between the specified nodes, but also let some undesirable elements 
in. Typically they consisted of cases of complex transitive complementation, i.e. a verb 
complemented by a direct object and an object complement, as illustrated in (81) below. 
(81)  a.  The  gods  are  making  [OD/NP  it]  [OC/AJP  hard]  [A/PP  for  him  as  well  as  his 
opponent] <ICE GB:S2A 008 #67:1:A> 
b.  The most respected financial journalists in the most reputable newspapers can 
easily find [OD/NP themselves, or their papers,] [OC/AJP liable for £50,000 or so] 
[A/PP owing to an incorrect forecast, a misplaced zero or merely an unhappy 
choice of phrase.] <ICE GB:W2B 015 #81:1>
92 
 
The  examples  in  (81)  illustrate  uninvited  guests  in  our  dataset,  both  typical 
complex transitive cases. As is apparent, some cases of complex transitive verbs could 
be extracted by the FTF in Figure 37, typically with the object complement filling the 
position between the specified direct object and the prepositional phrase which performs 
an adverbial function. These elements are clearly undesirable, but are they uninvited, as 
I claimed above? The answer is ‘not quite’: they have not been invited by name (i.e. 
specified by the FTF), but neither have they been refused entry at the door. To solve this 
                                                 
92 It is perhaps worth explaining that ICE GB analyses owing to as a complex (ditto tagged) preposition, 
and this is why example (81)b above is picked up by our FTF in Figure 37.  
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problem, we could either (i) tighten up the node sequence in the FTF, thus closing the 
gaps between the specified nodes to every kind of material (even pauses), or (ii) specify 
the kind of complementation required. At this point, I took advantage of a particular 
characteristic in the design of ICE GB: feature duplication.  
There is a certain amount of duplication built into the design of ICE GB. Along 
with a forgiving sequence specification, it allows the user a great degree of flexibility, 
which, as long as s/he accepts the ICE GB grammatical definitions, can be exploited in 
different manners. Take, for example, the case of transitivity. A node containing a verb 
which is complemented by a direct object is tagged as monotransitive, but this feature 
does not occur just in the said verb node: it percolates up to the verb phrase containing 
the verb, and to the clause containing the verb phrase.
93 
More specifically, if one wanted to build an FTF to retrieve transitive cases, one 
could simply specify a direct object node. This would retrieve all direct objects in the 
corpus,  but  not  necessarily  all  cases  of  (purely)  monotransitive  complementation:
94 
other complementation  patterns including a direct object (e.g. ditransitives, complex 
transitives) would also be present in the results. If the purpose of the search is to study 
only typical monotransitive complementation, the alternative is to specify the feature 
montr in a verb or clause node. This would extract all and only those cases of typical 
monotransitive complementation, to the exclusion of complex transitive and ditransitive 
complementation.  
Given  that  verbs  occurring  in  prepositional  versions  of  ditransitive 
complementation are considered monotransitives by the ICE GB parsing scheme, the 
FTF employed to retrieve them has been restricted to look for monotransitive verbal 
elements as can be appreciated in the feature specification montr in the first daughter 
node in Figure 37 so as to exclude complex transitive verbs. The DAT FTF in Figure 
37 yielded 1,260 hits. A similar FTF was built to look for PPs headed by for, and it 
extracted 930 hits.
95 
When an FTF is applied to the corpus, ICECUP compiles an exhaustive list of 
matching  cases  and  visualises  this  index  as  a  sequence  of  cases.  It  identifies  each 
matching configuration in a tree view by highlighting the matched area in the tree. The 
FTF in Figure 37 retrieved examples such as the one below: 
                                                 
93 At this point, it should perhaps be made clear —as Mukherjee (2005:78) points out— that transitivity in 
ICE GB is “entirely syntactic in nature,” i.e. it is based on elements required and attested in a given 
clause. 
94 The label monotransitive in ICE GB is applied to verbs complemented only by a direct object. 
95 These figures were obtained with ICECUP 3.0.  
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Figure 38: How the FTF in Figure 37 matches against a tree 
A  different  FTF  (DOC,  in  Figure  39  below)  was  constructed  to  search  for 
examples of prototypical ditransitivity, i.e. verbs containing an indirect object followed 
by a direct object.  
 
Figure 39: An FTF search pattern for DOC
96 
In ICE GB there are 1,440 structures like the one above. Notice that the ordering 
of the daughter nodes has been left unspecified, as can be appreciated by the fact that no 
arrows are shown between the nodes. The links between the nodes are set to unknown, 
thereby stipulating that the three nodes need not occur in that sequence. Thus, the order 
could in principle be VB OI OD, VB OD OI, OD OI VB, etc. Although some of the 
potential sequences can seem unacceptable, examples instantiating them can and do 
occur (e.g. the sequence OD VB IO is illustrated by the following: what it shows us 
                                                 
96 The principal terms for this FTF are as follows: VB= Verbal, OI= Indirect Object, OD= Direct Object.  
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<ICE GB:S2A 056 #8:1:A>). The FTF in Figure 39 retrieved examples such as the one in Figure 
40. 
 
 
Figure 40: How the FTF in Figure 39 matches against a tree 
If the link between VB and OI is set to immediately after, we get the same number 
of hits, thus showing that in ICE GB all cases of OIs must follow the VB node, whether 
we  specify  it  as  such  or  not.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  insist  that  the  direct  object 
immediately  follow  the  indirect  one  (by  setting  the  link  between  OI  and  OD  as 
immediately after), we get a smaller number of hits: a few examples (71, to be precise) 
are  excluded  in  which  the  two  objects  are  separated  by  other  elements  such  as 
adverbials,  pauses  and  interjections.  These  cases  were,  of  course,  included  in  our 
dataset. 
Feature duplication also played a role in the specification of this FTF. In searching 
for cases of ditransitive complementation, I could have simply specified just a node 
characterised as OI. That, however, would have retrieved, among many other things, all 
cases of so called dimonotransitive complementation, i.e. cases of an indirect object as 
the only (overt) verbal complement, e.g. I’ll tell you <ICE GB:S1A 007 #60:1:B>.  
Another difficulty was found in the features. I had originally specified the feature 
ditr  in  the  VB  node,  but  noticed  that  nonetheless  a  handful  of  cases  of  clear cut 
ditransitivity were not retrieved. This indicated that ICE GB’s feature duplication was 
not always dependable. In these cases, the feature ditr was present in the leaf node V, 
but had failed to percolate up to the VB node. I therefore decided to do away with any  
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feature specification in this FTF, especially in view of the fact that it was clear from the 
topology of the FTF itself that I required an indirect object followed by a direct object 
in my results. All the same, the extracted cases did include a handful of undesirable 
ones (see §4.2). 
The results of the queries made with FTFs had to be very carefully revised, in 
more  than  one  way,  particularly  those  extracted  by  Figure  37.  All  clauses  showing 
examples of the alternation were entered in a database. Each entry in the database was 
individually classified for several variables, such as the informational status of each 
complement, number of words, number of nodes, type of determiner used, whether the 
occurrence had been registered in written or in spoken language, and many others. The 
database  itself  made  it  simpler  for  the  constituents  to  be  sorted  according  to  these 
variables.  
The corpus examples of the verbs in the dataset have been used as a basis for the 
statistics discussed in the following chapters. Naturally, as all the experiments are based 
on the alternation DOC DAT, the corpus examples of prepositional phrases which were 
considered to be paraphrases of indirect objects (i.e. DAT) were also included in the 
investigation. 
What  follows  are  the  final  figures  of  ditransitive  complementation  patterns 
extracted from ICE GB and admitted to our dataset. Of a total of 854 cases, of which 
587 instantiate the double object construction, while 267 represent the prepositional 
alternant with to of for. As will be seen in the following section, the results of this study 
do not claim that all the verbs that take indirect objects are exemplified in this study. 
Therefore, the statistics provided here do not necessarily represent the total number of 
instances of DOC and/or DAT in the corpus. 
4.2 Complementation Patterns 
Indirect objects and their prepositional paraphrases were investigated in terms of (i) 
their word order, (ii) the verbs selecting them, and (iii) the prepositions involved. What 
follows is a quick overview of the complementation patterns involving ditransitivity 
found  in  ICE GB.  The  identified  patterns  were  later  classified  according  to  their 
potential for alternation with a different complementation pattern (see §4.3).  
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4.2.1 S V IO DO(NP) 
This pattern was investigated searching for indirect objects followed by nominal (as 
opposed to clausal) direct objects. A search in ICE GB  yielded 967 cases, but after 
exclusions, only 860 of them made it to the dataset. 
4.2.2 S V IO DO(CL) 
Clausal direct objects are very common in ICE GB, and ditransitive complementation 
was  no  exception.  Specifying  a  clausal  direct  object  preceded  by  an  indirect  object 
yielded 462 cases, before exclusions.
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4.2.3 S V DO ‘IO’(PP) 
This  pattern  was  rather  more  complex  to  search  for,  given  that  there  is  no  coding 
available in ICE GB for recipients or beneficiaries. As a consequence, this had to be 
done manually, a difficult and time consuming task (as can be seen in the difference 
between cases found and cases eventually incorporated to the dataset). Searching for a 
direct  object  followed  by  a  prepositional  phrase  headed  by  to  yielded  1,260  cases, 
before  exclusions.  A  similar  search,  but  with  a  prepositional  phrase  headed  by  for 
following the direct object, gave 930 hits, also before exclusions. 
4.3 Verb Classes 
Ditransitive verbs were organized into three classes in the dataset, according to certain 
variations  in  their  behaviour,  i.e.  the  alternation  between  their  indirect  objects  and 
different  prepositions  heading  the  prepositional  alternant.  The  prototypical  indirect 
object  occurs  in  the  SVOO  complementation  pattern,  which  is  typically  realized  as 
NP+NP. It alternates with a PP headed by to or for. In this study, I focused on verbs 
allowing the alternation between double object complements (DOC) and prepositional 
phrases (DAT) headed by to (§4.3.1), for (§4.3.3), or headed either by to or for (§4.3.3). 
The examples below instantiate the three complementation patterns of verbs found in 
the dataset.  
 
                                                 
97  There  were  also  a  handful  of  cases  (11,  to  be  precise)  of  ditransitive  complementation  involving 
coordination of one of the objects which were extracted from the corpus and included in the dataset (but 
not listed in this section).  
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(82)  a.  …you write of giving you encouragement and support and not telling you 
what a wally you are. <ICE GB:W1B 003 #167:2>                 → DOC to 
b.  Since the Theatre is a Department of University College we only offer this 
casual work to students. <ICE GB:W1B 021 #126:10>                          → DAT to 
c.  Yeah we used to buy Mum a vase every year for her birthday <ICE GB:S1A 019 
#106:1:E>                              → DOC to/for 
d.  And I brought these books for Sarah … <ICE GB:S1A 013 #246:1:B>        → DAT for 
e.  They brought me a bottle of Croft’s Original <ICE GB:S1A 057 #25:1:B> → DAT to 
 
As regards the alternation with a prepositional paraphrase, there are a number of 
verbs which only occur in DOC (e.g. afford, grant, quote) while many more occur only 
in DAT (e.g. forward, post). 
Lend and pay occur with similar frequency in both constructions. In contrast, give, 
offer, show and tell (those that contribute the larger numbers towards the final count) 
occur much more frequently in the double object construction. Those occurring more 
frequently with prepositional paraphrases than with indirect objects are do1 (impart), 
hand and sell. 
Other types of verbs were also found in the corpus but excluded, given that they 
did not allow for variants (see §4.3.2, §4.3.5, §4.3.6). Finally, it is perhaps obvious, but 
worth pointing out, that a verb can and does convey different meanings in the corpus, 
e.g. leave is used as a synonym for bequeath and for leave behind. These meanings have 
an effect on the verb’s complementation pattern: both meanings of leave can occur in 
ditransitive complementation, but only the first leave (which we will code as leave1) can 
alternate with a prepositional paraphrase headed by to (as in example (83)a), while the 
other  (leave2)  alternates  only  with  a  prepositional  paraphrase  headed  by  for  (as  in 
example (83)b). To make matters more interesting, in some cases (example (83)c) leave 
could potentially take either preposition. The semantic coding of verbs is not present in 
the tagging of ICE GB and had to be carried out manually.  
(83)  a.  Uhm now at this point I’m going to leave some more work to you <ICE GB:S1B 
014 #1:1:A> 
b.  Leaves it [i.e. the ball] for Geoff Thomas who plays it square to Derigo on the 
far left <ICE GB:S2A 001 #127:1:A> 
c.  The awful thing was that we just left it in the end to Gillian Bernard’s sister 
and my Mum and they worked like blacks <ICE GB:S1A 056 #307:4:A>  
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After exclusions were applied, there remained 587 examples of postverbal indirect 
objects (in DOCs). Of these, only 222 occur in written language, while the rest (365) 
occur in spoken language. Additionally, there are 267 DATs: 106 in written language, 
161 in spoken language.  
 
  DOC  DAT 
Spoken  365  161 
Written  222  106 
Total  587  267 
Table 41: Occurrences of DOCs and DATs in ICE GB 
Recall  that  in  ICE GB  the  spoken  and  written  subsets  are  dissimilar  in  size 
(637,562 and 423,702 words, respectively): Table 42 shows the figures normalised to 
occurrences  per  million  words,  in  order  to  render  the  data  less  opaque,  as  well  as 
comparable. 
 
  DOC  DAT 
Spoken  572  253 
Written  524  250 
Total  1096  503 
Table 42: Normalised occurrences of DOCs and DATs in ICE GB 
4.3.1 Class 1: V+IO+DO or V+NP+to 
The indirect objects of the verbs in this class are prototypical in that they match the 
basic criteria for indirect objecthood, i.e. they alternate with a to phrase and they occupy 
the position between verb and direct object. Table 43 below shows the list of verbs 
occurring in my dataset in both DOC and DAT. 
 
afford  do1 (impart)  make1(perform)  relate (tell) 
ask  drop  offer  rent 
assign  feed  owe  sell 
award  forward  pass  show 
bung  give  pay  sock 
charge  grant  post  teach 
cost  hand  present  tell 
deal  leave1 (bequeath)  promise  throw 
deliver  lend  quote   
deny  loan  read   
Table 43: V+IO+DO or V+NP+to  
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The contribution of this class of verbs to the global figures is very significant, 
accounting for over three quarters of the total number of cases in the dataset. 
4.3.2 Class 2: V+NP+to only 
These verbs were not included in the dataset, because even if some of them encode the 
notion of transfer (a common feature of ditransitive verbs) and in some instances, could 
be used interchangeably with typically ditransitive verbs (cf. give and donate), they do 
not allow a double object alternant. 
 
address  declare  mention  say 
announce  donate  narrate  submit 
confess  exhibit  report  suggest 
contribute  explain  refer  transfer 
convey  introduce  reveal   
Table 44: V+NP+to only 
4.3.3 Class 3: V+NP+NP or V+NP+for 
The indirect objects of verbs from this category occur in the double object pattern and 
alternate with a for phrase. 
 
buy  do2 (perform)  find  save (keep) 
cook  draw  leave2 (leave behind)  sew 
cut  earn  make2 (produce)  win 
design  file  purchase   
Table 45: V+NP+NP or V+NP+for 
There are 38 examples of this type of construction in ICE GB. Of these, 22 occur 
in written language, whereas the remainder occur in spoken language.  Additionally, 
there  are  33  prepositional  paraphrases,  distributed  between  written  (16  cases)  and 
spoken (17 cases) language. 
As regards the alternation with a prepositional paraphrase in the corpus, there are 
a number of verbs which only occur in the double object construction (e.g. buy, cook, 
earn), whereas only two cases occur only in the prepositional variant: leave2 and sew. 
Of  those  showing  alternation  in  the  corpus,  do2  shows  a  marked  preference  for  the 
prepositional  paraphrase.  Find  and  make2  are  found  more  frequently  in  the  double 
object  construction.  Only  win  and  save  occur  with  similar  frequency  in  both 
constructions.   
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4.3.4 Class 4: V+NP+NP or V+NP+to/for 
Additionally,  some  verbs  were  found  whose  indirect  objects  occurred  in  the  double 
object pattern and which can alternate with either a to  or a for phrase with no change in 
their meaning. 
 
bring  get  send 
cause  play  set 
fax  return  write 
Table 46: V+NP+NP or V+NP+to/for 
There are 150 instances of this type of indirect object in ICE GB: 77 occur in 
written language and 73 in spoken language. The prepositional paraphrases amount to 
54, with 24 examples occurring in written language, 30 in spoken language. 
In contrast with the previous two classes, the majority of verbs in this class show 
alternation between the double object and the prepositional paraphrase. Bring, get and 
send occur more frequently in double object constructions, the trend being reversed in 
the  case  of  play  and  write.  Only  cause  occurs  with  similar  frequency  in  both 
constructions. 
4.3.5 Class 5: V+NP+for only 
This class could be expanded to almost any transitive verb, to which a prepositional 
phrase headed by for is potentially attached. The prepositional phrase usually indicates 
on  whose  behalf  or  for  whose  benefit  the  action  denoted  by  the  verb  is  being 
performed.
98 They do not allow for a double object alternant, and were thus left outside 
the dataset. 
 
acquire  have 
borrow  obtain 
collect  recover 
compose  retrieve 
fabricate  withdraw 
Table 47: V+NP+for only 
                                                 
98 See also §3.4 and §3.3.3.  
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4.3.6 Class 6: V+NP+NP only 
These verbs carry an immediately postverbal noun phrase (usually a pronoun) which is 
analysed as an indirect object in ICE GB. All the same, they were not included in the 
dataset given that they do not allow for a prepositional alternant. 
 
advise  fine  persuade 
allow  guarantee  remind 
bet  inform  render 
convince  instruct  satisfy 
direct  permit  surprise 
Table 48: V+NP+NP only 
4.3.7 Class 7: V+NP+NP or V+NP+other prepositions 
A small number of verbs which were instantiated in double object constructions in the 
corpus  did  allow  for  a  prepositional  variant.  However,  these  variants  involved 
prepositions other than to and for (such as ask of, issue with) and were discarded. 
4.4 Fine Tuning the Dataset: Inclusions and Exclusions  
A certain number of decisions had to be taken in order to lend more precision to the 
study. We are only interested in situations where the speaker has a choice between DOC 
and DAT. In all other cases (e.g. cases of marked clausal configurations; cases where 
other factors than the ones under investigation influenced the choice;
99 cases including 
verbs which showed no possible alternation between the different patterns), the data 
points were removed from the dataset. What follows are the most common reasons for 
excluding occurrences from the dataset. Additionally, verbs listed as ditransitives in the 
literature but which did not actually appear in any of the basic patterns under study 
(NP+NP,  NP+PP)  in  ICE GB  (though  they  may  have  appeared  in  other 
complementation patterns) were also dropped.
100  
 
(i) In ICE GB, indirect objects can occur with either ditransitive or dimonotransitive 
verbs, that is, they can be followed by a direct object or they can occur on their own.
101 
There are 375 instances of dimonotransitive verbs (e.g. show, ask, tell) which are not 
                                                 
99  For example, when particular, idiomatic configurations were instantiated, see §0 and 4.4.3. 
100 It is worth noticing that most of these decisions affected (i.e. excluded) DOCs rather than DATs. 
101 In his detailed study of ditransitives, Mukherjee (2005) considers dimonotransitives (i.e. verbs which 
do not exhibit two objects) as cognitively or underlyingly ditransitive, as opposed to explicitly ditransitive 
verbs.   
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selected by DOC FTF. All dimonotransitive cases were excluded from the dataset, since 
no alternation is possible. 
(84)      But maybe Helen can tell us <ICE GB:S1A 055 #148:1:A> 
 
(ii) Direct objects can be realised as noun phrases or as clauses. Verbs which require 
their direct objects to be realised as a clause (e.g. convince, advise, etc.) were not taken 
into account, since they do not allow alternation.
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(85)    a.  Dimitri has also strongly advised the British pair that weather conditions are 
not right <ICE GB:S2B 024 #62:1:A> 
b.  *Dimitri has also strongly advised that weather conditions are not right to the 
British pair 
 
(iii) Most variants of ditransitive complementation which involved an indirect object 
followed by a clause (where, by contrast with (ii) above, the second complement was 
not required to be a clause) were also excluded. These were among the most numerous, 
and  mainly  involved  the  verb  tell.
103  In  most  cases,  these  sentences  do  not  have  a 
prepositional alternative (but see chapter 7). 
(86)  a.  For example does forty nine show us what was happening there <ICE GB:S1B 069 
#57:1:A> 
b.  I’m telling you that we don’t want to be bothered to go further than Ealing 
Broadway on Saturday <ICE GB:S1A 030 #211:1:A> 
 
(iv) Thematic variants of a clause. The typical cases of marked order clauses, such as 
clefts,  pseudo clefts,  fronted  direct  objects,  extracted  indirect  objects  (as  in  relative 
clauses and questions), and so on were explicitly excluded from consideration by the 
mere fact of the selection of nodes in the FTFs employed. For instance, example (87)a 
below  an  interrogative  passive  transform  of  X  told  you  that  was  impossible  to 
retrieve by means of the DOC FTF in Figure 39, given that this FTF searches (among 
other things) for an indirect object, and there is no indirect object in were you told that. 
Marked  variants  of  ditransitive  complementation  are  discussed  in  more  detail  in 
§4.4.1.3 and §4.4.1.4 below. 
                                                 
102 In fact, only advise (6 cases) and convince (17 cases) occurred in DOC in ICE GB exclusively with a 
clausal direct object. 
103 Exclusions due to this particular reason amounted to 455 cases, out of which tell accounts for 292.  
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However, some marked sentences did manage to slip through the first selection 
procedure, for example sentence (87)b below, which has all three nodes (i.e. a verb 
phrase, a direct object, and an indirect object) required for retrieval. These and other 
cases had to be manually removed, on the assumption that speakers had less room for 
choice  between  DOC  and  DAT.  Put  differently,  marked  sentences  were  assumed  a 
priori to skew the choice, in that they represent a departure from a default order. In 
marked  clauses,  the  introduction  of  foreign  (pragmatic  or  stylistic)  factors  was  thus 
considered to be instrumental in obscuring or affecting the constructional alternation.  
(87)  a.  were you told that <ICE GB:S1A 053 #151:1:C> 
b.  Yeah was it you that [told] me that <ICE GB:S1A 099 #271:2:A> 
 
(v) Idiomatic phrases presented a different problem. Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2002) 
classified  idioms  into  two  types,  those  that  allow  the  possibility  of  alternation  (“if 
appropriate heaviness and discourse conditions are met”, they warn), and those that do 
not.
104  Some  idioms  were  then  excluded  from  the  purpose  of  this  study  (see  §0). 
Example (88)a below illustrates an alternating idiom (included in the dataset), whereas 
example (88)b is an idiom with no possible prepositional variant (and thus excluded 
from the dataset). 79 cases of alternating idioms were included in our dataset (see Table 
56). 
(88)  a.  I still think that you find that most people who go into politics do so from a 
mixture of reasons but one of those reasons is actually to do good for for 
other people <ICE GB:S1B 024 #96:1:F> 
b.  He didn’t give it a chance though <ICE GB:S1A 006 #88:1:A> 
 
(vi) ‘Affected’ indirect objects occur with semantically light (uses of) verbs (e.g. give, 
do, have, make, take) and an eventive direct object (see Quirk et al. 1985:750 751). 
These structures were mostly excluded, inasmuch as a prepositional paraphrase is not 
normally possible. All the same, some cases of light verbs do allow a prepositional 
paraphrase (see §4.4.3), as corpus examples and internet searches confirm, and were  
thus duly included. Example (89)a below illustrates a non alternating pattern, whereas 
example (89)b is an instance of an alternating one. 
 
                                                 
104 See also Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2008) for a similar, if not as focused, treatment of idioms and 
light verbs.  
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(89)  a.  Give me a fright <ICE GB:S1A 042 #21:1:A> 
b.   I’m sorry not to be able to give you any better advice. <ICE GB:W1B 014 #50:3> 
 
(vii) As mentioned earlier, prepositional paraphrases of indirect objects are not given 
any  status  in  the  tagging  of  ICE GB,  and  are  thus  bunched  together  with  other 
adverbials. We only concerned ourselves with prepositional phrases whose semantic 
role did not deviate from the standard recipient/beneficiary typical of indirect objects. 
All other cases (notably locatives) were dropped, simply because no alternation was 
possible. 
(90)      Couldn’t  you  send  her  uhm  to  a  mixed  school  at  sixteen  like  King’s 
Canterbury where Fran’s going <ICE GB:S1A 054 #69:1:A> 
4.4.1 Thematic Variants  
This section deals with ditransitive complementation not occurring in typical, unmarked 
positions  in  the  clause.  Indirect  objects  often  occur  in  marked  positions,  as  a 
consequence of movement under certain conditions, such as thematic reordering or the 
selection  of  different  clause  types.  What  follows  is  a  classification  of  these  clausal 
elements according to their positions of occurrence, and is inspired by Herriman’s work 
(1995).
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4.4.1.1 Unmarked Ditransitivity  
Unmarked double object constructions are the main focus of this study. Searching for 
the  construction  in  ICE GB  without  specifying  whether  the  direct  object  is  a  noun 
phrase or a clause yields 1,440 cases. The category DOC1 in Table 49 applies to those 
indirect objects occurring in their unmarked position. 
 
DOC 1
106 
Unmarked 
S+V+IO+DO  I’m  peeved  about  that  giving  her  that  window  <ICE 
GB:S1A 007 #7:1:A> 
Table 49: Unmarked Indirect Objects 
                                                 
105 Indirect objects occurring in dimonotransitive complementation (see §4.2) are not considered in this 
section. 
106 The abbreviation DOC in this and other tables is used to refer to double object constructions.  
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4.4.1.2 Unmarked Prepositional Alternant  
Unmarked  alternants  in  ICE GB  were  no  simpler  to  retrieve  than  their  marked 
counterparts.  After  exclusions,  there  remained  267  cases  of  unmarked  prepositional 
alternants  admissible  to  the  dataset.  The  category  DAT1  in  Table  50  applies  to 
prepositional paraphrases of indirect objects occurring in their unmarked position. 
 
DAT 1
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Unmarked 
S+V+ DO+PP  Even  giving  Coppermalt  to  Charles  has  not  erased 
anything. <ICE GB:W2F 018 #45:1> 
Table 50: Unmarked Prepositional Paraphrases 
4.4.1.3 Marked Ditransitivity 
Cases of double object constructions which involved some departure from the canonical 
order S+V+IO+DO were considered marked, and excluded from the dataset. Among 
them,  we  found  passivisation,  relativisation,  questioning,  extraction,  and  other  cases 
which highlighted one position in the clause at the expense of others. Besides their 
unmarked  (immediately  postverbal)  position,  Herriman  distinguishes  three  other 
available positions for indirect objects in the clause: 
 
•  DOC2:  The  indirect  object  follows  the  verb  but  does  not  precede  the  direct 
object. 
•  DOC3: The indirect object follows both the verb and the direct object. 
•  DOC4: The indirect object has been moved to initial position in the clause. 
 
This latter category (DOC4) is not to be confused with indirect passive clauses 
(i.e.  clauses  where  the  recipient  argument  is  encoded  as  the  subject  of  a  passive 
sentence, see (91)). The distinction between DOC4 cases and indirect passive clauses 
lies in the disengagement between the argument and the function: whereas in DOC4 
cases, the recipient argument encoded as indirect object has been fronted but remains an 
object, in indirect passive clauses the recipient argument is no longer the object and has 
become the subject of the passive clause. 
Indirect object clauses were well represented in the corpus, with 258 cases. 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 The abbreviation DAT in this and other tables is used to refer to prepositional paraphrases of indirect 
objects.  
117 
(91)  a.  Declarative indirect passive clauses 
  You were given _ that when you broke your <ICE GB:S1A 022 #202:1:A> 
b.  Interrogative indirect passive clauses 
  Were you told _ that <ICE GB:S1A 053 #151> 
c.  Abbreviated relative indirect passive clauses 
  This idea ∅ given _ its fullest expression by Freud lies at the heart of three 
centuries of moral reflection <ICE GB:S2B 029 #73:1:A> 
 
For the same above mentioned reasons, cases where not one but both nominals 
have been moved or extracted from postverbal position are not discussed in more detail 
either. These only numbered 11: 
(92)  a.  Relative indirect passive clauses (with extracted direct object) 
  … as a result of the treatment that she was given _ for her injury <ICE GB:S2A 062 
#38:1:A> 
b.  Interrogative indirect passive wh clauses 
  What were you told _ ? 
 
As pointed out in §4.2, marked cases were not included in the dataset. Marked 
instances of double object constructions amounted to 67 cases.  
4.4.1.3.1  DOC2 
This position, where the indirect object retains its place immediately next to the verb but 
is  not  followed  by  the  direct  object,  accounts  for  63  out  of  67  cases  of  marked 
ditransitivity, making it the most frequent. The direct object in this configuration has 
been either fronted (as shown in cases A1 3 in Table 54) or been made into the subject 
by passivisation (cases B1 3 in Table 54).  
More  specifically,  types  A1 3  refer  to  cases  where  the  direct  object  has  been 
fronted without recourse to passivisation. As such, these types refer to the fronting of a 
direct object by thematic rearrangement (A1), by the choice of an interrogative clause 
(A2), or by the choice of a relative (A3) clause. In types A2 and A3, the direct object is 
replaced by a wh element, which can even be omitted in some A3 cases. Cases A1 to 
A3 were extracted using the FTF in Figure 51, and included cases such as (93) to (95) 
below. 
  
118 
 
Figure 51: FTF for capturing A1 to A3 DOC cases 
(93)  Interrogative wh clauses  
a.  We do not know how well this device functioned, or how much satisfaction it 
gave parishioners _ . <ICE GB:W2A 006 #31:1> 
b.  How much money have they given you _ <ICE GB:S1A 062 #73:1:A> 
(94)  Relative clauses 
a.  And she actually described the tie he was wearing that I’d given him _ for his 
Christmas before <ICE GB:S1B 026 #16:1:B0> 
b.  I enclose copies of the documents which they have sent me _ . <ICE GB:W1B 027 
#76:6> 
(95)  Subordinate clauses in (pseudo )clefts 
a.  This is, indeed, what many of the new religions offer their members _ ... . 
<ICE GB:W2A 012 #32:1> 
 
There were 29 cases of interrogative wh clauses (as in (93) above), 24 relative 
clauses (as in (94) above), and 9 clefts (as in (95) above). These, with the addition of the 
single A1 case (in Table 54), make up all the instances where the indirect object follows 
the verb but does not precede the direct object because this has been fronted somehow. 
On the other hand, where the direct object becomes the subject of a passive clause 
(i.e. DOC 2:2 cases in Table 54), three subcategories have been identified: declaratives 
(B1), interrogatives (B2), and relatives (B3).  B3 also includes ‘abbreviated’ relative 
clauses, i.e. “clauses where the relative pronoun and finite verb are omitted” (Herriman  
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1995:84). Types B1 to B3 of ditransitive complementation were extracted using the FTF 
in Figure 52 below, which loosely specifies the expected order of occurrence. 
 
 
Figure 52: FTF for capturing B1 to B3 DOC cases 
There were not many occurrences of these types, to the point that all the relevant 
examples retrieved by the FTF above are indeed included in Table 54 below. 
4.4.1.3.2  DOC3 
This category encompasses cases where the indirect and direct objects swap positions. 
Both objects appear after the verb, but it is the direct object which appears in immediate 
postverbal position. There were no examples of this ordering in ICE GB. Indeed, this 
arrangement appears to be dialectally marked, so much so that Hughes and Trudgill 
(1996:16) consider examples such as She gave it the man to be possible “in the educated 
speech  of  people  from  the  north  [of  England]”.  In  fact,  when  both  objects  are 
pronominal,  the  ordering  described  in  DOC3  is  the  favoured  one  by  speakers  in 
Lancashire, as Siewierska and Hollmann  (2007:94) found out. See  also §7.2.3.3 for 
further discussion. 
4.4.1.3.3  DOC4 
DOC4  describes  cases  where  the  indirect  object  has  been  moved  to  clause initial 
position by thematic fronting (C1), the selection of an interrogative clause (C2), or the 
selection of a relative clause (C3). These types were extracted using the FTF in Figure 
53 below, which searches for instances of indirect objects in first (clausal) positions.  
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Figure 53: FTF for capturing C1 to C3 DOC cases 
However, not many cases were (able to be) retrieved. It seems that this position is 
not very comfortable for indirect objects, and indeed Herriman points out (1995:89) that 
indirect objects in this position are of doubtful acceptability for many speakers. She 
remarks:  
Many grammarians (Fillmore 1965:12, Kruisinga and Erades 1953:80, among 
others) exclude this position altogether, while others (Quirk et al. 1985:728, 
Jespersen 1927:138 and Nida 1960:195, among others) note that it is highly 
unusual. Indirect objects in initial position are examples of language fuzziness 
(Aitchison 1991:36), i.e. they are borderline cases which most people judge as 
possible but not fully acceptable. 
Table 54 below lists, classifies, and  exemplifies the different types of  marked 
ditransitivity found in ICE GB. 
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A1 
 
•  Thematic fronting [1]
108  ￿  Nonsense, she told herself _. <ICE GB:W2F 020 
#24:1>
109 
A2  ￿  Interrogative wh clauses 
[29] 
￿  You ought to see what I got you _ for your 
Christmas present <ICE GB:S1A 036 #256:1:A> 
DOC 2:1 
IO follows V but 
does  not  precede 
DO (fronted DO) 
[N=63] 
A3  ￿  Relative clauses [24] 
 
 
￿  Subordinate  clauses  in 
(pseudo ) clefts [9] 
￿  Those batteries that you gave me _ lasted 
an hour <ICE GB:S1A 085 #132:1:B> 
 
￿  And what Mr Lampitt told you _ was that 
he was interested in acquiring a business 
<ICE GB:S1B 064 #17:1:A> 
B1  ￿  Declarative  direct 
passive clauses [1] 
 
￿  And  many  neighbourhood  watch 
volunteers  believe  that  not  sufficient 
encouragement and cooperation is offered 
them _ … <ICE GB:S2B 037 #31:1:A> 
B2  ￿  Interrogative  direct 
passive wh clauses [0]  
￿  I  didn’t  ask  him  how  much  was  given 
him_ in the end … (Herriman 1995:84) 
DOC 2:2 
IO follows V but 
does  not  precede 
DO  (DO  as 
passive subject) 
[N=3] 
B3  ￿  Relative  direct  passive 
clauses [1] 
 
￿  Abbreviated  relative 
passive clauses [1] 
 
￿  … the two hours that is promised us _ this 
evening anyway <ICE GB:S2A 028 #131:3:A> 
 
￿  …Wallace  was  not  sufficiently  close  to 
goal  to  have  an  obvious  scoring 
opportunity ∅ denied him _ <ICE GB:W2C 004 
042> 
DOC 3 
IO  follows  both 
V and DO 
[N=0] 
  ￿  Reversed  object 
positions [0] 
￿  “I will give it you.” He cried (LOB K12 5) 
C1  ￿  Thematic fronting [1]  ￿  Everybody  that  cooks  I  ask  _  how  they 
make pastry <ICE GB:S1A 057 131> 
C2  ￿  Interrogative wh clauses 
[0] 
￿  Whom did they give _ the watch? (Nida 
1960:114) 
DOC 4:1 
IO  moved  to 
initial  position  in 
the  clause 
(fronted IO) 
[N=1] 
C3  ￿  Relative clauses [0] 
 
 
 
￿  Indirect objects in clefts 
[0] 
￿  … a poor working lad whom few would 
have  given  _  credit  for  thinking  at  all 
(Poutsma 1928:215) 
 
￿  ?It’s me ∅ he gave _ the book (Quirk et 
al. 1985:1385) 
Table 54: Classification of Marked Ditransitivity 
4.4.1.4 Marked Prepositional Alternants 
As with the case of marked double object constructions, marked prepositional variants 
of indirect objects are listed below but not included in the dataset, for exactly the same 
reasons.  The  categories  applied  to  DOC  are  now  applied  to  DAT,  with  the  only 
difference that stranding is brought into the classification of marked cases in DAT.  
 
                                                 
108 Numbers in square brackets indicate the number of cases found in ICE GB of the structure in question. 
Where no cases were found in ICE GB, examples are given from other sources, which are indicated in 
parentheses next to the example. Where the source of the example is not indicated, the example has been 
constructed (i.e. not searched in other sources). 
109  It  could  be  argued  that  nonsense  is  not  the  direct  object,  as  shown  in  the  paraphrase  “This  is 
nonsense,” she told herself. For consistency’s sake, however, we continue to follow ICE GB’s analysis.  
122 
•  DAT 2: The prepositional phrase (encoding the recipient) follows the verb but 
does not precede the direct object. 
•  DAT 3: The prepositional phrase (encoding the recipient) follows the verb but 
does not precede the direct object. The resulting ordering is similar to that of 
DAT2, but different syntactic processes are at work (see footnote 111 for more 
details). 
•  DAT 4: The recipient argument has been moved to initial position in the clause 
(stranding or pied piping). 
 
The first thing worth mentioning about marked DAT cases is that they  vastly 
outnumber marked DOC ones (which amounted to 67), with 140 cases in ICE GB.
110 
As was the case with DOCs, the most populated type is found when direct objects are 
displaced, with 125 cases (in type DAT 2:1 and 2:2). Of these, 52 are found in instances 
where the prepositional phrase has been fronted by thematic rearrangement (A1), by the 
choice of an interrogative clause (A2), or by the choice of a relative clause (A3). The 
latter case is illustrated by (96) below.  
(96)  Relative clauses 
a.  Talking about Yugoslavs I told you about that poster I gave to Vlad  <ICE 
GB:S1A 014 #3:1:B> 
b.  I enclose a copy of my suggestions for amendment of the flyer and the letter 
that I have faxed today to Mary Smith. <ICE GB:W1B 025 #47:5> 
 
The remaining 73 cases are instantiated when the direct object has become the 
subject of a passive sentence, as in (97) and (98) below. 
(97)  Declarative direct passive clauses 
a.  You cannot be asked to pay for your sight test until your prescription has 
been given _ to you. <ICE GB:W2D 001 #40:1> 
b.  I accept that an explanation was given _ to the Liverpool Crown Court … 
<ICE GB:S2A 068 #13:1:A> 
                                                 
110 Notice that we are not including indirect passives in the count for marked prepositional alternants.  
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(98)  Relative direct passive clauses 
a.  And there will then be the command given to the guards …  <ICE GB:S2A 011 
#41:1:A> 
b.  ... we can offer you a speaker’s fee of <unclear word> which will be paid to 
you within the month following the course. <ICE GB:W1B 030 #89:5> 
 
Another  curiosity  is  found  in  type  DAT  4,  which  describes  cases  when  the 
recipient argument moves to initial position. These cases allow for the possibility of the 
argument taking the preposition with it (pied piping) or leaving it behind (stranding). 
Whether this movement was caused by thematic fronting (C1), interrogative (C2) or 
relative clause formation (C3), or clefting (C3), the results from the corpus seem to 
suggest that whenever possible, stranding is favoured over pied piping. In C1 types, the 
only  found  case  is  of  stranding  (see  (99));  C2  cases  show  two  stranding  cases  as 
opposed to a single ‘unstranded’ one (see (100)); relative clauses are equally divided 
between stranded and ‘unstranded’ alternatives (see (101)); whereas the only case of C3 
clefting also shows stranding (see (102)).  
(99)  Thematic fronting  
a.  but beyond that any idea that the security services were deliberately seeking 
to bring down the Prime Minister uh I give absolutely no credence to _ <ICE 
GB:S1B 040 #88:1:B> [with stranding] 
(100)  Interrogative wh clauses 
a.  Now  as  for  actually  how  or  to  whom  you  send  the  messages  _  there’s  a 
standard convention … <ICE GB:S2A 028 #96:2:A> 
b.  ... and forget that you who you’ve lent them to _ <ICE GB:S1A 013 #86:1:E> [with 
stranding] 
(101)  Relative clauses 
a.  He was a recent example of the long line of literate golden style civil servants 
to whom the English nation and its language owe so much <ICE GB:S2B 25 #98:1> 
b.  I mean obviously there are some books that you can’t do that to but but I 
would do that quite happily to a book <ICE GB:S1A 013 #139:1:B> [with stranding]  
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(102)  PPs in cleft 
a.  that’s Catholic Action for Native North Americans he does a lot of work for _ 
<ICE GB:S1A 096 #106 107:1:A> [with stranding] 
 
Due to space constraints, the remaining types of marked prepositional alternants 
will not be discussed. Regardless, Table 55 classifies and offers examples of all marked 
cases of DAT in ICE GB. 
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A1  ￿  Thematic fronting [11]  ￿  Miss Rogers … has read to me letters _ 
today … <ICE GB:S2A 063 #95:1:A> 
A2  ￿  Interrogative wh clauses 
[8] 
￿  … learn what other people can give _ to 
you … <ICE GB:S1A 003 #121:1:B> 
DAT 2:1 
PP  immediately 
follows  V 
(fronted DO) 
[N=52]  A3  ￿  Relative clauses [32] 
 
 
￿  Subordinate  clauses  in 
(pseudo ) clefts [1]  
￿  … this extra bit of power that they give _ 
to a voter <ICE GB:S1B 029 #60:1:A> 
 
￿  …  that’s  what  people  from  the  country 
would  bring  _  to  cousins  in  the  city  … 
<ICE GB:S1B 014 #106:1:A> 
B1  ￿  Declarative  direct 
passive clauses [30] 
￿  … this power is given _ to people in their 
own communities … <ICE GB:W2B 013 #11:1> 
B2  ￿  Interrogative  direct 
passive wh clauses [0] 
￿  What was given _ to John? 
 
DAT 2:2 
PP  immediately 
follows V (DO as 
passive subject) 
[N=73]  B3  ￿  Relative  direct  passive 
clauses [43] 
 
￿  Abbreviated  relative 
passive clauses [0] 
￿  … instructions which had been given _ to 
her … <ICE GB:S2A 063 #79:1:A> 
 
￿  The book ∅ given _ to us is blue. 
DAT 3 
PP  immediately 
follows  V 
(fronted PP) 
  ￿  Reversed positions 
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Miss Rogers … has read to me letters _ today 
… <ICE GB:S2A 063 #95:1:A> 
C1  ￿  Thematic fronting [0] 
 
￿  Thematic  fronting 
(stranded) [1] 
￿  To him he gave a book _ . 
 
￿  … any idea that the security services were 
deliberately  seeking  to  bring  down  the 
Prime  Minister  I  give  absolutely  no 
credence to _ <ICE GB:S1B 040 #88:1:B> 
C2  ￿  Interrogative wh clauses 
[1] 
 
 
￿  Interrogative wh clauses 
(stranded) [2] 
￿  Now as for actually how or to whom you 
send  the  messages  _  there’s  a  standard 
convention … <ICE GB:S2A 028 #96:2:A> 
 
￿  … and forget who you’ve lent them to _ 
<ICE GB:S1A 013 #86:1:E> 
DAT 4:1 
PP  moved  to 
initial  position  in 
the  clause 
(fronted PP) 
[N=15] 
C3  ￿  Relative clauses [5] 
 
 
￿  Relative  clauses 
(stranded) [5] 
 
 
￿  PPs in clefts [0] 
 
￿  PPs  in  clefts  (stranded) 
[1] 
￿  … a man … for whom she had wanted to 
find excuses _ <ICE GB:W2F 015 #43:1> 
 
￿  Uh an American lady that I gave a lecture 
uhm on architecture to _ …  <ICE GB:S2A 024 
#34:1:A> 
 
￿  It’s to me he gave the book _ . 
 
￿  That’s  Catholic  Action  for  Native  North 
Americans he does a lot of work for _ <ICE 
GB:S1A 096 #106 107:1:A> 
Table 55: Classification of Marked Prepositional Alternants  
4.4.2 Idioms 
Idioms  and  light  verbs  (the  latter  discussed  in  §4.4.3)  are  of  interest  to  this  study 
because  they  provide  a  repertoire  of  ready made,  “semi preconstructed  phrases” 
                                                 
111 In both DAT 2:1 (A1) and DAT 3, the rearrangement of clausal elements results in the prepositional 
phrase immediately following the verb, but while in one case this is because the prepositional phrase has 
moved over the direct object, in the other the direct object has vacated its position by either extraction or 
other syntactic processes.  
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(Sinclair 1991:109) which very often involve the verb give and other complement/s, and 
alternating complementation patterns (DOC and DAT) are very often possible. In using 
an  idiom,  however,  speakers  do  not  select  a  verb  firstly  and  then  its  attending 
complement/s,  but  rather  there  is  only  one  choice,  that  of  using  an  idiom.  Moon 
(1998:28) observes: “[a] single choice in one slot may be made which dictates which 
elements will fill the next slot or slots, and prevents the exercise of free choice”. In this 
light, speakers/writers who produced these ditransitive idioms in our database, can they 
really  be  exercising  a  choice  between  DOC  and  DAT,  or  was  the  choice  already 
predetermined for them from the moment they chose to use the verbal idiom?
112 
Idioms are generally defined as multi word expressions whose meaning cannot be 
arrived at compositionally, i.e. their overall meaning is not derivable from the sum of 
their parts. Moon (1998:4) provides two definitions of idioms: a narrow one, according 
to which an idiom is a unit that is fixed, semantically opaque, and metaphorical, such as 
kick the bucket or spill the beans; and a broad one, whereby the term is used more 
generally to refer to many kinds of multi word items, semantically opaque or not. The 
fact that this author felt it necessary to provide us with these two types of definition 
points at the gradient nature of idioms. Bolinger suggests (1977:168), “[t]here is no 
clear boundary between an idiom and a collocation or between a collocation and a freely 
generated  phrase  only  a  continuum  with  greater  density  at  one  end  and  greater 
diffusion at the other”.  
As mentioned earlier, give is a participant in many verbal idioms. By virtue of the 
fact that this verb is prototypically ditransitive, it also takes two complements when part 
of an idiom. In these cases, one of the complements usually has a beneficiary role, 
rather than a recipient one. It is also not infrequent for both complements to allow the 
possibility of rearrangement, thereby instantiating both double object and prepositional 
variants. All the same, alternating idioms tend to favour DOC over DAT (see Table 56 
below), and typically have a fixed direct object, as opposed to a fixed recipient.
113 The 
examples in (103) below (from Moon 1998:144) illustrate some idioms which can and 
do alternate between DOC and DAT.
 114 
                                                 
112 Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:273) apply the term verbal idiom to those sequences whose major 
element is a verb. 
113 See Hudson (1991) in §2.2.1. 
114 Moon (1998:144) notices that even those idioms which are strongly preferred in DOC can appear in 
DAT with a sufficiently heavy NP, cf. Larson (1988:341): 
i.  Alice gives hell to anyone who uses her training wheels. 
ii  The Count gives the creeps to anyone he’s around long enough. 
This phenomenon was also mentioned in Wasow (2002) and Bresnan and Nikitina (2003).  
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(103)  a.  Give someone a wide berth / give a wide berth to someone 
b.  Drop someone a line / drop a line to someone 
c.  Promise someone the earth / promise the earth to someone 
d.  Lend someone an ear / lend an ear to someone 
e.  Teach someone a lesson / teach a lesson to someone 
f.  Show someone the ropes / show the ropes to someone 
g.  Give someone the creeps / give the creeps to someone 
 
The alternation potential of ditransitive idioms has also been studied by Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav  (2002).
115  These  authors  classified  idioms  into  those  that  could 
alternate, those that could occur in DAT only, and those that occurred in DOC only. 
They suggest that the failure of the idioms in (104) below to appear in double object 
constructions is evidence of the fact that, for the alternation to be possible, the to phrase 
must encode a goal which can be interpreted as a recipient, and this is clearly not the 
case: most prepositional cases in (104) below are plain locatives. 
(104)  a.  Send someone to the showers / *send the showers someone 
b.  Take someone to the cleaners / *take the cleaners someone 
c.  Bring something to light / *bring light something 
 
In  our  study,  idioms  were  also  divided  into  those  that  could  or  did  alternate 
between DOC and DAT, and those that could not do so. The first class of idioms was 
incorporated into our dataset, the second class was discarded. Table 56 below shows the 
former category: the first column lists the verbs involved, the second column shows the 
corresponding (theme) arguments, and the next two columns show the occurrence of 
these idioms in the investigated constructions. Unless otherwise specified, where ‘0’ 
occurs  in  a  cell,  that  idiom  was  not  found  in  ICE GB,  but  was  investigated  in  the 
relevant complementation pattern via the World Wide Web. 
 
                                                 
115 See also Rappaport Hovav and Levin (2008).  
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Verb  Theme  DAT  DOC  Total 
DO  (in)justice  3  0  3 
DO  damage  4  0  4 
DO  favour/s  1  1  2 
DO  good  1  1  2 
DO  harm  2  1  3 
GIVE  access  2  1  3 
GIVE  attention  1  2  3 
GIVE  choice  0  2  2 
GIVE  comfort  1  0  1 
GIVE  confidence  0  1  1 
GIVE  credit  0  1  1 
GIVE  direction  0  4  4 
GIVE  edge  0  1  1 
GIVE  hand  0  1  1 
GIVE  heart  1  0  1 
GIVE  impression  0  1  1 
GIVE  lead  0
116  5  5 
GIVE  leadership  1  0
117  1 
GIVE  notice  0  1  1 
GIVE  opportunity  0
118  9  9 
GIVE  precedence  1  0  1 
GIVE  priority  1  0  1 
GIVE  thought  3  4  7 
GIVE  trouble  1  2  3 
HAND  initiative   1  0  1 
OFFER  choice  0  2  2 
OFFER  opportunity  1  0
119  1 
PAY  attention  2  0
120  2 
PAY  compliment  0  2  2 
PAY  tribute  3  0  3 
TEACH  lesson  0  2  2 
TELL   truth  0  5  5 
  Totals  30  49  79 
Table 56: Alternating Idioms in ICE GB Dataset 
The clauses in (105) to (107) below illustrate alternating idioms from my dataset. 
(105)  a.  In any case, the economic sanctions did most harm to the blacks. <ICE GB:W2E 
009 #107:9> 
b.  (…)  this  strategy  is  doing  it  no  harm,  despite  higher  bad  debt  write offs 
(again, like every other bank). <ICE GB:W2C 005 #8:1> 
                                                 
116 By analogy with give __ leadership. 
117 By analogy with give __ the lead. 
118 By analogy with offer __ opportunity. 
119 By analogy with give __ opportunity. 
120 By analogy with give __ attention.  
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(106)  a.  Alice had been glad to meet her and at first had tried to do several small 
favours for her. <ICE GB:W2F 009 #35:1> 
b.  Could you do me a favour please? <ICE GB:W1B 002 #23:1> 
(107)  a.  I  believe  that  he  was  crucified  dead  and  buried  and  that  we  do  not  give 
enough thought to this <ICE GB:S2B 028 #2:1:A> 
b.  John wanted to give this some thought (…) <ICE GB:W1B 027 #9:1> 
 
Table 57 below shows idioms found in ICE GB that cannot and did not alternate 
between DOC and DAT, and were therefore removed from our dataset.  
 
Verb  Theme  Verb  Theme  Verb  Theme  Verb  Theme 
BRING  recession  GIVE  credence  GIVE  stick  MAKE  way 
DROP  line  GIVE  disease  GIVE  substance  PAY  homage 
DROP  note  GIVE  example  GIVE  time  TAKE  ages 
GIVE  benefit of the 
doubt 
GIVE  heart attack  GIVE  view  TAKE  minutes 
GIVE  break  GIVE  impact  GIVE  way  TAKE  time 
GIVE  capacity  GIVE  minute  GIVE  weight  TELL  clue 
GIVE  chance  GIVE  option  LEAVE  time  TELL  so 
GIVE  clue  GIVE  possibility  MAKE  arrangements  TELL  what 
    GIVE  rise  MAKE  speech     
Table 57: Non Alternating Idioms in ICE GB Dataset 
The examples in (108) and (109) below illustrate non alternating idioms (in DAT 
and DOC, respectively) which were excluded from my dataset. 
(108)  a.  Did we give way to Stalin? <ICE GB:S1B 035 #80:1D> 
b.  Poplar had become the centre of a struggle which gave rise to a new political 
term – Poplarism. <ICE GB:W2B 019 #6:1> 
(109)  a.  I should’ve given you time to look at the forms <ICE GB:S1B 061 #89:1:A> 
b.  You shouldn’t have given him the chance <ICE GB:W2F 018 #77:1> 
4.4.3 Light Verbs 
Already in the mid 1920s, Poutsma and Jespersen had identified a tendency for ‘light’ 
(uses of) verbs. This use consisted of a (sometimes idiomatic) combination of a verb 
with general or vague meaning such as do, give, and have, followed by a deverbal noun,  
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or a “noun of action” (Poutsma 1926:394).
121,122 In the presence of a semantically vague 
verb, it is this noun which carries the major part of the meaning. These constructions 
have  been  called  light  verbs  (Jespersen  1927:117),  eventive  objects  (Quirk  et  al. 
1985:750 751),  expanded  predicates  (Algeo  1995:204),  and  stretched  verb 
constructions (Allerton 2001). 
Some of the characteristics of these constructions are listed below: 
 
•  The verb in question must be one of the most frequent semantically  general 
verbs,  such  as  give,  have,  make,  take,  etc.  (Algeo  1995:207).  The  semantic 
contribution of the verb to the meaning of the predication is very small: “[t]he 
main  semantic  content  is  located  not  on  the  light  verb,  but  in  the  noun 
functioning  as  head  of  the  direct  object”  (Huddleston  and  Pullum  et  al. 
2002:290).
123 
•  The noun phrase is “overwhelmingly indefinite” and “typically singular” (Quirk 
1995:116), as well as being very often a deverbal noun. 
 
Biber et al. (1999:1026 1027) identify a “cline of idiomaticity” in light uses of 
verbs,  ranging  from  clearly  idiomatic  expressions  ((110)a,  b),  through  to  relatively 
idiomatic expressions —where “the meanings of individual words are retained to some 
extent, but the entire expression also takes on a more idiomatic meaning” (1999:1027), 
and could even be replaced by a single verb ((110)c, d)—, to expressions where the 
verbs retain their core meaning ((110)e, f). 
                                                 
121 “Semantically general verbs are those used in an idiomatic (nonpredictable) meaning, which typically 
have long dictionary entries because defining them requires the specification of many different senses, 
according to the verbal context” (Algeo 1995:206). 
122 Poutsma (1926:399) makes a distinction between the elements which follow certain verbs (typically 
make). They can be verb stems in their own right (e.g. make a smile, make a move), or they can be simply 
nouns of action “that are not to be regarded as verb stems” such as make an examination, make a speech, 
make your choice, etc. 
123 Poutsma (1926:394) argues that the semantic vagueness of the light verb is apparent from the fact that 
the same deverbal noun may be associated with more than one verb “without much difference in meaning 
being involved.” This was indeed confirmed in our dataset, where the object support was used almost 
interchangeably with light verbs such as give and lend (and offer and win too, but these are, at best, 
marginally light).  
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(110)  a.  When we go public, you’ll make a killing. 
b.  Do you think you can take time out to have a cup of tea. 
c.  Have a chance. 
d.  Make a deal. 
e.  Well, we have an extra one. 
f.  He made a sandwich. 
 
It is this classification difficulty which makes Algeo (1995:204) claim that the 
expanded predicate  construction  is  “janus like,  looking  in  both  directions 
simultaneously. It is a syntactic construction at the core of the grammar of the clause. 
But it is also a lexical unit that requires entry in a dictionary”.  
In view of the fact that each light verb needs at least an object, most light uses are 
monotransitive. However, given that the semantic import of the verb is so small, the 
combination  can  almost  be  regarded  as  intransitive.  Consider  example  (111)  below, 
from Algeo (1995:204). 
(111)  a.  We had to do a dive. 
b.  We had to dive. 
 
The verb object combination do a dive in (111)a above is (excluding pragmatic 
considerations)  the  semantic  equivalent  of  the  verb  to  which  the  noun  object  is 
morphologically  related,  i.e.  dive.  Thus,  the  (structurally)  more  complex  pattern 
expresses the same meaning as the simpler one. 
By  the  same  token,  some  light  verb object  combinations  which  require  an 
additional object are semantically comparable to a monotransitive expression. Consider 
examples (112) below, from Quirk et al. (1985:751). 
(112)  a.  She gave me a push. 
b.  She pushed me. 
 
These constructions allow the speaker/writer a greater “syntactic versatility,” as 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:291) call it. The light verb + object combination 
allows for modifiers to be added to the deverbal noun. Consider example (113) below, 
where (113)b and (113)d are decidedly awkward.  
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(113)  a.  We had a delightful bath.
124 
b.  ?We bathed delightfully. 
c.  She gave him an unusually passionate kiss. 
d.  ?She kissed him unusually passionately. 
 
Additionally, light verb constructions are a convenient device to move the activity 
(over the human participant) towards clause final position, where it enjoys the focal 
limelight, as can be appreciated in (114), from Quirk et al. (1985:751). 
(114)  a.  He nudged Helen. 
b.  He gave Helen a nudge.  
 
As regards the alternation potential of some light verbs, Quirk et al. (1985:751) 
mention that indirect objects in light verb DOCs are not normally paraphraseable by a 
prepositional phrase, as seen in example (115) below. 
(115)  a.  I gave Helen a nudge. 
b.  ?I gave a nudge to Helen. 
 
The reason for this lack of alternation with DAT is that the purpose of light verb 
constructions is to focus on the deverbal noun denoting the activity. Thus, it is the direct 
object and not the human participant that should receive end focus. 
As was the case with idioms, light verbs in DOC and/or DAT complementation 
patterns were classified into those that could and those that could not alternate. Table 58 
below shows the alternating light verbs in our dataset: the first column lists the verbs 
involved, the second column shows the corresponding (theme) arguments, and the next 
two  columns  show  the  number  of  occurrences  of  the  idioms  in  the  investigated 
constructions. Where ‘0’ occurs in a cell, that idiom was not found in ICE GB, but was 
investigated in the relevant complementation pattern via the World Wide Web. 
 
                                                 
124 Example from Jespersen (1927:117).  
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Verb  Theme  DAT  DOC  Total 
GIVE  absolutions  1  0  1 
GIVE  appearance  1  0  1 
GIVE  advice  2  2  4 
GIVE  assurance
125   0  2  2 
GIVE  blessing/s  1  0  1 
GIVE  boost  1  0  1 
GIVE  consideration
126   1  2  3 
GIVE  encouragement
127   0  1  1 
GIVE  indication
128   0  4  4 
GIVE  look  0  2  2 
GIVE  response
129   0  1  1 
GIVE  shock  0  2  2 
GIVE  (fore)warning  0  2  2 
GIVE  support  0
130  7  7 
LEND  support  1  1  2 
OFFER  (re)assurance
131   1  0  1 
PAY  visit  2  0  2 
MAKE  visit  1  0  1 
  Totals  12  26  38 
Table 58: Alternating Light Verbs in ICE GB Dataset 
The clauses in (116) to (118) below illustrate  alternating light verbs from my 
dataset. 
(116)  a.  And  uh  having  recorded  the  matter  and  given  certain  advice  to  Mr  Scott 
Cooper … <ICE GB:S1B 069 #49:1:A> 
b.  I'm sorry not to be able to give you any better advice. <ICE GB:W1B 014 #50:3> 
(117)  a.  It is both inevitable and right that Conservatives should give the most careful 
consideration to the former Deputy Prime Minister's words …. <ICE GB:W2E 005 
#45:3> 
b.  Regarding  the  Foundation  and  Advanced  EEC  courses,  we’ve  given  this 
careful consideration … <ICE GB:W1B 030 #135:7> 
                                                 
125 From Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:293 296). 
126 See footnote 125. 
127 See footnote 125. 
128 See footnote 125. 
129 See footnote 125. 
130 By analogy with lend. 
131 See footnote 125.  
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(118)  a.  The outcome of the constitutional confrontation was influenced by several 
factors which lent support to the unitarist trend … <ICE GB:W2B 007#45:1> 
b.  With Phelan lending the impressive Ince solid support in midfield and Sharpe 
consistently pressing the opposition back on the left wing, United quickly 
established a pattern of command … <ICE GB:W2C 004 #32:2> 
 
Table  59  below  shows  light  verbs  which  did  not  alternate  between  DOC  and 
DAT, and which were removed from our dataset.  
 
Verb  Theme  Verb  Theme 
GIVE  brush off  GIVE  scare 
GIVE  call  GIVE  shout 
GIVE  cuddle  GIVE  smile 
GIVE  fright  GIVE  stare 
GIVE  kick  GIVE  start 
GIVE  miss  GIVE  surprise 
GIVE  pat  GIVE  wink 
GIVE  push  MAKE  call 
GIVE  rebuke  MAKE  contribution 
GIVE  rest  MAKE  decision 
GIVE  ring  MAKE  speech 
Table 59: Non Alternating Light Verbs in ICE GB Dataset 
The examples in (119) below illustrate non alternating (i.e. excluded) idioms in 
DAT and DOC. 
(119)  a.  Women might be able to make a valuable contribution to cricket <ICE GB:S1B 
021 #79:1:B> 
b.  Give it a rest, Benjamin. <ICE GB:W2F 012 #103:1> 
4.5 Experiment Design 
All experiments are basically comparisons. (R. Langley 1968:109) 
Experimental  research  in  corpus  linguistics  can  be  defined  as  the  conduct  of 
investigations which can confirm or refute hypotheses about the structure and use of 
language. The role of computation is to ensure the systematic abstraction and evaluation 
of data, against which hypotheses are evaluated. The role of data is in a way subsidiary 
to  the  uses  we  put  them  to.  However,  as  Meyer  (2002:102)  observes,  it  is  not 
uncommon to come across “many corpus linguists [who] have regarded the gathering of 
evidence as a primary goal”, the be all and end all of corpus research. There have been 
many  lengthy  papers,  full  of  graphs  and  tables,  signifying  very  little;  i.e.  with  not  
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enough attention paid to the significance of the reported findings. Aarts (2000:7) notes 
that these studies  
invariably [elicit] a “so what” response: so what if we know that there are 435 
instances  of  the  conjunction  “because”  in  a  particular  category  of  written 
language, whereas there are only 21 instances in conversations? So what if we 
are told that subordination is much more common in women’s speech than in 
men’s speech? 
That is why it is essential to start corpus based investigations with a particular 
linguistic  purpose,  and  to  constantly  remind  ourselves  that  frequency  and  statistical 
significance  do  not,  in  and  of  themselves,  answer  ‘why’  questions.  A  qualitative 
analysis must therefore be considered a (post ) requisite of quantitative research.  
As mentioned earlier, in this study, the research questions addressed  were the 
following: 
(120)  Research Questions 
a.  Do  information  status,  weight,  and  complexity  indeed  affect  the  dative 
alternation? 
b.  What is the relationship between these three factors? 
c.  Can  corpus  data  help  establish  a  model  of  the  interaction  between  these 
factors/variables? 
d.  Can these factors be manipulated into predicting speakers’ choices?  
 
The following sections compartmentalise and break down the experiment design 
applied to the corpus investigation. The experimental process is described according to 
the formalisation suggested in Wallis (2007), according to whom there are four parts to 
an experiment: (a) definition, (b) sampling, (c) analysis, and (d) evaluation.  
4.5.1 Definition 
Research questions, variables, target cases, and queries must be specified (prior to the 
conduct of any kind of analysis) based on case definitions. These ‘working definitions’ 
are “a way of avoiding inconsistency as the analysis proceeds” (Meyer 2002:107 108). 
Naturally, this does not preclude the possibility of altering definitions as new data are 
encountered. The constructions to be investigated (DOC and DAT) have been defined in 
§4.1, the variables investigated will be (preliminarily) defined below. 
Most theories of constituent ordering recognise the role of different principles: the 
Given  Before  New  (GBN)  principle  and  the  principle  of  end  weight  (PEW),  both  
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variously defined in the literature. In this study, the definition of givenness is largely 
based on retrievability, i.e. a noun phrase is given if its referent is recoverable from the 
preceding context. As regards the PEW, I distinguish between weight (defined as the 
number of words in a constituent) and complexity (defined as the number of phrasal 
nodes in a constituent).  
4.5.2 Sampling 
The  second  stage  in  the  experimental  process  is  sampling,  which  results  from  the 
application  of  the  definitional  criteria  as  established  in  the  previous  stage.  An 
experimental sample (or model) is thus abstracted from the dataset/corpus, and this is 
then classified according to the variables under study.
132  
The selection (and exclusion) criteria for our dataset were discussed in §4.1 and 
§4.2. In view of the fact that neither DOC nor DAT have unique lexical content, lexical 
searches would have been insufficient for extracting all instances of these constructions 
from the corpus. Because ICE GB is a parsed corpus and thus contains “annotation 
describing higher level grammatical constructions” (Meyer 2002:117 118), most cases 
in our dataset could be extracted automatically from ICE GB by means of FTFs and 
other searching procedures available via ICECUP. All the same, the results had to be 
manually revised to stop extraneous variables from affecting the sample.  
4.5.3 Analysis 
Analysis consists of assigning specific linguistic values to the target cases. In the present 
study, this was carried out off line from the corpus, i.e. cases were extracted manually 
into a spreadsheet and categorised individually.
133 Wallis (2007) also includes statistical 
analysis at this stage, specifically the application of statistical tests to the dataset, the 
search for patterns in the (abstract) model, and the ensuing refutation or confirmation of 
hypotheses. Statistical analysis is further discussed in §4.6 below. 
This study consists of a series of separate (mini ) experiments applied to the same 
dataset, as illustrated in Figure 60 below. 
                                                 
132 In principle, though, the experimental dataset can consist of the entire set of cases in the dataset, or 
simply of a random subsample of it. 
133 This allowed total frequencies to be separated from underlying data, i.e. the researcher can focus on 
relative frequencies rather than on number of instances of a specific construction per number of words in 
the corpus, a far less informative and useful ratio for inferential statistics.  
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Figure 60: Overall Experiment Design 
An  experimental  model  usually  consists  of  two  variables,  one  of  which  (the 
independent one) can be used to explain the other (dependent) variable (see §4.6.1). In 
Figure 60 above, my dependent variable (including cases of the dative alternation in 
ICE GB) is represented by the lozenge shape in the centre of the graph. The frequencies 
obtained  from  the  corpus  via  quantitative  analysis  are  then  tested  against  certain 
communicative principles and discourse factors which allegedly influence speakers to 
choose (in a particular context) one construction over the other. The variables which 
could explain the abstract model (i.e. the independent variables) are represented by the 
rectangles  surrounding  the  lozenge.  The  solid  arrows  stand  for  individual  tests 
conducted to ascertain the influence each variable had on the sample (i.e. to see how 
accurate GBN, weight, and complexity were at predicting the alternation), whereas the 
dotted lines represent association (paired) tests which explored the interplay between 
the posited explanatory factors.  
Ditransitive cases in my dataset were evaluated by means of Mann Whitney tests 
(discussed in §4.6.3) for simple measures of weight (in terms of number of words) and 
complexity  (number  of  phrasal  nodes).  By  comparing  the  distributions  of  DOC  and 
DAT cases as determined by the different variables (weight and complexity), this step 
attempted to ascertain whether any observable differences were indeed real or simply 
epiphenomenal. The GBN principle was tested against the dataset by means of a χ
2 test, 
given that the data was discrete. 
The next step involved evaluating the interaction between weight and complexity 
to see whether (i) they were coextensive, (ii) one was better than the other. The results  
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of  the  potential  weight/complexity  interaction  (a  likely  explanation  of  the  dative 
alternation) were then contrasted with an account of the alternation based solely on the 
GBN principle, in an attempt to identify the strength of the correlation between weight 
and complexity on the one hand, and information status on the other. Additionally, the 
potential interrelationship between weight and GBN was evaluated by means of Mann 
Whitney tests. 
Notice  that  this  is  a  mixed factor  design,  in  that  the  operationalisation  of  the 
variables  has  not  rendered  uniformly  linear  results  in  all  cases:  while  weight  and 
complexity are numerical, the information status (GBN) values are discrete (i.e. their 
values are given or new, not numbers on a scale such as 1, 3, etc.). It is this design that 
made it necessary to employ different statistical tests (χ
2, Mann Whitney, t, etc.), given 
that using more uniform alternatives (such as factor analysis, or ANOVAs) would have 
been less appropriate.
134 We have been more careful (in our statistical assumptions) than 
a  conventional  analysis  of  variance.  We  have  carefully  examined  each  individual 
variable as well as its interaction with the other variable/s, which is a more principled 
approach  than  just  pushing  the  data  through  an  automated  statistical  package  and 
relying on it to come out with a significance verdict. 
The dataset is clean, in that weight, complexity, and information status (GBN) are 
all competing predictive factors: all other categorical factors/values have been excluded 
from it (see §4.2). The experimental design makes these three variables fight each other 
in order to determine their relative strength with respect to the linguistic choice (DOC 
or DAT). As in a gladiator’s duel, we consider only two factors at a time: having three 
simultaneously  could  result  in  the  finer  details  of  their  interaction  being  lost  or 
overlooked. 
If we assumed that that weight, complexity, and information status (GBN) are 
independent from one another, then these factors would explain different portions of the 
dataset. If this were not strictly true, then they would explain an overlapping group of 
cases, while failing to explain the remainder of the data. In the vast majority of cases, 
though, these variables are indeed expected to favour the same (optimal) word order: the 
prediction is that the newer, heavier, and more  complex constituent will tend to be 
found in the second position in both constructions (DOC and DAT).  
                                                 
134 There is more to be said about the decision not to use ANOVAs. ANOVAs can be described as 
cascades or bundles of t tests which compare more than two groups in order to look at various potential 
sources  of  variance.  As  such,  they  do  not  offer  any  additional  insights  to  the  experimental  design 
employed in this study. Furthermore, we do not necessarily want to use t tests here, given that —as a 
matter of principle— we are treating any assumption of normal distribution of the dataset as suspect.   
139 
4.5.4 Evaluation 
Once  analysis  has  been  carried  out,  the  experimental  results  must  be  evaluated.  In 
Wallis (2007), this consists of two aspects: (i) verifying results against the corpus (i.e. 
ensuring that observations reflect a real phenomenon in the data “rather than mistakes in 
the analysis, an artefact of the grammar, variable definitions or sampling” (as Wallis 
(2007)  points  out  in  §8.3  of  his  e paper),
135  and  (ii)  considering  the  theoretical 
implications of the results by relating results to the literature.
136 This meant going back 
to the corpus and look at language in context. We should always remind ourselves that 
our results are devoid of linguistic justification until we find one for them. 
4.6 Quantitative Analysis 
Statistical packages tend to be used as a kind of oracle, from which you elicit a 
verdict as to whether you have one or more significant effects in your data. (…) 
After a magic button press, voluminous output tends to be produced that hides 
the  p values,  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  statistical  pilgrimage,  among  other 
numbers that are completely meaningless to the user, as befits a true oracle. 
(Baayen 2008:x) 
If  we  can  make  the  assumption  that  the  elements  in  the  dataset  are  broadly 
representative and broadly  comparable with other elements in the English language, 
then  inferences  can  be  derived  from  it.  However,  these  inferences  are  only  made 
possible by relying on statistical methods. The experimental sample thus becomes the 
test bed for hypotheses about language in general, an abstract model for confirmation 
and refutation (as well as selection). What statistical tests essentially do is give the 
researcher  confidence  when  generalizing  from  a  measured  sample  (dataset)  to  an 
unmeasured  instance  (language)  by  confirming  (or  disconfirming)  that  the  observed 
results in the model are not accidental, i.e. are likely to reoccur in the world (all other 
things being equal). This approach is sometimes called ‘inferential statistics.’  
What  follows  is  a  brief  discussion  of  certain  key  notions  instrumental  to  the 
design of the experiments. 
4.6.1 Variables  
As  discussed  earlier,  a  common  way  of  setting  up  an  experimental  model  is  by 
assuming two variables. The independent variable (IV) is the feature that (the researcher 
                                                 
135  When  an  explanatory  gap  resists  our  best  efforts  at  closing  it  by  refining  or  multiplying  our 
explanatory factors, it is clearly a potentially interesting research subject. 
136 In this regard, Wallis (2007) concentrates particularly on issues of theoretical commensurability (how 
the research results relate to previous reports), simplicity (i.e. Occam’s razor), causality and circularity 
(i.e. ensuring that research results are not circular nor the outcome of mere correlations).  
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assumes) could explain the dependent variable (DV). This setup is easily translated into 
a table; statistical tests are then applied in order to verify whether a change in the values 
of  the  IV  affects  the  values  of  the  DV.  The  default  negative  assumption  (i.e.  null 
hypothesis) is made that there will be no (significant) change.
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In this study, DV is represented by DOC and DAT, i.e. the dative alternation. The 
(relative)  weight,  (relative)  complexity,  and  information  status  (GBN)  of  these 
constructions are the IVs, and, as such, all possible predicting factors. 
It is perhaps not too early to remind ourselves of the dictum ‘correlation is not 
causation’. Identifying a correlation in the data is not to be equated with causation, i.e. if 
A  is  correlated  with  B  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  A  causes  B.  There  are 
alternative interpretations (B causes A, C causes both A and B) and significance tests 
are  not  able  to  decide  among  them.  In  short,  an  observed  significant  relationship 
between two variables need not be causal. 
4.6.2 Data Distribution 
The distribution of linguistic data is relevant to the choice of the appropriate statistical 
test to apply to the dataset: where the data is assumed to be normally distributed, certain 
tests are available; otherwise, a different kind of test is prescribed which makes other, 
different mathematical assumptions.  
Most phenomena in the world tend toward a normal distribution, i.e. if we group 
measurements  on  a  continuous  scale  (i.e.  plotting  the  number  of  times  each  score 
occurs) we will notice that the  resulting frequency  graph indicates that “though the 
scores span a wide range (from X to Y) the scores are generally clustered in the middle 
of the range” (Johnson 2008:6), while at each end the curve would be relatively flat. 
This means that scores tend to congregate around a typical value, and other, different 
values become less and less likely as they deviate further from this central value. Such a 
population distribution is the familiar bell shaped curve known as the normal curve or 
normal distribution. This is a pattern that approximates what would probably happen if 
you created a distribution of scores for the entire population. Thus, a normal distribution 
is only a theoretical distribution. As Goodwin points out, “[t]he normal curve is (…) a 
hypothetical  distribution  of  what  all  the  scores  in  the  population  should  be  like  if 
everyone is tested” (1995:113).  
                                                 
137 Langley (1968:148) reminds us that “[i]n normal usage, the word significant means important (…). In 
[s]tatistics, significant means beyond the likelihood of chance.”  
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There  seems  to  be  a  consensus  about  not  treating  linguistic  data  as  normally 
distributed (Dunning 1993, Kilgarriff 2001, Meyer 2002, Bresnan et al. 2007).
138 On a 
similar but more fact based note, Meyer (2002) uses three criteria for evaluating the 
assumption of normal distribution of linguistic data: kurtosis (i.e. the extent to which a 
distribution deviates from the normal bell curve), skewness (i.e. the extent to which 
more scores are above or below the mean of the distribution), and plain eyeballing the 
resulting graph (2002:126 127). As regards kurtosis and skewness, Meyer claims that 
“[i]f the data were normally distributed, the figures for kurtosis and skewness would be 
“0” (or at least close to “0”).” In my experiments, the weight and complexity of both 
DOC and DAT do indeed look like normal distribution, but this is not confirmed by 
their  respective  kurtosis  and  skewness.
139  It  seems  that  resemblance  is  not  a  strong 
enough argument for considering our dataset normally distributed.
140  
I therefore proceeded to treat the distribution of my dataset as not normal. Just as 
normally  distributed  data  requires  parametric  statistical  tests  for  their  analysis,  not 
normally distributed data calls for non parametric tests. I thus employed non parametric 
tests,  specifically  Mann Whitney  tests  and  Spearman  correlation  coefficient  at  the 
expense of t tests and Pearson correlation coefficient. These are all discussed in more 
detail in the following section. Parametric tests were not entirely discarded, but used to 
verify the significance results of Mann Whitney and Spearman, i.e. both non parametric 
and parametric tests were employed, thus avoiding objections about the distribution of 
the data.  
4.6.3 Tests 
As noted in the previous section, data determine the statistical tests to which they are 
amenable. In turn, the tests will determine the significance of the data.
141 In order to 
                                                 
138 In essence, these authors’ objections make up a rather purist mathematical argument, according to 
which a researcher is neither allowed to make assumptions about distributions, nor to make extrapolations 
from anything. However, see also Gries (2003b) for an argument for treating linguistic data as normally 
distributed. This author considers that “the resulting possibilities of interpretation outweigh the small risk 
to obtain slightly skewed results” (2003b:24). 
139 For instance, the weight of DAT constructions has a kurtosis of 11.1 and a skewness of 1.76, while the 
weight of DOCs has a kurtosis of 5.6 and a skewness of  0.38. 
140 Another reason for not treating the distributions of weight and complexity as normal is based on the 
fact that these measures consist of the difference between two distributions, both of which have a floor, 
i.e. the data cannot take on a value lower than some particular number (we cannot have a phrase with a 
negative number of nodes or words). This can cause the data to be skewed, and thus any assumptions of 
normal distribution are better abandoned, and non parametric tests are better adopted. Finally, the fact 
that  weight  has  been  considered  a  ranked  variable  by  some  linguists  is  yet  another  reason  for  not 
assuming a normal distribution of weight. 
141 Once again, it will be up to the researcher to turn statistical significance into linguistic significance, i.e. 
invest the correlations with motivation.  
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move one step closer to certainty or confidence, statistical tests have to do the job of 
culling the wheat from the chaff, i.e. ascertaining whether the observed phenomena are 
real (and likely to be repeated) or are simply attributable to chance. Only in the former 
case are claims based on the data valid. 
As mentioned by Biber et al. (1998:275), statistical techniques can be used to 
measure (i) the difference between groups (for example, with t tests, Mann Whitney 
tests, or ANOVAs), or (ii) the extent of the relationship between variables (as with a 
correlation). The first technique produces a test of significance, assessing the likelihood 
that that the observed difference or relationship could be due to chance, whereas the 
second type of technique provides the researcher with a measure of strength, assessing 
the importance of the difference or relationship. Both types of techniques were used in 
this study. 
When assumptions of normal distributions are not met by the data, non parametric 
tests have to be resorted to. This kind of test (Mann Whitney, χ
2) is very powerful in 
detecting  population  differences,  accept  weaker  (i.e.  less  accurate)  input,  and  can 
therefore be employed in very many research disciplines. Given that the dataset was not 
normally distributed, we employed the Mann Whitney test (a.k.a. rank sum test).
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Just  as  the  t  test,  the  Mann Whitney  test  evaluates  the  difference  in  central 
tendency  between  two  distributions.  More  specifically,  the  Mann Whitney  test 
compares (the medians of) two sample distributions, in order to find out whether the 
two are indeed different (in which case the difference is attributable to the independent 
variable) or whether both are (part of) one and the same, larger sample (in which case 
any  difference  between  them  is  due  to  chance  or  sample  variability,  i.e.  the  null 
hypothesis holds).  
In this study, a series of pair wise evaluations was carried out using a one tailed 
Mann Whitney test for heaviness and complexity, and the interaction between the two 
measures was also taken into account. A one tailed (as opposed to a two tailed) Mann 
Whitney test was used because we can predict a direction of the difference between the 
two distributions and ignore any findings which are in the ‘wrong’ direction (i.e. weight 
effects were expected to reinforce rather than impair GBN results). Anticipating the 
results  thus  allows  us  to  employ  a  more  powerful  test  of  significance  in  a  more 
controlled way.
143 
                                                 
142 A parametric test can nonetheless be used for ranked and/or not normally distributed data; however, it 
will  tend  to  overestimate  the  probability  of  variance;  i.e.  it  would  tend  to  assume  that  a  result  is 
significant when in fact it isn’t. 
143 A two tailed test would test for both effects, i.e. would evaluate whether weight reinforces or impairs  
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Another test that does not assume normally distributed data is χ
2, one of the non 
parametric statistical tests more commonly applied in linguistics. This test compares 
observed  experimental  frequencies  with  the  frequencies  expected  if  there  were  no 
differences in the distribution on the data. If the null hypothesis is confirmed, then the 
differences in the dataset are due to chance, while if the null hypotheses can be rejected, 
then  the  difference  is  not  due  to  chance,  and  the  researcher  is  safe  to  make 
generalizations based on the experimental dataset. In fact, χ
2 was used in this study for 
evaluating information status (the GBN principle), particularly because of the discrete, 
nominal, or non numerical values of this variable (i.e. both variables represent groups 
rather  than  counts),  and  not  just  because  of  considerations  about  the  (alleged)  non 
parametric nature of the data.  
Finally, in order to evaluate the strength of the correlation between constructional 
weight and complexity, a measure of association was required. Correlation tests express 
the strength of the correlation numerically, according to which a +1 value indicates a 
perfect  positive  correlation  (i.e.  both  variables  are  co extensive,  and/or  one  is 
redundant), a 0 value is the null hypothesis (i.e. that there is absolutely no correlation 
between the variables), and  1 expresses a perfect negative correlation (i.e. as in a see 
saw, high values in one variable are associated with low values in the other variable, 
and vice versa). Notice that the value of the correlation as measured in these tests (as 
Woods et al. (1986:161) point out) does not have  any units, being  a  dimensionless 
quantity, like a proportion or a percentage. 
The standard correlation test is Pearson’s r. However, Oakes warns us (1998:31) 
that the Pearson test assumes normally distributed data, and a linear relation between X 
and Y. We have already determined to employ the tests that make fewer assumptions, 
and thus to treat our data as not normally distributed. We therefore cannot use Pearson 
and  have  to  resort  to  an  alternative  test,  Spearman’s  rho.  This  test  depends  on  a 
comparison  of  the  rank  orders  rather  than  numerical  scores  (i.e.  numbers  are  first 
converted to ranks and then calculations are performed on these ranks, which is a very 
similar procedure to Mann Whitney’s). Spearman’s rho (or rs) is still expressed as a 
measure ranging from 1 through 0 to  1.
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My experiment design is in effect a form of multivariate analysis in that it (i) 
predicts  some  outcome  on  the  basis  of  two  or  more  predictors,  (ii)  looks  at  the 
                                                                                                                                               
GBN. 
144 Not everything is plain sailing though. A word of caution against this test is expressed by Woods et al. 
(1986). These authors warn us that Spearman’s rho “should not be used on data which have a more or less 
normal distribution” (1986:173). This is the usual caveat against Type II errors (i.e. throwing out results 
that may be significant). Again, if anything, we have been overcautious in our approach.  
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interrelationships between more than two variables, and (iii) allows for the assessment 
of the relative strengths of variables. It differs from other state of the art multivariate 
procedures (such as multiple regression, factor analysis, or loglinear analysis, as offered 
in statistical software packages) in that I employ mixed number types, since one of my 
variables (information status) offers discrete possibilities. This design has advantages 
and disadvantages. The most notable disadvantage is that the operationalisation of the 
variables  does  not  allow  for  full  automation,  and  is  thus  open  to  claims  of 
annotator/analyst inconsistency.
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same issue has forced us to break down the experimental process into a series of steps 
which  gave  us  the  chance  to  look  at  the  data  (and  tests)  much  more  closely  and 
carefully, never losing the actual language constructions from sight. Despite it being 
hugely time consuming, we found this method preferable to simply plugging the data 
into  SPSS,  pressing  a  magic  button,  and  then  reporting  the  results  as  (statistically) 
significant, without considering (i) the assumptions that go into the statistics employed, 
(ii) the linguistic significance of the results. 
To  recap:  after  a  survey  of  the  literature  on  ditransitive  complementation,  a 
determination of the relevant cases (verbs and patterns) in ICE GB, and an explanation 
of the purpose and methods to be followed in this study, the next chapter begins to 
tackle the first proposed explanatory variable, i.e. information status. 
 
                                                 
145 ICECUP 4.1 allows full automation of different types of variables, thus minimising the danger of 
inconsistency.  
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5  Information Status 
There can be little doubt that where syntax (in the narrower sense) fails to 
determine  some  part  of  the  sequential  ordering,  the  choice  between  the 
available options is always significant in some way. (Taglicht 1984:18 19) 
The ordering of constituents in ditransitives has been claimed to be affected by at least 
two factors: the informational status of the referents of the two postverbal noun phrases, 
and the weight and/or complexity of the noun phrases in question. In particular, the 
correlation between information status and choice of construction and its attendant 
constituent rearrangement has long been noticed. Some linguists even hold that the 
principles discussed in this chapter are valid cross linguistically (Firbas 1966, 1992; 
Chafe 1976, 1987; Prince 1981, 1992; Tomlin 1986; Gundel 1988; Gundel et al. 1993; 
Birner and Ward 1998, inter alia). This chapter discusses previous approaches to the 
analysis of the impact of information status on the alternating complementation patterns 
instantiated by prototypical ditransitive verbs. An overview of the different concepts 
traditionally  grouped  together  under  notions  such  as  Given  and  New  becomes 
necessary, in view of the fact that the treatment of this principle has somehow eluded 
terminological consistency.  
This  chapter  also  feeds  into  the  following  one,  where  a  series  of  corpus 
experiments puts the dynamics and explanatory power of the Given Before New (GBN) 
principle to the test.  
5.1 Introduction: Previous Approaches 
Word order is said to be regulated by at least two principles, described by Quirk et al. 
(1985) as the principles of end weight (PEW) and end focus (PEF), generally found in 
the literature in one guise or another. The principle of end weight stipulates that the 
‘heavier’ the constituent, the higher its chances of being placed in clause final position; 
whereas the principle of end focus states that the most important information (the focus) 
in the clause tends to occur towards the end of the clause, preceded by the not so 
important  information  (the  theme).  These  concepts  seem  to  have  an  admirable 
resilience. They still have a role to play in Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002), the 
latest  major  grammar  of  English  to  date.  Under  ‘general  tendencies  regarding 
information structure’, these authors (2002:1372) mention that heavy constituents tend 
to occur towards the end of the clause, that the focus typically appears at or towards the 
end of the clause, and that information that is familiar tends to be placed before that 
which is new.  
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Whatever the framework or terminology, it seems incontrovertible that the end of 
the clause constitutes a very coveted position, inasmuch as both the heavier and newer 
constituents are constantly vying for it. In the typical cases, both principles will make 
the same predictions, given that despite their very different wordings, they are closely 
interrelated in terms of the linguistic phenomena they are meant to describe, i.e. it is not 
unusual  for  the  most  important  information  to  require  a  fuller  statement  than 
information that has already been established, by one means or another. 
These principles have also been resorted to when attempting to account for the 
ordering  of  elements  above  the  clause,  and  indeed  above  the  sentence.  Quirk  et  al. 
(1985:1391n.)  mention  that  “the  principle  of  end  focus  applies  just  as  much  to  the 
ordering of clauses within a sentence as to the ordering of elements within a clause.” 
The word order predictions that fall out from the different information statuses of the 
referents of noun phrases (treated as discourse referents) have allowed linguists to put 
PEF to work in explaining different objects of study. Discourse analysts, for instance, 
have used these distinctions to explain the organization of discourse or texts (as opposed 
to the organization of clauses). A foundational text in this field is Halliday and Hasan 
(1976), according to whom a text as opposed to a random collection of sentences is 
‘cohesive’ inasmuch as there are syntactic and semantic ties binding the component 
clauses together. Among the syntactic devices used to link a text together, anaphora 
figures prominently. Anaphora is defined as the relationship between two elements in a 
text whereby the interpretation of one element is dependent on the  existence in the 
preceding  (linguistic)  context  of  an  expression  of  the  same  meaning  (whether  co 
referential or not). Anaphora is thus highly indicative of ‘old’ or given information, i.e. 
information  already  established  from  the  preceding  context.  Pronouns,  for  instance, 
typically refer back to (the referent of) a preceding noun phrase. The use of pronouns 
creates  anaphoric  chains  across  the  clauses  making  up  a  text,  in  that  they  allow  a 
referent introduced into the discourse by means of a full noun phrase to be taken up later 
by some sort of referential shorthand. In this light, anaphoric pronouns are considered 
prototypical (informationally) given elements.  
Anaphora  also  poses  important  theoretical  questions  relative  to  the  way  we 
understand and represent discourse in our minds. This cognitive dimension of anaphora 
and its attendant notions of given and new information has also been of interest to 
psycholinguistics, a relatively new discipline which has provided a new perspective on 
the opposition given/new.   
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Information status has been used as an explanatory tool in many different fields, 
such as syntax, pragmatics, discourse analysis, and psycholinguistics. Each and every 
discipline understands information status in slightly different ways, and a wide range of 
terms  has  been  proposed  in  order  to  emphasize  its  importance  for  the  differing 
dimensions of explanation. For example, as regards the distribution of information in 
propositions (as opposed to clauses or sentences), we find theme and rheme (Firbas 
1966,  1992;  Halliday  1967,  1985),  topic  and  comment  (Hockett  1958),  focus  and 
presupposition (Chomsky 1970), as well as variants and combinations: for example, 
Quirk et al. (1985) use theme and focus.  
Despite the overabundance of terms, the notional common ground is still there. In 
Birner and Ward’s words (1998:9): 
What previous approaches have in common is a general approach [sic] based on 
the degree to which information is assumed to be available to the hearer prior to 
its evocation in the current utterance. One aspect in which they differ is the 
source of this availability the prior discourse, for example, or the hearer’s 
knowledge store.  
Thus, it seems that regardless of the particular theoretical assumptions needed to 
shed light on the use of the terms given or new, the crux of the matter lies in the origin 
of an element’s givenness: is its origin textual (whereby givenness is associated with 
anaphoric retrievability) or is it rather resident in the addressee’s consciousness (and 
therefore  a psychological concept)? The following sections  attempt to  unravel these 
differences. 
5.2 Terminological Confusion  
As  we  have  seen,  the  principle  of  end  focus  makes  reference  to  topical  and  focal 
information. A different pair of opposites, given and new, has often been associated 
with  topic  and  focus,  and  this  association  resulted  in  a  deep seated  terminological 
confusion.  Two  problems  can  be  identified:  (a)  different  terms  have  been  used  by 
different authors to refer to one and the same concept, (b) the same term has been used 
by  yet  other  linguists  to  refer  to  different  concepts.  As  an  example  of  the  former 
problem,  consider  the  following  quote  from  Quirk  et  al.  (1985:1362  fn.):  “[s]ome 
linguists use the distinction topic/comment for our theme/focus (…) (and sometimes for 
our  given/new).  Others  speak  of  given  information  as  old,  shared,  or  presupposed 
information”. The resulting situation is one where coming across terms such as ‘theme’ 
or  ‘focus’  sends  alarm  bells  ringing  and  the  linguist  rushes  to  find  out  in  which  
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theoretical light the term is to be understood. Straightforward terminological reference 
is apparently something only to be hoped for. 
Problem (b) is slightly more complex: the use and definitions of given and new are 
still  far  too  numerous,  a  situation  which  vindicates  Humpty  Dumpty’s  notion  of 
meaning.  In  the  following  sections  I  will  briefly  survey  the  different  terms  and 
distinctions used to refer to these concepts, as well as the different uses to which they 
have been put.  
5.3 Conceptions of Information Status 
The  purpose  of  many  authors  (Prince  1981,  1992;  Halliday  1967,  1985;  Clark  and 
Haviland 1977; Gundel 1988, Gundel et al. 1993) in distinguishing between given and 
new information was ultimately to capture the information status of discourse entities 
(or their referents). Some of these authors differentiate essentially between two notions 
of givenness (retrievability versus accessibility), as will be seen in more detail in the 
following sections. 
5.3.1 Topic and Focus 
The principle of end focus can be seen as a reformulation of what the Prague School and 
the work of linguists such as Vachek and Firbas called Communicative Dynamism (CD). 
Both  concepts  refer  to  the  idea  that  in  presenting  their  message,  speakers  prefer 
reserving the element/s with higher information value for the end of an utterance.  
In this view, focus is quite an intuitive notion, referring to the most important, 
relevant, and usually informationally new, part of the clause. As stated earlier, focal 
information  tends  to  come  towards  the  end  of  the  clause,  and  represents  the 
informational climax of the sentence. In the default case, focus is intonationally marked, 
and in non typical cases, syntactically so, as will be seen in §5.3.5.  
The  status  of  elements  occurring  before  the  focus,  however,  has  always  been 
problematic.  Topic  was  first  introduced  by  Hockett  (1958),  for  whom  a  sentence 
consists of a topic and a comment (see §5.3.2), the typical configuration being that of 
topic preceding comment. In her detailed study of noun phrases, Keizer (2007:194ff.) 
reviews the three ways in which the term topic has been used in the literature. She 
distinguishes D[iscourse] topics, S[entence] topics, and G[rammaticalized] topics. 
The term D topic refers to the intuitive notion of ‘what the discourse is about’. D 
topics are not formally demarcated: rather, they can be conceived of as ‘floating’ over 
the discourse and not anchored to any constituent. The concept of S topic is in essence  
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equatable  to  that  of  D topic,  only  that  its  range  of  application  is  reduced  to  the 
sentence/clause. In other words, if D topics are ‘what the discourse is about’, S topics 
are  ‘what  the  sentence  is  about’.  Finally  for  Keizer,  G topics  perform  “a  fully 
formalized  grammatical  function,  distinguishable  by  a  number  of  invariable  formal 
features” (2007:196).
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5.3.2 Topic and Comment 
Related  to  the  distinction  between  topic  and  focus  is  the  pair  topic  and  comment. 
Straightforward definitions appear in Gundel (1988:210), where she states that these 
concepts are to be understood as pragmatic relations relative to a discourse context. Her 
definitions are quoted below. 
Topic Definition:  An entity, E, is the topic of a sentence, S, iff in using S 
the  speaker  intends  to  increase  the  addressee’s  knowledge  about,  request 
information about, or otherwise get the addressee to act with respect to E. 
Comment Definition:  A predication, P, is the comment of a sentence, S, iff, 
in using S the speaker intends P to be assessed relative to the topic of S.
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Gundel  next  discusses  the  correlation  between  topic/comment,  and  given/new. 
She holds that the terminological and conceptual confusion found in the literature on 
information status can be traced to the latter pair. This distinction has been used in (at 
least)  two  different  senses.  The  first  is  a  ‘relational  sense,’  whereby  topic  is  given 
information in relation to comment, and by the same token, comment is taken to be new 
in relation to topic. Put differently, the status of each element (topic or comment) is 
determined by contrasting it with the other member of the pair. This sense she simply 
dismisses as falling out from her own definitions of topic and comment. 
The other sense in which the given/new distinction has been used falls under the 
label ‘referential sense,’ inasmuch as “given/new describes the status of the referent of a 
linguistic expression vis à vis a cognitive state of the speaker or addressee” (1988:212). 
This referential sense of the given/new distinction is divided into two subcategories: (a) 
assumed familiarity and (b) activation. The table below is meant to help the reader keep 
track of Gundel’s claims. 
                                                 
146  G topics  have  often  been  confused  with  subjects.  However,  as  pointed  out  by  Li  and Thompson 
(1976), the distinction between [G ] topics and subjects is based on a number of formal differences. 
Topics are always definite; always set the framework for a clause; and always appear in clause initial 
position,  whereas  these  are  non essential  characteristics  of  subjects.  On  the  other  hand,  subjects  are 
determined by the verb (with which they are in agreement); and they may be empty, but the same cannot 
be said of topics. 
147 Keizer (2007:268) notes that according to Gundel’s definition, the comment always takes the form of a 
predication,  a  feature  which  clearly  differentiates  it  from  the  related  notion  of  focus,  which  is  not 
restricted in this way.  
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G/N distinction  relational sense   
  referential sense  →  (a) assumed familiarity 
    →  (b) activation 
Table 61: Gundel's (1988) G/N Distinction 
Let us start with assumed familiarity. Prince (1981) states that the referent of an 
expression is given if the addressee has previous knowledge or familiarity with that 
referent.  This  kind  of  givenness  seems  to  be  a  precondition  for  a  successful  topic, 
precisely because the function of a topic is to relate a clause to its context of occurrence. 
In  this  light,  Gundel  posits  her  Topic Familiarity  Condition  (1988:212),  which 
establishes a correlation between topic and givenness. 
Topic Familiarity Condition:   An entity, E, can successfully serve as a topic, 
T, iff, both speaker and addressee have previous knowledge of or familiarity 
with E.  
On the other hand, we have the notion of activation, as conceptualised by Chafe 
(1987:21 22). An entity is said to be cognitively activated if both speaker and addressee 
are not only familiar with it but are also thinking of it at the time of the utterance. 
Topics are usually activated, whereas comments are not. 
It seems, therefore, that topics must be given (in the sense of assumed familiarity). 
Comment, on the other hand, correlates with newness only in the relational sense, again 
by definition. Comments can hardly be referentially new, since they are not referential 
entities but, rather, predications about an entity. Nonetheless, as Siewierska (1993:254) 
holds, “[t]he topic is always given relative to the comment, and the comment is always 
new relative to the topic. But the comment need not be referentially new, though it often 
is” [my emphasis]. 
5.3.3 Theme and Rheme 
The terms theme and rheme can also be traced back to the Prague School linguists, 
specifically  to  the  work  of  Mathesius  (1975).  Within  the  framework  of  Functional 
Sentence Perspective (FSP), Mathesius’ theme and rheme are more or less formally 
equated with given and new information. Despite their obvious intuitive appeal, the 
properties of theme and rheme were left without adequate characterisation. 
The  job  fell  to  Halliday.  Following  in  the  footsteps  of  the  FSP  researchers, 
Halliday  distinguishes  between  information  structure,  which  depends  mainly  on 
intonation,  and  thematic  structure,  which  is  purely  syntactic.  In  what  he  calls  the 
structure of ‘clause as a message’ or thematic structure, Halliday uses theme and rheme  
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to refer to the (syntactic) structure of the clause. A clause, in Halliday’s view (1994:37), 
is organized as a message by having a special status assigned to one part of it: “[o]ne 
element in the clause is enunciated as the theme; this then combines with the remainder 
so that the two parts together constitute a message”.  
The  theme  is  the  point  of  departure  for  the  message,  the  element  selected  by 
speakers  to  ground  their  message.
148  Themes  usually  occur  clause initially,  but 
Halliday adds (1994:38) position is not part of the definition of theme. Rather, he 
insists,  first  position  in  the  clause  is  the  means  whereby  the  function  of  theme  is 
realized.
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Nonetheless, there is a  clear association between theme/rheme and  given/new: 
despite  belonging  to  different  systems  in  Halliday’s  framework,  both  given  and 
thematic  elements  have  been  found  to  precede  new  or  rhematic  elements.  Halliday 
recognises that “[o]ther things being equal a speaker will choose the Theme from within 
what  is  Given  and  locate  the  focus,  the  climax  of  the  New,  somewhere  within  the 
Rheme” (1994:299). The difference between the concepts lies in the fact that whereas 
the  theme  is  the  speaker’s  point  of  departure,  given  material  is  what  the  addressee 
already knows about or is familiar with. Halliday illustrates the difference as follows: 
“[g]iven and new thus differ from theme and rheme (…) in that ‘given’ means ‘here is a 
point of contact with what you know’ (…), whereas ‘theme’ means ‘here is the heading 
to what I am saying’ ” (1970:163). Theme and rheme therefore seem to be speaker 
oriented notions, while given and new are listener oriented.  
Additionally, Theme also bears some resemblance to the notion of [S ]topic, but 
the two notions are not to be equated. Halliday (1994:38) warns us that “[t]he label 
‘Topic’ usually refers to only one particular kind of Theme (...). [Topic] tends to be 
used as a cover term for two concepts that are fundamentally different, one being that of 
Theme and the other being that of Given.” 
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148  Taglicht  (1984:16)  claims,  however,  that  theme  and  rheme  are  textual  as  opposed  to 
psychological entities, and that the division into thematic and rhematic is based on sequential ordering. 
149 Indeed, as Firbas (1992:72) holds, neither theme nor rheme are position bound because “[t]hey refer to 
interpretative  arrangement.  Their  implementation  may,  but  need  not,  coincide  with  the  actual  linear 
arrangement.” 
150 Keizer (personal communication) points out a further restriction: whereas the function of S topic is 
usually restricted to constituents, typically in argument position, Theme can be assigned to any type of 
element.  
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5.3.4 Given and New 
The distinction between given and new elements has been held responsible for clausal 
organization: given elements are claimed to precede new information. Recall that the 
central problem in defining these terms lies in the source of givenness: an element can 
be  considered  to  be  given  (a)  if  it  is  anaphorically  retrievable,  or  (b)  if  it  is 
psychologically present in consciousness, two notions which do not entail each other. 
This difference in the source of availability of givenness has naturally resulted in many 
different claims about information status. More worryingly, the possibility of reducing 
these types to a single scale or factor seems unlikely. Arnold et al. (2000:29 30) believe 
that the root of this evil is to be found in the fact that “the given/new contrast is a 
simplified representation of accessibility”, a situation which has again resulted in an 
immense variety of coding schemes used to capture these distinctions.  
5.3.4.1 Conceptions of Given and New 
A good survey of the given/new chaos is Prince (1981). Her survey is used here as an 
introduction to the discussion of different authors’ conceptions of given and new, not 
simply to her own notions. Prince identifies three levels in which the distinction has 
been  used  in  the  literature  on  information  status:  saliency,  shared  knowledge,  and 
predictability/recoverability. These notions are relevant to the assumptions underlying 
the design of the corpus experiments. 
Saliency identifies given information with what is salient in discourse. This is the 
sense of givenness regularly seen in the works of Chafe (1976, 1987, inter alia). His 
definition of given information is “that knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in 
the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance (…). [G]ivenness is a 
status decided on by the speaker (…). [I]t is fundamentally a matter of the speaker’s 
belief  that  the  item  is  in  the  addressee’s  consciousness,  not  that  it  is  recoverable” 
(1976:30 32).  Chafe  further  points  out  that  given  information  usually  carries  weak 
stress, can be replaced by a pronoun and even be omitted. By contrast, new information 
is that which is not assumed to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of 
the utterance.  
More generally, Chafe holds (1987:21 22) that the distinction between given and 
new is in fact a manifestation of basic cognitive processes. He uses the term ‘activation’ 
(see also Gundel’s approach in §5.3.2) to provide a scale along which other concepts 
could be mapped. Concepts can therefore be active, defined as “in a person’s focus of 
consciousness”,  semiactive,  defined  as  a  concept  “in  a  person’s  peripheral  
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consciousness (…) which is not being directly focused upon”, or inactive, “one that is 
currently  in  a  person’s  long term  memory,  neither  focally  nor  peripherally  active” 
(1987:25). Armed with this classification, he then proceeds to state that given elements 
are elements which are already active, new elements are those which were previously 
inactive, whereas accessible or inferable elements are those which were previously in a 
semiactive state (i.e. available but not activated). The problem with Chafe’s approach, 
as Birner and Ward (1998:10) point out, is that consciousness is “a slippery notion”. 
Chafe  (1980:11)  defines  it  as  “the  activation  of  some  available  information  in  the 
service of the self”, but defining consciousness in terms of activation does not appear to 
shed light either on the notion of consciousness or indeed on the notion of activation. 
Moreover, as Collins (1995:41) objects, by what means can an experimenter test for the 
presence of an entity in the addressee’s consciousness?
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Another sense in which givenness has been used is that of shared knowledge.
152 It 
can  best  be  exemplified  by  the  work  of  Clark  and  Haviland  (1977)  and  Clark  and 
Marshall  (1981).  In  the  latter’s  account,  the  shared  or  mutual  knowledge  between 
speaker and addressee determines the appropriate use of a particular linguistic marker of 
givenness.  For  these  authors,  an  element  is  deemed  to  be  given  if  the  speaker  can 
assume that its  referent can be inferred from the knowledge shared by  speaker  and 
addressee,  both  as  participants  in  a  conversation  and  as  members  of  a  linguistic 
community.
153 Mutual knowledge can be established (or assumed) on the basis of the 
following: 
(121)  Mutual knowledge 
a.  Community membership: knowledge specific to all members of a particular 
community. 
b.  Physical  co presence:  knowledge  speakers  have  by  attending  to  the 
immediate situation of utterance, particularly with reference to their physical 
surroundings. 
c.  Linguistic  co presence:  knowledge  speakers  share  because  it  has  been 
mentioned in discourse.
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151  Recall  Lambrecht’s  dictum:  “[a]ny  assumption  on  the  part  of  the  speaker  which  has  no  formal 
manifestation in a sentence is irrelevant for the study of information structure” (1984:55). 
152 This is in itself a concept comparable to assumed familiarity in Gundel’s framework (see §5.3.2). 
153 See Sperber and Wilson (1982) for a critique of the notion of mutual knowledge. More specifically, 
these authors argue that mutual knowledge is of little explanatory value, given that it is inferable from 
(and a result of) comprehension, rather than the other way around. 
154  Ariel  (1988)  is  another  author  who  uses  a  similar  classification  of  contexts  for 
retrievability/accessibility. In her three way classification, “information stored as ‘general knowledge’ is  
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The source of givenness lies in the knowledge store (encyclopedic or other) of an 
individual.  Shared  knowledge  houses  all  three  senses  of  givenness:  both  retrievable 
elements  (whether  situational  or  textual)  and  elements  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
addressee are accommodated within it. And there, perhaps, lies its greatest flaw, in that 
such a commodious concept proves hard to rein in and employ in an experimentally 
useful way. 
Finally, according to Prince’s classification (1981), the givenness of an expression 
has also been equated with its predictability or recoverability, for example by Halliday 
(1967), Kuno (1972), and others. This third sense of givenness covers more ground than 
the first one (but less than the second), in that information is considered to be given if it 
is retrievable either anaphorically or exophorically. On the other hand, new information, 
naturally, is that which is not recoverable from the preceding context.  
Retrievability has long been considered a representation of givenness, and it can 
be found already at work in the Functional Sentence Perspective (FSP) framework. The 
notion of Communicative Dynamism (CD) plays an instrumental role in FSP, inasmuch 
as it provides a scale measuring the communicative contribution of discourse referents 
to the communicative thrust of discourse. Thus, newly mentioned elements will carry 
more CD than elements already established in discourse. Firbas states that the degree of 
CD of a constituent can be assessed by means of three factors: “(i) linear modification, 
(ii) the character of the semantic content of the linguistic element (…), and (iii) the 
retrievability  of  the  information  from  the  immediately  relevant  preceding  context” 
(1992:11). The interplay of these factors “determines the distribution of CD over the 
written sentence” (1992:11), the overriding factor being the contextual one.
155  
In this light, “what is actually in play is the retrievability/irretrievability from the 
immediate relevant context” (1992:14). Information is given if it is retrievable from the 
preceding  context  “and/or  if  the  referent  suggesting  it  is  present  in,  and  hence 
retrievable  from,  the  immediately  relevant  situational  context”  (1992:14).  Firbas’s 
criterion of givenness is thus clearly different from Chafe’s. In the latter’s approach, 
givenness depends on the presence of the information in the addressee’s consciousness, 
whereas in the former’s givenness revolves around the actual presence of an element in 
the immediately relevant context. 
                                                                                                                                               
not automatically accessible. Information from the physical surroundings, provided it is one [sic] that 
speakers are attending to, is mentally represented with a higher degree of Accessibility. Recent linguistic 
material is the most accessible source of information, other things being equal” (1988:68). 
155 In spoken sentences, Firbas adds, intonation does play a role, but is itself highly sensitive and thus 
subordinated to the contextual factor.  
155 
Retrievability is also present in Halliday’s account. This author deviates mildly 
from the givenness notions of the Prague School, enriching them with a psychological 
status. Given information is specified as being treated by the speaker as “recoverable 
either anaphorically or situationally” (1967:211), whereas new information is new “not 
in the sense that it cannot have been previously mentioned, although it is often the case 
that it has not been, but in the sense that the speaker presents it as not being recoverable 
from  the  preceding  discourse,”  perhaps  for  rhetorical  purposes  [emphasis  added] 
(1967:204).  In  his  framework,  given  elements  need  not  be  retrievable  from  the 
preceding discourse, but are rather “options on the part of the speaker (…); what is new 
is in the last resort what the speaker chooses to present as new” (1967:211). 
Ariel uses recency of mention as the crucial factor in assessing givenness: the 
general claim is that “referring expressions are no more than guidelines for retrieval” 
(1988:68). Her classification is a detailed analysis of the behaviour of different elements 
which are usually lumped together as typical representations of given elements. Ariel 
classifies  referential  expressions  according  to  the  accessibility  of  antecedents.  The 
distinction given/new is seen as a “means to code the accessibility of the referent to the 
addressee” (1988:68). Anaphoric expressions are classified into Low Accessibility (LA) 
markers,  Mid Accessibility  (MA)  markers  and  High  Accessibility  (HA)  markers.  In 
turn, each category is linked to three types of context general knowledge, physical 
surroundings,  and  linguistic  context  which  provide  the  textual  scope  where  the 
referential interpretation of the anaphoric form is to be found.  
 
Accessibility 
Value 
Typical anaphor 
 
Source of 
antecedent 
Comments 
Low  Full NPs/Proper names  General Knowledge  Often  First Mention;  Long 
Distance 
Medium  Demonstratives  Physical Context  Deictic; Medium Distance 
High  Pronouns  Linguistic Context  Anaphoric; Shorter Distance 
Table 62: Ariel markers of accessibility (1988) 
Ariel  found  out  that:  (a)  pronouns  (HA  markers)  tend  to  operate  over  short 
distances,  with  antecedents  generally  within  the  same  sentence;  (b)  demonstrative 
anaphors  (MA  markers)  tend  to  occur  over  intermediate  distances;  and  (c)  definite 
descriptions  and  proper  names  (LA  markers)  tend  to  prefer  antecedents  in  previous 
sentences and beyond.
156 This difference in behaviour (or acceptability at least) and the 
                                                 
156 This classification of nominals and their behaviour appears to mirror that provided by Binding Theory 
within GB, with R expressions being equivalent to LA markers, Anaphors to MA markers, and Pronouns 
to HA markers.  
156 
characteristic patterning of different accessibility markers is dealt with by resorting to 
the notion of anaphoric distance, i.e. the distance between an anaphoric expression and 
its antecedent, measured over four categories: same sentence, previous sentence, same 
paragraph, across paragraph (1988:72). Consider the examples in (122): 
(122)  a.  Martin  Amis  wrote  ‘London  Fields’  in  1989.  He  had  previously  written 
‘Money.’ 
b.  Martin Amis wrote ‘London Fields’ in 1989. *? Martin Amis had previously 
written ‘Money.’ 
 
The examples in (122) illustrate that pronouns are much more acceptable than full 
noun phrases in a second mention of an entity introduced immediately before. In Ariel’s 
framework, this is explained by the fact that pronouns are HA markers, whose context 
of interpretation is found in the immediately preceding linguistic context, making them 
more accessible than full noun phrases.
157 
5.3.4.2 Prince’s Proposals 
In the preceding discussion of Prince’s survey (1981), it became quite clear that the 
distinction between given and new is either not adequately defined or defined in too 
extremely narrow a fashion to be useful beyond the theory specific definition. Recall 
that  Prince  identified  three  levels  of  givenness:  saliency,  shared  knowledge,  and 
predictability/recoverability. The problem with this is that these levels are not mutually 
independent, and hence deemed by her to be not very useful. Prince (1981:232 237) 
proposes instead to distinguish given from new by means of a taxonomy based on a 
sliding scale of assumed familiarity, where rather than given and new elements, we have 
Evoked, New and Inferrable [sic] ones.
158 
Evoked  entities  are  textually  (anaphorically)  or  situationally  (exophorically) 
retrievable:  the  former  are  called  textually  evoked  entities;  the  latter,  situationally 
evoked entities. In contrast, New entities are those which make a first appearance in the 
text, and are subclassified into brand new those that are unfamiliar to the addressee 
or unused a similar concept to Chafe’s ‘semi active’ whereby the speaker assumes 
the  addressee  is  familiar  with  the  entity,  despite  it  being  irretrievable  either 
anaphorically  or  situationally.  The  novelty  comes  in  the  guise  of  the  Inferrables 
                                                 
157 For experimental support to some of Ariel’s claims, see Biber, Conrad, and Reppen (1998:106 132). 
158 Inferrable with two r’s is the spelling Prince adopts for her concept. Given that I will later be using 
this notion for two experiments, her spelling is the one I am adopting henceforth.  
157 
category.
159 For an entity to be inferrable, the speaker must assume that the addressee 
can  identify  the  entity  referred  to  by  the  speaker  by  means  of  the  necessary  (non 
linguistic) inferences. 
A word of praise for Prince’s taxonomy comes from Brown and Yule (1983:182), 
who find it commendable that thanks to Prince’s inspired approach a distinction 
“between what has been treated as ‘given’ in the linguistics literature (situationally and 
textually evoked, in her terms), as opposed to what has been treated as ‘given’ in the 
psycholinguistics  literature  (situationally  and  textually  evoked  plus  the  class  of 
inferrables)” is now possible. The table below illustrates Brown and Yule’s grounds for 
encomium. 
 
Psycholinguistics  Linguistics  Prince’s Taxonomy (1981) 
Textually 
evoked  
Already  introduced  into  discourse  (e.g. 
pronouns, anaphoric referents) 
 
 
GIVEN  Situationally 
evoked 
Salient  in  the  discourse  context  (e.g.  I, 
you, etc.) 
 
 
GIVEN 
Inferrables  Entities assumed to be inferrable from a 
discourse entity already introduced 
Unused  Known to the speaker in his background 
knowledge, but not in his consciousness 
at the time of the utterance (e.g. proper 
names) 
 
 
NEW 
 
 
 
 
NEW 
Brand New  Not known in any way to the hearer (e.g. 
indefinite NPs) 
Table 63: Prince’s Taxonomy 
There were also criticisms. Ariel (1988:67 68) takes Prince’s 1981 model to task 
because it fails to characterize “specific linguistic forms, such as definite descriptions, 
deictics, proper names and pronouns”. 
160 Ariel claims that Prince’s categories are not 
linguistic ones. That is, notions such as inferrable or brand new only describe properties 
of  referents  which  may  (or  may  not)  be  instantiated  into  actual  discourse  entities. 
Another, more general criticism, is voiced by Birner and Ward (1998), when they say 
that Prince’s 1981 model does not address the question of the origin of givenness. In her 
new model, Prince (1992) formalises the distinction between hearer old and discourse 
old information. Discourse old information is information which is retrievable from the 
discourse; discourse new information, on the other hand, is not textually retrievable. 
Hearer old information is that which the speaker assumes the addressee has knowledge 
                                                 
159  The  notion  of  inferrable  in  Prince  is  similar  to  that  of  bridging  (Clark  and  Haviland  1977), 
presupposition (Beaver 1977), and accommodation (Lewis 1979).  
160 Ariel’s critique applies to Prince’s 1992 model as well.  
158 
of or is familiar with. Lastly, hearer new information is that which the speaker cannot 
assume to be shared knowledge between speaker and addressee.
161 
The distinctions resulting from the pairs new old and hearer discourse give rise to 
four possible information statuses, illustrated below: 
(123)  a.  Hearer old, discourse old 
Information which has previously been evoked in the current discourse, and 
which the speaker therefore believes is known to the hearer.  
b.  Hearer old, discourse new 
Information which has not been evoked in the current discourse, but which 
the speaker nonetheless believes is known to the hearer.  
c.  Hearer new, discourse new 
Information which has not been evoked in the current discourse, and which 
the speaker does not believe to be known to the hearer.  
d.  Hearer new, discourse old 
Theoretically, information which has been evoked in the current discourse, 
but which the speaker nonetheless believes is not known to the hearer.
162  
 
These possible information statuses make it plain that newness in discourse is not 
necessarily coextensive with newness to the hearers, as has been observed (Firbas 1966, 
Halliday 1967, Chafe 1976), but rarely worked into a coherent framework. To illustrate 
this difference, the prototypical example is the sentence I saw your father yesterday. 
There,  even  though  the  noun  phrase  your  father  had  not  been  introduced  in  the 
discourse  before,  it  is  still  given/old/shared/familiar  information  to  the  addressee  at 
some level of analysis. Put differently, your father is new to the discourse but familiar 
to the addressee (no pun intended). 
Birner  and  Ward  (1998:15)  provide  another  useful  example  as  illustration. 
Consider (124): 
(124)      Last night the moon was so pretty that I called a friend on the phone and told 
him to go outside and look. 
 
                                                 
161 On a related note, Snyder (2003) associates Prince (1992) with Birner and Ward (1998) in that they 
share a belief in the arbitrariness of the relationship between syntactic form and discourse function. In this 
light,  all  these  authors  believe  that  “syntax  is  exploited  but  not  created  according  to  pragmatic 
considerations” (Snyder 2003:3). 
162 Prince (1992) notes that this type of information does not occur in natural discourse.  
159 
In this example, the moon is an entity not evoked in the prior discourse, but which 
can  be  assumed  to  be  known  to  the  hearer  (discourse new,  hearer old);  a  friend 
represents information that has not been previously mentioned and is unknown to the 
hearer (discourse new, hearer new); and him has been explicitly evoked in the previous 
clause (discourse old; hearer old). The phone is an example of inferrable information 
(see below), given that these days people are expected to have telephones. 
Table 64 below shows the similarities between Prince’s 1981 and 1992 models: 
some concepts are very easy to translate to others. 
 
Prince 1981 Model  Prince 1992 Model 
Class  Subclass  Discourse status  Hearer status 
Textually evoked  Old  Old  Evoked 
Situationally evoked  New  Old 
Inferrable  New  Old, New 
New  Unused  New  Old 
  Brand new  New  New 
Table 64: Information Status Models
163 
5.3.5 Pragmatic Tension: Colliding Principles? 
All the different notions we have discussed so far are meant to provide a measure 
of how (and perhaps why) speakers build sentences the  way they  do.  The different 
oppositions topic/focus, theme/rheme, and given/new can be conceived of as measuring 
instruments applicable to the analysis of speakers’ preferences as regards word order. 
Despite the differences these distinctions are meant to capture, they are all subject to an 
underlying  ordering  principle:  topic/theme/given  information  is  claimed  to  precede 
focus/rheme/new  information.  In  what  follows,  I  analyse  the  Given  Before  New 
ordering  principle  as  well  as  the  principle  of  Task  Urgency  (TU),  two  very  often 
opposite  forces  held  to  be  responsible  for  determining  or  influencing  word  order 
preferences.  Further  reference  will  be  made  to  this  section  in  the  discussion  of  the 
experimental results. 
We have seen earlier that notions such as Communicative Dynamism (CD) and 
the principle of end focus (PEF) attempted to capture the idea that a speaker typically 
presents the addressee with familiar information first before moving on to introduce 
new information.  
The same ideas lie at the core of the Given Before New (GBN) principle, with the 
difference  that,  despite  terminological  confusion,  given  and  new  are  more  intuitive 
                                                 
163 Based on Komagata (1999).  
160 
notions.  If  we  abstract  away  from  the  coding  difficulties,  determining  an  entity’s 
information status can be done more or less straightforwardly by taking into account the 
preceding discourse and/or the knowledge store called upon by the participants of the 
speech event.  
A different principle is proposed by Givón (1988), who claims that word order 
can  be  better  accounted  for  with  his  Task  Urgency  principle,  according  to  which 
speakers need to tailor their utterances so as to attend first to the most urgent task. 
Givón’s words, however, fail to specify an operative definition of what he means by 
urgent.
164 If urgent in his model can be equated with new, then this author is effectively 
saying that speakers’ utterances follow a NBG pattern rather than a GBN one. Givón 
observes  that  urgent  information  is  that  which  is  either  less  predictable,  or  more 
important (1988:264). It is this kind of information which functionally tends to appear 
in  pre posed  or  earlier  position  in  a  string.  Consider  an  example  from  Givón, 
reproduced below as (125). 
(125)  a.  He gave the book to Mary. 
b.  He gave Mary the book. 
 
Example (125) illustrates dative shift in English, whereby the noun phrase Mary is 
moved  out  of  a  prepositional  phrase  headed  by  to  and  into  immediately  postverbal 
position,  the  preposition  being  discarded  at  the  same  time.  However,  this  operation 
realigns not just syntactic structure, but pragmatic information as well. If the (relative) 
position  of  (to)  Mary  in  (125)a  can  be  explained  by  claiming  that  it  was  more 
predictable than the book, and thus placed later in the clause by sheer TU force, then 
how to account for the possibility of (125)b with the same (functional) principle? Givón 
(1988:273 274) argues that this apparent counter example is in fact an instance of the 
two subcategories of urgent information (predictability and importance) clashing with 
each other. According to the predictability principle, Mary should follow the book, since 
it is more predictable in context. According to the importance principle, however, Mary 
should  precede  the  book,  because  it  is  thematically  more  important:  “the  language 
resolves the conflict by going with the thematic importance clause of ‘task urgency’, 
and against the referential predictability clause” (1988:273 275).  
                                                 
164 Snyder is one author who takes exception to Givón’s loose definitions, and discards his model due to 
this fact. She even suggests that this absence of a precise definition even entails the possibility of the two 
principles (GBN and Task Urgency) being conflated, if we assume that “what is urgent for the speaker is 
establishing a frame of syntax and context in which entities representing new information can be more 
easily processed by the hearer” (2003:16 17).   
161 
To recap: we have two principles (GBN and TU) purporting to account for the 
same range of phenomena, and at loggerheads with each other. In particular, if indeed 
urgent is not the same as new, what happens when new information in a clause is also 
the most important, i.e. the most urgent?  
In reviewing these conflicting principles, Wasow (2002) suggests three ways out 
of this quandary. The first is to prove one principle wrong and discard it; the second is 
to  find  a  more  general  principle  under  which  both  GBN  and  Task  Urgency  can  be 
subsumed; the third one is to consider both principles not as surefire determinants of 
word order, but as optional constraints, a proposal as Snyder (2003:16 17) puts it 
very  much  in  line  with  Optimality  Theory  (OT).  Thinking  about  TU  in  terms  of 
(defeasible)  constraints  seems  indeed  to  be  closer  to  Givón’s  intentions  (see  Givón 
1988:273 274).  
Gundel  (1988)  thinks  along  similar  lines,  suggesting  that  the  outcome  of  the 
conflict between the two principles may vary, and that variation ensures that the speaker 
is provided with larger communicative options. This author resorts to the opposition 
topic/comment rather than given/new.  
Recall  that  in  her  view  topic  is  an  entity  about  which  the  speaker  intends  to 
increase  the  addressee’s  knowledge,  and  comment  is  a  predication  intended  by  the 
speaker to be assessed relative to the topic. GBN and TU clash in unmarked cases where 
the comment is the most important part of the sentence. If GBN wins out, the result is 
one of the constructions in (126), where the topic comes before the comment.  
(126)  a.  The boy, he is from Hawaii.       Left dislocated 
b.  Movies, Rina is crazy about.     Topicalized 
c.  The one who broke the window was Taro.   Pseudo cleft 
d.  Your battery seems to be dead.    Subject creating
165 
e.  George is difficult to talk to.    Subject creating
166 
 
However, if it is TU which emerges victorious, the resulting constructions will be 
those in (127), where it is the new comment that precedes the given topic. 
(127)  a.  He’s shrewd, that one.        Right dislocated 
b.  It was Ivan I saw.    It cleft 
 
                                                 
165 Subject to Subject raising construction. 
166 Object to Subject raising construction.  
162 
Marked sentences usually entail a departure from the canonical topic comment 
ordering, for instance, when there is a shift in topic, or when the topic is contrastive, i.e. 
in cases where the topic is new.  
Topics are by definition always (relationally) given. This results in a situation 
where  GBN  and  TU  agree  on  the  ordering,  or  in  Gundel’s  words  (1988:229),  they 
“conspire (…) to put topic first”, as can be seen in (126).
167 
The fact that no language seems to have a syntactic construction placing new 
topics  after  the  comment  is  explained  by  Gundel  by  claiming  that  this  hypothetical 
construction is an impossibility because it would be inconsistent with either principle. 
The experiments reported in the next chapter will make use of the GBN principle 
only, for the simple reason that it seems to be the only available one, there being no 
clear indication about how to develop a coding scheme for TU. 
5.4 Accounts of the Dative Alternation 
It was pointed out in the previous sections that certain connections have been identified 
between, for instance, given and thematic elements, themes and contexts, and so on. 
More specifically, Chafe (1976) compared notions such as givenness, contrastiveness, 
definiteness, subjects and topics. The idea gained momentum that information structure 
could be reduced to other properties.  
Correlations  do  certainly  obtain  between  givenness  and  other  factors.  Take 
heaviness, for example. It is generally shorter NPs such as pronouns and names that are 
used  to  refer  to  information  already  present  in  the  discourse.  By  the  same  token, 
information being introduced to the hearer and described for the first time usually needs 
a lengthier statement. The question is: how can we be certain that, for instance, it is the 
length of the noun phrase which is a consequence of its givenness, or for that matter, 
that givenness is a consequence of length? Are these notions two different factors, is 
one causing the other, or does it simply look like causation because both are so heavily 
correlated? Some observed tendencies may be only secondary consequences of more 
fundamental determinants. 
When correlations occur between two elements, the researcher is faced with two 
alternatives: either straightforwardly reducing one to the other, or teasing the two apart 
in order to contrast them and ascertain which of the two is indeed subordinate to the 
other. This latter alternative is useful in that it lends more precision to the research and 
                                                 
167 This is rather a disingenuous solution, in that the first element in the examples in (126) is considered to 
be both (informationally) new and (referentially) given. In this respect, Gundel seems to be attempting to 
have her cake and eat it too.  
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it endows one factor with a greater explanatory power over other, different factor/s. In 
what follows I intend to provide some background to the question of how other factors 
claimed to affect ordering preferences have been treated in some typical accounts of the 
dative alternation. As will be seen, more than one factor can partially explain the same 
phenomenon.  These  competing  explanations  have  been  treated  in  this  study  as 
secondary to the more general GBN principle, for reasons to be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
5.4.1 Animacy 
The information status of a noun phrase has also been claimed to be affected by the 
inherent properties of its referent. Thus, animacy has been considered one of the factors 
affecting  word  order.  Foley  and  Van  Valin  (1985:288)  place  animacy  in  the  wider 
context of salience, and resort to the Silverstein Hierarchy (Silverstein 1976).  
Speaker/addressee  >  3rd  person  pronouns  >  human  proper  Ns  >  human 
common Ns > other animate Ns > inanimate Ns 
This  hierarchy  finds  a  precedent  in  Jespersen  (1927),  and  followers  in  Dowty 
(1979) and Givón (1984). The basic idea is that the referents of noun phrases can be 
classified in terms of their position on this sliding scale: noun phrases whose referents 
rank  higher  in  the  Silverstein  hierarchy  tend  to  occupy  more  prominent  syntactic 
positions than noun phrases lower on it.
168 For example, speech act participants (speaker 
and addressee) are more salient than the (potentially absent) participant/s of the third 
person, humans are more salient than other animate beings, and these in turn are more 
salient than inanimate entities.  
In Foley and Van Valin’s view, dative shift is to be understood as an operation (in 
keeping with a rule noted in many languages) which takes non undergoer arguments 
(i.e. the one instantiated in the prepositional phrase) and makes them undergoers. A 
verb  such  as  give  requires  three  core  arguments,  namely  an  actor  (the  giver),  an 
undergoer (the gift), and a recipient (the receiver). Dative shift allows the speaker to 
rearrange the arguments in order to assign undergoer status to a different core argument. 
Animacy has a  role to  play: since it is usually the case that noun phrases realising 
recipient arguments refer to animate beings (i.e. they are higher up in the Silverstein 
hierarchy than those noun phrases realising undergoer arguments), it is to be expected 
that they occupy a more topical position closer to the verb. This rearrangement has a 
                                                 
168  In  this  light,  subjects  are  syntactically  more  prominent  than  objects,  and  indirect  objects  more 
prominent than direct objects, but less so than subjects.  
164 
purely pragmatic motivation, since Foley and Van Valin hold that the two constructions 
have the same meaning.
169 On the other hand, if the speaker prefers to have an animate 
recipient in clause final position, dative shift does not apply.  
Another author for whom animacy is at the centre of an account of the dative 
alternation  is  Ransom  (1979).  She  contends  that  in  English  and  in  many  other 
languages, the relative animacy of the recipient and the undergoer is the fundamental 
explanatory principle applicable to the dative alternation. Recourse is again made to a 
scale: a participant higher on the animacy hierarchy precedes a participant lower down 
the  scale.  Tomlin  (1982)  also  resorts  to  animacy  as  one  of  his  three  independently 
motivated  principles  whose  combination  can  explain  the  distribution  of  basic 
constituent  orders  in  many  different  languages.  His  Animated  First  Principle  (AFP) 
states  that  “in  simple  basic  transitive  clauses,  the  NP  which  is  most  animated  will 
precede NPs which are less animated” (1982:102), whereby the most animated NP will 
be  the  one  which  more  closely  approximates  the  prototypical  agent,  i.e.  it  will  be 
animate, active and volitional. 
An account of the ditransitive alternation based on animacy considerations yields 
conflicting  results  in  our  database.  A  check  in  ICE GB  shows  that  in  prepositional 
ditransitives  (DAT),  animate  referents  are  in  fact  more  common  in  clause final 
positions, one step removed from the verb.  
 
DO  PP 
A  I  A  I 
2  265  238  29 
1% < 99%  89% > 11% 
Table 65: Animacy in DAT (n=267) (A = animate, I = inanimate) 
However,  the  occurrence  of  animate  referents  in  the  indirect  object  of  double 
object constructions (DOC, i.e. the dative shifted construction) is overwhelmingly more 
frequent in first postverbal position than in the second nominal slot.  
 
IO  DO 
A  I  A  I 
538  49  5  582 
92% >  8%  1% < 99% 
Table 66: Animacy in DOC (n=587) (A = animate, I = inanimate) 
                                                 
169  Not  everybody  agrees  with  the  view  that  the  two  alternative  constructions  carry  the  same 
constructional meaning. Bolinger was among the earliest proponents of the idea that “[a] difference in 
syntactic form always spells a difference in meaning” (1968:127). In more recent times, Gropen et al. 
(1989)  and  Goldberg  (1995,  2006)  are  among  those  that  specifically  believe  the  double  object 
construction and its prepositional paraphrase to be essentially different in meaning (see §2.2.3.3).   
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It  therefore  seems  that  there  is  interaction  between  animacy  and  argument 
structure. Animacy appears to be correlated with the recipient role, but fails to fully 
explain  the  alternation.
170  Still,  an  explanation  of  dative  shift  in  terms  of  animacy 
considerations is not to be straightforwardly discarded.
171 
5.4.2 Definiteness 
New information is more often than not introduced by indefinite expressions and at later 
stages referred to by means of definite expressions. Furthermore,  given, identifiable 
information is almost invariably represented by definite noun phrases and/or anaphoric 
elements. Brown and Yule (1983:171) count the following among the syntactic forms 
usually associated with given information. 
 
•  Lexical  units  which  are  mentioned  for  the  second  time,  particularly  those  in 
definite expressions, e.g. I saw a dog. The dog was black. 
•  Lexical  units  which  are  presented  as  being  within  the  semantic  field  of  a 
previously  mentioned  lexical  unit,  again  particularly  those  in  definite 
expressions, e.g. We had a picnic last Sunday. The beer was warm. 
•  Pronominals used anaphorically following a full lexical form in the preceding 
sentence, e.g. The jewels looked expensive. I later learned they were stolen. 
•  Pronominals used exophorically where the referent is present, e.g. I’m not eating 
that. 
•  Pro verbals, e.g. He is always threatening to top himself, but he never actually 
does. 
 
There  seems  to  be  a  correlation  between,  on  the  one  hand,  definiteness  and 
givenness; and on the other, between newness and indefiniteness. It is therefore not 
surprising that definiteness has been taken as an indicator of givenness.  
                                                 
170 Attempting to arrive at inductive predictions from the dataset is a different matter. The problem can be 
stated rather siemply: if a recipient is animate, what are its chances of being DOC or DAT? In fact, most 
recipients are animate! 
171 Bresnan and Hay (2008) report that recent studies involving multiple variables (Gries 2003b, Bresnan 
et al. 2007) have shown that the predictive power of animacy is not reducible to any of the other variables 
(information status, weight, complexity, etc.).  
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But this relationship is not symmetrical: while it is true that given elements are 
usually definite, it is not necessarily true that definite elements are always given.
172 As 
Chafe  points  out,  it  not  unusual  to  find  sentences  like  I  talked  with  the  carpenter 
yesterday, in which the carpenter is definite but somehow new (textually irretrievable). 
He goes on: “[i]n such cases, the definiteness is established on some other basis than 
immediately prior mention, which would create givenness as well” (1976:42), where 
givenness is defined as presence in the addressee’s consciousness. The example above 
(We  had  a  picnic  last  Sunday.  The  beer  was  warm.)  is  a  case  in  point,  where  the 
givenness  of  the  noun  phrase  is  established  by  recourse  to  a  set  of  extra linguistic 
expectations (known in other frameworks as frames or schemas, see also §6.3.2) usually 
associated with a picnic. 
According to Foley and Van Valin (1985), the information status of a noun phrase 
in discourse is dependent on three factors: reference, definiteness and givenness (the 
latter just discussed). Reference is a term used to assess whether a noun phrase refers to 
an entity in the world, e.g. in (128) below, only the first noun phrase is referential. 
(128)      The boy saw the unicorn. 
 
Definiteness  allows  the  speaker  to  assume  that  the  hearer  can  individuate  the 
referent of the noun phrase, a situation which obtains with the boy but not with the 
unicorn.
173 But when it comes to the indefinite article, reference and its attendant notion 
of definiteness are not as useful as they could be, precisely because the indefinite article 
can mark both referential and non referential indefinite noun phrases, as illustrated in 
(129) below. 
(129)  a.  I’m looking for a snake (which has just escaped from my lab: referential). 
b.  I’m looking for a snake (for my son: non referential). 
 
Different  frameworks  have  had  to  grapple  with  this  uneven  relation  between 
givenness  and  definiteness,  and  their  associated  theory internal  implications.  For 
example, in the framework of Dominance Theory (Erteschik Shir 1979), the determiner 
system  plays  a  major  role  in  indicating  the  dominance  of  a  noun  phrase,  whereby 
                                                 
172 The same applies to new information and indefinites: while new information tends to be expressed by 
means of indefinites, this tendency cannot be turned into a rule, i.e. stating that indefinites can only 
represent new information is simply a misleading overgeneralisation. 
173 Still, it can also be claimed that the unicorn is indeed referential in context, e.g. in the framework of a 
story.  
167 
dominance is the quality of a constituent towards which the speaker intends to direct the 
attention of the addressee/s.
174 Determiners form a hierarchy according to the degree of 
specificity, a closely related notion to that of definiteness.
175 Erteschik Shir mentions 
that  indefinite  determiners  are  generally  used  to  indicate  that  the  noun  phrase  is 
dominant  (although  it  can  be  non dominant  too).  Definites  in  general  are  used  to 
indicate that the noun phrase is non dominant, whereas pronouns cannot possibly be 
used dominantly.  
Another example of awareness of the mismatch between given information and 
definite noun phrases is found in Functional Sentence Perspective (FSP), where Firbas 
(1992:14)  states  that  “information  marked  by  the  definite  article  as  known  [given] 
cannot always be regarded as such from the point of view of FSP”.  
Li  and  Thompson  (1976)  and  Gundel  (1988)  observe  that  in  some  languages 
definite  expressions  refer  necessarily  to  topics,  and  in  English  in  particular,  only 
definite noun phrases can occur as dislocated topics. 
(130)  a.  The/*A window, it’s still open. 
b.  It’s still open, the/*a window. 
 
Noting  that  the  converse  is  also  true  in  many  languages,  i.e.  that  expressions 
referring  to  topics  are  necessarily  definite,  Gundel  (1988:213 215)  even  makes  this 
relation  between  definiteness  and  (by  proxy,  by  way  of  topicality)  givenness  into  a 
condition, which she calls the Topic Identifiability Condition.  
Topic Identifiability Condition:  An expression, E, can successfully refer to a 
topic, T, iff E is of a form that allows the addressee to uniquely identify T. 
In Gundel’s view, then, what distinguishes definite noun phrases from indefinite 
ones is “the assumed identifiability of the referent”.  
Givón  is  another  author  (2001)  calling  upon  the  notion  of  definiteness  in  his 
account of the effects of the dative alternation. He notes that in ditransitive clauses the 
indirect object is generally more topical than the direct object. Since topical objects are 
usually highly predictable and rooted in the preceding context, indirect objects tend to 
be overwhelmingly definite and anaphoric.
176 The dative alternation moves the noun 
phrase  embedded  in  a  prepositional  phrase  to  a  position  prototypically  occupied  by 
                                                 
174 Dominance Theory is dealt with in more detail in the next section (§5.4.3). 
175 For a very detailed analysis of definiteness, genericness and specificity, see Lyons (1995). 
176 All the same, Hawkins (1994:111) points out that “if definite [usually shorter] items generally precede 
indefinite ones, this could be because short items are predicted to precede longer ones in that structure 
and language, or because of their information status.” Definiteness on its own cannot settle the argument.  
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definite  elements,  so  “[i]t  is  hardly  surprising  then  that  in  many  languages  dative 
shifting (…) also has the effect of definitizing” (2001:471). As evidence, Givón offers 
English examples.  
(131)  a.  She gave a book to the/a boy. 
b.  She gave the book to the/a boy. 
(132)  a.  She gave the boy a/the book. 
b.  *She gave a boy the book. 
c.  ?She gave a boy a book. 
 
These examples seem to demonstrate that whereas the direct object can be either 
definite or indefinite, this is not the case with the indirect object, which is compelled to 
be definite. 
A check in my dataset shows that the first postverbal position in DAT is shared 
evenly between definite and indefinite noun phrases, whereas the prepositional phrase 
encodes definite referents much more often than indefinite ones.  
 
DO  PP 
D  I  D  I 
135  132  208  59 
50% = 50%  78% > 22% 
Table 67: Definiteness in DAT (n=267) (D = definite, I = indefinite) 
In  the  dative shifted  version  DOC,  we  also  see  a  majority  of  indefinite  noun 
phrases  in  clause  final  position.  However,  the  indirect  object  is  overwhelmingly 
definite.  
 
IO  DO 
D  I  D  I 
560  27  217  370 
95% >  5%  37% < 63% 
Table 68: Definiteness in DOC (n=587) (D = definite, I = indefinite) 
Both  these  results  vindicate  Givón’s  view:  dative  shift  does  seem  to  have  a 
definitising effect on the moved noun phrase.  
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5.4.3 Topicality, Theme, Dominance and Topicworthiness 
Other authors prefer to explain the dative alternation by appealing to notions such as 
theme and topic. Foremost among them is Givón (again), who has argued over the years 
(1979, 1984, 1993) that dative shift involves a change in the “relative topicality” of the 
patient  and  the  recipient  arguments.
177  This  author  claims  (1993:219)  that  when  a 
participant can be coded as a nominal or as an oblique, the former option has a tendency 
to correlate with the participant being more topical in discourse. Immediate postverbal 
position seems therefore to require a more topical participant.  
Givón’s  ideas  inspired  many  other  authors  who  have  developed  their  own 
frameworks.  Erteschik Shir  is  one  such  author.  In  her  view,  dative  shift  can  be 
explained by the notion of dominance, which is defined as follows. 
A constituent C of a sentence S is dominant in S iff the speaker intends to direct 
the attention of his hearers to the intension of C by uttering S. (1979:443) 
Dominance  is  considered  to  be  an  absolute  property  whereas  other  competing 
notions  such  as  Communicative  Dynamism  (CD)  or  given  and  new  are  relative 
properties. Dative movement is deemed to be a rule that functions to force a dominant 
interpretation  of  the  noun  phrase  that  ends  up in  final  position,  and  a nondominant 
interpretation of the other noun phrase. Erteschik Shir holds that the position of the 
recipient is related to its dominance. As evidence for this claim, she (1979:446) offers 
the examples in (133), noting that their unacceptability lies in the fact that dominance is 
being assigned to a noun phrase that cannot be interpreted dominantly, the typical case 
being an unstressed pronoun it. 
(133)  a.  *John gave a girl it. 
b.  *John gave the girl it. 
c.  *John gave Mary it. 
d.  *John gave her it.
178 
 
If  we  translate  Erteschik Shir’s  framework  to  Givón’s,  a  non dominant  noun 
phrase is topical, whereas a dominant noun phrase is non topical. 
                                                 
177 If we consider that topics are usually definite (definitionally so, according to Gundel), saying that 
definites tend to precede indefinites in ditransitives is not dissimilar to saying that topics tend to precede 
non topics. The two notions are closely interlinked, and this is why Givón appears in different sections 
without having fundamentally altered his thinking in this respect. 
178 Despite Erteschik Shir’s asterisk, this example is acceptable for many speakers.  
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In  his  1986  book,  Tomlin  contends  that  basic  word  order  is  ruled  by  three 
principles,  with  a  range  of  applications  across  languages:  Verb Object  Bonding 
(discussed in §2.2.1), the Animated First Principle (see §5.4.1), and the Theme First 
Principle.  The  latter,  Tomlin  holds,  constrains  the  triggering  of  certain  syntactic 
alternations, of which the dative alternation is one. Tomlin focuses on the fact that in a 
double object construction, a pronominal object cannot occur in final position, e.g. in I 
gave them to Mary, the nominal them occurs in an infelicitous position after dative shift 
has applied, witness *I gave Mary them. If the use of dative movement is analysed in 
discourse,  Tomlin  suggests,  it  can  be  seen  that  speakers  “prefer  dative moved  [i.e. 
double object] sentences embedded in paragraphs where the text prior to the dative 
moved  sentence  dealt  with  possible  recipients”  (1986:68).  The  more  established  the 
recipient  is  in  the  discourse  (i.e.  the  more  given  it  is),  the  higher  its  chances  of 
occupying immediate postverbal (thematic) position, leaving the focal position at the 
end of the clause for the less or non established participant, the patient. On the other 
hand, when the preceding context deals with objects for giving, double object sentences 
are avoided, since they would place a thematic element towards the end of the clause.  
Thompson (1987, 1990) is another author using Givón’s ideas to study the dative 
alternation.  She  revamps  Givón’s  notion  of  topicality  into  a  new  concept  of 
topicworthiness, defined (1990:241) as “the likelihood of a noun phrase being the topic 
of  discussion”,  and  claimed  to  be  measurable  in  terms  of  a  cluster  of  properties.
179 
Typically, then, a topicworthy entity is definite, specific, animate (usually a pronoun or 
a proper noun), and relatedly, short and given.  
In her experiments, based on 196 clauses extracted from two murder mysteries 
and a personal narrative, Thompson sets out to demonstrate that the dative alternation is 
not an optional operation but, rather, is determined by the speaker’s need to manage 
information  flow.  The  choice  of  formulation  for  a  recipient  (noun  phrase  or 
prepositional  phrase)  is  claimed  to  be  critically  influenced  by  information  flow. 
Thompson’s  work  confirms  hypotheses  which  are  not  dissimilar  to  those  we  have 
already  seen  in  the  work  of  Givón  and  Tomlin,  namely  that  when  more  than  one 
argument  is  eligible  for  immediately  postverbal  position,  the  more  topicworthy  one 
(with  the  exception  of  the  subject)  wins.  This  results  in  recipients  in  double  object 
constructions being more topicworthy (and therefore occurring earlier) than recipients in 
the prepositional alternants.  
                                                 
179 The term topicworthiness is explained by the fact that these properties are identical to those usually 
found in grammatical subjects, which Thompson claims are the “grammaticization” of discourse topics.  
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In  a  later  paper  (1995),  Thompson  finds  a  new  twist  to  her  notion  of 
topicworthiness: iconicity.
180 Her “iconicity hypothesis for dative shift” states that “[o]f 
the two positions in which recipients can occur, those recipients which occur in the 
earlier (i.e. postverbal) position can be shown to be conceptually closer to the preceding 
discourse material than those recipients which occur in the later (i.e. the end) position” 
(1995:168).
181 More simply put, high topicworthiness predicts immediately postverbal 
position. 
Topicworthiness  has  not  been  experimentally  tested  in  my  database,  simply 
because it subsumes under a single name very different concepts already proposed as 
likely explanations for the ditransitive alternation (e.g. definiteness, animacy, givenness 
and length), most of which are more easily coded (although not always amenable to an 
accurate definition). 
The following chapter evaluates (against a corpus) some of the models discussed 
so far which account for the dative alternation by giving a central explanatory role to the 
information status of the arguments participating in ditransitive complementation. As 
such, it can be viewed as a companion chapter to this one. 
                                                 
180  Snyder  points  out  (2003)  that  Thompson  is  here  joining  other  linguists  such  as  Haiman  (1985), 
Langacker (1991), as well as Givón (1993) who maintain that pragmatic factors and linguistic structure 
are iconically connected, and more importantly, cognitively significant. Snyder (2003:2) goes on: “On 
this view, the association between a particular linguistic form and its discourse function is non accidental 
and by design: a discourse function is associated with a particular form because that form is the best 
possible form to convey the relevant function”. This view is opposed to those held by e.g. Prince (1992) 
and Birner and Ward (1998). 
181 For instance, the fact that in John taught Harry maths there is an implication that Harry actually learnt 
something about maths (an implication which is absent in John taught maths to Harry) is a measure of the 
fact that Harry is “conceptually closer to the preceding discourse material.”  
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6  Testing the Theories: Given Before New (GBN) 
6.1 Introduction: Corpus Experimentation 
By and large, speakers have more than one alternative as regards couching the same 
propositional  meaning  in  clauses.  In  this  chapter  I  explore  speakers’  choice  of 
construction  between  a  ditransitive  verb  taking,  on  the  one  hand,  two  nominal 
complements (e.g. John gave Mary a book) which I have called the double object 
construction  (DOC)  and  on  the  other,  a  nominal  complement  followed  by  a 
prepositional phrase (e.g. give a book to John), which I have called DAT (dative).
182 
This constructional choice will be investigated in relation with the information status of 
the referents of the noun phrases involved. In §6.2.2, §6.3.2 and §6.4.1, I will proceed to 
make clear which senses of the terms given and new are the ones employed in the 
corpus experiments. The underlying assumption is that speakers do not toss a coin when 
they have a constructional choice to make, but rather that, in Birner and Ward’s words 
(1998:1), “speakers exploit their structural options to specific pragmatic ends”. 
6.2 Corpus  Experiment  1:  GBN  by  Textual 
Retrievability 
This  section  introduces  a  corpus  experiment  designed  to  test  the  effect  of  the 
informational  status  of  (the  referents  of)  the  noun  phrases  involved  in  ditransitive 
complementation, or, more specifically, to put the Given Before New principle to the 
test.  In  this  experiment,  given  and  new  are  coded  using  the  criterion  of  textual 
retrievability.  Design issues relative to the dataset, experiments, definitional criteria, 
underlying assumptions, and resulting exclusions have been discussed in chapter 4.
183 
Can corpus studies help track and confirm or disconfirm the conditions of use of these 
constructions?  
6.2.1 The GBN Principle 
Given that the possibility of indirect objects alternating with prepositional paraphrases 
involves  rearranging  clause  elements  (rearrangement  often  explained  in  terms  of 
                                                 
182 The use of theoretically loaded terms such as dative, dative shift or double object construction is not 
synonymous with any kind of commitment on the part of the author to any specific theoretical model.  
183 Parts of this section were presented at the ICAME 2003 Conference in Guernsey. An article version 
appeared in A. Renouf and  A. Kehoe (eds.) The Changing Face of Corpus Linguistics, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi (2006:243 262). Some minor changes to my dataset have taken place since the paper submission 
deadline.  
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information status), I looked into the application of the Given Before New principle to 
the corpus dataset. I used retrievability/irretrievability from context as the benchmark 
for stating that a constituent (or rather, its referent) is either given or new. Since it is 
very usually the case that the more firmly rooted an element is in the context, the less 
(explicit) information it tends to carry, I will assume that GBN is also a measure of 
accessibility. 
6.2.2 Retrievability 
As mentioned, textual retrievability is the sole criterion used to determine the givenness 
of  a  referent,  an  idea  which  is  in  line  with  the  framework  of  Functional  Sentence 
Perspective (FSP). Firbas, one of FSP’s leading proponents, suggested (1992:22) that 
the  overruling  criterion  for  branding  a  nominal  group  as  either  given  or  new  is  its 
retrievability (see §5.3.4.1), while at the same time warning us of a distinction between 
(a) “information that not only conveys common knowledge shared by the interlocutors, 
but is fully retrievable from the context”, and (b) “information that, though conveying 
knowledge shared by the interlocutors, must be considered unknown (…) and in this 
sense irretrievable from the context”, anticipating in this way the hearer old/discourse 
old distinction of Prince (1992), as discussed in §5.3.4.2.
184  
Notice  the  correlation  in  the  above  quote  between  the  textual  and  the 
psychological  spheres  of  givenness.  If  the  referent  of  the  noun  phrase  is  textually 
retrievable  (i.e.  explicit),  it  is  also  shared  psychologically,  in  that  it  is  information 
common willy nilly to interlocutors. If we invert the relation, information that is 
shared  between  speakers  can  be  either  retrievable  (i.e.  anaphorically  present  in  the 
preceding context) or irretrievable (I saw your father yesterday, where your father is 
definitely known information to the interlocutors, despite not having been mentioned 
previously).
185  Using  retrievability  in  context  provides  a  more  solid  indicator  of 
givenness, in that it should account for more cases. This was a core assumption for the 
selection of retrievability as an operational criterion.  
In this experiment, the term given is subdivided into:  
 
                                                 
184 Note that Firbas (1992) is a collection of much earlier work by the same author. 
185 Prince (1992) mentions that the combination ‘retrievable and not shared’ does not occur in natural 
discourse.   
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•  Situationally given: noun phrases whose referents are salient in the discourse 
context. This category was limited mainly to exophoric pronouns (e.g. I’m not 
eating that), and other deictic elements (you, me). 
•  Textually given: noun phrases whose referents (or referential links) were present 
in  the  preceding  text.  These  consisted  of  elements  which  had  already  been 
introduced  in  the  discourse,  mainly  definite  noun  phrases  and  anaphoric 
pronouns. 
 
Every single (postverbal) noun phrase in my database was checked against its 
context of occurrence in ICE GB. Givón’s (1984, 1988) notion of referential distance 
was instrumental in determining the coding for textual givenness of the noun phrases in 
the database.
186 Referential distance is determined by the distance (measured in clauses) 
from the noun phrase participating in one of the constructions (DOC and/or DAT) to its 
last referent in the preceding discourse. In this experiment, a noun phrase was coded as 
given if its referent could be found in the preceding twenty clauses.
187 For the purpose 
of this experiment, given means ‘retrievable or recoverable from the discourse either 
anaphorically  or  exophorically’. 
188  All  other  cases  were  coded  as  new.  Pragmatic 
inferences and semantic connectedness between elements were not taken into account at 
this stage (but see §6.3.1). 
The results of this classification are meant to give an approximate measure of the 
applicability or predictive power of GBN with respect to the choice of construction. The 
related notions of length, weight and complexity are explored in chapter 7. 
GBN predicts that (a) the first elements in both DOC and DAT will constitute 
given information, and that (b) the second noun phrase in a DOC, and the prepositional 
phrase in DAT will include new information. This in turn leads to a number of research 
questions: are these predictions true for DOC and DAT, and in both written and spoken 
language? Is there a relation between the two objects in DOC in terms of given and new 
information? Is there a relation between noun phrase and prepositional phrase in DAT, 
again in terms of given and new information? 
                                                 
186 See also Ariel’s (1988) notion of anaphoric distance, §5.3.4.1. 
187 The use of an arbitrary 20 clause span was deemed necessary to achieve full coverage. While most of 
the  referents  occurred  within  a  7 to 10  clause  span,  referring  expressions  were  often  anaphorically 
anchored to a referent located further back. 
188 By adopting this methodology, the term given can be equated with referentially given, and not at all 
with relationally given, if we follow Gundel’s distinction (1988), as seen in §5.3.2.   
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6.2.3 Results 
As we have just seen, GBN predicts that (a) the first noun phrase in both DOC and DAT 
will be given information; and (b) the second element in both DOC and DAT will be 
new information. As regards DOC, both predictions seem to be straight on target: the 
results confirm GBN predictions about the givenness of the first element, as well as the 
newness of the last one.
189  
 
IO  DO 
G  N  G  N 
517  70  111  476 
88% > 12%  19%< 81% 
Table 69: Given and New in DOC: Total (n=587) 
The clauses in (134) below illustrate counterexamples to our expectations. The 
italicized  phrases  in  (134)a  and  (134)b  consist  of  given  (i.e.  previously  mentioned) 
information in final position in DOC, while hi fi journalists in (134)c is a noun phrase 
with information not at all previously mentioned, and therefore new according to our 
retrievability criteria. 
(134)  a.  I mean did you ever give people your number? <ICE GB:S1A 090 #226:2:A> 
b.   I just send everybody those <ICE GB:S1A 079 #257:1:A> 
c.  DCC and PASC will give hi fi journalists plenty to write about for the next 
ten years. <ICE GB:W2B 038 #123:1> 
 
Despite  these  counterexamples,  GBN  predictions  for  DOC  are  strongly 
confirmed, not only in general but also when the results are broken down according to 
their occurrence in a written or spoken medium.  
 
IO  DO 
G  N  G  N 
329  36  78  287 
90% > 10%  21%< 79% 
Table 70: Given and New in DOC: Spoken (n=365) 
                                                 
189 These figures indicate absolute frequencies.  
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IO  DO 
G  N  G  N 
188  34  33  189 
85% > 15%  15%< 85% 
Table 71: Given and New in DOC: Written (n=222) 
Overall, it is the indirect object in ditransitives which  evidences mostly  given 
material (88% in Table 69), with the largest contribution to this percentage attributed to 
indirect objects in spoken language, with 90% givenness (see Table 70). 
As regards DAT, both  predictions are surprisingly disconfirmed in the overall 
results. The results show that the first elements in DAT are marginally more new than 
given, whereas the last elements are more firmly given than new. 
 
DO  PP 
G  N  G  N 
131  136  145  122 
49% < 51%  54% > 46% 
Table 72: Given and New in DAT: Total (n=267) 
When these results are broken down according to their occurrence in a written or 
spoken medium, additional curiosities surface. Written language results are particularly 
puzzling. We can still see the tendency noted in DAT totals, whereby first elements are 
surprisingly more new than given: that is, prediction (a) remains disconfirmed. In the 
prepositional phrase, given material occurs as often as new. But prediction (b) holds in 
the  balance:  the  50 50  result  of  second  elements  in  DAT  does  not  warrant  its 
dismissal.
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DO  PP 
G  N  G  N 
40  66  53  53 
38% < 62%  50%= 50% 
Table 73: Given and New in DAT: Written (n=106) 
Surprisingly, these predictions are inverted in the case of spoken language, where 
it is prediction (a) that is confirmed, and (b) that is disconfirmed.
191 
 
                                                 
190  It  is  a  fair  warning  to  say  that  this  result  as  well  as  others  showing  small  differences  in 
percentages might simply indicate that more data need to be considered. 
191 Ozón (2006) found, however, that the spoken/written dimension had no significant effect on the dative 
alternation.  
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DO  PP 
G  N  G  N 
91  70  92  69 
56% > 44%  57%> 43% 
Table 74: Given and New in DAT: Spoken (n=161) 
In short, in both DOC and DAT, prediction (b) led us to expect last elements to 
constitute new information. Although this prediction finds support in the case of the 
direct object in DOC (81% new information, see Table 69), the prepositional phrase in 
DAT shows only a 46% occurrence of new information (Table 72).  
As regards the remaining research questions, the results show that there is indeed 
a relation between the two complements in DOC: the first is mostly given, whereas the 
second is mostly new. It is interesting to note that comparing the results of Table 69, 
Table 70, and Table 71 (i.e. those discussing DOCs) with a χ
2 test yields significant 
results (e.g. Table 69: p<0.01; Table 70: p<0.01; Table 71 p<0.01).  
In DAT, however, the expected relation between noun phrase and prepositional 
phrase is in fact inverted, with the object marginally incorporating new, at the expense 
of given, information, and the prepositional phrase bearing mostly given information.
192 
Interestingly, comparing the results of the DAT tables (e.g. Table 72, Table 73, Table 
74) with a χ
2 test yields non significant results (namely, Table 72: p = 0.23; Table 73: p 
= 0.07; Table 74: p = 0.91), which means that results are due to chance.
193 These results 
could point to the need for further data, but at this stage they mean that very little can be 
claimed from the differences observed (i.e. the null hypothesis that information status 
has no impact on the alternation cannot be disproved). 
Finally, direct objects in both constructions were expected to vary in accordance 
with GBN, achieving a much higher information value in DOC when preceded by an 
indirect object and thus forced towards focal position. The experiment has shown that, 
regardless of their position (i.e. late in DOC and early in DAT), direct objects tend to 
carry new material. Results also seem to show that their newness increases considerably 
when pushed to clause final position. 
                                                 
192 A discussion of counterexamples to our expectations for DAT and of their diagnostic relevance for the 
coding scheme employed is carried out in §6.3.1. 
193  These  χ
2  calculations  were  performed  with  the  free  2x2  χ
2  calculator  at
  www.ucl.ac.uk/english 
usage/staff/sean/resources/2x2chisq.xls.  
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6.2.4 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
I  have  examined  speakers’  syntactic  choices  in  ICE GB  in  order  to  look  into  the 
possible application of the principle of GBN to real data. The results confirmed the 
predictions for DOC. As for DAT, the experiment failed to support both the givenness 
of the first element, as well as the newness of the last one. These results do not seem to 
lend blind support to GBN. This could be rooted in the fact that the criterion used in this 
experiment for separating given and new, i.e. textual retrievability, can be misleading 
inasmuch as it can eclipse other factors which also affect the choice of construction. 
In view of these results, it may be tempting to conclude that GBN does not work 
with real data, which is more unruly than introspective data. However, a more cautious 
approach is called for. The experimental results are better viewed as non conclusive: 
after  all,  they  do  confirm  GBN  predictions  for  DOC,  and  thus  cannot  be  discarded 
straightaway. On the other hand, results fail marginally at least to produce the same 
confirmation in DAT. I believe this experiment shows that textual retrievability cannot 
be  the  only  measure  for  determining  the  givenness  of  an  expression.  To  be  more 
representative,  the  coding  scheme  needs  to  be  refined  in  order  to  distinguish  other 
elements. A similar category to Prince’s notion of inferrable elements (see §5.3.4.2) is 
employed in the next section. 
6.3 Corpus  Experiment  2:  GBN,  Retrievability  and 
‘Inferrables’ 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  still  to  test  the  validity  of  the  GBN  principle.  The 
definitional criteria have now been widened to incorporate a middle notion between 
clearly  given  elements  and  clearly  new  ones.  Besides  given  and  new,  inferrable 
elements are now also recognised in the coding scheme. The aim of this decision is to 
address the shortcomings of (strict) retrievability (discussed below), and thus to refine 
and hopefully improve the experimental results.  
6.3.1 Textual Retrievability: Shortcomings 
Many factors are claimed to affect information ordering in the clause. The experiment 
reported  in  §6.2  attempted  to  test  the  predictive  power  of  the  GBN  principle  in 
determining speakers’ choices. The investigated constructions, DOC and DAT, give the 
speaker the choice of selecting which of the noun phrases in question to postpone and 
place in clause final position. It was expected that, regardless of the construction in  
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which they appeared, noun phrases carrying new information would favour clause final 
position. The experiment showed (even if marginally) that this is not necessarily the 
case (particularly in DAT constructions), perhaps because it did not take other notions 
and principles into account.  
Wasow  and  Arnold  (2003:130)  suggest  that  there  is  another  mechanism 
underlying GBN: “the desire to put focused, important information at the end i.e. 
save the punch line for the end”. Accordingly, speakers will also tend to reserve the 
final  spot  for  what  they  consider  to  be  the  focus,  the  most  important  part  of  their 
message. Quirk et al. (1985:1356 1357) call this the principle of end focus (PEF). The 
problem  is,  focal  information  need  not  be  coextensive  with  new  information. 
Huddleston and Pullum et al. (2002:1370) illustrate this with the following exchange, 
where her is clearly given information in focal position. 
(135)  A:  Did they give the job to you or to Mary? 
B:  They gave it to her. 
 
These authors hold that this “apparent paradox can be resolved by distinguishing 
between  the  familiarity  status  of  Mary  considered  as  an  entity  (…),  and  Mary 
considered as the value assigned to the variable in the focus frame They gave it to X” 
(2002:1370).
194 In (135) the noun phrase Mary is given because she has been mentioned 
earlier and is thus identifiable for the addressee, but it is also (focally) new because the 
speaker cannot assume that the addressee knows it was Mary who got the job. However, 
this type of focal newness went unregistered in the previous experiment, and pronouns 
were unfailingly coded as given information. The coding scheme only recognized new, 
at the expense of focal, information, as a consequence of using textual retrievability as 
the sole criterion. 
The unexpected results of the previous experiment may therefore be instantiating 
cases in which the dimensions of new and focal information diverge, cases in which 
focal  information  wins  the  competition  with  textually  (ir)retrievable  information  for 
clause final position, i.e. cases in which PEF outweighs GBN.  
The examples below illustrate unexpected patterns in the findings of the previous 
experiment. They also illustrate (i) other shortcomings of using textual retrievability as 
                                                 
194 Huddleston and Pullum et al. distinguish between (informational) focus, defined as “an intonationally 
marked constituent, which typically represents addressee new information” and the focus frame, defined 
in turn as “the residue of the proposition, typically representing addressee old information” (2002:1370). 
Other authors have used the same mechanism under different names, e.g. Davidse (1996:303) prefers to 
use constant/variable instead of focus/focus frame.  
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a benchmark for determining the givenness of a constituent, and (ii) the interaction of 
information status with other notions. 
(136)  a.  I’ve given the title to this lecture of The Immunological Compact Disc <ICE 
GB:S2A 042 #1:1:A> 
b.  If somebody has just done something to you that you don’t like then you 
would <ICE GB:S1A 037 #250:1:A> 
c.  I was disappointed that the Belgians felt they shouldn’t supply ammunition to 
us <ICE GB:S2B 013 #90:1:E> 
 
Examples (136)a and (136)b instantiate discontinuous (heavy) noun phrases: the 
title  …  of  The  Immunological  Compact  Disc,  and  something  …  that  you  don't  like. 
These were not excluded from consideration, given that alternation between DOC and 
DAT  is  allowed.  However,  they  presented  a  problem  for  the  coding:  are  these 
discontinuous noun phrases given or new? Using textual retrievability allows only the 
preceding context to make the decision: if a phrase was mentioned previously, it is 
given; in all other cases, it is new. Both noun phrases in italics in (136)a and (136)b 
were coded as new, since both the title and something were irretrievable from either text 
or situation.  
Example  (136)c  illustrates  the  necessity  for  taking  notions  of  semantic 
connectedness into account when coding for information status. In the preceding twenty 
clauses, there was no previous mention of ammunition to consider it a given element. 
However, there was talk of armaments and foreign policy, and ammunition clearly has a 
place in that semantic field. Despite this, ammunition was coded as a new element.  
6.3.2 Inferrables 
In view of the issues just discussed in the previous section, a middle notion (between 
given  and  new)  was  thought  necessary.  Prince  (1981:236)  suggests  the  concept  of 
inferrables: “[a] discourse entity is Inferrable if the speaker assumes the hearer can infer 
it,  via  logical  or,  more  commonly,  plausible  reasoning,  from  discourse  entities 
already Evoked or from other Inferrables”. Inferrables make up an in between class, 
consisting of elements which are not as firmly established in the preceding context as  
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given elements are, and at the same time are not as novel in their informational content 
as new elements are.
195 
The definitions for coding the noun phrases participating in DOC and DAT are 
found below, taken mainly from Prince (1981) and Collins (1995). 
 
(i)  Given: noun phrases whose referents are directly recoverable because they 
have  been  previously  mentioned  or  referred  to  directly  in  the  discourse 
situation.  This  is  a  similar  concept  to  hearer old/discourse old,  and  a  not 
dissimilar one to givenness as defined by (textual) retrievability. 
(ii)  Inferrable: noun phrases whose referents were not mentioned in previous 
discourse  but  nonetheless  derivable  from  (a)  elements  already  in  the 
discourse, or (b) other inferrables. This is similar to hearer old/discourse 
new; these cases were not (textually) retrievable.
196 
(iii)  New: noun phrases whose referents are introduced for the first time into the 
discourse,  and  therefore  non recoverable.  A  similar  concept  to  hearer 
new/discourse new.  These  noun  phrases  are  neither  retrievable  nor 
inferrable. 
6.3.3 Results 
The results of our new three way coding system are found below. Recall that in using 
textual retrievability, the 1,708 postverbal noun phrases in our dataset (i.e. 854 cases 
times two) were coded as either given or new: 904 given and 804 new. With a new 
category involved, the given noun phrases now number 852, the new ones 511, and the 
new inferrable ones amount to 345 (or 20% of all the postverbal NPs in our dataset). 
The new inferrable class seem to have drawn its members mostly from the new NPs. 
 
IO  DO 
G  I  N  G  I  N 
510  51  26  87  165  335 
87%  9%  4%  15%  28%  57% 
Table 75: Given, New, and Inferrables in DOC (n=587) 
                                                 
195 The notion of inferrable elements takes schema theory (Bartlett 1932, Tannen 1979) into account. A 
schema can be defined as a “cluster of interrelated expectations” (Chafe 1987:29). For example, the 
schema house entails expectations such as window, door, room, and so on. 
196 Strictly, inferrables can also be described as hearer new/discourse old.  
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DO  PP 
G  I  N  G  I  N 
117  71  79  138  58  71 
44%  26%  30%  52%  22%  26% 
Table 76: Given, New, and Inferrables in DAT (n=267) 
These  results  remain  surprising,  but  are  not  unprecedented:  Collins  (1995) 
reported similar findings in his study of ditransitive complementation, where participant 
arguments in DOC are more sharply defined (see below) than those participating in 
DAT. Collins’ results are illustrated in the tables below. 
 
IO  DO 
G  I  N  G  I  N 
97  10  1  7  13  88 
90%  9%  1%  6%  12%  81% 
Table 77: Collins Results for DOC (1995) 
DO  PP 
G  I  N  G  I  N 
22  15  20  24  19  14 
39%  26%  35%  42%  33%  25% 
Table 78: Collins Results for DAT (1995) 
If we compare recipients in both constructions, we can appreciate that they are 
overwhelmingly given in DOC (87% in my data in Table 75, 90% in Collins’ data in 
Table 77), whereas recipients in DAT are spread over the information status scale (in 
both  my  and  Collins’  data,  Table  76and  Table  78  respectively).  Turning  to  theme 
arguments
197, we can appreciate that they are mostly new (57% in my data in Table 75, 
81% in Collins’ data in Table 77) in DOC, whereas in DAT they are also spread over 
the information status scale. Collins posits his ‘receiver entity differentiation’ idea to 
account for these results, according to which recipients and themes (the latter called 
entities  in  his  parlance)  need  to  be  more  acutely  differentiated  (in  terms  of  their 
givenness, heaviness, etc.) when participating in DOC than when they occur in DAT. 
This is so because whereas in DAT the theme argument is prepositionally marked, this 
is  not  the  case  in  DOC,  where  only  word  order  indicates  the  distinction  between 
arguments. Receiver entity differentiation then helps word order in DOC establish the 
adequate interpretation (semantic roles) of the participants in the construction. This help 
                                                 
197 The term theme as used in this chapter refers to arguments, specifically to that argument in ditransitive 
complementation which is not the recipient/receiver or beneficiary. It is not to be confused with theme 
from the pair theme/rheme.  
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is not required in DAT cases, given that the preposition is a strong indicator of the 
recipient argument: even in unclear cases (e.g. where nothing distinguishes between the 
instantiations of the arguments), it is still possible to separate out recipient and theme, 
as can be seen below. 
(137)  But I started sending them usually to them as it came in <ICE GB:S1B 064 #44:1:B> 
 
By  being  a  bridging  category  between  given  and  new,  inferrables  are  neither 
strictly given nor strictly new. In our study, it was decided that a coding system with 
three categories was essential for bringing about more confident results. At a later stage, 
the classification was reduced to binary values for reasons of data sparseness.
198  
Evidence against considering inferrables as an independent category in our model 
is arrived at by comparing the information status of themes and recipients in our dataset. 
Table 79 and Table 80 below list recipients and themes classified by their information 
status, as well as their contribution towards explaining the alternation.
199 
 
  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69) 
Recipients (G)  510  138  648  9.37 
Recipients (I)  51  58  109  7.64 
Recipients (N)  26  71  97  24.81 
Total  587  267  854  41.82 
Table 79: χ χ χ χ² Applied to Recipients 
  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69) 
Theme (G)  87  117  204  20.20 
Theme (I)  165  71  236  0.05 
Theme (N)  335  79  414  8.94 
Total  587  267  854  29.19 
Table 80: χ χ χ χ² Applied to Themes 
The χ² results for both tables are extremely significant (p<0.0001). They indicate 
that there is a significant relation between the dependent variable (information status of 
arguments) and the independent variable (DOC and DAT). Simply put, the information 
status  of  arguments  does  indeed  affect  the  alternation  DOC/DAT.  Particularly 
noticeable above are (a) the strong χ² contributions of new recipients and given themes; 
                                                 
198 In their study of the dative alternation, Bresnan and Hay (2008:249) also resort to data sparseness in 
their decision making. ‘Data sparseness’ refers to the problem of having too many 0s in a classification, 
i.e. of having a classification too thorough for the available data. In their paper, the detailed coding of 
animacy was later revised into a binary classification. 
199 These results confirm that indirect objects and/or recipient arguments are mostly definite (see §5.4.2).  
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and (b) the very poor χ² contribution of inferrables, which are much lower (especially in 
the case of themes) than those of given and new recipients or themes. In this light, 
grouping inferrables together with other GBN values seems a valid solution to reinforce 
predictive  accuracy.  Indeed,  this  involves  taking  a  step  back,  but  only  in  terms  of 
procedure, not in terms of knowledge discovery. For our model, a new issue raises its 
head: where to place this new category? 
6.3.3.1 Inferrables as New 
As was predictable from §6.3.1, (and is visible in Table 75 and Table 76), the bulk of 
the  inferrable  category  had  been  coded  as  new  with  the  earlier  coding  system. 
Therefore, treating inferrables as new information is not very fruitful, in that the results 
do not offer any improved predictions if compared with strict retrievability, and in fact 
revert to very similar figures: notice the similarities between Table 69 and Table 81, on 
the one hand; and Table 72 and Table 82, on the other. 
 
IO  DO 
G  N  G  N 
510  77  87  500 
87% > 13%  15% < 85% 
Table 81: Inferrables as New in DOC (n=587) 
DO  PP 
G  N  G  N 
117  150  138  129 
44 % < 56%  52% > 48% 
Table 82: Inferrables as New in DAT (n=267) 
6.3.3.2 Inferrables as Given  
Wasow (2002:70) decided to group inferrables together with given entities, since the 
inferrable noun phrases in his dataset were not many.
200 Let us see the implications of 
such a decision for our purposes. 
 
IO  DO 
G  N  G  N 
561  26  252  335 
95% > 5%  43% < 57% 
Table 83: Inferrables as Given in DOC (n=587) 
                                                 
200 In fact, so few were his inferrables that he suggests in a footnote (2002:70) that he might as well have 
left them out altogether, since no significant changes would have resulted from that decision.  
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As we can see by comparing Table 83 with Table 69, grouping inferrables with 
given elements increases the accuracy of GBN predictions for the first element in DOC, 
from 88% (using retrievability as the only coding criterion) to 95%. At the same time, it 
reduces the percentage of new elements occurring after given elements from 81% to 
57%. Still, both GBN predictions for DOC (givenness of the first element, newness of 
the second) remain on target. 
As regards DAT, consider Table 84 below.  
 
DO  PP 
G  N  G  N 
188  79  196  71 
70% > 30%  74% > 26% 
Table 84: Inferrables as Given in DAT (n=267) 
When  using  a  binary  given/new  classification,  first  elements  in  DAT  were 
expected to be given, but this was marginally disconfirmed (49% in Table 72). With 
inferrables grouped with given elements, it is only natural that this percentage increases, 
to 70% in this case. The flipside of the coin is that whereas previously newness in 
second  elements  in  DAT  was  instantiated  in  46%  of  the  cases  (a  marginally  low 
percentage), this newness is now even lower, down to 26% of cases. In this light, only 
the first GBN prediction for DAT has been improved upon, while the prediction relating 
to  the  newness  of  the  second  element  is  (even  more)  off target.  Consequently,  this 
grouping of inferrables with given information has been discarded because of its lack of 
success  in  predicting  information  status  in  our  dataset,  especially  relative  to  other 
measures (see below). 
6.3.3.3 Inferrables as a Variable Category 
In this section, inferrables are not lumped together with any one category. Rather, their 
allegiance changes: those occurring in the first noun phrase in either DOC and DAT are 
considered  to  be  given,  on  the  basis  that  they  are  occupying  a  typically  unfocused 
position; and those appearing in the second noun phrase in either DOC and DAT are 
considered to be new by virtue of the fact that they occur in a typically focal position. 
Recall that inferrables are intrinsically neither fully given nor fully new, but are 
rather a category straddling the boundary between given and new elements. Inferrables 
are not entirely given because they have not been mentioned in the text before (i.e. they 
are not textually retrievable), and they are not entirely new because they can be derived 
(inferentially)  from  other  elements  in  the  discourse.  To  anticipate  objections  of  
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circularity, let me clarify that I am not claiming that inferrables occur in final position 
because  they  are  new,  or  that  inferrables  occur  in  immediately  postverbal  position 
because  they  are  given.  That  would  be  tantamount  to  confusing  their  intrinsic 
(informational) properties with their extrinsic circumstances (position of occurrence, or 
constructional expectations about their informational status). Rather, based on the dual 
nature of inferrables, I am simply assuming that their occurrence in a prototypically 
focal position activates their newness, just as their occurrence in a typically unfocused 
position warrants their treatment as given elements. The elements in question remain 
inferrables  but  are  treated  as  new  or  given,  respectively;  it  is  important  to  keep 
treatment and identity apart. Ultimately, this bunching together of inferrables with other 
elements is a matter of methodological convenience; and in this study, it is devoid of 
ontological claims about their nature. 
Table 85 below shows a marked improvement over its sister, Table 83. Both GBN 
predictions for DOC are improved upon: the first prediction remains at 95%, but the 
second increases its accuracy from 57% to 85%. This is the strongest confirmation of 
GBN in our data so far.  
 
IO  DO 
G  N  G  N 
561  26  87  500 
95%  > 5%  15% < 85% 
Table 85: Variable Inferrables in DOC (n=587) 
As  regards  the  prepositional  alternant,  Table  86  below  also  shows  an 
improvement  over  its  sister,  Table  84.  The  first  GBN  prediction  (givenness  of  first 
element)  stays  at  70%,  but  the  second  prediction  (newness  of  the  second  element) 
moves up from 26% to 48%. It is slightly off target, but still better than the predictions 
emanating from the strict retrievability model (cf. 46% in Table 72). 
 
DO  PP 
G  N  G  N 
188  79  138  129 
70% > 30%  52% > 48% 
Table 86: Variable Inferrables in DAT (n=267) 
Applying a χ² test to the results from Table 81 to Table 86 yields ambivalent 
results. When inferrables are treated as new, significance is only achieved in DOCs but 
not in DATs, i.e. Table 81 is significant (p<0.01), but that is not the case with Table 82  
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(p = 0.07). Similar results are obtained when inferrables are treated as given: Table 83 
(p<0.01) is significant, but not Table 84 (p = 0.44). The only case in which both DOC 
and DAT are significant is when inferrables are considered a variable category (Table 
85: p<0.01; Table 86: p<0.01).
201 Thus, treating inferrables as a variable category yields 
the best GBN predictors of the three measures considered.  
6.3.4 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
In view of the results obtained in §6.3.3, we now have a classification with stronger 
predictions. We can therefore now discard both strict retrievability and inferrability as a 
subcategory of givenness/newness from our study, since both have been outperformed 
at predicting GBN by variable inferrables. At this stage, however, it becomes apparent 
that  DATs  remain  rather  unmanageable  and  difficult  to  predict,  especially  when 
compared with DOCs.  
6.4 Corpus Experiment 3: GBN Configurations  
This section changes the viewpoint: rather than looking at the information status of each 
individual  noun  phrase  in  each  construction,  we  now  attempt  to  look  at  GBN 
configurations; i.e. the information status of both noun phrases involved in DOC and 
DAT.  Section  6.4.4  describes  the  assignment  of  a  numerical  value  to  these  GBN 
configurations, and how this index can be used as an indicator of constructional choice. 
As in the previous experiment, inferrables are treated as a variable category. 
This experiment again puts the GBN principle to the test. Among the questions to 
be addressed we find: what can and does happen to, say, a noun phrase in first position 
in  DAT  carrying  given  information?  What  elements  does  it  combine  with?  Can 
configurations be better GBN predictors than the individual elements participating in 
the constructions? Does the GBN principle really affect the DOC/DAT choice? And if 
that is the case, can we predict a rule? 
6.4.1 Configurations 
As mentioned earlier, inferrables occurring in first position in both DOC and DAT are 
treated as given, on the basis that they are occupying a typically unfocused position. By 
the same token, whenever an inferrable appeared in second position in either DOC and 
                                                 
201  These  χ
2  calculations  were  performed  with  the  free  2x2  χ
2  calculator  at
  www.ucl.ac.uk/english 
usage/staff/sean/resources/2x2chisq.xls.  
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DAT,  it  was  coded  as  new.  This  simplification  reduced  the  number  of  possible 
configurations to a manageable four: 
 
•  the first element was given and the second new (GN, the default order); 
•  both elements were new (NN); 
•  both elements were given (GG); or  
•  the first element was new and the second given (NG).
202  
6.4.2 Frequency Results 
Table 87 below lists the 4 configurations according to their occurrence in DOC or in 
DAT. GBN appears to explain most of the examples in the dataset: 556 cases (out of a 
total of 854, i.e. a healthy 65%) are cases where a given noun phrase precedes a new 
one. 
 
Configurations  DOC  DAT  Total 
GN  482  74  556 
NN  18  55  73 
GG   87  114  201 
NG  0  24  24 
Total  587  267  854 
Table 87: Configurations  
As regards DOCs, we can appreciate that most cases (82%, 482 out of 587) fall 
within the GN configuration, as was expected by GBN, and as was found to obtain in 
§6.2.3 and §6.3.3. However, when it comes to DATs, it is not clear what explains the 
majority of cases: the middle ground is bigger than the clear cases, hinting perhaps at 
borderline effects. Table 87 above also confirms that the NG configuration, and in fact 
most configurations contrary to GBN expectations, appear more frequently in DAT (a 
fact that will be confirmed in §6.4.4). Most DAT cases (114) are found in the GG 
configuration,  but  this  is  a  category  also  open  to  DOC  cases  (with  87  cases).  This 
configuration is often realised by two pronouns, this being the case in 56 cases of DAT 
(49%, 56 out of 114), and in 32 cases in DOC (37%, 32 out of 87).
203 
In order to find out whether the results in Table 87 above are significant (i.e. to 
exclude the influence of chance), we conducted a statistical test, χ². This test result 
                                                 
202 This approach is similar to that of Smyth et al. (1979). 
203 New elements cannot in principle ever be realised by pronouns, so the occurrence of two pronouns in 
configurations GN, NN, and NG is ruled out.   
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allows one to reject the null hypothesis (i.e. that a construction will be DOC or DAT 
regardless of the information status of its constituents), which in turn indicates that there 
is  a  significant  relation  between  the  GBN  configurations  and  the  DOC/DAT 
alternants.
204  
 
Configurations  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69) 
GN  482  74  556  26.08 
NN  18  55  73  20.63 
GG   87  114  201  18.94 
NG  0  24  24  16.50 
Total  587  267  854  82.15 
Table 88: χ χ χ χ² applied to Configurations (Variable Inferrables) 
The results of χ² indicate that there is a significant relation between the dependent 
variable (configurations) and the independent variable (DOC and DAT). Simply put, 
GBN configurations do indeed affect the alternation DOC/DAT. An additional point of 
interest is found in the realisation that similar (significant) χ² results are obtained when 
looking at GBN configurations regardless of the definition of givenness employed, as 
can be appreciated in the tables below. 
 
Configurations  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69) 
GN  415  43  458  31.89 
NN  61  79  140  12.90 
GG   102  88  190  6.26 
NG  9  57  66  29.15 
Total  587  267  854  80.20 
Table 89: χ χ χ χ² applied to Configurations (Retrievability, see §6.2.2) 
Configurations  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69) 
GN  317  44  361  19.11 
NN  18  27  45  5.41 
GG   244  144  388  1.93 
NG  8  52  60  26.79 
Total  587  267  854  53.24 
Table 90: χ χ χ χ² applied to Configurations (Inferrables as Given, see §6.3.3.2) 
Just as the individual information status of participants exert an influence on the 
alternation, GBN configurations also appear to give solid indications about speakers’ 
choice. Furthermore, all the different methods for measuring GBN employed so far are 
                                                 
204 See §4.6.3 for more detailed information about this test and others.  
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validated by the strong results obtained, since the value of the different χ² is very high 
in all cases.  
6.4.3 Predictors 
Another  way  in  which  the  significance  of  configurations  can  be  confirmed  is  by 
employing naïve probabilities. It is possible to arrive at an estimation of the probability 
of an event occurring based on data in a sample, by dividing the occurrences of the 
event  in  question  by  the  total  number  of  events.  This  calculation  is  based  on  an 
assumption  of  sample  representativeness;  i.e.  we  assume  that  the  sample  is 
representative  of  the  population,  and  that  some  change  in  the  (sample)  dataset  will 
reflect almost exactly to the population. With a very large number of data points, we can 
be confident that dividing one by the other the sample is going to be representative of 
the population.  
Table 91 below (based on Table 88) lists the values for p(DOC) and p(DAT). In 
short, p(DOC) is the probability of DOC for every configuration. As discussed above, 
we can come up with a crude rule that states that ‘if the configuration is GN, then it is 
realized as DOC (and not DAT)’; this is then formalized by taking the 482 correct 
examples of GN configurations instantiated as DOC in our dataset and dividing them by 
556, which is the total of all GN configurations in the dataset. p(DOC) for GN thus 
amounts to 87%. Also, in order to measure our degree of confidence in the value, we 
may  use  the  binomial  confidence  interval  (C.I.  in  Table  91  to  Table  93  below) 
expressed as a probability (see below).
205 This interval is the strongest, most statistically 
sound  measure  of  the  confidence  on  the  prediction  (should  the  experiment  be 
reproduced). It also represents a measure of how confident the researcher can be about 
their data. Naturally, the smaller the error margin, the higher the confidence (the better 
the  results).  This  means,  for  example  that  the  probability  of  DOC  given  a  GN 
configuration equals 0.87 plus or minus 0.03, which in itself expresses a very confident 
result. 
 
                                                 
205  See  www.ucl.ac.uk/english usage/resources/ftfs/experiment2.htm.  The  function  simplifies  to  z  x 
sqrt[p(DOC) x p(DAT)/total], where z = 1.96 for an error of 0.05.  
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Configs.  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69)  p(DOC)  p(DAT)  C.I. 
GN  482  74  556  26.08  0.87  0.13  +/ 0.03 
NN  18  55  73  20.63  0.25  0.75  +/ 0.10 
GG   87  114  201  18.94  0.43  0.57  +/ 0.07 
NG  0  24  24  16.50  0.00  1.00  +/ 0.00 
Total  587  267  854  82.15       
Table 91: Configurations as Predictors 
The formula for p(DAT) is not dissimilar to that for p(DOC), only that it is the 
DAT cases which are divided by the total cases of the configuration. Observing the p 
columns, we can tell that apart from GG (which is rather flat, and thus unable to make 
strong predictions), the remaining configurations are interesting, in that they are all over 
70%. As mentioned, GN is accurate as a predictor of DOC 87% of the time; NN is 
accurate as a predictor of DAT 75% of the time; and NG is accurate as a predictor of 
DAT 100% of the time (but is only based on 24 cases).  
We can arrive at a rule which would cover everything and thus would enable to 
assess the predictive power of the Table 91. The strongest candidate for such a rule is 
“if GN => DOC, otherwise DAT”, and we can also tell that this rule is correct 79% of 
time [(482+55+114+24)/854].  
By using naïve probabilities, we can also find out whether the speaker’s choice 
between the two constructions can indeed be predicted by looking at the first element in 
the  configuration.  In  other  words,  is  it  possible  that  it  is  the  givenness  of  the  first 
element (or the newness of the second element) which determines DOC or DAT? We 
will evaluate whether the information status of each element affects the alternation, as 
seen in Table 92 (for the first element) and Table 93 (for the second one).  
Naturally, considering separate elements causes the probability to drop, because 
the rule for determining the predictive power of the table is cruder. For example, in 
looking at first position, I am combining the p(DOC)GN (i.e. 0.87 in Table 91) and 
p(DOC)GG (i.e. 0.43 in Table 91 too).  
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Configs.  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69)  p(DOC)  p(DAT)  C.I. 
G?
 206  561  188  749  4.14  0.75  0.25  +/ 0.03 
N?  26  79  105  29.54  0.25  0.75  +/ 0.08 
Total  587  267  854  33.68       
Table 92: First Position as Predictor 
Table 92 above looks at first position only, and enables us to come up with a rule 
which is accurate 75% of the time: “if the first position in the construction is given (as 
opposed to new), the construction is DOC; otherwise it is DAT” is accurate 75% of 
time.
207 The opposite rule (i.e. “if a new  element appears in first position, then the 
construction is DAT; otherwise it is DOC”) is also accurate 75% of time.
208 Note that 
the predictive power of the table is the same (75%) as both constructional probabilities.  
 
Configs.  DOC  DAT  Total  χ χ χ χ²(SF=0.69)  p(DOC)  p(DAT)  C.I. 
?G  87  138  225  29.60  0.39  0.61  +/ 0.06 
?N
209  500  129  629  10.59  0.79  0.21  +/ 0.03 
Total  587  267  854  40.18       
Table 93: Second Position as Predictor 
Table 93 looks at the second position in both constructions. A rule stating that “if 
a  new  element  occurs  in  second  position,  then  the  resulting  construction  is  DOC, 
otherwise  it  is  DAT”  was  found  to  be  accurate  79%  of  time.
210,  Interestingly,  the 
constructional probabilities are found either side of the predictive power of the table 
(i.e. 75%, right between 61% and 79%), which is explainable because the formula for 
calculating the predictive power of the table is an average, which takes into account 
both cells.
211 This average would obscure the fact that, for example, new elements in 
second position in DOC constitute the strongest claim with 500 elements. This fact is 
however picked up by p(DOC)?N, with the rule being true 79% of the time. 
                                                 
206 In accordance with GBN. 
207 The formula is (561+79)/854. 
208 Given and new elements in first position behave similarly, as is evident in their accuracy values (75%). 
Confirmation for this fact is also available when both the weight and information value of configurations 
are contrasted (as we will see in §8.3.2). When contrasting GN and NN configurations, it was found out 
that new elements in first position were indeed heavier than new elements in second position, indicating 
that new elements in first position behaved almost like given elements. 
209 In accordance with GBN predictions. 
210 This seems to be in line with claims by Wasow (2002), Goldberg (20060, and Bresnan and Hay 
(2008), inter alia, that the theme argument in DOC is very rarely given. 
211 The formula is (138+500)/854.  
193 
6.4.4 GBN Index: An Inductive Measure 
Real language data is rather messy and does not lend itself easily to generalizations. An 
interesting approach is to try and derive rules from our multiple observations, so that 
these  rules  will  in  turn  offer  valid  generalizations  about  the  behaviour  of  these 
constructions beyond our dataset.  
This section forces GBN configurations to yield a GBN index which can in turn 
be  employed  to  describe  the  arrangement  of  information  status  values.  Given  noun 
phrases were given the arbitrary figure 1; new noun phrases were coded as 2.
212 The 
information status of each construction was calculated by deducting the information 
value of the second noun phrase from that of the first one. In this light, only those 
constructions following the GBN principle (regardless of whether they were instantiated 
as DOC or DAT) will give a negative information status index (i.e. G minus N would 
translate as 1 minus 2, which results in  1). 
Notice  that  this  approach  still  entails  looking  at  GBN  configurations  (i.e.  the 
information status of both noun phrases involved in DOC and DAT), rather than at the 
information  status  of  each  individual  noun  phrase  in  each  construction.  Thus,  a 
construction with a positive GBN index (GBN>0) is equatable to an NG configuration 
(2 minus 1 gives 1); one with a negative index is GN (as seen above), and a GBN index 
of  0  is  attributable  to  either  GG  or  NN  (cases  where  the  GBN  principle  offers  no 
prediction). 
I evaluated three hypothetical generalizations emanating from the application of 
the above GBN index to the dataset. The first one was GBNα, as summarized in (138) 
below. When the GBN index was positive, the rule predicts the construction to be DAT; 
when negative, the construction is predicted to be DOC; and when 0, the generalization 
offers no prediction. 
(138)  GBNα (cut off = 0) 
If GBN > 0 => DAT  
If GBN < 0 => DOC 
If GBN = 0 => ? 
 
                                                 
212 Sean Wallis (personal communication) suggested at a later stage that I could have coded information 
status differently, specifically by coding given NPs as 0 and new NPs as 1. This would constitute a more 
Boolean  approach,  and  the  resulting  feature  would  be  newness  rather  than  givenness,  and  have  the 
advantage of being more elegant. However, the results would have been exactly the same, so I decided to 
use my old coding scheme.  
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Table 94 below illustrates the hypothetical predictions of GBNα when compared 
with the actual corpus data. The rule explains the bolded cells in Table 94, the rest of 
the cells being false positives. Recall that there are 267 DAT cases and 587 DOCs in 
our dataset. 
 
  GBN>0  GBN<0 
DAT  24  74 
DOC  0  482 
Table 94: GBNα Predictions 
By examining the table we can see that predictions are not very successful for 
DATs, with barely 1 out of 4 being accurately predicted (i.e. 24 out of 98). By contrast, 
predictions for DOC are 100% accurate (i.e. 482 out of 482).
213 Part of the story is 
missing, though, in that cases with a GBN index of 0 are excluded from the predictions. 
The  purpose  of  the  following  generalizations  is  to  include  all  those  cases  and  thus 
achieve 100% coverage, necessarily at the expense of accuracy. 
(139)  GBNβ (cut off =  1) 
If GBN ≥ 0 => DAT  
If GBN < 0 => DOC 
 
Rule (139) above is similar to GBNα, but takes all constructions with a GBN 
index of 0 to be DATs. Table 95 below summarises GBNβ results. 
 
  GBN≥0  GBN<0 
DAT  193  74 
DOC  105  482 
Table 95: GBNβ Predictions 
As  above,  the  cells  in  bold  represent  the  number  of  accurate  predictions.  The 
predictions  are  quite  accurate  for  DOCs,  despite  the  fact  that  false  positives  have 
increased in number. GBNβ also seem to be a better predictor of DATs.  
Considering constructions with a GBN index of 0 as part of DOCs is what rule 
GBNγ below does.  
                                                 
213 That is, every time this rule offers a prediction, it is accurate. This is not the same as saying that this 
rule’s predictions are accurate for all cases in our dataset, as we will see.  
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(140)  GBNγ (cut off = 0.1) 
If GBN > 0 => DAT  
If GBN ≤ 0 => DOC 
 
  GBN>0  GBN≤0 
DAT  24  243 
DOC  0  587 
Table 96: GBNγ Predictions 
GBNγ offers impressive results for DOCs, where 100% accuracy (and coverage) 
is  achieved.  However,  the  DAT  predictions  are  very  poor,  with  false  positives 
outnumbering true ones ten to one.  
As in the previous section, a way of evaluating all these rules is by applying naïve 
probabilities, as illustrated in the tables below.  
 
GBNα  DOC  DAT  Total  p(DOC)  p(DAT) 
GBN>0  0  24  24  0.00  1.00 
GBN<0  482  74  556  0.87  0.13 
Total  482  98  580     
Table 97: GBNα Naïve Probabilities  
p(DOC) is the probability of DOC for the rule; i.e. if we posit a rule such that ‘if 
GBN<0, then DOC’. This probability is calculated by taking the 482 true positives that 
the rule predicts and divide then by 556 (true and false positives added together), which 
amounts to a naïve probability of 0.87. p(DAT) is basically the same formula, only that 
it  is  the  DAT  cases  which  are  divided  by  the  total  cases.  Observing  the  last  two 
columns, we can tell that both parts of the rule offer interesting predictions, indicated in 
bold. As regards Table 97, we can see that GBN>0 is an infallible predictor of DAT, 
with 100% accuracy. However, this is only part of the story, as this rule is based on only 
24. On the other hand, GBN<0 is an accurate predictor of DOC 87% of the time.  
Table 98 evaluates our second inductive rule, i.e. GBNβ. 
 
GBNβ  DOC  DAT  Total  p(DOC)  P(DAT) 
GBN≥0  105  193  298  0.35  0.65 
GBN<0  482  74  556  0.87  0.13 
Total  587  267  854     
Table 98: GBNβ Naïve Probabilities   
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We can see that the first part of this rule (GBN≥0) is an accurate predictor of DAT 
65% of the time; whereas the second part (GBN<0) accurately predicts DOC 87% of the 
time.  
As regards Table 99, we can see that GBN>0 is an accurate predictor of DAT 
100% of the time (again, a prediction of limited value, given that it is based on only 24 
cases). 
 
GBNγ  DOC  DAT  Total  p(DOC)  P(DAT) 
GBN>0  0  24  24  0.00  1.00 
GBN≤0  587  243  830  0.71  0.29 
Total  587  267  854     
Table 99: GBNγ Naïve Probabilities  
On the other hand, GBN≤0 is more modest in its accuracy (predicting DOC at 
71%) but is based on far more cases. 
Naïve  probabilities  provide  a  simple  method  for  evaluating  different  inductive 
generalizations, but they do not tell the whole story. A major objection to the use of 
naïve probabilities is that they do not inform us about their generality of application, i.e. 
as seen earlier, we can have a rule which is 100% accurate but only covers a handful of 
cases,  and  is  therefore  not  very  useful  for  our  purposes.  To  address  this  issue,  our 
information status data was evaluated in terms of accuracy and coverage, as defined 
below: 
 
•  Accuracy: true positives divided by the total number of (explained) cases. 
•  Coverage: number of positives (both true and false) divided by the total number 
of cases.
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Accuracy was calculated for each rule by adding up the true positives (i.e. the bold 
cells) and dividing them by all the cases predicted by the selected rule. For example, the 
formula  for  calculating  the  accuracy  of  GBNα  (see  Table  94)  was  (24+482)/580, 
whereby 580 is arrived at by the addition of all the figure in Table 94. Cases with a 
GBN  index  of  0  are  not  included  in  this  calculation,  since  they  do  not  offer  any 
prediction in GBNα. In calculating the accuracy of GBNβ and GBNγ, however, cases 
                                                 
214 True positives are cases correctly included in the generalisation, true negatives are cases correctly 
excluded, false positives are cases incorrectly included (i.e. wrong predictions), and false negatives are 
cases incorrectly excluded.  
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with  a  GBN  index  of  0  are  incorporated  because  they  are  part  of  the  rule’s 
predictions.
215 
Coverage is the probability that a rule ‘fires’ (or p(rule firing)); whereas accuracy 
is the probability of a rule being correct once it has fired (i.e. p(rule correct | rule 
firing)). By Bayes’ Theorem, assuming that probabilities are independent from each 
other (a reasonable assumption in this case), the score can be computed as follows: 
score  = p(rule correct)  
= p(rule correct | rule firing) × p(rule firing)  
= accuracy × coverage. 
 
In  selecting  among  different  rules,  it  is  fairly  obvious  that  the  choice  is  not 
arbitrary:  the  strongest  rule,  the  one  that  gives  more  (qualitative  and  quantitative) 
accurate results is the best one.
216 Once the accuracy and coverage of every single rule 
was calculated, I selected the best one by using a simple measure called score. This was 
obtained by multiplying accuracy and coverage. This measure allows the researcher to 
choose the best rule. 
 
Rule  Accuracy  Coverage  Score 
GBNα  87%  68%  59 
GBNβ  79%  100%  79 
GBNγ  72%  100%  72 
Table 100: Evaluation of GBN Rules 
From Table 100 above we can see that the best rule, the one with the highest score 
is GBNβ. The corollaries of this rule (and of the distributions it represents) are that (a) 
the orthodox configuration GN is strongly associated with DOCs, and (b) all other non 
standard  combinations  of  information  statuses  (i.e.  GN,  GG,  and  NN)  are  more 
amenable to DATs.  
6.4.5 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
The  previous  sections  have  provided  us  with  accurate  predictors,  regardless  of  the 
formalisation employed, which had particularly strong effects in DOCs. However, after 
evaluating our inductive rules by means of naïve probabilities and accuracy/coverage 
measures  (and  selecting  the  best  one),  there  are  still  a  number  of  false  positives  to 
                                                 
215  The  formula  for  calculating  the  accuracy  of  GBNβ  was  (193+482)/854,  and  that  for  GBNγ, 
(24+587)/854. 
216 Also, no rule is preferable over a rule which is less than half of the time right, in that it does not 
improve over chance.  
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explain. These are represented by the unbolded cells in the tables from the previous 
section.  If we leave  aside a few outliers in the NG  configuration, questions remain 
unanswered,  particularly  about  what  determines  the  DOC/DAT  alternation  in  the 
configurations GG and NN. These cases will be discussed in chapter 8.  
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has tested the GBN principle in different ways, by employing different 
coding  schemes  (textual  retrievability  in  §6.2;  inferrables  in  §6.3  onwards),  by 
considering  the  information  status  of  individual  elements  (§6.2  and  §6.3)  and  of 
configurations (§6.4), and by applying different tests and measures to the results.  
Strong  predictions  are  derivable  from  looking  at  the  overall  (constructional) 
distribution of information status, as well as by looking at the individual information 
status of the noun phrases in first and/or second position. This is indicative of a strong 
correlation between information status and this particular grammatical choice (DOC or 
DAT). The significant results in the studies reported in this chapter also indicate that all 
the different classificatory methods for information status are valid. However, as was 
pointed out time and again, statistics do not answer why questions: for that, further 
investigation is required to evaluate what is going on (and whether the data predicts 
anything else). 
The  next  chapter  is  concerned  with  the  impact  of  heaviness  on  the  dative 
alternation. Different measures for evaluating heaviness are discussed and implemented 
in the analysis of corpus data. 
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7  Testing the Theories II: Length, Weight, 
Complexity 
7.1 Weight  
As we have seen earlier (§5.1), word order is claimed to be affected by the principles of 
end weight (PEW) (Quirk et al. 1985:1361 1362) and end focus (PEF) (Quirk et al. 
1985:1356 1357). In this chapter we will concern ourselves with the principle of end 
weight, which stipulates that the  ‘heavier’ the  constituent, the higher its chances of 
appearing after a lighter one. Weight is variously defined in the literature, many times 
vaguely so. The idea is intuitively clear, but that does not make it easy to operationalise, 
particularly when conducting data driven experimentation. The chapter is organized in 
the  following  manner:  §7.1  provides  a  definition  of  weight,  discusses  a  number  of 
accounts  of  the  dative  alternation  based  on  weight,  and  conducts  an  experiment  to 
evaluate weight measures in ICE GB. Section 7.2 follows the same structure, but rather 
than applying it to weight, we use a different measure of heaviness, namely complexity. 
Conclusions are offered in §7.3. 
7.1.1 Weight: Definitions and Assumptions 
In his discussion of Heavy Noun Phrase Shift (HNPS), Wasow (1997a:84 85) discusses 
eight  definitions  of  heaviness,  quoted  below.  Unfortunately  for  the  purposes  of  this 
study, most of these definitions tend to conflate what I will call weight (defined as the 
number of words in a constituent, as seen in (141)d and (142)a below) and complexity 
(defined as the number of phrasal nodes in a constituent, as glimpsed in the rest of the 
definitions, with the exception of (141)e, which does not seem to fit either weight or 
complexity, but see footnote 218 below). In the rest of this chapter, I will keep weight 
and complexity apart (see Altenberg 1982 and Rosenbach 2005 for a similar approach). 
(141)  (Categorical) Heaviness  
a.  An NP is heavy if it “dominates S” (Ross 1967, rule 3.26). 
b.  “The condition on complex NP shift is that the NP dominate an S or a PP” 
(Emonds 1976:112).
217  
c.  “Counting a nominal group as heavy means either that two or more nominal 
groups (…) are coordinated (…), or that the head noun of a nominal group is 
postmodified by a phrase or clause” (Erdmann 1988:328). 
                                                 
217 For Emonds, complexity and heaviness are coextensive concepts.  
200 
d.  “The  dislocated  NP  [in  HNPS]  is  licensed  when  it  contains  at  least  two 
phonological phrases” (Zek and Inkelas 1990:377).  
e.  “It is possible to formalize the intuition of ‘heaviness’ in terms of an aspect of 
the  meaning  of  the  constituents  involved,  namely  their  givenness  in  the 
discourse” 
218 (Niv 1992:3).  
(142)  (Graduated) Weight  
a.  Number of words dominated (Hawkins 1990). 
b.  Number of nodes dominated (Hawkins 1994).
219  
c.  Number  of  phrasal  nodes  (i.e.  maximal  projections)  dominated  (Rickford, 
Wasow, Mendoza Denton, and Espinoza 1995:111).  
 
Wasow (1997a:85) classifies the above definitions into (a) categorical ones, i.e. 
those that “consider only properties of the shifted [i.e. heavy] NP”, and (b) graduated 
ones,  i.e.  those  that  “compare  the  weight  of  the  [heavy]  NP  to  the  weight  of  the 
constituents it gets shifted over [lighter by definition]”. Arnold et al. (2000:29) found 
two advantages to this approach: (a) recent work has shown that it is the relative weight 
that is important in accounts of weight motivated phenomena (Hawkins 1994, Wasow 
1997a),
220  (b)  the  graded  nature  of  weight  effects  is  brought  to  the  fore  with  this 
approach.  This  study  will  make  use  of  graduated  measures  for  both  weight  and 
complexity.  I  will  be  concerned  with  situations  in  which  the  speaker  has  a  choice 
between alternative orders, both of which are syntactically and semantically acceptable 
(DOC vs. DAT).  
7.1.2 Accounts of Weight 
Williams (1994) conducted a corpus study (with spoken and written, American English 
data) to evaluate the dative alternation. In the 168 cases he found of the alternation, he 
discovered  that  goal  [i.e.  recipient]  arguments  tended  to  occur  84%  of  the  time  in 
immediately postverbal position (i.e. DOC) when they were shorter in prosodic length 
                                                 
218  Although not explicitly stated as such in Niv’s  framework, given information is equated to light 
information (i.e. not heavy), while new information is considered to be heavy. 
219 Hawkins (1994) defines syntactic complexity as involving “the number of structural relations within 
different portions of a tree, measured in terms of sets of structurally related nodes” (1994:29). However, 
as in Hawkins (1990), he continues to use number of words as a more easily computable surrogate. 
220 In other words, “weight effects depend on the relative weights of constituents, not only on the weight 
of any one” (Wasow 2002:57).  
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than the theme argument.
221 On the other hand, goal arguments favoured end positions 
(i.e. DAT) 80% of the time when they were longer than their theme counterparts. His 
results are presented in Table 101 below.
222 
 
Length  DOC  DAT 
G<T  41 (84%)  8 (16%) 
G>T  2 (20%)  8 (80%) 
Table 101: Results in Williams (1994)  
In the above table, ‘G<T’ indicate that the Goal element is shorter than the Theme 
element,  whereas  ‘G>T’  indicates  the  opposite.  Williams’  results  seem  to  robustly 
confirm the predictions arising from the PEW. I was able to reproduce his study, but 
using number of words (instead of number of moras) as the criterion for weight. As we 
can see in Table 102 below, the tendencies found are not dissimilar, with the majority of 
themes in DOC longer than goals, and the reverse being true in DAT cases. 
 
Weight  DOC  DAT 
G<T  96%  4% 
G>T  47%  53% 
Table 102: Williams’ results revisited 
With a much larger dataset (854 cases of alternation) and a different measure for 
weight, the results for DOC are not just repeated but actually strengthened to almost 
categorical status: when goals (recipients) are shorter than themes, DOC is preferred 
96% of the times. However, the results cannot be said to be replicated when it comes to 
DAT, in that the predictions emanating from PEW seem to (barely) hang in the balance, 
confirmed but only marginally. 
In a later study, Collins (1995) put PEW predictions to the test in his analysis of 
the  dative  alternation.  Using  a  reduced  dataset  (108  cases)  of  spoken  and  written 
Australian English, he compared the length of the constituents involved, measuring this 
in terms of number of words. His findings are copied in Table 103 below. 
 
                                                 
221 Williams used a very complex measure of prosodic length, based on moraic theory as described in 
Hyman (1985). Moras are prosodic elements similar in extent to syllables, but not necessarily so. 
222 Williams does not indicate what to do in situations when the goal and the theme have the same number 
of moras, which is unfortunate, in that this is rather a common occurrence.  
202 
 
  Receiver    Entity 
DOC  1.1 words  <  3.6 words 
DAT  3.0 words  >  2.2 words 
Table 103: Results in Collins (1995)  
In  Collins’  study,  ‘entity’  refers  to  the  postverbal  element  which  is  not  the 
Receiver. As we can see, his results confirm Williams’ findings, i.e. in DOC cases, the 
average number of words of receivers [recipients] occurring in immediately postverbal 
position  is  considerably  (more  than  three  times)  shorter  than  the  length  of  entities 
[theme arguments]. In DAT cases, again the shorter argument appears closer to the verb, 
but  the  difference  in  length  between  the  two  is  not  as  marked  as  in  DOC  cases.  I 
managed to replicate his experiment, the results are presented in Table 104 below. 
 
  Receiver    Entity 
DOC  1.28 words  <  3.05 words 
DAT  1.28 words  >  1.09 words 
Table 104: Collins’ results revisited 
My  results  appear  to  confirm  Collins’  findings  (and,  simultaneously,  PEW 
predictions), but the differences in weight between the different arguments are not as 
marked, particularly in the case of DAT. It is curious to find out that in my dataset the 
average length for receivers in both DOC and DAT is exactly the same, at 1.28 words. 
In  their  impressive  grammar,  Biber  et  al.  also  discuss  the  dative  alternation 
(1999:927 930). They conducted a corpus study (in the massive Longman Grammar of 
Spoken and Written English corpus, with over forty million words) to evaluate the effect 
of the length of constituents in the three most common lexical verbs that allow for both 
patterns, e.g. give, offer and sell.
223 Their results are reproduced below. 
 
  Length of NP 
DOC  1 word  2 words  3+ words 
DO  15%  35%  50% 
IO  85%  10%  5% 
  Length of NP 
DAT  1 word  2 words  3+ words 
DO  55%  25%  20% 
to phrase  45%  30%  25% 
Table 105: Results in Biber et al. (1999)  
                                                 
223 It is worth noting that with these verbs, the DOC pattern is much more common than DAT.  
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In DOC, the majority of indirect objects are indeed very short, with 85% of them 
being only one word long, and indirect objects longer than a word seeming to be a 
rarity. This weight effect is not found to be as strong in DATs, where immediately 
postverbal position is accorded to direct objects. Of these, only (?!) 55% are realized as 
one word, with a healthy 45% being greater than one word in length. To phrases are not 
much  longer  than  direct  objects  in  DAT,  with  45%  being  one  word  long  too  (not 
counting the preposition, see §7.1.3). The authors conclude that length is not such an 
important factor in DATs as it is in DOCs. 
When  replicating  Biber  et  al.  experiment,  I  was  surprised  by  the  similarity 
between results: my results for DOC are almost exactly the same as theirs, despite the 
fact that my dataset is much smaller, and I consider many more than three verbs (in fact, 
well over 50). My results can be seen in Table 106 below. 
 
  Length of NP 
DOC  1 word  2 words  3+ words 
DO  16%  35%  49% 
IO  84%  11%  5% 
  Length of NP 
DAT  1 word  2 words  3+ words 
DO  47%  33%  20% 
to phrase  52%  22%  26% 
Table 106: Biber et al.’s results revisited 
What was found in DAT is that it is not always the case that the first postverbal 
element is shorter than what follows: (i) the length of DOs is found to be (marginally) 
longer  than  one  word  in  my  data;
224  and  (ii)  to phrases  also  appear  to  be  realized 
frequently as one word.
225 In conclusion, both Biber et al.’s and my results seem to 
confirm PEW predictions, strongly  for DOCs and not so much for DATs. Still, the 
divergence found in the length (or weight) of the prepositional pattern seems to suggest 
that there is something else at work. We must investigate further. 
7.1.3 Corpus Experiment 4: Weight 
In  DOC  and  DAT,  the  choice  of  which  constituent  ordering  is  used  appears  to  be 
determined by the weight (and/or complexity) of the phrases in question. Aarts (1992: 
                                                 
224 As can be appreciated in Table 106, in DAT cases, 33% of direct objects are 2 words long, and 20% of 
direct objects are 3 or more words long. 
225 As will be seen in §7.1.3, prepositions in DATs are considered simply case marking devices and not 
counted as words.  
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83)  notes  that  the  weight  of  an  NP  is  clearly  related  to  the  number  of  elements  it 
contains.  Bearing  this  and  Wasow’s  distinction  (1997a:84 85)  between  graded  and 
categorical  measures  in  mind,  I  measured  weight  in  this  study  as  the  difference  in 
number of words between the (postverbal) noun phrases involved in either DOC or 
DAT. This ecision assigned a weight index to each occurrence of DOC/DAT and not to 
the individual nominal or oblique. 
(143)  Relative weight: W = WNP1   WNP2 
a.  I can still get [letters]1 to [you]1 <ICE GB:W1B 003 #98:1>                ￿W:1 1=   0 
b.  Nobody sent [their children]2 to [them]1 <ICE GB:S2A 021 #80:1:A> ￿W:2 1=   1 
c.  I brought [you]1 [a present]2 <ICE GB:W2F 002 #220:1>                               ￿W:1 2=  1 
d.  Yeah was it you that told [me]1 [that]1 <ICE GB:S1A 099 #271:2:A>  ￿ W:1 1=  0 
e.  I got [my mum]2 [one]1 <ICE GB:S1A 048 #286:1:B>                   ￿  W:2 1=  1 
 
As can be seen from the examples in (143) above, in the following experiment the 
preposition introducing  the recipient/beneficiary argument in DAT (to  or for) is not 
counted as part of the constituent. These prepositions are treated as coding devices, 
flagging adpositionally the recipient/beneficiary argument. We have already mentioned 
(see  §2.1)  how  in  late  Middle  English,  prepositions  were  drained  of  their  (mainly) 
locative meanings to take on the grammatical task of case marking. Sag and Wasow 
(1999:155 156) also suggest that certain uses of prepositions in English can only be 
understood as indicating what role their object plays in the clause, and exemplify with 
the dative alternation. More radically, Givón (1993:95) went even further, considering 
prepositional phrases as the only true indirect objects in English, by virtue of the fact 
that the preposition is the one clear indication of the semantic role of the participant in 
question.  
This study is mainly concerned with cases in which the alternation is possible, that 
is, instances in which the speaker has an authentic choice to make between DOC and 
DAT.  Moreover,  we  are  considering  an  explanation  of  the  alternation  in  terms  of 
number of words/ nodes in both complementation patterns (i.e. DOC and DAT). In a 
pair of pragmatically and informationally equivalent examples such as John gave Mary 
a kiss and John gave a kiss to Mary, we notice that the number of participants is the 
same, but not the number of words of the participating arguments: when Mary appears 
as a recipient in DAT, the speaker has no choice but to encode it with a preposition (to 
in this case). A hypothesis looking at number of words/nodes as an explanation of the  
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dative  alternation  would  show  an  immediate,  automatic  difference  between  the  two 
examples, but this is a difference over which the speaker has no control whatsoever, is 
grammatically imposed from above, and thus limits the speaker’s choice. Therefore, 
because the use of a preposition to or for is unavoidable, i.e. mandatory for a speaker in 
the  expression  of  DAT,  it  is  only  fair  that  this  element  is  omitted  from  the  word 
count.
226 The impact not counting the preposition in DAT has on the experiment will be 
discussed in §7.1.3.2. 
Recall that the set of experiments is only  concerned  with instances where the 
alternation is possible, i.e. where the postverbal elements of the actual clause allow 
rearrangement. Based on this premise, the dataset excluded most DOC examples which 
involved an indirect object followed by  a direct object instantiated as a clause (see 
§4.2).  In  these  cases  (mainly  involving  the  verb  tell),  the  weight  effects  were 
categorical: no alternation was possible.  
(144)  a.  And Mr Hook told me that in nineteen eighty six the company which had 
recently acquired the company in Tunbridge was interested in expansion <ICE 
GB:S2A 070 #5:1:A> 
b.  *And  Mr  Hook  told  that  in  nineteen  eighty six  the  company  which  had 
recently acquired the company in Tunbridge was interested in expansion to 
me 
 
However,  there  were  indeed  some  examples  of  clauses  which  allowed  for  the 
dative alternation, as seen below. These were of course included in the dataset. 
(145)  a.  Well he’d better not get drunk and tell Jo what happened in the weekend <ICE 
GB:S1A 030 #274:1:C> 
b.  Well he’d better not get drunk and tell what happened in the weekend to Jo 
 
Occasionally, it is not a whole clause (as in example (145)a above) but part of a 
constituent  which  is  postponed.  The  most  commonly  affected  part  is  the 
postmodification  of  a  noun  phrase,  the  postponement  of  which  results  in  a 
                                                 
226 In her study of a different alternation (of  and s genitives), Rosenbach (2005) uses a similar argument 
for not counting the definite article preceding the of genitive (e.g. John’s book vs. the book of John). 
Given that turning one option into the other would result in an impossible sentence (e.g. *John’s the 
book), counting the article causes a “natural imbalance” (2005:623) in the number of premodifiers. Her 
argument is based on Altenberg’s (1982), who considered that the use of the definite article introduced an 
‘automatic difference” (1982:79) between the (genitive) constructions, and for that very same reason also 
chose to exclude it from the count.  
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“discontinuous noun phrase” (Quirk et al. 1985:1397). For the purposes of this study, 
we have distinguished two types of extraposition from NP (ENP), which are discussed 
below. 
In  corpus  examples  which  instantiated  DAT,  it  was  not  unusual  for  a  long, 
complex noun phrase (functioning as direct object) to have its postmodifier extraposed 
over the prepositional paraphrase of the indirect object.  
(146)  a.  If somebody has just done something to you that you don’t like then you 
would <ICE GB:S1A 037 #250:1:A> 
b.  and what I’d like people to do is uh give brief summaries to the group about 
the contents of their essays <ICE GB:S1B 016 #3:1:A> 
 
In  the  examples  above,  different  elements  have  been  separated  from  their 
antecedent: a restrictive relative clause in (146)a and a prepositional postmodifier in 
(146)b. These actual cases of extraposition were labelled ENP1. For the purposes of 
determining weight (as well as complexity), only the non displaced elements within the 
NP were counted, e.g. the weight of the first postverbal NP in (146)a is 1 (something) 
and not 5 (something … that you don’t like).
227, 228 
As  stated  earlier,  we  are  only  concerned  with  instances  where  the  dative 
alternation is possible. With corpus examples instantiating DOC, the only way of testing 
for their alternation potential is to see whether the indirect object could be placed in a 
prepositional phrase headed by to of for, and to rearrange the postverbal elements in 
order to try and ‘fit’ the resulting prepositional phrase into the existing clause without 
making further changes. In most cases, this procedure is rather straightforward, as seen 
below. 
(147)  a.  I’ve forgotten to tell you all this <ICE GB:S1A 008 #264:1:B> 
b.  I’ve forgotten to tell all this to you  
 
However,  there  are  cases  where  the  alternation  would  be  possible  only  if,  as 
suggested  earlier,  the  indirect  object  noun  phrase  in  DOC  is  (i)  placed  inside  a 
prepositional phrase headed by to or for, and (ii) wedged between the head of the direct 
object noun phrase and its modifiers, thereby causing the direct object noun phrase to 
                                                 
227 For the same reason, the complexity of (146)a is 1 ([NP something] and not 4 ([NP something … [CL that 
[NP you] [VP don't like]]]). 
228 Wasow (2002:7) observes that the results of this syntactic operation, i.e. the postponement of a heavy 
element and the lightening of the early NP both “serve to increase the probability of satisfying PEW.”  
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become discontinuous. The difference with ENP1 lies in the fact that while ENP1 in 
DAT is actual and real, the kind discussed here which we will call ENP2 is only 
potential.  Below  are  some  examples  of  this  sort  of  ENP.  The  symbol ♦  shows  the 
position where the prepositional paraphrase of the indirect object would have to occur 
for the sentence to be felicitous. 
(148)  a.  …there  are  new  religions  that  offer  their  member  release  ♦  from  those 
constraints which exist in a complex, impersonal society …  <ICE GB:W2A 012 
#33:1>  
b.  …there  are  new  religions  that  offer  release  to  their  member  from  those 
constraints which exist in a complex, impersonal society … 
c.  she was showing me some photographs ♦ of herself and John in the Lake 
District <ICE GB:S1A 009 #112:1:A> 
d.  she was showing some photographs to me of herself and John in the Lake 
District 
 
Rather controversially, perhaps, it was assumed that, were the alternation to take 
place, a speaker would choose the ENP option over the non extraposed one, i.e. in the 
examples below, a speaker would choose (149)a over (149)b. In some cases, this was 
the only option open for a speaker.
229 
(149)  a.  there  are  new  religions  that  offer  [release]  to  their  member  from  those 
constraints which exist in a complex, impersonal society. 
b.  there are new religions that offer [release from those constraints which exist 
in a complex, impersonal society] to their member. 
 
On this basis, for the purposes of determining weight (and complexity) in cases of 
ENP, only the non displaced elements within the noun phrase were counted, e.g. the 
weight of the first postverbal noun phrase in (149)a is 1: (release).
230 
The following experiment attempts to test the predictive power of the notion of 
weight  in  determining  speakers’  choices  (DOC  vs.  DAT).  Does  weight  affect  the 
DOC/DAT choice? If so, can we derive a rule from the data? Necessarily, in this section 
all other (pragmatic) factors are excluded from consideration.  
                                                 
229 There are 14 cases of ENP1 in our dataset, and 55 cases of ENP2. 
230 The complexity of (149)a is 1 as well: ( [NP release]).  
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7.1.3.1 Frequency Results 
The  weight  (number  of  words)  of  every  single  postverbal  NP  participating  in  the 
alternation  was  manually  counted.  Using  a  simple  formula,  a  spreadsheet  then 
calculated the relative frequency of the constructions in the dataset (DOC or DAT). At 
this stage, I had access to the relative frequency of every single DOC and DAT. The 
figure below shows the frequency of the (relative) weights of each construction (DOC 
or DAT). 
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Figure 107: Constructional Weight  
The graph looks like a normal distribution curve.
231 The mean for the distribution 
of DAT is found at  0.184, while the mean for the distribution of DOC is  1.78. I used a 
one tailed Mann Whitney test for weight in order to measure the difference between the 
distributions  of  DOC  and  DAT;  the  result  indicated  (statistical)  significance  (z  = 
12.96).
232 From this we can conclude that there is indeed a reliable relationship between 
weight on the one hand, and DOC and DAT on the other. Furthermore, this relationship 
is not a matter of chance, i.e. weight does affect choice in my dataset. In DOC, the  1 
                                                 
231 The issue of frequency distribution of linguistic data and the kind of appropriate tests to use was dealt 
with in more detail in chapter 4. Simply put, we have decided to consider our dataset as not normally 
distributed, on evidence from skewness and kurtosis. This decision has the added benefit of allowing us to 
employ only those statistical tests which make fewer assumptions about the dataset. 
232 Oakes (1998:17) explains that “[f]or a one tailed test at the 5 per cent significance level, the critical 
value of z is 1.65. If the calculated value of z is less than the critical value, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there was no significant difference between the two groups under comparison.”  
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value of the mean indicates that indirect objects tend to be shorter than direct objects, 
thus confirming PEW predictions and our a priori expectations. In DAT, however, the   
 0.184 mean indicates that both constituents (direct object and to /for phrase) tend to 
have the same weight, i.e. number of words. This goes against our expectations, but not 
necessarily against PEW. 
7.1.3.2 An Inductive Measure of Weight 
Figure 107 above indicates the distribution of the relative weight of DOCs and DATs in 
our  dataset.  An  interesting  approach  is  to  try  and  derive  rules  from  our  multiple 
observations,  so  that  these  rules  will  in  turn  offer  valid  generalizations  about  the 
behaviour of these constructions. Based on the distributions in Figure 107, I tried to 
arrive at a cut off point in order to distinguish and separate the two distributions as 
much as possible. Naturally, the bigger the skew, the better the cut off point is (and the 
more reliable the ensuing rule would be).  
Generating this type of rule is an engineering exercise, in that the only available 
guidelines  are  (a)  separating  maximally  the  means  of  the  two  distributions,  and  (b) 
minimizing the error rate of the rule (i.e. the number of unexplained cases). I evaluated 
three cut off points (0,  1, and 0.1) in terms of their predictive power (accuracy) and 
their coverage.
233 For the purposes of this section, predictive accuracy (i.e. probability 
that the rule is correct) is calculated as the number of correct predictions divided by the 
number of explained cases; coverage was calculated as total number of cases minus 
unexplained cases (see also §6.4.4). The latter measure was employed to complement 
the former, given that naïve predictive accuracy does not tell us much (if anything at all) 
about how general the rule might be in practice. This is not quite a statistical question, 
but rather a methodological one.  
The first rule evaluated was Wα, based on a cut off point located at 0. This would 
indicate that if the weight of a construction (notice that we do not specify between DOC 
and DAT) is positive, then the rule predicts that the construction in question would be 
DAT. If the constructional weight is negative, then the construction would be DOC. If 
the constructional weight is right on the cut off (i.e. 0), the rule offers no prediction. 
This is summarized in (150) below. 
                                                 
233 We could have tested many different cut off points for their contribution to the model (e.g.  0.1,  0.2, 
etc.). This proved to be unnecessary by virtue of the fact that only a few cut off points were able to (a) 
maximally separate the means of the two distributions, and (b) provide a suitable solution to cases of zero 
constructional weight.  
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(150)  Wα (cut off = 0) 
If W > 0 => DAT  
If W < 0 => DOC 
If W = 0 => ? 
 
Table 108 below illustrates the predictions of Wα when compared with the actual 
corpus data. The rule explains the bolded cells in Table 108, but does not explain the 
unbolded ones (false positives).  
 
  W<0  W>0 
DAT  69  68 
DOC  462  21 
Table 108: Wα Predictions 
The predictions are quite accurate for DOCs, where there are only a handful of 
false positives. In the case of DATs, the rule does not offer very reliable predictions. 
One reason for this is that the rule does not fire when the constructional weight is 0, and 
there are quite a few cases (104 in DOC, 120 in DAT). Despite the DAT results, which 
drive the rule accuracy down to 85%, the rule coverageis still high at 73%, not bad for a 
tendency. In simple figures, this means that Wα successfully predicted 530 cases out of 
620, inaccurately predicted 90 cases out of 634, and offered no predictions at all in 224 
cases. 
The next rule evaluated was Wβ, based on a cut off point located at  1, which at 
first blush seemed to be the one optimally separating the means of the two distributions, 
i.e.  the  most  powerful  inferential  rule  derived  from  the  distributions  in  Figure  107 
above. This cut off point specifies that if the constructional weight is positive or zero, 
then the rule predicts that the construction would be DAT. In all other cases (i.e. if the 
constructional weight is negative), then the construction would be DOC. Notice that the 
 1 cut off point pushes all the 0s in one direction (that of DAT). This is summarized in 
(151) below. 
(151)  Wβ (cut off =  1) 
If W ≥ 0 => DAT  
If W < 0 => DOC 
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Table 109 below illustrates the predictions of Wβ when compared with the actual 
corpus data. As before, the rule explains the bolded cells in Table 109, but does not 
explain the unbolded ones (false positives).  
 
  W≥0  W<0 
DAT  198  69 
DOC  125  462 
Table 109: Wβ Predictions 
The  predictions  are  quite  accurate  for  DOCs,  although  the  number  of  false 
positives has increased. In the case of DATs, the rule does show an improvement over 
Wα,  explaining  many  more  cases  (true  positives)  while  keeping  its  false  positives 
constant. The rule coverage has increased to 100% given that it now offers a prediction 
even when the constructional weight is 0. The rule accuracy is marginally better at 77%. 
Wβ successfully predicted 660 cases out of 854, and offered false predictions in 194 
cases out of 854. 
The final rule was Wγ, based on a 0.1 cut off point. This cut off simply tried to 
push the 0s toward DOC instead of DAT. If the weight of a construction is positive, 
then  the  rule  predicts  that  the  construction  would  be  DAT.  In  all  other  cases,  the 
construction would be DOC. This is summarized in (151) below. 
(152)  Wγ (cut off = 0.1) 
If W > 0 => DAT  
If W ≤ 0 => DOC 
 
Table 110 below illustrates the predictions of Wγ when compared with the actual 
dataset.  The  rule  explains  the  bolded  cells  in  Table  110,  but  does  not  explain  the 
unbolded ones (false positives).  
 
  W>0  W≤0 
DAT  68  199 
DOC  21  566 
Table 110: Wγ Predictions 
The predictions are remarkably high in accuracy as regards DOCs, with very few 
false positives. In the case of DATs, the rule is indeed very bad, the false positives far 
outnumbering  the  true  positives.  The  rule  coverage  is  still  100%,  since  the  0s  are  
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included in the rule (they are DOCs). The rule accuracy is still high at 74%, which can 
be explained because of the disparity in the number of DOCs and DATs in our dataset 
(587 vs. 267 respectively). In sum, Wγ successfully predicted 634 cases out of 854, and 
yielded bad predictions in 220 cases out of 854. 
Once  the  accuracy  and  coverage  of  every  single  rule  was  calculated,  I  then 
selected the best one by using a simple measure called score, which was the product of 
both  accuracy  and  coverage  ratios.  This  numerical  value  then  was  instrumental  in 
choosing between definitional criteria (higher is better).
234 
 
Rule  Accuracy  Coverage  Score 
Wα  85%  73%  62 
Wβ  77%  100%  77 
Wγ  74%  100%  74 
Table 111: Evaluation of Weight Rules 
From Table 111 above we can see that the best rule is Wβ, and that the cut off 
point was indeed optimally placed at  1 in the distribution graph illustrated in Figure 
107.
235 Wβ is the one with the highest score, as well as being the one which explains the 
data better, as opposed to Wγ, which despite having a high accuracy, did not manage to 
explain as high a proportion of DATs as Wβ does. The corollaries of this rule (and of 
the distributions it represents) are that (a) DOCs tend overwhelmingly to have negative 
constructional weight, and (b) the weight of DATs tends to be greater than  1, i.e. zero 
or positive (recall that the mean of the DAT distribution is  0.184). From this we can 
conclude that whereas the PEW was confirmed for DOC, it was not found to be strongly 
supported by DAT data. 
Now that the evaluation process for the different rules is in place, I would like to 
address the scenario arising from counting the preposition in DAT cases. Effectively, 
this adds one element to the calculation of the constructional weight of DAT. But it also 
introduces an element of circularity into the assessment of the alternation. By counting 
the preposition, there is an increase in the relative weights of DATs (but not of DOCs). 
This increases the separation between the DOC and DAT distributions, and as such 
makes it easier to choose a cut off point that separates the two means, which in turn 
results in stronger, more accurate rules. However, this also measures something which 
can only occur in one of the alternants, and would therefore artificially skew the results, 
                                                 
234 See also §6.4.4. 
235 See also footnote 233.  
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just for the purpose of obtaining a better rule. Table 112 illustrates the actual figures 
arising from counting P in. 
 
Rule  Accuracy  Coverage  Score 
Wα  93%  83%  77 
Wβ  82%  100%  82 
Wγ  90%  100%  90 
Table 112: Evaluation of Weight Rules (P included) 
As can be appreciated, moving the DAT mean one stage to the left causes the 
accuracy of the rules to jump up. However, it is only a fake jump, an artefact of the 
design of the rules: the result is stronger but it is not applied evenly but in a skewed 
manner, given that P only appears in one of the alternants.  
7.1.3.3 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
After evaluating our inductive rules and selecting the best one, there are still a number 
of false positives which remain unexplained (or rather explained inaccurately). These 
are  represented  by  the  unbolded  cells  in  the  tables  from  the  previous  section.  In 
particular, our best rule Wβ yields wrong predictions in 194 cases. Recall that this rule 
predicted that (a) constructions whose relative weight was positive or 0 were likely to 
be DAT, and (b) constructions whose relative weight was negative were likely to be 
DOC. Prediction (a) has 69 false positives (i.e. cases where the constructional weight is 
negative but the construction is actually DAT), while prediction (b) has 125 (cases of 
DOC with a constructional weight of 0 or positive values). 
Notice that, given our operationalisation of constructional weight and the PEW, 
both constructions were expected to yield negative constructional weight values, since 
the lighter structure would be followed by the heavier. However, only in the case of 
DOCs do our data support the PEW; and the case of DATs is a bit more problematic. 
The PEW would lead us to expect patterns such as those in (153) below, but these have 
proved to be quite rare in our dataset. More typical cases are those in (154). 
(153)  a.  …two groups of undergraduates told [stories]1 [to the rest of the class]5 <ICE 
GB:W2A 007 #117:1> 
b.  An important part of NFCA’s work is giving [free advice]2 [to foster carers 
and children and young people]7 <ICE GB:S2B 038 #102:3:A>  
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(154)  a.  …I propose to send  [your description]2 to [them]1 <ICE GB:W1B 030 #46:3> 
b.  …the Government agreed to pay [all the compensation costs]4 [to redundant 
workers]2 <ICE GB:W2C 001 #27:2> 
c.  …the  NCC  will  send  [its  recommendations  for  14  to  16 year olds  ]8  [to 
MacGregor]1 <ICE GB:W2C 002 #14:1> 
 
These cases cannot be explained by weight considerations alone, but other notions 
need to be resorted to. Perhaps complexity? This is what Chomsky (1975:477) had to 
say on the issue: 
It is interesting to note that it is apparently not the length of words of the object 
that determines the naturalness of the transformation, but, rather, in some sense, 
its complexity. Thus “they brought all the leaders of the riot in” seems more 
natural that “they brought the man I saw in.” The latter, though shorter, is more 
complex.
236 
7.2 Complexity 
Several  authors  have  claimed  that  complexity  is  indeed  the  motivation  behind  the 
constructional rearrangement of constituents. Foremost among these authors is Hawkins 
(1994), in whose Early Immediate Constituents (EIC) model word order is subservient 
to a purely syntactic processing principle, measured as the relative complexity of the 
involved constituents. In this light, complexity is independent from context, identity of 
discourse participants, speaker’s intentions, or indeed any other pragmatic factors. 
7.2.1 Complexity: Definitions and Assumptions 
As we have seen in §7.1.1, complexity has been variously defined in the literature. For 
our purposes, the complexity of each constituent is considered to be the number of 
phrasal  nodes  it  dominates,  and  the  constructional  complexity  will  be  arrived  at  by 
deducting the complexity of the second constituent from that of the first, in keeping 
with the operationalisation of our measure of weight. 
7.2.2 Complex Accounts 
The thrust of Hawkins (1994) is that performance considerations (i.e. an unconscious 
desire on the part of participants in a conversation to recognize constituent structure 
online  as  quickly  and  efficiently  as  possible)  can  explain  structure,  and  therefore 
                                                 
236 Chomsky was referring to the particle movement transformation.   
215 
principles such as PEW or PEF are epiphenomenal. In other words, there is no such 
thing as given before new, or short before long; all these preferences are explained by 
the parser’s desire to ensure recognition of phrasal heads as early as possible.  
In his words (Hawkins 1994:57): 
[C]onstituents occur in the orders they do so that syntactic groupings and their 
immediate constituents (ICs) can be recognized (and produced) as rapidly and 
as  efficiently  as  possible  in  language  performance.  Different  orderings  of 
elements result in more or less rapid IC recognition. 
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Hawkins comes up with a very convoluted method for calculating complexity, 
whereby complexity is a ratio between the number of words in a construction and the 
number of (immediate) constituents involved in it. An important notion for the EIC 
model is that of Constituent Recognition Domain (CRD), which represents the number 
of nodes that need to be parsed by the addressee in order to recognise the construction in 
question.  The  CRD  is  instrumental  in  making  processing  decisions.  Consider  the 
examples below, and Hawkins’ explanation (1994:57): 
(155)  a.  I [VP gave [NP the valuable book that was extremely difficult to find] [PP to 
Mary]] 
b.  I [VP gave [PP to Mary] [NP the valuable book that was extremely difficult to 
find]] 
Example (155)b provides a more rapid presentation of the three ICs of the VP 
(V, NP, and PP) than (155)a. The verb gave is the first IC of the VP in both 
examples and signals to the parser that a VP should be constructed. The PP is a 
two word IC here. Its positioning to the left of the lengthy NP in (155)b makes 
it possible for all three daughter ICs to be recognized within a short viewing 
window, since the NP can be recognized on the basis of the determiner the, 
occurring in leftmost position within this NP. In (155)a, on the other hand, the 
viewing window extends all the way from gave to the preposition to, (…) and 
the heaviness of the intervening NP delays access to this third IC. Of the twelve 
total words dominated by this VP, therefore, 11 need to be examined for IC 
recognition in (155)a, whereas just four suffice in (155)b. 
In this light, smaller CRDs are more efficient and therefore preferable, since they 
reduce the processing cost for both speaker and parser. The CRD sets the framework for 
Hawkins’  final  notion,  his  IC to non IC  ratio,  which  is  arrived  at  by  dividing  the 
                                                 
237 We will not concern ourselves with determining what the ultimate purpose and functionality of weight 
or complexity effects is. Some authors (e.g. Frazier and Fodor 1978; Hawkins 1990, 1994; Kimball 1973) 
have argued that the PEW facilitates parsing by postponing long and/or complex elements, and thus 
minimises the processing cost. However, Wasow (1997a:94) believes that there is an air of implausibility 
about parsing considerations as the ultimate explanation, given that for words and (phrasal) nodes to be 
counted  (and  for  the  ordering  of  constituents  to  be  evaluated  for  communicative  efficiency),  it  is 
necessary for the speaker to have the utterance fully formulated before speaking. Rather, by appealing to 
experimental  evidence  showing  that  utterance  planning  is  carried  out  sentence internally,  the 
postponement of  heavy, difficult phrases is better explained by  virtue of the  fact that this technique 
facilitates planning during utterance production.  
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number of immediate constituents in the CRD by the number of terminal elements (i.e. 
words) in the same CRD. This notion provides the metrics for evaluating alternative 
arrangements of constituents. 
Keizer  (2007:280)  has  taken  Hawkins’  system  to  task  on  two  counts  (a)  the 
limited nature of his texts samples, mainly taken from written texts; and (b) the lack of 
clarity as regards the “underlying principles of the analysis”, upon which hinges the 
analysis given to a construction. This has the unfortunate consequence of uncertainty 
about the appropriate analysis (in EIC terms) that is to be given to an utterance.  
In  the  following  experiment,  we  will  employ  similar  notions  of  complexity, 
applied in a first stage to constituents (number of non terminal nodes), and in a second 
stage to constructions, whereby constructional complexity is a relative notion defined as 
the difference in number of phrasal nodes between the two constituents participating in 
ditransitive complementation. 
7.2.3 Corpus Experiment 5: Complexity 
This experiment attempts to verify  whether the  notion of complexity can indeed be 
teased apart from that of weight, and whether the two can, or should, be conflated in 
their predictive power regarding DOC and DAT. Clearly, a certain correlation between 
the two notions is expected,  given that phrasal nodes are always linked to terminal 
nodes. In this study, I used a simpler indicator of complexity, the number of phrasal 
nodes dominated by a constituent. As with weight, complexity was measured as the 
difference in number of phrasal nodes between two constituents.  
(156)  Relative complexity: C = CNP1   CNP2 
a.  I’ll bring [these]1 to [you]1 <ICE GB:S1A 079 #193:1:B>                        ￿C:1 1=  0 
b.  Show [the maggots]2 to [them]1 <ICE GB:S1B 079 #305:1:J>                 ￿C:2 1=  1 
c.  … I showed [him]1 [the standing orders]3 <ICE GB:S1A 069 #52:1:A>   ￿C:1 3=  2 
d.  You have given [me]1 [you]1 <ICE GB:W1B 006 #16:1>                                   ￿C:1 1=  0 
 
The criteria for identifying phrasal nodes in DOC and DAT relied on the parsing 
of ICE GB. Phrasal nodes were counted automatically with an FTF (see Figure 113 
below), in order to ensure accuracy and consistency in the results.  
  
217 
 
Figure 113: A Complexity Finder FTF (OI= indirect object) 
The  figures  below  illustrate  how  the  FTF  matched  the  corpus  data.  The 
highlighted nodes are those counted in for complexity, e.g. the indirect object in Figure 
114 below was found by  our  complexity  finder FTF to have two phrasal (i.e. non 
terminal) nodes, and 2 is therefore its complexity value. Other complexity values (i.e. 3 
and 5) are illustrated in Figure 115 and Figure 116, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 114: Complexity Finder match (complexity=2)
238 
                                                 
238  The  principal  terms  for  Figure  114  are  as  follows:  OI=  Indirect  Object,  DT=  Determiner,  DTP= 
Determiner Phrase, DTCE= Central Determiner, NPHD= Noun Phrase Head.  
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Figure 115: Complexity Finder match (complexity=3)
239 
 
Figure 116: Complexity Finder match (complexity=5)
240 
The decisions about discontinuous noun phrases and whether or not to count the 
preposition in DAT (as discussed in §7.1.3) are still valid and apply to this experiment 
too. In short, when modifiers within a noun phrase are separated from their antecedents 
(as  in  (157)  below),  only  the  non displaced  elements  within  the  noun  phrase  were 
considered  for  the  purpose  of  determining  phrasal  complexity.  In  other  words,  the 
complexity  of  the  first  postverbal  NP  in  (157)  is  1  ([NP  something]  and  not  4  ([NP 
something … [CL that [NP you] [VP don't like]]]).  
                                                 
239 Besides those established in footnote 238, the principal terms for Figure 115 are as follows: NPPR= 
Noun Phrase Premodifier, AJP= Adjective Phrase, AJHD= Adjective Phrase Head. 
240 Besides those established in footnotes 238 and 239, the principal terms for Figure 116 are as follows: 
NPPO=  Noun  Phrase  Postmodifier,  P=  Prepositional,  PREP=  Preposition;  PC=  Prepositional 
Complement.  
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(157)     If somebody has just done something to you that you don’t like then you 
would <ICE GB:S1A 037 #250:1:A> 
 
This experiment attempts to test the predictive power of the notion of complexity 
in  determining  speakers’  choices  (DOC  vs.  DAT).  Does  complexity  affect  the 
DOC/DAT choice? If so, can we predict a rule? Necessarily, in this section all other 
(pragmatic) factors are excluded from consideration.  
7.2.3.1 Frequency Results 
The complexity (number of phrasal nodes) of every single postverbal NP in DOC and 
DAT  was  counted  automatically  by  means  of  an  FTF.  Using  a  simple  formula,  a 
spreadsheet then calculated the relative frequency of every single DOC and DAT in the 
dataset. The figure below shows the frequency of the (relative) complexities of each 
construction (DOC or DAT). 
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Figure 117: Constructional Complexity 
The results indicate that the mean for the distribution of complexity in DOC is      
 1.68, which means that indeed the most complex constituent does tend to appear in 
final  position.  As  regards  DAT,  the  mean  of  the  distribution  is   0.243,  which,  as 
opposed to what the mean of DOC indicated, nominals involved in DAT have very 
similar  complexity.  A  Mann Whitney  test  was  conducted  in  order  to  compare  the  
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distributions of DOC and DAT, and the result indicated (statistical) significance (z = 
12.25). This result shows that there are two different distributions in Figure 117 above.  
This  result  allows  us  to  claim  that  there  is  a  reliable  relationship  between 
complexity and DOC/DAT and this relationship is not a matter of chance. Complexity 
tends  to  affect  choice.  At  this  point  it  is  worth  noting  the  similarities  between  the 
complexity results described here and the weight results reported in §7.1.3. The means 
are very similar (mean DOC weight:  1.78, mean DAT weight:  0.184), as is the value 
of z (12.96 for weight and 12.25 for complexity).  
7.2.3.2 An Inductive Measure of Complexity 
We next tried to generate an inductive rule for complexity along the lines set out in 
§7.1.3.2 for weight. The idea is to try and capture generalisations in the behaviour of the 
alternants  based  on  our  dataset.  Taking  the  distributions  in  Figure  117  as  basis,  I 
decided  to  evaluate  three  cut off  points  in  order  to  separate  the  two  complexity 
distributions, and eventually arrive at the best inductive rule. As before, the three cut off 
points (0,  1, and 0.1) were evaluated for their accuracy and coverage.
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The first rule evaluated was Cα, based on a cut off point located at 0. This would 
indicate that if the complexity of a construction (notice that no construction is specified) 
is positive, then the rule predicts that the construction in question would be DAT. When 
relative  complexity  is  negative,  then  the  construction  would  be  DOC.  If  the 
constructional  complexity  is  right  on  the  cut off  (i.e.  0)  then,  the  rule  offers  no 
prediction. This is summarized in (158) below. 
(158)  Cα (cut off = 0) 
If C > 0 => DAT  
If C < 0 => DOC 
If C = 0 => ? 
 
Table 118 below illustrates the predictions of Cα when compared with the actual 
corpus data. As can be appreciated, the rule explains the bolded cells in Table 118, but 
does not explain the unbolded ones (false positives). 
 
                                                 
241 As in the case of cut off for weight (see §7.1.3.2), here again we could have tested many different cut 
off points for their contribution to the model (e.g.  0.1,  0.2, etc.). This proved to be unnecessary by virtue 
of the fact that only a few cut off points  were able to (a) maximally separate the means of the two 
distributions, and (b) provide a suitable solution to cases of zero constructional complexity.  
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  C>0  C<0 
DAT  68  79 
DOC  20  466 
Table 118: Cα Predictions 
The  predictions  are  quite  accurate  for  DOCs,  where  there  are  only  20  false 
positives. In the case of DATs, the rule fails to yield anything better than 50% accuracy. 
The rule does not apply for every single case in which the relative complexity falls on 
the cut off (i.e. 0), and these are not negligible (101 in DOC, 120 in DAT). The rule 
coverage is 84%, its accuracy is 73%. In actual figures, Cα successfully predicted 534 
cases out of 633, inaccurately predicted 99 cases out of 633, and offered no predictions 
at all in 221 cases. 
The next rule evaluated was Cβ, based on a cut off point located at  1, perhaps the 
optimal point for separating the means if we look at the complexity distribution figure 
above. This cut off point specifies that if the constructional complexity is positive or 
zero, then the rule predicts that the construction would be DAT. In all other cases, then 
the construction would be DOC. The  1 cut off point pushes all the 0s in the direction of 
DAT, thus maximizing the coverage of the rule. This is summarized in (139) below. 
(159)  Cβ (cut off =  1) 
If C ≥ 0 => DAT  
If C < 0 => DOC 
 
Table 119 below presents the predictions of Cβ. The rule explains the bolded 
cells, but does not explain the unbolded ones (false positives).  
 
  C≥0  C<0 
DAT  188  79 
DOC  121  466 
Table 119: Cβ Predictions 
The  predictions  are  quite  accurate  for  DOCs,  although  the  number  of  false 
positives has increased dramatically (from 20 to 121). In the case of DATs, the rule 
does show an improvement over Cα, explaining many more cases (true positives) while 
keeping its false positives constant. The rule accuracy is better at 77%. Cβ successfully 
predicted 654 cases out of 854, and wrongly predicted 200 cases out of 854.  
222 
The final rule was Cγ, based on a 0.1 cut off point. This cut off was employed for 
the sole purpose of testing the effect of pushing the 0s toward DOC instead of DAT. If 
the complexity of a construction is positive, then the rule predicts that the construction 
would be DAT. In all other cases (i.e. if the constructional complexity is 0 or negative), 
then the construction would be DOC. This is summarized in (140) below. 
(160)  Cγ (cut off = 0.1) 
If C > 0 => DAT  
If C ≤ 0 => DOC 
 
Table 120 below illustrates the predictions of Cγ when compared with the actual 
dataset. The rule explains the bolded cells below, but does not explain the unbolded 
ones. 
 
  C>0  C≤ ≤ ≤ ≤0 
DAT  68  199 
DOC  20  567 
Table 120: Cγ Predictions 
The predictions are remarkably high in accuracy as regards DOCs, with few false 
positives. In the case of DATs, the rule does not perform very well, the false positives 
far  outnumbering  the  true  positives  199  to  68.  The  rule  coverage  is  100%,  0s  are 
included  as  DOCs  in  the  rule.  The  rule  accuracy  has  gone  down  to  74%.  This  is 
explained because of the disparity in the number of DOCs and DATs in our dataset (587 
vs. 267 respectively). In sum, Cγ successfully predicted 635 cases out of 854, and gave 
bad predictions in 219 cases out of 854. 
By multiplying the accuracy and coverage for every rule, I calculated the score. 
This indicated that our best rule is Cβ. 
 
Rule  Accuracy  Coverage  Score 
Cα  84%  74%  61 
Cβ  77%  100%  77 
Cγ  74%  100%  74 
Table 121: Evaluation of Complexity Rules 
Still, these results show that  I have been unable to improve (significantly) on 
weight as a predictor of the alternation, neither in terms of accuracy nor coverage, let 
alone  score.  Cβ  indicates  that  (a)  DOCs  tend  overwhelmingly  to  have  negative  
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constructional complexity, and (b) the complexity of DATs is very often greater than  1, 
tending towards 0 (recall that the means of the DAT distribution was  0.243). As in the 
case of weight rules, we can conclude that whereas the PEW (as measured in phrasal 
nodes) was confirmed for DOC, it was not supported by DAT data. 
7.2.3.3 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
There are still false positives to explain, since our best rule Cβ failed 200 times. Recall 
that this rule predicted that (a) constructions whose relative complexity was positive or 
0 were likely to be DAT, and (b) constructions whose relative complexity was negative 
were likely to be DOC. Prediction (a) has 79 false positives, while prediction (b) has 
121.  As  in  the  case  of  relative  weight,  our  operationalisation  of  constructional 
complexity and the PEW led us to a priori expect both constructions to yield negative 
values, since the lighter structure would be followed by the heavier. However, only in 
the case of DOCs do our data support the PEW. 
In DOCs, false positives are those that have positive relative complexity, such as 
(161)a below, as well as those with 0 relative complexity, such as (161)b. In the latter 
case, two pronominal noun phrases are often involved. 
(161)  a.  I got [my mum]2 [one]1 <ICE GB:S1A 048 #286:1:B> 
b.  Yeah was it you that told [me]1 [that]1 <ICE GB:S1A 099 #271:2:A> 
 
As regards (161)b, given that pronouns do not differ in weight or complexity, the 
appearance of two of them in DOC or DAT is unexplainable by the PEW.
242 In fact, 
Biber  et  al.  (1999:929)  found  in  their  massive  corpus  that  when  two  pronouns  are 
involved  in  ditransitive  complementation,  their  preferred  pattern  of  occurrence  both 
inside and outside Britain is DAT,
243 “because the syntactic relationship is more clearly 
marked, particularly in view of the two possible orders when there is no such marker”, 
as illustrated with an example from ICE GB in (162) below.
244 
(162)     But I started sending them [letters] usually to them [business associates] as it 
came in <ICE GB:S1B 064 #44:1:B> 
                                                 
242 See also §8.4.4. There are 35 cases of DOCs with two postverbal pronouns, all of them with 0 as their 
weight and complexity index (and thus expected by our model to be DATs). 
243  This  preference  for  the  prepositional  construction  when  both  objects  are  pronominal  is  in  direct 
contrast to the overall rarity of the prepositional pattern with full noun phrases. 
244 In a study of the Survey of English Dialects (SED), Kirk (1985) suggests that in Britain the DAT 
patterns  are  giving  way  to  the  DOC  ones,  a  situation  reinforced  by  the  findings  of  Cheshire  et  al. 
(1993:75),  who  also  report  (based  in  a  study  of  the  Survey  of  British  Dialect  Grammar)  that  DAT 
constructions have been ousted by the DOC ones in many urban areas. This is also supported by the sheer 
number of DOCs and DATs in ICE GB, where the former far outnumber the latter.  
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In DOC cases, Biber et al. (1999:929) identify two patterns, which I will call 
DOCi and DOCii, as seen in (163) below. DOCi instances have a very high frequency in 
conversation, and are mainly found with the pronoun it as direct object. Notice that 
while it is naturally construed as a direct, inanimate object, other personal pronouns 
could just as easily be interpreted as an indirect or a direct object. This is why for the 
speaker in (162), DAT was the only option. As regards DOCii (as seen in (163)b and c), 
Biber et al. (1999:930) found it mainly occurred in conversation and fiction.
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(163)  a.  Give me it (DOCi) 
b.  Give it me (DOCii) 
c.  You gave him [a dog] me. <ICE GB:W2F 001 #108:1> 
 
According  to  Biber  et  al.  (1999:929),  register  can  be  considered  a  strong 
explanatory factor in deciding among the  competing patterns when both objects are 
pronominal. In their data, DOCi patterns are twice as frequent as DOCii ones, whereas in 
fiction the reverse patterns prevails. Hawkins (1994:312 313) accounts for DOCi and 
DOCii cases by resorting to complexity. Consider his examples below: 
(164)  I [VP gave it [PP to him]]  
VP Constituent Recognition Domain (CRD, see §7.2.2): 3/3=100% 
(165)  I [VP gave [NP him] it] 
VP CRD: 3/3=100% 
 
Despite the example in (164) corresponding to the most frequent pattern, he sees 
that the overall structure of the VP is simpler in (165) than in (164), given that the P and 
PP nodes are no longer there. The CRDs for the VPs in both examples are not being 
improved upon, both rate at 100%. This simplification by  removal of  nodes is also 
employed  to  account  for  cases  of  DOCii  (example  (166)  below),  despite  no  CRD 
improvement being made. 
(166)  I [VP gave it him]  
VP CRD: 3/3=100% 
 
                                                 
245 Jespersen (1927:278 287) attributed the presence of the immediately postverbal it in examples such as 
(163)b to a tendency in all languages to place “a weakly stressed pronoun as near to the verb as possible. 
This may sometime lead to the direct object being placed before the indirect object.”  
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Support  for  Hawkins’  explanation  can  be  provided  by  dialectal  studies.  For 
example, in their study of Lancashire dialects, Siewierska and Hollmann (2007) have 
found out that when both theme and recipient are personal pronouns, there is a clear 
preference  for  positioning  the  theme  before  the  recipient  (i.e.  DOCii  cases  such  as 
(163)b), so much so that this alternative double object construction is nearly twice as 
common as the canonical one (i.e. DOCi cases such as (163)a). In fact the theme before 
recipient order is not only dominant in the DOC cases, but is also dominant overall, as it 
also  obtains  in  the  DAT  ones.  In  Lancashire  then,  the  most  common  patterns  are 
differentiated not in terms of ordering but simply in terms of the presence or absence of 
a preposition, as we can see below. 
(167)  a.  I’ll give it your sister. 
b.  I’ll give it to your sister. 
7.3 Conclusions 
Weight and complexity are difficult to separate. At the same time, lexical weight is 
(marginally) a better predictor of the alternation. Both measures are very successful 
predictors of constituent ordering, with over 75% accuracy for the alternations in our 
dataset. This conclusion seem to be aligned with those of Wasow (1997a) and Hawkins 
(1994). As pointed out earlier, this finding is not entirely unexpected, given that more 
words usually mean more structure, and more structure usually means more words. 
There  still  remain  some  unexplained  cases.  Weight  and  complexity  are  also 
claimed  to  correlate  with  information  status  (GBN).  I  will  discuss  this  in  detail  in 
chapter 8.  
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8  Interacting Variables 
8.1 Introduction: Resolving Competing Hypotheses 
We have seen in previous chapters that information status, weight, and complexity each 
explain a good percentage of cases of the dative alternation. Many linguists have tried to 
employ  reductive  theories  that  essentially  seek  to  explain  linguistic  phenomena  by 
recourse  to  a  single,  simple,  underlying  variable.  Hawkins  (1994),  for  instance, 
considers  weight/complexity  to  be  the  only  significant  determinant  of  word  order 
variation. 
The problem is that all the different factors discussed so far in this study (which 
include Hawkins’) fail to account for all instances of either DOC or DAT. This fact has 
driven many efforts towards accounting for word order variation (of which the dative 
alternation is a case in point) by means of an army of potential explanatory factors. For 
example, Gries (2003b) used discriminant analysis (a multiple regression method) to 
derive dative alternation predictions from a dataset. He coded for animacy, referential 
distance, semantic process described by the verb, kind of determiner, pronominality, 
and  discourse  status  of  the  noun  phrases  instantiating  DOC  and  DAT.  His  model 
accurately identifies 83% of DATs and 95% of DOCs. DATs are elusive for his model 
too.
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In another study of the dative alternation, Bresnan et al. (2004 2007) employed 
logistic  regression  using  variables  such  as  (discourse)  accessibility,  pronominality, 
definiteness,  animacy,  number,  length,  semantic  class  of  the  verb,  and  structural 
parallelism,  the  first  six  elements  being  coded  in  both  recipients  and  themes.  Their 
results are impressive: they claim their model is able to accurately predict 94% of the 
actual choice (i.e. DOC/DAT) in a corpus of telephone conversations.
247 In a similar 
study, Bresnan and Hay (2008) also employed logistic regression, but did not code for 
definiteness and number, while adding syntactic complexity (measured as number of 
graphemic words) to the mix of factors. 
Wasow and Arnold (2003) have praised (as well as employed) studies resorting to 
multiple  factors  because  of  their  adequacy  for  treating  factor  weighting  (i.e.  some 
factors are stronger than others, no factor is categorical), as well as factor interaction. 
Models employing multiple factors are susceptible to criticism precisely for the high 
                                                 
246 As will be seen in §8.4.2, the model introduced in this study accurately predicts 79% of DOCs and 
74% of DATs. 
247  Their  findings  also  determined  that  givenness,  animacy,  definiteness,  pronominality,  and  relative 
length are all associated with immediate postverbal position in both DOC and DAT.  
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factorial  correlations;  that  is,  despite  factor  combination  models  offering  improved 
predictions, their results are very difficult to attribute to any one explanatory factor. 
Consider (168) below. It is a challenge verging on the impossible to decide whether her 
is placed in immediately postverbal position because it is given, because it is animate, 
because it is a pronoun, because it is short (or shorter than the next complement), or 
because it is less complex (than the next complement). 
(168)  Paolo gave her a football top from his home team. 
 
As a methodological aside, we need to insist yet again that correlations should not 
be confused with explanations. Thus, research into correlating factors has to address the 
issue  of  the  linguistic  motivation  of  empirical  analysis.  Specifically,  how  can  we 
separate  (and  compare)  the  effect  that  different  but  correlated  factors  have  on  our 
dataset? How can we be certain whether or not, e.g., information status is a consequence 
of weight, or for that matter, that weight is a consequence of information status? Are 
these notions two different factors, or is it just that one of them looks like a causal factor 
because of its high correlation with the other? In other words, are the factors under 
consideration  independent,  or  is  there  a  fundamental  one  that  renders  the  others 
epiphenomenal? These questions cannot be settled by mere correlational statistics.  
In sum, the three variables discussed in this study (information status, weight, and 
complexity) are predictive, but (a) do they overlap to the extent that one explanation can 
be subsumed under another?, and (b) if we take them together, can we get a higher 
degree of coverage than with each variable on its own? Finally, is there an overarching 
generalisation linking the various factors that affect the alternation? If (b) is true, that 
would mean that despite their overlaps, there is some degree of independence between 
them, a conclusion both important and useful: it is not the case that each prediction 
reduces to the other one.  
8.2 Weight vs. Complexity 
In  chapter  7  we  considered  two  different  implementations  of  the  PEW  separately: 
weight (number of words) and complexity (number of phrasal nodes). However, long 
phrases have more complex structures (more phrasal nodes and very often clausal or  
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prepositional  postmodifiers),  and  thus  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find  the  two  notions 
conflated.
248 
8.2.1 Interaction (i)  
The experiments in chapter 7 have looked at overlapping hypotheses trying to predict a 
particular contingent event: the choice of DOC or DAT structures. There is apparently a 
core of cases which are covered by weight and complexity measures, both variables 
being plausible explanations for word order arrangements. This is reinforced by the fact 
that we arrived at two inductive rules (i.e. Wβ in §7.1.3.2 and Cβ in §7.2.3.2) with very 
similar accuracy and coverage (77% and 100% respectively for both measures). This 
logical dependency between weight and complexity does not preclude the existence of 
slightly  different  (explained)  sample  sets.  In  what  follows  I  attempt  to  determine 
whether,  in  considering  weight  and  complexity  as  separate  explanations,  we  are 
essentially  describing  the  same  intrinsic  phenomenon  in  different  ways.  Can  we 
demonstrate that these two notions are just alternative types of measure for heaviness? 
If that is not the case, and we pit one against the other, does complexity predict the 
result of the linguistic choice between DOC/DAT better than weight? Can we apply 
Occam’s razor, i.e. is ‘number of words’ simpler than ‘number of phrasal nodes’? These 
issues  will  be  discussed  in  the  following  sections.  A  discussion  of  the  interaction 
between PEF and PEW is reserved for §8.3. 
8.2.2 Weight vs. Complexity: Results 
I conducted a regression test to check whether weight and complexity were measuring 
the same thing (see chapter 4, particularly §4.6.3, for a description of the tests employed 
in these experiments). The resulting scattergram (plotting the distribution of the relative 
weight and the relative complexity of DOC and DAT in our dataset) was evaluated by 
means of Spearman’s rho (a measure of linear correlation). If weight and complexity are 
indeed  measuring  the  same  thing,  we  would  expect  to  see  a  nice  fit  between  the 
distributions of weight and complexity of both DOC and DAT, with the dots in the 
distribution forming an approximate line, and a positive regression value nearing 1. If 
complexity and weight are measuring different things, then the scattergram should show 
a cloud of dots and the regression value would be near 0.
249 Figure 122 below illustrates 
                                                 
248 As we have seen in chapter 7, even separating PEW from PEF is sometimes difficult, given that  
constituents carrying new information often require lengthier statements, and thus also tend to occur later. 
249 See Woods et al. (1986:160 161) and Oakes (1998:30 31) for further details on this test.  
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the scattergram resulting from comparing constructional weight and complexity in our 
dataset. 
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Figure 122: Weight vs. Complexity  
The scattergram shows a very apparent linear correlation, with the majority of the 
points representing the distribution of relative weight (along the X axis) and relative 
complexity  (along  the  Y  axis)  clustering  together  and  forming  a  clear  line.  The 
correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho, or rS) confirms that our two variables do indeed 
correlate in our dataset: the value of rS is very high at 0.95. The correlation between 
weight and complexity not only exists, but it is actually a very strong one. This means 
that constructions with a large number of words do have lots of structure (i.e. lots of 
phrasal nodes). This strong correlation between weight and complexity suggests that 
there is hardly any benefit in choosing one measure over the other as predictor for the 
DOC/DAT alternation. 
We then divided our dataset into DOC and DAT occurrences, to check the effect 
of this correlation in the different constructions. The results are presented in Figure 123 
and Figure 124 below. 
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Figure 123: Weight vs. Complexity in DOC 
Weight vs. Complexity in DAT
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
 
Figure 124: Weight vs. Complexity in DAT 
It becomes apparent that the correlation applies equally forcefully in both DOC 
and  DAT,  with  weight  and  complexity  slightly  more  strongly  correlated  in  DOC 
(Spearman’s rho: 0.95) than in DAT cases (Spearman’s rho: 0.92), as can be seen in the 
slightly  differing  values  of  the  coefficient.  We  can  now  confirm  that  weight  and 
complexity predictions in our dataset are essentially one and the same thing. 
8.2.3 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
Due to their overlap, weight and complexity effects are very difficult to separate. Both 
measures  are  very  successful  predictors  of  constituent  ordering,  with    over  75% 
accuracy for the alternations in our dataset (as found in chapter 7), and lexical weight  
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(marginally) the better predictor of the alternation. This conclusion seems to be aligned 
with those of Wasow (1997a) and Hawkins (1994), both of whom hold that number of 
words is as effective a measure of heaviness as number of nodes. As pointed out earlier, 
this  finding  is  not  entirely  unexpected,  given  that  more  words  usually  mean  more 
structure. On the other hand, more structure does not necessarily entail more words. 
One way or the other, the PEW appears utterly vindicated, and the good news is that its 
effects are robust enough to be measureable in terms of words or phrasal nodes, the 
latter according to the definitions found in the grammar underpinning ICE GB. 
We have, however, not explained all the cases in our dataset. In what follows, I 
analyse  the  interaction  between  information  status  and  weight.  I  chose  weight  over 
complexity given that it is easier to measure (number of words being more apparent 
than number of nodes). 
8.3 GBN vs. Weight  
It has been pointed out (Hawkins 1994, Wasow and Arnold 2003) that there are indeed 
correlations  between  information  status  (the  GBN  principle)  on  the  one  hand,  and 
weight  and  complexity,  on  the  other.  Recall  that  the  GBN  principle  predicts  given 
information  occurring  before  new  information,  and  that  shorter  noun  phrases  (e.g. 
pronouns, names) are very often used to refer to information which has already been 
introduced into the discourse, compared with those that are being introduced to the 
hearer and described for the first time.  
8.3.1 Interaction (ii)  
In the following sections  I attempt to asses whether or not the claimed relationship 
between information status and weight obtains in empirical data. In order to find an 
answer, I carried out a series of Mann Whitney tests (see §4.6.3, as well as e.g. Oakes 
(1998) for further information on this test) to identify the strength of the correlation 
between constructional weight and GBN values. Notice that due to the discrete nature of 
GBN values (G and N as GBN values are different from 1, 2, 3, etc. as units of weight 
value), it is not possible to use correlation coefficients (Pearson or Spearman tests) as a 
measure of association between GBN and weight.  
232 
8.3.2 GBN vs. Weight: Results 
The purpose of this section is to find out to what extent constructional weight is the 
result of the GBN choice. The Mann Whitney tests attempt to see whether the means of 
the weight of different GBN configurations (e.g. GG, GN, etc.) can be separated. If they 
can, then the different configurations are associated with different weights. If GBN and 
weight values do correlate, then we have been measuring the same thing with different 
elements.  
Figure 125 below shows the frequency of the different configurations (GN, GG, 
etc.)  according  to  their  weight,  irrespective  of  DOC  or  DAT.  That  is,  the  X  axis 
represents the different constructional weights, and the Y axis plots the number of times 
GBN configurations occurred in the dataset. 
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Figure 125: GBN vs. Weight 
First  of  all,  configuration  NG  does  not  offer  enough  data  (only  24  cases,  all 
DATs) to be entered into any statistical test, so what follows are tests applied to the 
distributions GN vs. GG, GG vs. NN, and GN vs. NN.  
The first test contrasts the distribution of weight in GN configurations with that of 
weight  in  GG  configurations.  GN  configurations  are  instantiated  556  times  in  our 
dataset, with over 85% of those occurring in DOC form. GG, on the other hand, occurs  
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201 times, with a majority of DAT cases (57%). The result of the Mann Whitney test is 
statistically  significant  (z=  9.83).  In  other  words,  GBN  separates  out  two  different 
distributions vis à vis weight, i.e. the two tested configurations have different weights. 
The mean of the weight of GN is  1.67, in keeping with expectations emanating from 
our operationalisation of weight, according to which the weight of a particular instance 
of a construction was calculated by deducting the weight of the second noun phrase 
from that of the first noun phrase. In this light, a negative weight was expected to be the 
default, a confirmation of the PEW. GN configurations appear to conform to the PEW. 
The mean of the weight of GG is  0.348, very close to 0, which was the weight value 
expected of this configuration, particularly when both noun phrases were realized as 
pronouns.  
Notice that in both GN and GG configurations the first element is given. As such, 
this test is also telling us something about the effect of the second element, N in GN, 
and  G  in  GG.  More  specifically,  it  appears  that  the  difference  in  the  means  is 
attributable to this element. The occurrence of  new information in the  second noun 
phrase of either DOC or DAT is indeed an indicator that the said noun phrase is heavier 
(i.e. has more weight) than both (a) a noun phrase in immediately postverbal position 
carrying given information, and (b) a noun phrase in second position carrying given 
information.  
The second pair tested was GG and NN. We have discussed GG configurations in 
the preceding paragraph. NN configurations occurred 73 times, mostly in DAT (75%). 
The result of the Mann Whitney test is again statistically significant (z= 3.82). As in the 
previous  pair,  GBN  and  weight  affect  the  dataset  in  different  ways  and  cannot  be 
conflated.  
We  have  seen  that  GG  configurations  are  expected  to  have  0  relative  weight 
(especially when instantiated by pronouns), and that expectation appears to have been 
confirmed by the mean of their weight. NN configurations, on the other hand, have a 
mean weight of  1.29.
250 The negative value of this mean suggests that their relative 
weight is better aligned with GN configurations than with GG ones. That is, regardless 
of information status, the second noun phrase is clearly heavier than the first one, a 
result which seems to support PEW. The newer, the weightier then. Also, when both 
noun phrases have similar informational value (i.e. GG or NN), weight seems to be the 
one tipping the scales towards DOC or DAT. 
                                                 
250 Notice that by definition, pronouns cannot occur in this configuration, in that their (mainly anaphoric) 
referring capabilities automatically brand them as carrying given information by proxy.  
234 
The final test pairs GN and NN, both already discussed in previous paragraphs. 
The result of the Mann Whitney test is also statistically significant (z=  1.78). Again, 
GBN  and  weight  are  shown  to  behave  differently  and  determine  different  data 
distributions.  As  in  the  first  case,  GN  and  NN  configurations  share  a  second  new 
element. Thus, the test also touches on the effect of the first element (G in GN and N in 
NN), and differences and similarities in the means could be tracked to this element. 
Noun phrases in first position carrying new information appear to behave similarly to 
those carrying given information (in that very same position) as regards weight; both are 
lighter  than  the  noun  phrases  following  them.  In  other  words,  noun  phrases  in  first 
position behave similarly regardless of their information status, i.e. they are lighter than 
noun phrases in second position. 
8.3.3 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
Linguists  have  not  failed  to  notice  the  correlation  between  information  status  and 
heaviness/weight/complexity  notions.  What  they  make  of  this  correlation,  however, 
varies. Some authors treat weight as the fundamental factor explaining the alternation, 
with information status being treated as an epiphenomenal occurrence. Hawkins (1994) 
is  foremost  among  those  reducing  GBN  effects  (as  well  as  other  factors  such  as 
animacy) to PEW ones.  
Other  authors  are  not  as  certain.  Curiously,  even  contradictory  results  can  be 
found  in  Arnold  et  al.  (2000)  and  Wasow  (2002),  who  report  that  their  corpus 
investigation  results  support  the  dominance  of  weight  over  information  status  in 
affecting  ordering,  but  their  experimental  (psycholinguistic)  results  do  not.  This 
discrepancy leads them to advocate a compromise solution, whereby neither GBN nor 
PEW can be reduced to the other, and can thus cover more ground when accounting for 
constituent ordering when combined. 
This  solution  is the  driving  force  behind  Arnold  et  al.’s  (2000)  and  Wasow’s 
(2002) models, the former of which holds that: 
[T]he role of each factor depends in part on the strength of competing factors. 
When there is a big weight difference between constituents, there is a strong 
tendency to produce the light argument early, and discourse status may not play 
as large a role. In contrast, when one argument is extremely accessible (…), 
discourse status will influence constituent ordering more than weight (Arnold et 
al. 2000:50). 
Our tests in this section have shown that information status and weight define and 
explain different subsets in our data, which means they are not coextensive. Reducing  
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one to the other is therefore not a solution, in that it would mean throwing away part of 
the explained data for the sake of simplifying the explanatory model. 
8.4 Multiple Competing Variables 
We have seen that the three measures discussed so far (information status, weight and 
complexity) are distinct but not completely independent. This section discusses a simple 
yet powerful way in which they can be brought together in order to derive predictions 
for the dataset.  
Recall that weight was measured as number of terminal nodes, and relative weight 
as the difference between the weight of the first noun phrase and that of the second noun 
phrase  in  either  construction  (see  §7.1.3).  Complexity  was  measured  as  number  of 
phrasal nodes, and relative complexity as the difference between the complexity of the 
first noun phrase and that of the second noun phrase in either construction (see §7.2.3). 
The case of GBN configurations is different: given noun phrases were given an arbitrary 
value of 1 and new noun phrases were given a value of 2. The information status index 
of the different configurations was calculated as the difference between the GBN value 
of the first noun phrase and that of the second noun phrase in either construction (see 
§6.4.4).  
With this operationalisation of the variables, we abstracted inductive rules from 
the corpus dataset which explained a large proportion of the data. These rules were 
based  on  threshold  values  applied  to  the  distribution  of  the  data  according  to  the 
different  principles,  and  were  later  evaluated  for  their  accuracy  and  coverage  in 
predicting the right constructional choice. The rules are listed below: 
 
Weight Inductive Rule  Complexity Inductive Rule  GBN Inductive Rule 
Wα  
If W > 0 => DAT  
If W < 0 => DOC 
If W = 0 => ? 
Cα  
If C > 0 => DAT  
If C < 0 => DOC 
If C = 0 => ? 
GBNα  
If GBN > 0 => DAT  
If GBN < 0 => DOC 
If GBN = 0 => ? 
Wβ  
If W ≥ 0 => DAT  
If W < 0 => DOC 
Cβ  
If C ≥ 0 => DAT  
If C < 0 => DOC 
GBNβ  
If GBN ≥ 0 => DAT  
If GBN < 0 => DOC 
Wγ  
If W > 0 => DAT  
If W ≤ 0 => DOC 
Cγ  
If C > 0 => DAT  
If C ≤ 0 => DOC 
GBNγ  
If GBN > 0 => DAT  
If GBN ≤ 0 => DOC 
Table 126: Inductive Rules for the Variables 
The  rules  that  we  constructed  drew  a  line  in  the  distribution  of  the  data,  and 
evaluated the data which fell both sides of the line. Sometimes the rules included cases  
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that fell right on the line (e.g. γ rules push 0s into DOC not DAT (if X > 0 => DAT; if X 
≤ 0 => DOC), which means that despite the variable in question not offering a definite 
prediction by giving a 0 result, these 0 values were forced into giving a prediction. In 
some  other  cases,  the  in between,  undecidable  cases  represented  by  0s  were  not 
included in the rule (e.g. α rules leave 0s alone, i.e. they allow them to sit on the fence 
when faced with the DOC/DAT choice). By including in the rule only those cases where 
a definite prediction is made (and discounting the 0s), the accuracy of the rule naturally 
increases, at the expense of coverage, inasmuch as not all cases are covered in the rule. 
The rules were rated by a measure called score, which consisted of the product of 
accuracy and coverage values. The resulting overall score was the chosen method for 
cross comparing any two rules (a rule with a higher score is better than one with a lower 
one). The accuracy, coverage, and scores of our rules are illustrated in Table 127 below, 
with the scores in bold representing the chosen (best) rule for each variable. 
 
Rule  Accuracy  Coverage  Score 
Wα  85%  73%  62 
Wβ  77%  100%  77 
Wγ  74%  100%  74 
Cα  84%  74%  61 
Cβ  77%  100%  77 
Cγ  74%  100%  74 
GBNα  87%  68%  59 
GBNβ  79%  100%  79 
GBNγ  72%  100%  72 
Table 127: Accuracy, Coverage, and Scores of Inductive Rules 
We decided to combine the three best inductive rules in order to try and improve 
the coverage and accuracy of the model. There is a trade off at some point between 
accuracy  and  coverage.  The  choice  is  clear:  either  allow  rules  not  to  have  100% 
coverage  (leaving  0s  undecided)  in  order  to  increase  their  accuracy,  or  sacrifice 
accuracy in order to achieve full coverage. Inevitably, increasing the coverage reduces 
accuracy, because more noise is allowed into the calculations. Wα is very accurate, 
predicting the right constructional choice 85% of the time, but it only applies about 3 
out of 4 times, that is, it only offers (right or wrong) predictions for 73% of our dataset. 
In order to make any kind of meaningful comparison between the explanatory 
power of one principle over another, we have to put all the different rules on an even 
keel. Thus, no undecidable cases were allowed in the rules, and as a consequence full  
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coverage was warranted. All the selected (best) rules in this study have 100% coverage, 
at the expense of their accuracy.  
 
Rule  Accuracy  Coverage  Score 
Wβ  77%  100%  77 
Cβ  77%  100%  77 
GBNβ  79%  100%  79 
Table 128: Selected Inductive Rules 
8.4.1 Design Issues 
The case of information status merits further discussion. Recall from chapter 6 (§6.4.4) 
that given elements were associated with a GBN value of 1, while new elements were 
associated  with  a  GBN  value  of  2,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  an  NP  with  new 
information value has twice the information value of an NP with given information 
value. Information status is a different kind of concept from the idea of, e.g. weight. An 
NP with a weight of 2 (i.e. consisting of 2 words) has indeed twice the weight of an NP 
with a value of 1 (consisting of a single word). In short, GBN values are expressed 
numerically in order to be compared, but are still discrete and non parametrical in that 
they do not represent points in a scale but rather conventional, arbitrary, Boolean like 
values. 
Employing numerical values for coding information status gives the researcher the 
possibility of attributing a certain GBN value to the whole construction, as opposed to 
attributing  GBN  values  to  individual  instances  of  constituents  participating  in  the 
construction. That is, it is a configuration which gets a GBN value, not e.g. a recipient 
NP.  This  is  in  line  with  the  operationalisation  of  our  measures  of  weight  and 
complexity, which by virtue of their being relative (e.g. the weight of a construction is 
the weight of NP1 minus that of NP2) yield values associated to whole constructions. 
This  internal  consistency  is  also  part  of  the  reason  behind  the  adoption  of  100% 
coverage  for  all  our  inductive  rules,  otherwise  it  is  not  very  easy  to  make  any 
comparisons at all.
251  
We  have  seen  in  previous  chapters  that  identifying  thresholds  in  distributions 
provided us with simple rules (GBN in chapter 6, weight and complexity in chapter 7). 
                                                 
251 It is not necessarily undesirable to leave some things undecided, i.e. to accept coverage weaker than 
100%.  Sean  Wallis  (p.c.)  has  mentioned  that  this  is  a  fairly  standard  procedure  in  knowledge based 
systems,  where  a  series  of  independent  rules  predicting  some  outcome  do  not  have  100%  coverage. 
However, this is compensated by having a weighted voting system, whereby the predictions of different 
variables do not carry the same importance.  
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That is, when e.g. the relative weight of a construction exceeded a certain value, the said 
construction  was  predicted  to  be  DOC  (i.e.  an  individual,  principle specific 
determination). The central idea of this chapter is to conjoin these rules, and force them 
to  predict  the  constructional  choice  by  simple  majority  vote  (SMV).  The  design  is 
straightforward enough: given three rules, the predicted outcome is the one on which at 
least two of them agree. By combining the rules, we expect stronger results. 
Table 129 below enumerates the possible combinations according to the predicted 
constructional  outcome  derived  from  the  threshold  values  of  each  variable.  For 
example, combination 4 describes constructions (i) predicted to be DOC by Wβ (i.e. 
with negative relative weight), (ii) predicted to be DAT by Cβ (i.e. with 0 or positive 
relative complexity), and (iii) predicted to be DAT by GBNβ (i.e. with 0 or positive 
GBN value).  
 
Combination  Wβ  Cβ  GBNβ 
1  DOC  DOC  DOC 
2  DOC  DOC  DAT 
3  DOC  DAT  DOC 
4  DOC  DAT  DAT 
5  DAT  DOC  DOC 
6  DAT  DOC  DAT 
7  DAT  DAT  DOC 
8  DAT  DAT  DAT 
Table 129: Combinations of Variables 
We will next look at all combinations, with particular attention to those cases 
where they correctly predict (by majority) DOC or DAT.  
8.4.2 Simple Majority Voting (SMV): Results 
Table 130 below lists the results of the SMV model when applied to our dataset. 
 
Combination  Wβ   Cβ  GBNβ  DOC  DAT  Total 
1  DOC  DOC  DOC  396  21  417 
2  DOC  DOC  DAT  61  47  108 
3  DOC  DAT  DOC  4  1  5 
4  DOC  DAT  DAT  1  0  1 
5  DAT  DOC  DOC  8  2  10 
6  DAT  DOC  DAT  1  9  10 
7  DAT  DAT  DOC  74  50  124 
8  DAT  DAT  DAT  42  137  179 
      Total  587  267  854 
Table 130: Combinations of Variables and Results  
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The  breakdown  is  useful  in  that  it  shows  (i)  whether  or  not  the  different 
predictions hold up, (ii) where the different predictions differ. It is possible to see how 
one rule predicts a result, and how accurate it is in comparison with the actual dataset.  
It is worth noticing that there is a certain amount of overlap in the predictions (i.e. 
one example can be explained successfully by more than one variable), but that is of 
course not only expected but welcomed, in that it serves to reinforce the power of the 
model. At the same time, it also allows the researcher to investigate in more detail those 
cases where the variables are pulling apart, predicting different outcomes. 
The bold figures in the Table 130 above indicate the derived predictions; more 
specifically, bold figures are the true positives, and unbolded figures the false positives. 
For example, combination 1 leads you to expect DOC, given that the β cut off points 
make all three variables point in that direction. That is, in these cases, the constructional 
weight and complexity are negative, as well as the GBN index, all of which indicate that 
PEW and PEF apply perfectly here, i.e. the first constituent in the construction (i.e. the 
indirect object in DOC or the direct object in DAT) is shorter, less complex and given in 
relation to the second constituent. Combination 8 is equally strong, in that all variables 
point towards DAT.  
Cases where only one rule (or no rule) predicts the right outcome (as compared 
with the dataset) make up the model’s residual amount of probability. These are cases 
which are classed as false positives according to the SMV model (e.g. 21 DAT cases in 
combination 1), but when considered from the viewpoint of an individual variable, are 
nonetheless accurate predictions if measured against the dataset. Put differently, these 
are  cases  in  which  one  variable  is  in  the  minority  (i.e.  has  been  defeated  by  the 
combination of the other two variables) in the SMV model, but its predictions are still 
factually right. These cases are discussed in §8.4.4. 
Recall that the figures in Table 130 above indicate the derived predictions, the 
bold figures indicating the true positives, and the unbolded figures indicating the false 
positives.  To  illustrate,  out  of  a  total  of  417  instances  of  combination  1  cases,  396 
actually occur in DOC (true positives), and only 21 in DAT (false positives). Notice that 
this means that a full 49% of the actual dataset (i.e. 49% of 854 cases) is covered by the 
predictions emanating from combination 1 alone. Combination 8 is similar, in that it 
strongly  predicts  DAT,  and  this  is  verified  by  the  data:  there  are  179  cases  of  this 
combination of variables, and over 76% of them are indeed DAT. Cases where all 3 
variables  are  in  total  accord  therefore  account  for  70%  of  the  total  (417  cases  in 
combination 1, and 179 cases in combination 8).  
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The remaining combinations are not as strong, given that there is one variable in 
disagreement  with  the  others.  In  these  combinations,  the  application  of  a  simple 
majority voting rule (2 out of 3) forces the data into supplying a prediction. In this light, 
combinations 2, 3, and 5 predict DOC; whereas combinations 4, 6, and 7 predict DAT. 
Let’s review some of these combinations in more detail.  
 
•  Combination  2  indicates  a  DOC  prediction  (by  majority  rule),  and  this  is 
supported by the data: 61 out of 108 cases are actually instantiated as DOC, but 
there is a strong number of false positives (47 out of 108, or 43%). This seems to 
suggest that the dissenting minority variable in this combination, i.e. GBN, does 
have a strong influence on the distribution of constructions even if the other two 
variables gang up against it.
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•  Combination 3 indicates a DOC prediction by majority rule, and out of a total of 
5 cases, 4 follow this prediction, with a single outlier. 
•  Combination 4 predicts DAT by majority rule, and is the only case instantiated 
in our dataset that gives the lie to this prediction. This is the only combination 
without true positives. 
•  Combination 5 predicts DOC, and we can see that this is true in 8 out of 10 
cases.  
•  There  are  10  cases  covered  under  combination  6,  and  9  out  of  10  represent 
accurate predictions. 
•  Combination 7 covers a decent number of cases (15% of the whole dataset, 124 
out of 854). Still, it presents the greatest challenge to the model, in that the false 
positives  outnumber  the  true  positives.  In  this  combination,  weight  and 
complexity are in agreement, but their agreement lies on the wrong side of the β 
cut off point. As in combination 2 (of which combination 7 is the opposite), 
GBN seems to outweigh both variables in an SMV model. 
 
Predictions derived from Table 130 have an accuracy of 78%, calculated as the 
number of correct (i.e. accurately predicted) cases divided by the number of explained 
cases, i.e. (396+61+4+0+8+9+50+137) / 854. The coverage in Table 130 is, naturally, 
100%.  The  accuracy  of  DOCs  in  this  model  is  79%,  calculated  with  the  following 
formula:  (396+61+4+8)  /  587.  The  accuracy  of  DATS  is  slightly  lower  at  74%, 
calculated with the following formula: (0+9+50+137) / 267. The model is marginally 
                                                 
252 In fact this is supported by all the data, and in combination 7 with particular force.  
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more successful at predicting DOC, a result which is expected inasmuch as there are far 
more  DOCs  than  DATs  in  the  dataset.  DATs  have  traditionally  proved  to  be  more 
problematic for many different models, and this one is no exception. 
In order to better appreciate the import of the SMV model, the data from Table 
130 can be viewed as intersecting sets.  
 
 
Figure 131: Coverage  
Figure 131 above and Figure 132 below both consist of three intersecting sets, 
each  representing  one  of  our  variables.  The  numbers  within  two way  intersections 
indicate instances where two variables agree on their predictions, whereas the triple 
intersection shows cases where our model’s predictions are unanimous, i.e. all three 
variables are in agreement. Recall that all figures derive from Table 130. The coverage 
of the model is illustrated in Figure 131, whereas Figure 132 illustrates its accuracy.  
In evaluating coverage in Figure 131, there are 596 cases where the variables in 
our model predict the same outcome (417 cases of DOC in combination 1, and 179 
cases of DAT in combination 8), and this is why this figure is placed within the three 
way  intersection  (W∩C∩GBN).  There  are  232  cases  where  weight  and  complexity 
agree on a prediction (108 cases of DOC in combination 2, and 124 cases of DAT in 
combination  7),  but  GBN  predicts  a  different  outcome.  These  cases  are  thus 
incorporated  in  the  W∩C  intersection,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  GBN  variable.  The 
remaining  cases  in  Figure  131  are  (i)  15  cases  of  agreement  between  weight  and 
information  status  but  not  complexity  (W∩GBN,  as  resulting  from  the  totals  of 
combinations  3  and  6),  and  (ii)  11  cases  of  agreement  between  complexity  and 
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information status but not weight (C∩GBN, as resulting from the totals of combinations 
4 and 5). 
Finally, notice that adding up all the cases for which the model offers a prediction 
(596+232+15+11, i.e. all the figures in Figure 131) results in 854 cases or the totality of 
our dataset, which means that our model’s coverage remains 100%. 
Turning  now  to  our  model’s  accuracy,  we  have  to  consider  Figure  132.  The 
figures are still derived from Table 130, but whereas we considered combination totals 
in  evaluating  coverage,  we  now  focus  only  on  the  accurate  predictions  (i.e.  true 
positives)  emanating  from  that  table.  For  example,  the  three way  intersection 
(W∩C∩GBN) in Figure 132 is now populated not by all cases where the variables were 
in agreement (as was the case in Figure 131), but rather by those cases where agreement 
was factually accurate. The number of accurate predictions common to all variables 
(533 in all) is thus the sum of DOC predictions (396 cases) in combination 1, and of 
DAT predictions (137 cases) in combination 8.  
 
 
Figure 132: Accuracy 
Let’s consider the two way intersections. The 111 cases in W∩C consist of the 
sum of accurate predictions (61 instances) for DOC in combination 2 and those for DAT 
(50 cases) in combination 7. In both these combinations the GBN variable is not in 
agreement with the other two. A consequence of this is that there are a number of false 
positives  (121  in  total,  the  sum  of  47  cases  in  combination  2,  and  74  cases  in 
combination 7) that can be explained neither by weight nor by complexity, i.e. only the 
disagreeing variable (in this case, GBN) predicts the right outcome. Cases where one 
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variable  is  pulling  away  from  the  other  two  are  therefore  considered  to  be  false 
positives, and thus have no place in two way intersections. This is why in Figure 132, 
the 121 false positives in W∩C, for instance, appear only in the GBN set which does not 
partake of any intersections. That is, those 121 cases cannot be explained either by 
weight or by complexity alone, nor by a combination of the two: only our remaining 
variable (i.e. information status) can account for them (see §8.4.4).  
By the same token, W∩GBN  cases (13 in all) consist of the sum of  accurate 
predictions  (4  cases)  for  DOC  in  combination  3  and  those  for  DAT  (9  cases)  in 
combination 6. The 2 false positives in these combinations are accountable only by 
complexity, since weight and information status cannot do that job. Finally, the 8 cases 
present in C∩GBN consist only of  accurate predictions for DOC in combination 5, 
because  combination  4  offers  only  inaccurate  DAT  predictions.  All  the  same,  those 
cases  unaccountable  by  the  combination  of  the  two  variables  in  question  (1  false 
positive in combination 4, and 2 other false positives in combination 5) are nonetheless 
accountable by the remaining variable (again, see §8.4.4). 
As  regards  overall  accuracy,  measured  as  the  number  of  correct  predictions 
(533+111+13+8) divided by the number of explained cases (854), we can see that it 
rightly stays at 78%.
253 Section 8.4.4 will focus on the residual probability of the model, 
i.e. that 22% of false positives, in an attempt to investigate cases where predictions from 
different variables part company so as to identify shortcomings in the proposed model. 
8.4.3 Preliminary Consideration of the Results 
We have found in §8.2 that weight and complexity were strongly correlated, which calls 
into  question  their  usefulness  for  a  three way  SMV  model.  If,  despite  being 
definitionally  distinct,  they  determine  similar  datasets,  isn’t  considering  them  as 
separate variables doubling the effect of the same phenomenon? In order to address this, 
as well as to find out which of the two is better at predicting the alternation (when 
paired  with  GBN),  we  set  up  two  tables.  The  SMV  model  is  adapted  to  a  2 way 
prediction: in Table 133, weight is paired with information status, while in Table 135 it 
is complexity which is paired with GBN. 
 
                                                 
253 Insisting on strict accuracy (i.e. cases where all three variables are not only in agreement but factually 
right in their predictions) causes this index to fall to 62% (533/854).  
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Combination  Wβ  GBNβ  DOC  DAT  No. 
1  DOC  DOC  400  22  422 
2  DOC  DAT  62  47  109 
3  DAT  DAT  43  146  189 
4  DAT  DOC  82  52  134 
    Total  587  267  854 
Table 133: Weight and GBN 
Combinations 1 and 3 are rather straightforward to read off Table 133 above, in 
that both variables are in agreement. For example, in combination 1, both variables 
predicted 400 cases accurately (prediction and instantiation were both DOC) and 22 
cases inaccurately (prediction was DOC but instantiation was DAT). Combinations 2 
and 4 are rather less straightforward. The variables are in disagreement, and as such it is 
hard to determine the (in)accuracy of their joint prediction, given that what is accurately 
predicted by one variable counts as an inaccurate prediction for the other variable. For 
example, in combination 4 in the table above, Wβ accurately predicts 52 cases of DAT, 
but at the same time, these 52 cases are inaccurate predictions of GBNβ, which expected 
them to be DOC. However, it is still possible to calculate the coverage and accuracy of 
weight measures when paired with GBN, as we can see in the sets below. 
 
 
Figure 134: Accuracy and Coverage in Weight and GBN 
The  numbers  in  Figure  134  are  all  derived  from  Table  133.  The  number  of 
accurate  predictions  common  to  both  variables  (546  in  all)  is  the  sum  of  DOC 
predictions  (400  cases)  in  combination  1,  and  of  DAT  predictions  (146  cases)  in 
combination 3. Those cases predicted by weight only (in Figure 134 above, 114 in all) 
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are the sum of weight predictions for DOC (62 cases) in combination 2, and for DAT 
(52 cases) in combination 4. As regards cases only predicted by GBN (129 cases), they 
are the sum of GBN predictions for DAT (47 instances) in combination 2, and for DOC 
(82  instances)  in  combination  4.  Worth  noticing  in  Figure  134  above  is  that  the 
coverage is not 100%: there were 65 cases in the dataset which were neither matched by 
any individual prediction nor by the combination of both, and consisted of the 22 cases 
of DAT in combination 1, and 43 cases of DOC in combination 3.  
The combination of weight and  GBN therefore  has a coverage index of 92%, 
calculated as cases for which the model offered a prediction (i.e. 789 cases, the sum of 
114+546+129), divided by the total number of cases in the dataset (i.e. 854 cases). This 
entails that a two variable model cannot explain every single case in our dataset. On the 
other hand, the accuracy in Figure 134 above (which is in turn derived from Table 133) 
is  69%,  measured  as  the  number  of  correct  predictions  divided  by  the  number  of 
explained cases (546/789). 
Let  us  now  consider  the  combinations  involving  complexity  and  information 
status, to the exclusion of weight, as presented in Table 135 below. 
 
Combination  Cβ  GBNβ  DOC  DAT  No. 
1  DOC  DOC  404  23  427 
2  DOC  DAT  62  56  118 
3  DAT  DAT  43  137  180 
4  DAT  DOC  78  51  129 
    Total  587  267  854 
Table 135: Complexity and GBN 
The figures in Table 135 can also be rendered in sets for a clearer evaluation of 
their coverage and accuracy. 
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Figure 136: Accuracy and Coverage in Complexity and GBN 
The  figures  in  Figure  136  are  all  derived  from  Table  135.  Here  again,  the 
coverage is not 100%: there are 66 cases which are not explained by either complexity 
or GBN, hinting at the same conclusion as before, i.e. a two variable model cannot 
explain the whole of our dataset. The coverage of complexity measures when paired 
with GBN covers 92% of the total cases (788/854). On the other hand, the accuracy 
from  Figure  136  above  (which  is  in  turn  derived  from  Table  135)  is  (again)  69%, 
measured as the number of correct predictions divided by the number of explained cases 
(541/788).  
It therefore seems that there is very little to distinguish between the efficacy of 
weight and complexity as predictors: both have an accuracy of 69% when paired with 
GBN. In earlier versions of this study, simpler variable definitions were used. These 
were later improved upon and refined, which resulted in the increased accuracy and 
coverage of the predictions emanating from the variables, but they were not necessarily 
more amenable to the multi variable model (i.e. did not improve the accuracy of the 
model).  The  usefulness  of  having  two  different  variables  is  higher  when  these  are 
maximally (and perhaps crudely) separated, and (of course) do not correlate. The more 
they agree, the more the accuracy of the model decreases. This is applicable to the 
results of this study. Over the course of this research, weight and complexity appear to 
have increasingly become two definitions of one and the same phenomenon, which have 
caused a decrease in the overall predictive accuracy of the model. This is perhaps an 
argument for retaining cruder variable definitions.  
In other words, using a combination of three variables as predictor (accuracy 78%, 
see §8.4.2) has hardly improved the accuracy of the predictions of each variable, either 
541  113  134 
Complexity  Given Before New 
66 
U  
247 
individually (weight 77%, complexity 77%, information status 79%, see §8.4) or when 
paired (both weight and GBN, and complexity and GBN had an accuracy of 69%, as 
seen  earlier).  Weight  and  complexity  are  highly  correlated  (recall  Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient was very high, 0.95), and seem to be measuring the same thing.  
The  model’s  78%  accuracy  appears  to  be  the  average  of  the  accuracies  of 
information  status  on  the  one  hand,  and  weight  and  complexity,  on  the  other.
254 
However, it is worth noticing that even if GBN’s accuracy is higher than that of our 
model (78%), the latter’s is a much more robust prediction index, given that it is based 
on more principles. What is important is the a posteriori empirical predictions of the 
model, i.e. how many cases are correctly predicted when two or more principles agree. 
8.4.4 Residual Probability or Counterexamples 
Grau …ist alle Theorie, Und gruen des Lebens goldner Baum. (Goethe) 
 
Modelling  performance  data  is  an  exercise  consisting  in  reasoned  simplifications  of 
actual events. Furthermore, Mukherjee (2005:87) argues that “corpus based models of 
grammar should not attempt to explain all performance data in their entirety, because 
the data will always include instances of, say, unacceptable language use, clear mistakes 
and intended ungrammaticality”. This is of limited applicability to our dataset, but is 
nonetheless a sensible reminder that it is not reasonable to aim for an explanation of 
100% of all cases in performance data.  
Recall that residual probability consists of cases in which one variable is not part 
of the majority in the SMV model, but its predictions are still factually right. Residual 
probability is thus entirely made up of false positives, and consists of four possible 
scenarios, derived from Table 130 above, listed in (169) below, and illustrated in Figure 
137 further down. 
                                                 
254  An  advantage  of  SMV  is  that  it  corrects  logical  dependencies,  whereby  two  variables  overlap 
substantially.  If  variable  X  predicts  83%  and  Y,  77%,  it  may  be  the  case  that  Y’s  77%  is  entirely 
dependent on (included in) X’s. In this case, using SMV is instrumental in demonstrating that Y adds very 
little to the overall accuracy of the predictions.  
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(169)  Residual probability 
a.  Only weight predicts the right outcome (i.e. is factually right). There are 3 
such cases: 1 in combination 4, and 2 in combination 5. 
b.  Only complexity predicts the right outcome (i.e. is factually right). There are 
2 such cases: one in combination 3, and another in combination 6. 
c.   Only GBN predicts the right outcome (i.e. is factually right). There are 121 
such cases: 47 in combination 2, and 74 in combination 7. 
d.  No rule predicts the right outcome (i.e. is factually right). There are 63 such 
cases: 21 in combination 1, and 42 in combination 8.  
 
 
Figure 137: Residual Probability 
Before discussing the four types identified in (169), it is important not to lose 
from sight that residual probability is determined by our predictors, which are in turn 
based on cut off points. These threshold values nudge the data into providing definite 
predictions (e.g. a negative constructional value indicates a preference for DOC), while 
simultaneously stopping them from sitting on the fence (i.e. all types of constructional 
values,  whether  positive,  negative  or  zero,  are  associated  with  a  prediction).  This 
procedure, while successfully allowing the data to select their own rules, also allows 
some percentage of error. This is what we have called the noise of the variables, and 
should not affect the validity of the results.  
Cases  where  the  weight  variable  is  the  only  one  giving  the  (factually)  right 
prediction amount to three. In these cases, and despite their high correlation, weight and 
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complexity do not agree on their predictions. This divergence can be explained largely 
as a consequence of the presence of ditto tags in the examples in (170) below. 
(170)  a.  I am surprised that the judges in the competition for the RIPA HAY Prize 
should  have  awarded  [OD/NP  even  a  commendation]  [A/PP  to  the  Brighton 
Health Authority] … <ICE GB:W1B 027 #63:5> 
b.  So what we try and teach our students when we teach [IO/NP them] [DO/NP 
integrated circuit design] is simply this <ICE GB:S2A 029 #66:2:A> 
 
To indicate that certain compound expressions function grammatically as single 
units,  the  ICE GB  grammar  assigns  them  ditto  tags,  whereby  all  lexical  items  in  a 
compound are joined as part of a structure, and not given any internal analysis (see 
Figure 138 below). This resource is particularly useful in dealing with e.g. personal 
names and book titles, as well as some particularly complex NPs.  
 
 
Figure 138: Ditto tagged Phrase in ICE GB 
In examples (170)a and (170)b, Brighton Health Authority and integrated circuit 
design are all analysed in ICE GB by employing ditto tags, i.e. they are considered 
compounds.  This  means  that  the  full  NP  the  Brighton  Health  Authority  in  (170)a 
consists  of  four  words,  but  not  four  phrasal  nodes  (as  expected)  but  rather  two. 
Integrated circuit design in (170)b consists of three words but only one (phrasal) node, 
rather than the three one would expect in accordance with other, similar analyses of NPs 
in ICE GB.
255 Ditto tags thus highlight the difference between weight and complexity, 
                                                 
255 If we were to disregard the ICE GB analysis of this NP and adjust the number of phrasal nodes (i.e. 
increase it to three), example (170)b would stop being a counterexample to combination 4 and become a  
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in that the imbalance between terminal and phrasal nodes is definitionally guaranteed. 
In Figure 138 above, the phrase integrated circuit design is considered a compound, and 
given a (reduced) flat analysis. 
Turning now to cases where the right prediction was yielded only by complexity, 
these are also few, and are listed in (171) below. In these cases weight and complexity 
are pulling apart in their predictions, again as a result of ditto tagging.  
(171)  a.  I’m reading it [OD/NP Treasure Island] at the moment [A/PP to my son]  <ICE 
GB:S1A 013 #65:1:D> 
b.  Thus, if Bank A ends the day owing [IO/NP Bank B] [OD/NP $100m]. <ICE GB:W2C 
016 #26:2> 
 
Case (171)a includes an oversight on my part: the compound Treasure Island was 
mistakenly analysed as consisting of one word and two (phrasal) nodes, instead of two 
words and one node, as suggested by the presence of a ditto tag. 
256 As regards (171)b, 
the phrase Bank B is also ditto tagged in ICE GB: two words, one phrasal node. It is this 
disparity  in  the  number  of  (terminal  and  phrasal)  nodes  which  brings  about  the 
disagreement between our weight and complexity variables. There is another peculiarity 
in (171)b. This example originated in written language, and as such, the analysis given 
is understandably derived from the original written text. The NP $100m is analysed as 
one node and one word. Recourse is not even made to ditto tags: the three elements $, 
100, and m all appear as the author wrote them, and no further analysis was given it.
257 
The largest contribution to the model’s residual probability  (121 cases) comes 
from cases where weight and complexity agree, as expected, on their predictions, but 
these  are  not  verified  in  the  dataset,  i.e.  they  are  factually  wrong.  Only  our  GBN 
variable predicts the right outcome.  
Recall that in the operationalisation of GBN discussed in chapter 6 (§6.4), our cut 
off  point  GBNβ  indicated  that  configurations  with  a  negative  constructional  value 
predicted DOC. This is essentially the same as saying that only those configurations 
which consisted of a given element followed by a new one (i.e. GN) predicted DOC, all 
                                                                                                                                               
true positive to the same combination, which would perhaps be more desirable, given that combination 4 
is the only one in our model without a single true positive. 
256 Correcting this error would make (171)a no longer a counterexample to combination 3, but rather a 
true positive for combination 7. 
257 There are hardly any benefits in going against this ICE GB analysis. However, if we did this, the 
complexity of the NP would be increased, and the constructional complexity  would turn negative in 
value. Thus, while in our original analysis the construction was a counterexample to combination 6, it 
would now still a counterexample, but to combination 8 (where all predictions are wrong).  
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other configurations (GG, NN, NG) thus being associated with DAT. The examples in 
(172)  below  exemplify  counterexamples  instantiated  by  the  different  configurations: 
(172)a  illustrates  configuration  NN;  (172)b,  configuration  GG;  and  (172)c, 
configuration NG. 
(172)  a.  The outcome of the constitutional confrontation was influenced by several 
factors which lent [OD/NP support] [A/PP to the unitarist trend] …<ICE GB:W2B 007 
#45:1>  
b.  …  penalise  those  employers  that  don’t  offer  [OD/NP  opportunities]  [A/PP  to 
disabled people] <ICE GB:S1B 057 #7:1:D>  
c.  … whenever safety was at odds with production there was a temptation to 
give [OD/NP precedence] [A/PP to the latter]. <ICE GB:W2C 007 #110:3>  
 
All 47 DAT cases in this section have negative weight and complexity values 
(which would require DOC, by Wβ and Cβ), while being correctly predicted as DAT by 
their GBN value alone (either 0 or positive). 
On the other hand, all 74 DOC cases in this section have a negative GBN value 
(which  means  that  given  noun  phrases  do  truly  precede  new  ones),  but  weight  and 
complexity values associated with DAT (i.e. either 0 or positive). In fact, 57 of the 74 
DOC cases have values of 0 for weight and complexity; and 40 of the 57 consist of one 
word long NPs.
258 The examples in (173) below illustrate DOC cases. 
(173)  a.  I mean if she’d really wanted to leave him she’d have sent [IO/NP you] [OD/NP 
flowers] <ICE GB:S1A 080 #171:1:B> 
b.  … you give [IO/NP the head] [OD/NP support] <ICE GB:S1B 025 #98:1:B> 
 
Example  (173)a  has  0  as  both  weight  and  complexity  values  (thus  predicting 
DAT), and negative GBN value (thus predicting DOC). Recall that our model predicts 
DAT for cases with 0 or positive (constructional) values, and only negative values are 
associated  with  DOCs.  On  the  other  hand,  example  (173)b  has  positive  weight  and 
complexity values (predicting DAT), and a negative GBN value (the head analysed as 
given, and support as new, thus predicting DOC).  
All these counterexamples seem to point towards the need for refining GBNβ. It 
does not seem a coincidence that the more crudely measured variable is the one that 
                                                 
258 Zero values can be considered borderline cases in that a single word would be enough to change the 
prediction. However, as we have seen, our cut off points impose a sharp differentiation and borderline 
effects are thus not contemplated.  
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produces the most counterexamples to the model. An alternative  explanation is that 
information status is a different kind of beast and is indeed best kept separated from 
other, more tameable concepts. 
In the last category of residual probability, all our variables agree on a prediction, 
only it is the wrong one, i.e. it is not supported by the data. There are 63 cases in which 
every single variable offered a wrong prediction, and as such these examples would 
provide a serious challenge to our model. 
(174)  a.  They sent [OD/NP one] [A/PP to my mother] … <ICE GB:S1A 007 #277:1:B> 
b.  But of course now they’re going to send [IO/NP everyone] [OD/NP one] … <ICE 
GB:S1A 007 #272:1:B> 
 
Example (174)a is a typical example of DAT. On its own, it is able to be predicted 
by GBN, weight and complexity. In our model, however, where it is outnumbered by 
DOCs, its negative values for all variables predict DOC. On the other hand, example 
(174)b has 0 values for all variables (predicting DAT). In fact, of the 42 examples in 
this section of (wrongly) predicted DATs (i.e. examples such as (174)b), a full 37 have 
0 values for all three variables, i.e. cases with minimal distinctiveness as regards DOC, 
but nonetheless DAT by our β cut offs.
259 
The greatest challenge to the model thus appears to consist of those cases in which 
there really is no big difference between the prototypical cases of each construction (see 
the examples in (174) above), at least as far as we have described/defined them in this 
study by means of threshold values. When differences exist but cannot be picked up by 
any of the three measures we employed, the model overgeneralises and yields false 
positives. This is nonetheless to be expected, as well as accepted, in view of the fact that 
the true positives far outweigh the false ones. Residual probability can be described as 
the cost the researcher pays for obtaining successful predictions.  
8.5 Experimental Conclusions 
We have been able to identify threshholds for the inductive rules, and established that 
the different factors overlap to a degree but are also semi independent from one another. 
This  semi independence  results  in  their  different  explanatory  powers.  The  factors 
predict different subsets of the data, and putting them together yields a more robust and 
                                                 
259 Furthermore, there are 37 constructions involving 1 word long postverbal NPs, 35 of which involve 
two pronominal noun phrases (see also §7.2.3.3).  
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improved  predictive  score  (though  not  necessarily  in  numerical  terms)  than  would 
otherwise be the case if we considered each variable independently.  
On a methodological note, the experiments conducted appear to have reached the 
limits of what the data will tell. More specifically, talking about percentages of the 
distribution may be understood as going beyond what the significance tests employed 
allow for. A percentage of accuracy within the dataset is not guaranteed to be replicated, 
as it is likely that some variation will creep in, as a result of e.g. slightly different 
distributions, difference in corpus or dataset, etc. 
By  using  scores  in  an  SMV  model,  one  can  predict  whether  an  observation 
belongs to DOC or to DAT. Between 70 80% of the examples are correctly predicted in 
this model as belonging to either of the two constructions. We now have an estimate of 
all explained data, as well as of data which remains unexplained, which is a quite useful 
result from the point of view of a research programme. 
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9  Conclusions 
Not  everything  that  counts  can  be  counted,  and  not  everything  that  can  be 
counted counts. (Sign hanging in Einstein’s office at Princeton) 
This thesis set out to address the following research questions, by employing a corpus 
based methodology: 
(175)  Research Questions 
a.  Do  information  status,  weight,  and  complexity  indeed  affect  the  dative 
alternation? 
b.  What is the relationship between these three factors? 
c.  Can  corpus  data  help  establish  a  model  of  the  interaction  between  these 
factors/variables? 
d.  Can these factors be manipulated into predicting speakers’ choices?  
 
In order to obtain questions and hypotheses to test against corpus data, a critical 
review of the literature on ditransitives was conducted in chapter 2. We saw how a 
diachronic approach is very much the only perspective which offers a uniform view of 
the (development of) two related complementation patterns. The overview continued 
with synchronic approaches, divided in two different schools of thought. Traditional 
approaches were discussed first, particularly Quirk et al. (1985), with their characteristic 
attempt at a “functional description of syntactic relations” (Mukherjee 2005:11), which 
led  these  authors  not  to  insist  on  a  strict  separation  of  syntax  and  semantics.  The 
transformational  paradigm  was  reviewed  next,  from  its  early,  intuitive,  and  sensible 
postulation of a dative shift transformation which captured the similarity between the 
double  object  construction  and  its  prepositional  paraphrase,  to  the  theoretical 
gymnastics  in  an  attempt  to  account  for  two  verbal  complements  by  means  of 
apparently inadequate theoretical tools. Finally, cognitive approaches linking language 
phenomena and cognition were also reviewed in chapter 2.  
In  chapter  3,  I  discussed  which  structures  could  be  called  complements,  and 
briefly  discussed  a  battery  of  syntactic  and  semantic  criteria  for  their  identification. 
Reference  was  also  made  in  this  chapter  to  constituency  tests  employed  in  the 
identification of (the scope of) indirect objects. The dativus ethicus was used as a means 
of exemplifying gradience in the categorisation of complements and adjuncts.  
Once working hypotheses and definitions have been gleaned from the literature, 
the corpus —containing real, performance data— becomes a yardstick against which to  
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measure or test them. Chapter 4 described the organization of the dataset (target cases, 
exclusions,  automation  involved,  etc.),  as  well  as  the  design  of  the  experiments, 
including tests and other statistical notions employed in the quantitative analysis of the 
extracted corpus data. This thesis illustrates a novel methodological approach which 
both  relies  on,  and  simultaneously  reins  in,  automation.
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qualitative analysis of authentic data by means of a parsed corpus makes it possible to 
describe  linguistic  structures  “rapidly  and  exhaustively,  empirically  and  reliably, 
resulting  in  a  testable  and  frequency based  account  of  authentic  language  use” 
(Mukherjee 2005:38). Additionally, the use of authentic (i.e. corpus) data ensures the 
analysis  is  based  on  empirical,  realistic  grounds.  In  this  light,  the  methodology 
employed can be construed as exploratory data analysis. 
In chapter 5, previous approaches to the analysis of the impact of information 
status  on  the  ditransitive  alternation  were  discussed.  Related  concepts  (theme  and 
rheme,  given  and  new,  etc.)  were  evaluated,  in  order  to  clarify  our  standpoint  in  a 
traditionally  murky  field.  This  chapter  also  provided  the  background  for  chapter  6, 
where the Given Before New (GBN) principle was ionvestigated.  
Chapter  6  tested  the  GBN  principle  in  different  ways,  by  employing  different 
coding schemes (textual retrievability, as well as the presence of inferrable elements), 
by considering the information status both of individual elements and of configurations, 
and finally by applying different tests and measures to the corpus results. The GBN 
principle predicts that (a) the first NP would be given, and that (b) the second NP would 
be new in either DOC or DAT. Using strict retrievability confirmed predictions (a) and 
(b) for DOC (88% of NP1 in DOCs were given, and 81% of NP2 in DOCs were new), 
but was not successful in DATs (49% and 46%, respectively). These results partially 
supported  GBN,  but  appeared  to  point  to  the  need  for  refining  our  retrievability 
criterion, in that other factors such as end focus seemed to be obscured by it. Inferrables 
(an intermediate notion between given and new) were called upon in order to reinforce 
predictive accuracy. And that was indeed the case: GBN predictions for DOC were 
again  confirmed  (95%  and  85%  respectively).  As  regards  DAT,  both  predictions 
supported the GBN more strongly, but only one of them was verified (70% and 48% 
respectively). 
                                                 
260 Indeed, the approach discussed in this study was used as an early model for the design of the Next 
Generation Tools project (www.ucl.ac.uk/english usage/projects/next gen/report.htm) carried out at the 
Survey of English Usage. In short, the NGT project developed a software environment for conducting 
experimental  research  employing  (parsed)  corpora.  Certain  research  processes  (e.g.  the  extraction  of 
numeric  variables,  abstract  generalisations),  which  in  this  study  were  carried  out  manually  are 
systematised in NGT with the help of automation.  
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We then explored GBN configurations; i.e. the information status of both noun 
phrases  involved  in  DOC  and  DAT,  from  which  we  derived  rules  offering  valid 
generalizations  about  the  behaviour  of  these  constructions.  Once  again,  strong 
predictions were derivable from looking at the overall (constructional) distribution of 
information status. The significant results in this chapter indicate that all the different 
classificatory methods for information status are valid.  
A different pragmatic factor, namely heaviness, was tested in Chapter  7. This 
factor was discussed in two different guises: weight, measured as number of words, and 
complexity, measured as number of nodes. Accounts of the dative alternation in terms of 
heaviness  were  discussed,  and  a  number  of  hypotheses  were  evaluated  against  the 
dataset. Relative (as opposed to categorical) measures were used for both weight and 
complexity, which means that weight in this study was defined as the  difference in 
number of words between the (postverbal) noun phrases involved in either DOC or 
DAT. The frequency of the (relative) weights of each construction (DOC or DAT) was 
plotted, cut off points posited in order to try and separate the distributions of DOC and 
DAT, and inductive rules were arrived at. The best rule for weight was accurate 77% of 
the  time,  and  was  applicable  to  all  cases  in  our  dataset.  The  same  procedure  was 
followed  in  dealing  with  complexity,  with  similar  results  (77%  accuracy  and  100% 
coverage). This shows why weight and complexity have been difficult to separate (even 
if  lexical  weight  is  marginally  better  as  a  predictor),  but  are  both  very  successful 
predictors of constituent ordering, with over 75% accuracy for the alternations in our 
dataset.  
The  three  pragmatic  variables  discussed  were  brought  together  in  chapter  8. 
Firstly, weight and complexity are different manifestations of the PEW, but had a very 
similar accuracy and coverage in relation to our dataset. When tested, it was found that 
our two variables were correlated, and highly so (rS = 0.95). More specifically, weight 
and complexity were slightly more strongly correlated in DOC (rS = 0.95) than in DAT 
cases  (rS  =  0.92).  In  a  second  stage,  weight  and  GBN  were  also  inspected  for 
correlational behaviour. GBN and weight behaved differently and determined different 
data distributions, which means they are not coextensive and cannot be reduced to a 
single factor.  
Finally, a simple yet powerful method was suggested for joining our variables in 
order  to  derive  predictions  for  the  dataset.  Based  on  the  operationalisation  of  the 
variables, the inductive rules, and the threshold values already discussed, a table was 
constructed  listing  all  the  possible  combinations  according  to  the  predicted  
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constructional outcome (DOC or DAT). This breakdown was useful in that it showed (i) 
whether  or  not  the  different  predictions  could  hold  up,  (ii)  where  the  different 
predictions  differed.  It  was  possible  to  see  how  a  rule  predicted  a  result,  and  how 
accurate that result was in comparison with the actual dataset. By means of a simple 
majority  vote  (SMV)  procedure,  the  resulting  model  has  100%  coverage  and  its 
predictions are successful 78% of the time. Moreover, the variables are joined in their 
predictions, and thus offer a more robust and improved predictive score than would 
otherwise be the case if we considered each variable independently.  
The results in this study have lent support to Collins’ notion of receiver/entity 
differentiation (see §6.3.3), according to which participants in DOC are more highly 
differentiated than participants in DAT. While DATs have a preposition to differentiate 
between receivers and entities, DOCs do not, and thus need an alternative method of 
achieving this differentiation. This is carried out by means of more marked differences 
in the heaviness and information status of their participants. From §6.4.3, we can see 
that the GBN principle is supported by the DOCs in our dataset, 482 out of 587 (82%) 
have a GN configuration. DATs are not so well behaved: most of them (114 out of 267, 
or 43%) do not tend to distinguish informationally between entity and receiver.  
We have also seen (§7.1.3.2) that the PEW is not confirmed for DATs, where both 
participants have approximately the same weight (i.e. 120 out of 267 cases of DAT, or 
45%, have 0 as their constructional weight). On the other hand, the PEW is confirmed 
in  DOCs,  where  indirect  objects  (receivers)  tend  to  be  shorter  than  direct  objects 
(entities),  with  462  cases  (out  of  587,  or  79%)  showing  this  by  their  negative 
constructional weight. This finding is replicated in evaluating complexity (see §7.2.3.1), 
where we find that receivers and entities are more sharply differentiated in DOCs than 
in  DATs.  And  even  when  contrasting  GBN  and  Weight  (see  §8.3.2),  we  can  see 
Collins’ principle supported. In discussing the mean weight of GN configurations (85% 
of which are DOCs in our dataset), we appreciated that it is negative ( 1.67), pointing at 
an actual difference in terms of number of words. Contrast this with the mean weight of 
GG configurations (57% of which are DATs), with a less marked weight difference 
tending towards 0 ( 0.348). Our dataset thus seems to show that (in line with Collins’ 
idea) the higher the differences between the participants in a construction, the more the 
said construction will tend to be DOC.  
At first sight, this study appears only to have confirmed theoretical claims already 
in the literature. Its added value, however, lies in its innovative, principled, simple, and 
yet powerful methodological approach to corpus based research. Among the advantages  
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of the proposed model is its simplicity, which allows the researcher to accommodate 
further  variables  (e.g.  such  as  animacy,  different  NP  types,  speaker  gender,  etc.). 
However, more computational support will be necessary in assessing the multivariable 
interactions. Another benefit of this study is that besides having shown that speakers do 
use (cross linguistically valid) variables such as the GBN Principle and the PEW, it has 
also  illustrated  the  effects  of  manipulating  variables  in  a  dataset.  Additionally,  in 
selecting hypotheses from the literature while allowing the dataset to inductively select 
their own rules, this study  combines a theory down (corpus based) approach with  a 
words up (corpus driven) method. Finally, the illustration of our SMV model with Venn 
diagrams provides a useful tool for the identification of best or prototypical examples of 
each construction, at least as far as they have been described/defined in our dataset by 
our threshold values. 
Researchers conducting quantitative analysis offline from the corpus will always 
run  the  risk  of  losing  from  sight  that  the  dataset  under  analysis  consists  of  actual 
language, and is only expressed as figures. This separation between corpus examples 
and  databases  very  often  results  in  the  overreliance  on  predetermined  quantitative 
stages/tests for the analysis of data. It need not be like this. 
In the methodology proposed in this study, cases in the statistical model were 
constantly inspected against the actual clauses in the corpus, in order to check what the 
results  actually  meant  from  a  linguistic  point  of  view  (particularly  in  the  case  of 
counterexamples).  Returning  to  the  corpus  to  verify  the  accuracy  and  relevance  of 
findings also proved to be advantageous in allowing the researcher freedom to adjust 
and modify their searching/analytical procedures, not in an automated way (as permitted 
by many procedures common in statistical software packages) but rather by applying 
linguistic (as opposed to purely statistical) expertise and reflection to the analysis of the 
dataset.  
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